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 Abstract 
 
 
The social quality approach is proposed as a participatory democratic and 
social justice oriented alternative to the dominance of neo-liberal 
individualism in much contemporary policy, practice and theory (Therborn, 
2001; Walker, 1998, 2005). This thesis develops the social quality concept of 
social empowerment (Herrmann, 2012) in relation to participatory democratic 
theory and practice. In empirically-driven but theory-laden case studies of a 
democratic workplace and a democratic local government initiative the thesis 
asserts the close relationship between social empowerment and democratic 
participation, along with the multi-dimensional nature of empowerment. The 
case studies are situated within the context of different typologies of possible 
democratic societies. They are both underpinned by the democratic dialectic 
(Bernard, 1999), which assesses the values of liberty, equality and solidarity 
as a normative grounding for the research. 
 
The critical realist and social quality theory philosophical foundations of this 
work are set out in Chapter 2. This chapter discusses the critical 
methodological approach that these foundations presuppose and the 
justification for the case study methods. Chapters 3 and 4 critically review 
power and empowerment theories and democratic theories, which develops 
the concepts of social empowerment and participatory democracy. The 
second part of Chapter 4 introduces three ideal typologies of liberal, social 
and participatory democracy that are used to frame the analysis, while 
Chapter 5 develops the democratic dialectic as the normative guide for 
assessing the democratic complexion of the case studies.  
 
The case studies are presented in Chapters 6 and 7, and analysed in Chapter 
8. The findings suggest that social empowerment is present to different 
extents, and in different ways, in the two case studies. This is contingent on 
factors including historical development, the form of power relationships in 
economic, social and political relations in the context of wider liberal 
democratic values in the UK, and the extent to which the democratic dialectic 
values are realised in practice. The conclusion reviews the argument in this 
thesis and suggests implications for policy-makers, practitioners and future 
research.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Democratic Society and 
Social Quality 
 
 
In Britain today there is a generalised distrust in politicians (a projection – 
rightly or wrongly - of instrumental rationality and selfish interests onto 
political actors, Hay, 2007), an increasing disengagement from the political 
process (a decline in voter turnout and a prevalence of an anti-political 
culture, Stoker, 2006; Flinders, 2013), and disassociation between the 
everyday lives of ordinary people and the bubble of corporate politics in 
Westminster (Blond, 2010; Glasman, 2010). Recent scandals in major political 
and economic institutions such as the 2008 financial crisis (which has provided 
the impetus for a political retrenchment of the welfare state in Britain, with a 
disastrous impact on the poorest and less well off, Corbett & Walker, 2013), 
the public anger at the MPs’ expenses scandal, and the betrayal of public 
trust by major news organisations have increased the sense that British 
democracy is increasingly a discredited system of political organisation. 
Moreover, the UK is increasingly coming to be dominated by political and 
economic elites to the extent that we are now said to reside in a ‘post-
democracy’, where the capacities of ordinary people to have an influence 
over the political process (and by extension their everyday lives) is severely 
constrained (Crouch, 2004). 
 
As a remedy to these problems there has been a growing interest in increasing 
citizen participation, engagement or involvement in a wide range of 
democratic processes, including new democratic innovations (Smith, 2005, 
2009; Stoker, 2006; Zittel & Fuchs, 2007; John et al., 2011; Geisel & Newton, 
2012). More radically, drawing on New Left participatory democratic theory 
(Pateman, 1970; Macpherson, 1977; Mansbridge, 1980; Barber, 1984; Gould, 
1988), some proffer fundamental changes in the structure of social 
institutions in favour of a more participatory society that is less liberal 
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democratic and less capitalistic in its composition (Fung & Wright, 2003; 
Wright, 2010). Associated with this are arguments for a transformation in the 
nature of contemporary citizenship, from a consumerist orientation in the 
context of neo-liberal capitalism, towards a more participatory conception of 
citizenship by learning the values and skills of democratic citizenship through 
the process of democratic participation itself (Pateman, 1970, 2012; 
Pinnington & Schugurensky, 2010). 
 
This thesis engages with normative and empirical arguments for democratic 
innovations, citizen involvement, and participatory democracy as remedies to 
the current malaise of British democracy. The thesis focuses on power 
relations and democracy, assessing especially the concept of social 
empowerment (Herrmann, 2012) in participatory democratic settings, drawing 
on empirical case studies of a democratically owned and controlled worker 
co-operative (workplace democracy) and a local government participatory 
budgeting process (local community democracy). This necessitates an 
exploration of theories of power and empowerment, theories of democracy, 
and typologies of democracy in practice. Further, the thesis draws on a 
normative theoretical foundation for empirical research by adopting a critical 
social science approach (Sayer, 1992, 2009, 2011). It describes and critiques 
the values of liberty, equality and solidarity that make up the democratic 
dialectic (Bernard, 1999) as a means to assess social empowerment in 
participatory democratic settings.  
 
This introductory chapter firstly discusses contemporary problems with 
democratic politics and expands these concerns to a consideration of the 
social quality of democratic society. Secondly, a set of research questions 
which frame the theoretical and empirical analysis are highlighted. Thirdly, 
the contributions that this research makes to social scientific knowledge are 
discussed, and fourthly, a brief overview of the argument of this thesis 
describes the content of the chapters that follow. 
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Political Disenchantment, Neo-liberalism and Social Quality 
 
Dalton (2004, p.1) argues that contemporary democracies face a challenge 
posed not by an external competitor, but ‘from democracy’s own citizens, 
who have grown distrustful of politicians, sceptical about democratic 
institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic process functions’. 
This is a problem for both mature and new democracies as Stoker (2006, 
pp.35-44) describes a rise in ‘political disenchantment’ in the USA, Canada, 
Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and also in the newer 
democracies of central and eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, East Asia 
and India.  
 
Citizens appear to be disillusioned by democracy in practice, but not 
necessarily in principle, and there has been a marked increase in distrust in 
politicians since the late 1960s (Stoker, 2006). This is manifested in a lack of 
trust in government information with 59 per cent of the UK population 
believing that official figures are used ‘dishonestly’ by the government in 
2005 (Stoker, 2006, p.34). For Hay (2007), such political disenchantment is 
due to two interconnected factors: neo-liberalism and globalisation processes. 
Neo-liberalism can be defined as ‘a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’ 
(Harvey, 2005, p.2). Crouch (2004) argues that in terms of citizens’ rights 
neo-liberal ideology and policy has contributed to an over emphasis on 
negative rights such as guaranteeing private property and the protection of 
the ‘individual’ against others, especially the state.  
 
Neglected positive citizenship rights on the other hand, relate to abilities to 
participate in political society. This has negative consequences for democratic 
politics: 
 
[n]eo-liberalism, informed by public choice theoretical assumptions 
suggests the value of a highly delimited political sphere which does not 
encroach upon the essentially private realms of economic and social 
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exchange, encouraging a profoundly suspicious, sceptical and anti-
political culture (Hay, 2007, p.5). 
 
Moreover, the associated processes of globalisation, including the increasingly 
unfettered nature of capital downplay the capacity of democratic politics 
within nation-states to produce collective outcomes and consequently 
increase the power of multinational corporations over the national political 
process. Although, as Hay (2007, p.151) points out, the extent to which 
national policy-making is constrained by globalising processes is overplayed: 
‘if policy-makers believe that their autonomy is greatly diminished and that, 
in an era of globalisation, their policy choices must be driven by the perceived 
imperatives of competitiveness, they will deny themselves the political 
autonomy they might otherwise enjoy’. British democracy is skewed towards 
the interests of business, increasing especially since the 1970s, and has 
provided ‘flexibility’ in the form of low corporate taxes, low labour standards, 
weakened collective bargaining rights, and poor quality public services 
(Crouch, 2004, p.36). This means that neo-liberalism and globalisation 
processes combine to provide the conditions for ‘democratic decline’ in the 
form of a ‘major imbalance now developing between the role of corporate 
interests and those of virtually all other groups’ (Crouch, 2004, p.104). Hay 
(2007, p.5) sees neo-liberalism and globalisation together as conspiring ‘to 
discredit the ‘political’ in contemporary societies’. 
 
Crouch (2004, 2011; also Duménil & Lévy, 2004, 2005) suggests that this trend 
is part of a renewal of elite politics that has weakened democracy to the 
extent that we have moved into an era of ‘post-democracy’. Such a transition 
has particular salience for parties of the left whose electoral base has become 
marginalised in the era of corporate politics. For example, the development 
of New Labour policies in the 1990s that sought to accommodate the minority 
interests of economic elites through continuing the privatisation of public 
services reflected a ‘shift from a party suited to democratic politics to one 
prepared for post-democracy’ (Crouch, 2004, p.64). This ultimately means 
that the relationship between citizens, the government and the private 
supplier of public services such as transport, utilities, services in schools and 
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in the NHS grants great power to business interests (with the support of the 
state) but not to the public: 
 
[t]he citizen has a link, through the democratic electoral and political 
system, to government (national or local). Government has a link, 
through the law of contract, with the privatised supplier. But the 
citizen has no link, neither of market nor of citizenship, to the 
supplier, and, following privatisation, can no longer raise questions of 
service delivery with government, because it has contracted such 
delivery away. As a result the public service has become a post-
democratic one: henceforth the government is responsible to the 
demos only for broad policy, not for detailed implementation (Crouch, 
2004, pp.101-102). 
 
The solution to this crisis in representative democracy proffered by Flinders 
(2013, p.176, original emphasis) and many others is to provide more 
opportunities for citizen engagement in ‘a deepening of democratic politics, 
as opposed to an individualised form of market-based life politics’. That said, 
there is much disagreement on the extent of participation desirable or 
feasible (Chapter 4). For Crouch (2004) this could be through direct public 
funding of parties and citizens’ assemblies in local and regional government, 
empowered with the decision-making capabilities to influence and positively 
change their everyday lives. This indicates that the distinction between 
representative democracy and moves towards a more participatory democracy 
is an important issue in contemporary democratic societies, and is a central 
concern of this thesis. 
 
Democratic Values 
 
The discussion so far has considered major problems for contemporary 
democratic societies in the form of disenchantment with the ‘political’ and 
the sense of powerlessness for people that is compounded by the eroding of 
democracy, the growth of professionalised political elites and increase in 
power of economic elites, and the dominance of neo-liberal economic 
ideology and practice as a political project. Deepening democratic 
participation in the polity is seen as a possible corrective to this. But these 
problems also have broader and significantly negative consequences for the 
notion of the ‘social’ in democratic societies (Walker, 2005; Corbett & 
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Walker, 2013). This can be explored through the scale of social and economic 
(and therefore, political) inequalities which since the late 1970s have posed 
an increasing threat to democracy itself (Lindblom, 1977, 1982).  
 
In the UK, Dorling (2011) estimates that the percentage of wealth (excluding 
pension rights and main residence housing equity) owned by the top 1% of the 
population has increased from 21 per cent in 1976 to 53 per cent in 2008. 
Over the same time period, the top half (excluding the top 5%) have seen a 
decrease of their share of wealth in the UK from 54 per cent to 31 per cent, 
with the bottom 50 per cent of the population having 8 per cent of national 
wealth in 1976 and 6 per cent in 2008. As equality is a fundamental value of 
democracy (Anderson, 1999; Bernard, 1999), this extent of social and 
economic inequality is highly problematic. Following Tawney (1952), Walker 
and Walker (2011, p.276) argue for the value of equality: for social justice in 
a democracy there should be an ‘equalisation of life chances… [t]his does not 
imply perfect equality… but a clear distinction between individual or personal 
differences between people in terms, for example, of intelligence and 
identity, and social differences derived from the structure and organisation of 
society’. While the former provide for the richness and diversity of human 
life, the latter act only to restrict the life chances of some and enhance those 
of others on the basis of social, economic and consequently, political 
inequalities. 
 
This suggests that attention to the design of democratic institutions, the role 
of normative values such as equality in this, and the consequences that these 
at the structural level have on the everyday quality of life of citizens is 
paramount. Further democratic values are freedom and solidarity, which 
along with equality exist in a dialectical relationship because they can be in 
conflict in democratic societies (for example, equality is characterised by 
liberals such as Berlin (2002) as restricting freedom), but for full democracy 
these values must be optimised in a ‘positive equilibrium’, rather than the 
maximisation of one or two over the others (Phillips, 2006, p.161; Bernard, 
1999). Under the influence of neo-liberalism, for example, negative liberty is 
maximised, which reduces equality and ‘provokes a dislocation of the most 
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basic social consensus’ (Bernard, 1999, p.10). However, the three democratic 
dialectic values are each subject to contrasting interpretations and require 
sustained exploration to assess democracy in this thesis. 
 
Social Quality and Social Empowerment 
 
This thesis assesses participatory democracy in this context from the 
perspective of social quality, which aims to provide a holistic consideration of 
the ‘social’ as the basis for policy-making, rather than the narrow economic 
concerns which tend to dominate current politics (Beck et al., 1998, 2001; van 
der Maesen & Walker, 2012). Indeed, Walker (1998, p.109) asserts that in the 
western European context, the aim of the social quality project is to ‘create a 
social policy that has its own independent rationale and legitimacy so as to 
counterbalance the dominance of economic and monetary policy within the 
EU’. Social quality refers to ‘the extent to which citizens are able to 
participate in social relationships under conditions which enhance their well-
being, capacities and potential’ (Beck et al., 2012, p.68). This has relevance 
for democratic politics as it focuses on participation in the systems of 
governance of everyday lives in order to improve quality of life. This concern 
with participation can be broadly interpreted to refer to the social, political 
and economic spheres of people’s lives (democratic society, over the narrow 
democratic polity), hence the concern with workplace democracy and local 
community democracy in the empirical case studies.  
 
The ‘social’ is theorised as emerging from constitutively interdependent social 
relations between processes of self-realisation and the participation of 
individuals in forming collective identities (Beck et al., 2012; Chapter 2). This 
focuses on the agency, character and conduct of individuals but also the 
social structural conditions in which people interact. Such a view of the 
‘social’ adopts a relational and contingent understanding of human societies 
and rejects utilitarian, methodological individualist or structural determinist 
approaches. The theory of social quality also conceptualises four factors 
relating to the conditions of social quality: socio-economic security, social 
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cohesion, social inclusion and social empowerment (van der Maesen & Walker, 
2012) 
 
Social empowerment is central to analysis of participatory democracy from a 
social quality perspective as it refers to ‘the degree to which the personal 
capabilities and the ability of people to act are enhanced by social relations’ 
(Herrmann, 2012, p.202). This concept focuses attention on both the social 
structural and historical conditions of human interaction and self-
development, along with the personal capabilities and abilities to act. In this 
way, social empowerment relates to Mills’ (1970) concern with the 
intersection of history and biography as the locus for the sociological 
imagination. For the study of participatory democracy, this necessitates 
attention to the design and structure of democratic institutions and the 
human relationships and actions that take place within them and suggests a 
critical realist understanding of structure and agency (discussed in Chapter 2).  
 
Therefore, this thesis adopts a critical social science approach that is 
theoretically grounded, but empirically-driven (Sayer, 2011). The study’s first 
aim is to examine theories of democracy and the normative values that 
underpin different conceptions (or ideal typologies) of democratic society: 
liberal, social and participatory. The second aim is to theoretically develop 
the democratic dialectic to assess the conditions of social empowerment in 
participatory democratic settings. This is then applied to two empirical case 
studies. This study is interdisciplinary. It draws on a theoretical perspective 
developed within social policy and concepts drawn from political theory in 
order to conduct a political sociological study of participatory democracy. 
 
Research Questions 
 
The following three research questions are addressed in this thesis: 
 
 How can the democratic dialectic values of liberty, equality and 
solidarity be optimised in a ‘positive equilibrium’ most appropriate for 
democratic society? 
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This question is primarily considered in developing the normative guide in 
Chapter 5 that underpins the empirical case studies.  
 
 What kind of democratic society is the optimisation of the democratic 
dialectic most suited to? 
 
This question is addressed in Chapters 4 and 5 which considers liberal, social 
and participatory democracy. Chapter 4 introduces the three as ideal 
typologies and Chapter 5 relates these to the democratic dialectic values. 
 
 To what extent, and in what ways, do participatory democratic 
settings display evidence of social empowerment? 
 
As indicated by this introductory discussion, this is the central research 
question that guides this thesis and the theoretical groundwork for answering 
this question is conducted in Chapter 3 (on theories of power and 
empowerment) and in Chapter 4 (on theories of representative and 
participatory democracy, and democratic typologies). The empirical evidence 
for this question is presented in Chapter 6 (on workplace democracy) and 
Chapter 7 (on participatory budgeting), and analysed in Chapter 8. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in several ways. Firstly, the social quality 
theory and research framework has undergone considerable theoretical 
development since it was introduced in 1997 by the Amsterdam Declaration 
on the Social Quality of Europe (Walker, 1998). An extensive range of 
indicators have been developed by the European Foundation on Social Quality 
(van der Maesen & Walker, 2005; van der Maesen, 2009). These have often 
been applied in quantitative-based research (Monnickendam & Berman, 2008; 
Abbott et al., 2011; Abbott & Wallace, 2012a, 2012b). Therefore this research 
contributes to the development of the social quality project by 
operationalising an aspect of social quality theory – social empowerment – in 
qualitative research. Further, it develops social quality beyond the discipline 
of social policy, as this research adopts a political sociological approach to the 
study of democracy. 
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Secondly, the democratic dialectic has had some theoretical and empirical 
development from Bernard’s (1999) original model. It has been applied to an 
empirical study of welfare regimes (Saint-Arnaud & Bernard, 2003), and it has 
been critiqued and theoretically developed by Phillips (2006; 2007). This 
thesis further critically develops the theoretical components of the 
democratic dialectic by investigating the contested nature of the concepts of 
liberty, equality and solidarity and linking them to different typologies of 
democratic society drawn from Esping-Andersen’s (1990; 1999) typologies of 
welfare regimes. Further, the model is used for empirical qualitative 
research, where previous work has been theoretical development and 
quantitative analysis. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis engages with political science and political theory 
literature on democracy and associated values in order to provide a broader 
political sociological analysis of the social quality of participatory democracy. 
It contributes research on empirical cases of democratic innovations in 
economic and civil-society/local government contexts. This research is 
focused empirically on micro to meso levels, with theoretical attention to the 
macro implications. It contributes to theoretical and empirical knowledge 
about the possibilities for participatory democracy in contemporary society in 
existing debates about democratic innovations (Smith, 2005, 2009; Geisel & 
Newton, 2012) and the real utopias project on ‘empowered participatory 
governance’ (Fung & Wright, 2003; Fung, 2004; Wright, 2010). Moreover, 
following Pearce (2010a, p.323) this thesis adopts a necessarily critical 
approach because the theory and practice of participatory democracy is 
 
desirable but problematic; it is not a utopian vision; nor is it a worthy 
but anachronistic legacy of Ancient Greece; nor a short-lived moment 
of ‘people power’. Participatory democracy has begun to be studied 
seriously, because we have a growing number of experiments to learn 
from, as well as a growing body of new theoretical debate. 
 
Fourthly, the two case studies are an application of the social quality 
perspective and the model of the democratic dialectic to these empirical 
settings for the first time. The democratic workplace studied is relatively 
unique amongst co-operatives and the participatory budgeting process is 
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amongst the most extensive and longest running in the UK at present. This 
exploratory research is also an application of concepts derived from social 
quality to these cases for the first time. This is especially pertinent for the 
empirical exploration of the settings and social empowerment. The research 
findings (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) suggest multiple dimensions of social 
empowerment in different social settings that can be used to further refine 
the theoretical components of social quality and develop the concept of social 
empowerment.  
 
Thesis Plan 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the philosophical foundations, methodology and methods 
used in this thesis. It begins with a description of the practical process of 
carrying out the two empirical case studies, including exploring potential case 
studies, gaining access, the fieldwork experiences, and writing up. Following 
this the ontological and epistemological foundations of the thesis are 
explicated by a discussion of social quality theory and critical realist 
approaches to research (critical social science). Next, a critical methodology 
is developed from the philosophical foundations which requires reflexivity in 
empirical research. The methods used are then explained, which includes a 
justification for the choice of the case study method and a description of the 
‘five stages of critical reflexivity’, drawn from critical ethnography 
(Carspecken, 1996). Next, the methods of direct observation and in-depth 
semi-structured interviews are described, along with the file folders method 
for thematic analysis of the data. Lastly in this chapter, some possible 
criticisms of the methodology and methods used are considered, along with 
ethical issues encountered in the fieldwork. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 develop the concept of social empowerment, typologies of 
liberal, social and participatory democracy, and the normative guide 
(democratic dialectic) that underpins the empirical research. The strong focus 
on the theoretical aspect of this research is necessary as it adopts a theory-
laden but empirically-driven approach to the case studies (Chapter 2). 
Chapter 3 critically reviews power theories. It begins by drawing on the 
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Hobbesian roots of modern theories of power, which provides the 
philosophical origins of the elite power and ‘faces of power’ debates that took 
place during the twentieth century. The second part of this chapter switches 
attention from perceived weaknesses in these approaches, including scientific 
naivety, methodological individualism and implicit political conservatism, to 
new theories of power. This focuses especially on the communicative and 
realist theories of power developed since the 1970s. New critical theories 
draw on structural and agential understandings of power which highlight the 
social relational aspect of the concept. This provides the context for 
explicating the social quality concept of social empowerment that underpins 
the empirical research. 
 
Chapter 4 briefly discusses the historical development of democracy from 
Ancient Greece to modern capitalist democracies. The distinction between 
representation and participation is central to the tensions in the historical 
development of modern democratic societies. This is followed by a critical 
analysis of representative and participatory theories of democracy. This 
section distinguishes between direct and deliberative conceptions of 
democracy and a range of participatory innovations. It suggests that, rather 
than viewing these as rival concepts, they can be subsumed under the 
participatory theory of democracy which suggests the need to expand 
democratic participation from the political sphere to the social and economic 
spheres. Moreover, dichotomous conceptions of representative democracy and 
participatory democracy (Blaug, 2002) are rejected in favour of a continuum 
between more representative and more participatory democratic processes.  
 
Continuing with the notion of a continuum, the next section applies this 
theoretical discussion to typologies of democratic society, drawn from Esping-
Andersen’s (1990, 1999) influential typologies of welfare regimes and 
discussion of citizenship. Key distinctions between liberal democracy and 
social democracy as actually existing democratic ideal types are made which 
include the nature of citizenship rights, the role of the state, and the 
relationship between state, market and civil society. These ideal types do not 
correspond exactly to existing societies but allow for ‘greater analytical 
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parsimony’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.73). The two typologies are conceived 
as opposite ends of a continuum that are not opposed, but are two competing 
means to interpret democracy and reconcile it with capitalism. Participatory 
democracy is proposed as a possible alternative, focusing on institutional 
innovations that may deepen democratic participation. This section ends with 
the contention that in assessing institutional innovations it is necessary to 
draw on underpinning democratic values and their competing interpretations. 
 
This issue is taken up in Chapter 5 on the democratic dialectic. The model is 
firstly critically developed, which suggests a plurality of conceptions of 
liberty, equality and solidarity which fit with different democratic typologies. 
The chapter discusses each of the three values in turn, settling on the 
concepts of freedom as self-development, relational egalitarianism and social 
and system integration as appropriate for the optimisation of the democratic 
dialectic values. These also suggest a more participatory conception of 
democracy, enhancing the normative value of a possible participatory 
democratic typology.  
 
The importance of this is not just as a normative guide to the empirical 
research of participatory democratic settings that follows, but also in relation 
more broadly to democratic societies. This is explored in the final section of 
this chapter which returns to the discussion of neo-liberalism introduced 
above. The final section highlights how neo-liberalism is corrosive of 
democracy and severely constrains the optimisation of the democratic 
dialectic in contemporary societies. Attention is drawn to the current context 
of a hegemonic neo-liberal ideology and policy, which in Britain poses an 
existential threat to its democracy, and tentatively suggests that social 
quality could form a counter-hegemonic perspective which could reassert 
democratic values. However, the central aim of this chapter is to elucidate 
the democratic dialectic as the normative guide for the assessment of 
participatory democracy in an economic context and local community 
context. 
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This is taken up in Chapter 6 which describes a case study of workplace 
democracy in a wholefood wholesale co-operative called Suma in West 
Yorkshire. The chapter begins by discussing the history of the worker co-
operative movement. It then discusses the history of Suma, drawing on 
existing research on the co-operative which elucidates the historical 
development of the organisational structure. Next Suma’s participatory 
democracy is discussed including the principles that underpin it and some 
criticisms. Social empowerment in Suma is conceptualised as a range of 
dimensions from the solidaristic bases of empowerment to passive 
empowerment and active empowerment. This highlights a strong notion of 
social empowerment in the organisation linked to its egalitarian and 
democratic culture. 
 
Chapter 7 looks at a participatory budgeting (PB) process called You Choose in 
Tameside, Greater Manchester, which is run by the local council. The chapter 
begins by tracing the historical development of PB from its radical origins in 
Porto Alegre, Brazil, to its adoption and adaptation by the World Bank, and its 
implementation in the UK as part of a technical fix to the problems of 
democratic representation described above. Given this history, the structure 
of You Choose is explained with reference to the local context of Tameside 
and the disillusioned political culture in Britain. Despite this there are some 
positive aspects of participatory democracy in You Choose and incipient 
dimensions are identified that have potential for fuller social empowerment. 
 
Chapter 8 brings the discussion together by analysing the findings of the case 
studies firstly in relation to the democratic dialectic and then with regards to 
social empowerment. Issues relating to the development of participatory 
democracy encountered in Chapter 4 are also discussed here. Next, some 
tentative comparisons are made of the similarities and differences between 
the two cases and the findings are related to the social quality theory that 
underpins this research. Chapter 9 then concludes by summarising how the 
research questions have been answered, the main contributions of this 
research, policy implications of the findings, and possible directions for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2 
Critical Realism and Social Quality: 
Philosophical Foundations, Methodology 
and Methods 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the methodology adopted for the theoretical 
exploration of the concepts of power, empowerment and democracy 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and the two empirical case studies (Chapters 6 and 7). It 
also describes the methods employed in the fieldwork. The methodological 
position used is critical reflexivity which requires an explication of the social 
quality and critical realist ontological and epistemological foundations of this 
research. The methods employed are qualitative case studies which use direct 
observations and in-depth interview techniques.  
 
The chapter firstly provides a chronological re-telling of the process of 
conducting the empirical work. This section introduces some issues for the 
methods, methodology, and ethics, which are elaborated on in the discussion 
that follows. Secondly, the methodological approach is set out with reference 
to social quality and critical realism and their ontological and epistemological 
foundations. Thirdly, the case study methods employed are critically 
examined. Fourthly, ethical issues are discussed. 
 
The Fieldwork 
 
The initial project proposal identified four potential case studies from 
Internet searches. These were a homecare social enterprise in Northern 
England, a harvesting co-operative in Sheffield, participatory budgeting pilots 
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conducted by local governments across the UK, and a community-owned post 
office in Sheffield. 
 
In 2010 and 2011, literature reviews of the concepts of power, empowerment, 
and democracy were written. The potential case studies were critically 
considered and initial inquiries were made. It was decided that the empirical 
component of the thesis should assess two examples of participatory 
democracy, ideally one in the economic sphere and one pertaining to civil 
society, outside of the formal political sphere. This is because early work on 
the thesis developed the notion of participation as requiring the expansion of 
democracy in social and economic life, as advocated by Pateman (1970), 
Macpherson (1977) and Gould (1988) (Chapter 4). Two cases also allowed 
some comparison of similarities and differences between the democratic 
settings (Chapter 8). 
 
Two cases were selected: a democratic workplace and a participatory 
budgeting initiative. This was because of the radical potential of economic 
democracy in view of the anti-democratic nature of neo-liberal capitalism 
(Chapter 6) and the social justice aspirations of the original participatory 
budgets in Brazil (Chapter 7). This suggested that these case studies would be 
fertile for critical sociological inquiry and would concern the themes of 
participatory democracy and social empowerment. The parameter for the two 
cases was the UK, as the discussion of democracy in Chapters 4 and 5 
indicates that the UK combines elements of both liberal democracy and social 
democracy, which is a contrasting macro context in which to situate the case 
studies. 
 
Workplace Democracy Case Study 
 
Internet searches highlighted many co-operatives in the Sheffield area and a 
practitioner’s insight was gained from a meeting with an organisation that 
supports the development of UK co-operatives in April 2011. This revealed 
that some co-ops are less democratic than others with different organisational 
structures, all of which require different worker mind-sets to capitalist 
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businesses. Many UK co-ops were described as small businesses with only a 
handful of members, but one, a vegan, organic and wholefoods wholesaler 
called Suma had around 130 members and had been running since the 1970s. 
Further discussions with members of Sheffield-based food co-ops revealed 
that Suma was viewed as the leading co-op in the region. 
 
Further online research revealed that the size and longevity of Suma, and its 
claim to have a democratic system of management and an equal wage policy 
would make it a relevant and practical case study. Initial telephone contact 
was made in June 2011, and after meeting a member of Suma in July, a brief 
proposal was submitted explaining the nature of the research and what the 
case study would entail. Confirmation of access required patience. Distinct 
from hierarchical businesses with formal command structures, democratic 
approval from Suma members was needed before the researcher was allowed 
to conduct the case study. With this approval came the condition that access 
to the organisation for interviews and observations would need to minimise 
disruption. 
 
In view of this, and especially that Suma is a private-setting, it was agreed 
that the gatekeeper would recruit interested members of the co-op via 
internal email, using a research brief prepared by the researcher, for 
interviews proposed to begin in January 2012. Although this had the potential 
for the gatekeeper to manage the selection of interview participants (Lofland 
et al., 2006), given the private setting of the co-op it was conceded that this 
was the best way to ensure access. The sixteen participants chosen had a 
range of experiences and backgrounds, and once the fieldwork was underway 
it was possible to recruit a further five from informal discussions with Suma 
workers and an interviewee recruitment poster. 
 
The fieldwork took place during January and February 2012, in which time the 
researcher observed six different meetings. All six involved a variety of Suma 
members, and generated contextual and reflective field notes which 
enhanced the researcher’s understanding of how Suma operates and its 
culture. Added to this contextual data were some internal documents and 
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Suma member statistics which were acquired during the fieldwork. Twenty-
one in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with Suma workers, 
fourteen of which were men and seven women, twenty were members of the 
co-op and one was a contracted worker (non-member). The interviews were 
audio recorded and transcribed in full, and transcripts were shared with the 
participants to confirm accuracy (Fielding & Thomas, 2008). 
 
The case study was bounded by the premises of Suma. The relative ease of 
access to research participants once onsite and the time spent on the 
premises waiting to meet interviewees allowed the researcher to become 
immersed in the day-to-day workings of the organisation. This provided a 
stimulating atmosphere in which to begin analysis and develop understanding 
of the organisation while in the field. By the time that the fieldwork was 
complete, a great deal of data analysis had already taken place and the 
outline of the case study had been constructed. 
 
Upon completion of the interviews in late February 2012, a small discussion 
group with two interview participants was held to discuss the initial findings 
and clarify some facts about the co-op’s operational structure and working 
practices. A short summary of the research findings was provided to Suma. 
The research data, fieldwork notes, and existing analysis were then used to 
complete the case study from March 2012 until late May 2012 using the file 
folders method (Merriam, 1988). The methods used to collect and analyse the 
data are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Participatory Budgeting Case Study 
 
In mid-2011 Internet searches produced a list of recent UK participatory 
budgeting (PB) trials, especially using Government reports (DCLG, 2010) and 
the PB Unit website, an NGO that encourages the implementation of PB in the 
UK. This revealed that variety of forms of PB had been used, some of which 
had more citizen participation than others. They have been used by local 
councils, parish councils, housing associations, and local police forces. For 
example, an evaluation document of a notably extensive pilot by Tower 
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Hamlets Council (2009) revealed that deliberative methods of decision-making 
were used and the process involved citizens in core-budgets, which are some 
aspects of the original Porto Alegre model (Baiocchi, 2005). Local councils 
involved in PB pilots were contacted via email and phone, including 
Newcastle, Salford, Scarborough, Sheffield, and Tower Hamlets. It was 
immediately apparent that no confirmation could be given about future PBs 
until around April 2012 when local budgets were renewed.  
 
In October 2011, the researcher visited a PB event for funding local 
community groups run by Sheffield City Council, which turned out to be a 
purely networking event as not enough groups had applied. Coupled with the 
uncertainty over future budgets and some councils (including Sheffield) 
changing their political administration in May 2011, the prospects for a viable 
case study were unclear. Over winter 2011/2012 email contacts were 
maintained while the focus of the research shifted to the fieldwork for the 
workplace democracy case study. The scope was expanded and initial 
inquiries were made into some housing associations in Sheffield and Salford 
that had used PB in the past, which revealed that they would no longer be 
running them. In the Sheffield case, this was because the outcomes were not 
to the liking of the housing association or its customers.  
 
The researcher also met with other academic researchers interested in PB, 
council officers from Sheffield City Council, and liaised with a member of the 
PB Unit, to gain a fuller picture of the state of PB in the UK and to highlight 
possible case studies. From this, it was decided that Newcastle, Scarborough, 
and Tameside Councils may run PB in 2012. In April 2012 Sheffield confirmed 
that they would be running one small PB process for young adults, Newcastle 
had no further plans, a parish council in Scarborough had confirmed that they 
were to run an event and were open to a case study, while Tameside had not 
only decided to run PB, but had produced a programme of nine events for 
funding local voluntary and community group projects to run throughout 2012.   
 
Tameside was chosen for the case study due to the clear commitment to PB, a 
voting process that engaged citizens reflectively, and also because it involved 
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a number of PB events across the borough which allowed for multiple 
observations, and opportunities to recruit interview participants from a wider 
cohort than at a single event. The innovative method of funding the process, 
through money saved by household recycling, and openness of the council 
officers to the possibility of a case study were additional factors. 
 
Following telephone contact with a council officer in charge of the PB process 
in April 2012 and a meeting in mid-May 2012 at Tameside Council offices, it 
was agreed that the researcher could attend the PB events to observe, but 
had to recruit interviewees outside of the formal voting process in order to 
minimise disruption. Councillors would be informed about the research but 
would only participate in interviews if they were personally interested, and 
the assessment panel that runs prior to each PB event would not be open to 
the researcher to observe due to the sensitive nature of the discussions 
(relating to legality of the applications). A research brief was submitted via 
email, and the researcher agreed to write a summary for the Council on the 
practical findings. It was also agreed that the gatekeeper would arrange 
interviews with three senior council officers involved with the running of the 
process (held in July 2012). 
 
While this agreement came too late to observe the first PB event, the 
following eight were all open to the researcher. Enough data was collected, 
and interviewees recruited, from four PB events held between mid-June and 
mid-September 2012 (Chapter 7). This enabled the researcher to gain an 
understanding of how the events work and the democratic relations involved. 
Twenty-three interviewees were recruited, including the three council 
officers selected by the gatekeeper, a further council officer, three 
Councillors, and sixteen citizens (each citizen attended one of the events, and 
only one of the sixteen had no association with any of the groups involved in 
the process).  Of these twelve were female and eleven were male. In-depth 
semi-structured interviews took place in the weeks following each event 
either at the interviewee’s home, the Council offices or at public places in 
the borough. 
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In contrast to the Suma case study, the less clear boundaries of the case (Yin, 
2009), the time gap between PB events and between interviews held at 
disparate locations in Tameside meant that the process of conducting the 
second case study was intermittent between mid-June and late-September 
2012. This created difficulties in building momentum for analysing and making 
sense of the data, with gaps of days and weeks between interviews and 
observations. The stop-start nature of the fieldwork meant that it wasn’t until 
the interviews were almost complete in September that the researcher was 
able to conduct a sustained analysis of the data. 
 
The case study was written up by the end of November 2012, during which 
time further contact was made with Tameside Council to procure contextual 
data to enhance the case study findings. Again, the process of file folders 
(Merriam, 1988) for developing, categorising, and linking themes was used to 
organise the data from interview transcripts, observation field notes and 
council documents. In mid-November a summary report was produced for 
Tameside Council. By late November, the empirical component of the thesis 
had been completed, with reworked theoretical chapters and further analysis 
(Chapter 8) completed in the following months. The methodology and 
methods used in the fieldwork are explained in detail in the following 
discussion. 
 
Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology 
 
This thesis is theoretically grounded in the social quality perspective (Beck et 
al., 1998; 2001; van der Maesen & Walker, 2012) and critical realism (Bhaskar, 
1978; 1979; 1989). Social quality pertains to the extent of participation by 
people in social relations that enhance their ‘well-being, capacities, and 
potential’ (Beck et al., 2012, p.68). For social quality a theory of the ‘social’ 
is required (Herrmann et al., 2012). This draws on the transformative model 
of action (Bhaskar, 1979, 1989), and distinguishes social quality from various 
other social scientific perspectives such as utilitarianism, voluntarism, 
dialectical materialism, and structural functionalism (Herrmann et al., 2012). 
It also helps the social quality perspective to avoid the neglect of theory and 
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overly individualistic accounts in other quality of life perspectives (Phillips, 
2006; Wallace & Abbott, 2007). Social quality operationalises the ontological 
and epistemological roots of critical realism as a theory of the social. This 
philosophical groundwork forms the meta-theoretical basis for the critical 
methodology and methods used in this study. 
 
Social quality theory is based on six assumptions which require explanation to 
foreground the ontological and epistemological position adopted here. This 
section addresses the six assumptions, followed by the ontological and 
epistemological positions that underpin this research, and the critical 
methodology that is justified by these philosophical foundations. 
 
Six Assumptions of Social Quality Theory 
 
The first assumption underpinning social quality theory is that humans are 
social beings in which ‘individuality is an expression of the social nature of 
people’ (Beck et al., 2012, p.45). The centrality of this Aristotlean principle 
allows social quality to develop a theory distinct from, on the one hand, the 
Benthamite roots of utilitarian philosophy, and also voluntarism, both of 
which place excessive emphasis on the individual over society, and on the 
other hand, dialectical materialism in much of the Marxist tradition, and 
Durkheimian structural functionalism, both of which focus on structure to the 
detriment of human agency (Herrmann et al., 2012).  
 
Individuals are not in contradistinction to society, as atomised economic 
agents, nor subsumed within social structure, but rather, are dialectically 
relational (Bhaskar, 1993). This is expressed in the critical realist theory of 
transformative action. In Bhaskar’s (1989) model, society always necessarily 
predates people, and as such, society and people are two very different 
things. Society is ‘an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions that 
individuals reproduce or transform’ (Bhaskar, 1989, p.76). Therefore, society 
provides the necessary conditions for human action, and this action can 
intentionally (or unintentionally) reproduce or transform society, thus setting 
the social context for further human action. This places the focus on social 
23 
 
relations, within the context of societal and historical change. In a stratified 
social system (e.g. capitalism) with unequal power relations, this has 
implications for the kinds of human action that are available to individuals, 
and it is argued in this thesis that human organisation in participatory forms 
of democracy rather than liberal or social models (Chapters 4 and 5) has the 
possibility of positive transformative action. As Bhaskar (1989, p.6) puts it 
 
[f]rom the critical realist perspective, contrary to the tradition of 
contemporary social democracy, socialist [democratic] emancipation 
depends on the transformation of structures, not the amelioration of 
states of affairs… it consists in a move or transition from unneeded, 
unwanted and oppressive, to needed, wanted, and empowering sources 
of determination. This might include, for example, a switch from a 
situation where production is determined by the pursuit of private 
profit and subject to arbitrary fluctuation, to one where it is subject to 
democratic negotiation and planning.  
 
Therefore, under this assumption, it is necessary to theorise the social as 
constituted by social beings, temporally shaped by – and with the capacity to 
shape – the organisations, associations and structures that make up society. 
Explaining how this happens, or why it does not happen and how it could 
happen, is one of the tasks of critical sociological inquiry. 
 
This understanding of structure and agency presupposes the second 
assumption of social quality, that individuals within society are constitutively 
interdependent (Beck at al., 2012). This means that  
 
people as social beings (first assumption) interact with each other, and 
these interactions constitute a diversity of collective identities which 
provide the contexts for their self-realisation and which lead to 
manifestations of the social... a person’s self-realisation is enabled 
through interaction with various collective identities (Beck et al., 2012, 
p.46). 
 
Three stages of constitutive interdependency can be identified in which the 
social is realised through processes of interaction between several tensions 
(but it is not produced by these tensions) (Beck et al., 2012, p.49). The first 
stage is the ‘framing structure’ in which tensions between processes of 
individual self-realisation and the formation of collective identities are 
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constitutively interdependent (Beck et al., 2012, p.47).  Second, constitutive 
interdependency between the framing structure and self-referential 
capacities allows individuals to develop the competence to act and configure 
human interrelationships in organisations, institutions and companies. This 
second level focuses on everyday practices and how they relate to theoretical 
abstractions. The productive and reproductive relationships that result from 
this form the third stage of constitutive interdependency which realises the 
social (Beck et al., 2012). This places Bhaskar’s conception of structure and 
agency at the heart of social quality. 
 
In social quality terms, this means that the social is ‘an expression of the 
always changing [societal] totality as an open process’ (Beck et al., 2012, 
p.48). The recognition of the historical context for social (in)action highlights 
the third assumption that underpins social quality theory, whereby the 
historically determined context for constitutive interdependency is formed by 
interplay between two basic tensions – between societal processes and 
biographical processes as opportunities, and between systems, institutions, 
organisations and communities, families, networks, groups as interactions 
(Beck et al., 2012). This third assumption of a historically determined but 
changing context forms the basis for the realisation of the three-fold concept 
of constitutive interdependency (the second assumption) (Beck et al., 2012). 
 
Stemming from this, the fourth assumption proposes that there are varying 
points of departure for four constitutional factors (human security, social 
recognition, social responsiveness, human capacity), four conditional factors 
(socio-economic security, social inclusion, social cohesion, social 
empowerment), and four normative factors (social justice, solidarity, equal 
value, human dignity) of social quality (Beck et al., 2012). The three sets of 
factors are not the causes of the transformations in human conditions, but 
rather are ‘instruments for unravelling and analysing processes that result in 
the transformation of human interrelationships’ (Beck et al., 2012, p.54). For 
this research, the nature of existing democratic settings is constitutional, and 
social empowerment is the conditional factor, while the democratic dialectic 
provides the normative guide.  
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The fifth assumption of social quality emphasises that normative factors are 
necessary ethical considerations for assessing the processes that help to 
realise the social, while the sixth assumption proposes that analysis of the 
constitutive interdependency of aspects of social quality will produce new 
points of departure for policy options which are historically and theoretically 
grounded (Beck et al., 2012). In this research the normative values of self-
development (freedom), relational egalitarianism (equality), and social and 
system integration (solidarity) optimise the democratic dialectic (Chapter 5). 
These values form the ethical considerations and theoretical grounding for the 
case studies. As Sayer (1997) points out, the need for a normative grounding is 
pertinent to ensure that criticism of existing social relations takes place from 
a standpoint that has a vision of an alternative. 
 
Further, the implications of this theoretical and empirical research suggest 
potential policy changes aimed at improving social quality, especially through 
participatory democracy (Chapter 9). This means that focus on the social as 
distinct from, but reproduced or changed by, human agents acting in the 
context of historically shaped social structures stresses social relations, 
contingencies and constitutive interdependency. Recognition of this is the 
basis for describing social empowerment in the participatory democratic 
settings. 
 
Ontological and Epistemological Foundations 
 
Given these six assumptions the critical realist ontological and epistemological 
foundations which underpin social quality can be explicated in more detail. 
They provide the basis and justification for a critical methodological approach 
taken in this research. As described above, in contrast to utilitarian, 
voluntarist, dialectical materialist, and structural functionalist perspectives, 
social quality avoids the classic dichotomy of individual actor and society and 
conceives of ‘interacting individuals as social beings, i.e. praxis as a matter of 
historicity’ (Herrmann et. al, 2012, p.86). Indeed, a recurring theme in this 
thesis is the rejection of methodological individualist epistemological views, 
present in both utilitarianism and voluntarism, and an emphasis on the social 
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relational concept of social quality. Much work in the social sciences does not 
properly acknowledge the social, focusing too much on either individuals or on 
structures.   
 
Social quality theory draws on the critical realist ontology, and its central 
proposition that reality is stratified.  This is explained by Bhaskar (1989, 
pp.180-182) as the ‘intransitive’ dimension; ‘a conception of reality, including 
knowable reality, [which is] only contingently, partially and locally 
humanised’.  Danermark et al. (2002, p.199) describe the stratified nature of 
reality as consisting of the level of the ‘real’ where generative mechanisms 
exist (whether they actually produce an effect or not). The level of the 
‘actual’ is where these structural mechanisms produce a factual event, which 
may or may not be experienced. Should an event be experienced, it falls into 
the domain of the ‘empirical’. This means that the domain in which empirical 
sociological research works – the empirical - is a smaller subset of a wider 
ontological realm. The world is therefore independent of our beliefs about it, 
and it is differentiated and stratified (Benton & Craib, 2001). This 
necessitates the use of theory in sociological research to explain the 
unobservable aspects of reality. 
 
This focus on ontology over epistemology is distinct from much philosophy of 
social science, especially the influential logical positivist movement and 
Weberian sociology.  Danermark et al. (2002, p.8) explain that in much 
positivist influenced social science ‘[o]ntology is reduced to epistemology… in 
this perspective reality becomes ‘flat’’, whereas critical realism involves ‘the 
criticism of that reduction of reality which does not take into account deep 
structure with its underlying mechanisms, and thus restricts our understanding 
of the world’. This is the epistemic fallacy, whereby ‘statements about being 
can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge’ 
(Bhaskar, 1978, p.36).   
 
Instead, Bhaskar (1979, p.69) describes society as ‘a complex and causually 
efficacious whole – a totality, which is being continually transformed in 
practice. As an object of study it can be neither be read straight off a given 
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world nor reconstructed from our subjective experiences’.  Further, this 
transformative model of action is explored by social scientists in an open 
system, whereby ‘the generative mechanisms [studied by social scientists] 
operate in a complex interaction with other mechanisms, which either co-
operate with or work against the mechanism in question’ (Danermark et al., 
2002, p.199). The critical realist epistemology therefore, derived from the 
ontological view that reality is independent of knowledge of it and that it is 
also stratified in an open system, proposes that that social scientific 
knowledge has a social nature. This is the transitive dimension (Bhaskar, 
1989). Harvey (1990, p.2) argues that because ‘knowledge is structured by 
existing sets of social relations’, critical researchers must use a methodology 
that engages with both empirical data and theoretically with social 
structures. 
 
Sayer (1997; also Hammersley, 2002) has questioned critical realism and other 
critical social sciences (e.g. Fay, 1987) on the grounds that they assume that 
ought follows straightforwardly from is, and often neglect the role of 
normative theory in critical studies. Sayer (1997, pp.477-478) argues that 
criticism necessarily presupposes the possibility of a better alternative, which 
must be shown to be feasible from a critical standpoint, not in terms of 
blueprints, but rather ‘through the likely tendencies or mechanisms of 
different forms of social organisation’, exploring ‘as far as possible what the 
causal powers and liabilities of alternative forms of social organisation are 
likely to be’. The alternative proposed here is participatory democracy, and 
the critical standpoint adopted is derived from the values of the democratic 
dialectic and participatory democratic theory (Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
For social quality theory constitutive interdependency is a characteristic of 
human societies, and sociological research must acknowledge this, especially 
from an ontological point of departure of the stratified nature of reality. This 
means that social scientific knowledge claims must be grounded in – but not 
determined by – normative theory, in order to identify and criticise deeper 
lying structural mechanisms in relation to material practices from the 
standpoint of a better alternative. As Sayer (1992, p.116) puts it; 
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[a]bsract theory analyses objects in terms of their constitutive 
structures, as parts of wider structures and in terms of their causal 
powers. Concrete [empirical] research looks at what happens when 
these combine. 
 
The empirical findings are tentative and contingent on future transformative 
action in society, and use research methods that explain social processes from 
a critical standpoint based on a normative view of possible alternative forms 
of social organisation (Sayer, 1995). Questions on the feasibility of such an 
alternative conception of democracy are considered in Chapters 4, 5 and 9, 
but these foundations presuppose a critical methodology. 
 
Critical Methodology 
 
The ontological and epistemological foundations described above have 
implications for the methodology used. Outhwaite (1987, p.56) posits that 
research based on realist principles involves attention to ‘an object of inquiry 
which is already defined in certain ways in the world of everyday life and 
ordinary language’. This object is typically re-described by the researcher in 
order to bring out its complexity, and the relationship that it has with ‘its 
internal and external environment as an outcome of a multiplicity of 
interacting factors’ (Outhwaite, 1987, p.57). A dialectical approach to theory 
and empirical data is necessary because of the critical realist conception of 
the stratified nature of reality described above. Crucially, the object of 
inquiry indicates the methods appropriate for the research, with no particular 
bias towards a prescribed set of methods or research paradigms and no special 
status for empirical work (Outhwaite, 1987; Danermark, et al., 2002; Morrow 
& Brown, 1994).  
 
This thesis has adopted a methodology that is theoretically grounded but 
developed by empirical case studies. The central object of study is 
participatory democracy, as distinct from liberal democratic and social 
democratic variants, which involves competing definitions and different kinds 
of democratic relationships. A second object of study is the concept of social 
empowerment: how power relationships in social settings can enable 
individuals to develop their capabilities and potential, and especially how this 
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features as a part of specifically democratic relationships between people. 
The theoretical component to this thesis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 investigates 
and re-describes the concepts of power and democracy in relation to the 
wider structural aspects of society (using the normative guide of the 
democratic dialectic).  
 
Following this, qualitative methods are appropriate to describe the 
participative democratic experiences of individuals in relation to the 
contingent social structures which frame these experiences in the case 
studies. Through a process of critical reflexivity (Anderson, 1989) the 
experiences of individuals in these participative democratic settings have 
been interpreted, described and contrasted with wider political, economic 
and social contexts. The research describes the tensions and contradictions 
between the empirical practices of participatory democracy in the two case 
studies and the theoretical analysis of wider social structures. Further, this 
also demands attention to the contingent nature of power and democracy in 
everyday life with reference to constitutive interdependency and the 
transformative model of social action (Chapter 8).  
 
Outhwaite (1987) argues that realist research is ontologically bold, but is 
cautious in terms of what can be inferred through empirical sociological 
research, describing tendencies in social phenomena, rather than causal 
relationships. The critical realist emphasis on the contingent nature of social 
relations is pertinent here, social quality theory and the democratic dialectic 
assume the possibility of structural changes through human action which has 
the tendency to create such changes – depending on circumstances - but this 
is not a given, casual reaction.  Structures are often constraining and well as 
enabling, but an understanding of these deeper mechanisms in relation to 
everyday social practice, can work towards the possibility of positive social 
change (Sayer, 1995). This strategy ensures that the empirical research is 
theory-laden, but not theory determined (Anderson, 1989; Bhaskar 1989; 
Lather, 1986), and draws on critical reflexivity in the collection, 
interpretation and analysis of empirical data. 
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Critical reflexivity requires reflection on the link between theory and data, 
self-reflection on the researcher’s biases and ‘reflection on the dialectical 
relationship between structural/historical forces and human agency’ 
(Anderson, 1989, p.254).  In practical terms this has involved the theory-laden 
interpretation of emergent empirical data described above, self-reflection by 
the researcher has involved compiling field notes in observations, reflective 
notes following observations and interviews, redrafting interview schedules 
based on emergent themes during the fieldwork, and reflection on the 
relationship between the constitutive interdependency of individuals and 
social structural transformation in the post-fieldwork analysis.  
 
This process avoids a concern with positivist issues of ‘reliability’ or ‘validity’ 
in qualitative research as empirical ‘[d]ata are meaningful only in terms of 
their theoretical context... data must not be treated as independent of their 
socio-historical context’ (Harvey, 1990, p.8).  Instead, the critical reflexive 
approach developed here draws on the concept of trustworthiness (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). It is not necessary to reject the critical realist ontology in favour 
of a constructivist account of multiple realities and its associated 
methodological paradigm (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), but some principles of 
naturalistic inquiry have been appropriated to increase the practical quality 
of this research (Seale, 1999a; 1999b). 
 
The concern here is with techniques for increasing the probability of credible 
findings. Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose prolonged engagement, persistent 
observation and triangulation as techniques to this end. Ensuring sufficient 
time in the field to build understanding of the culture of the social settings, 
testing the emerging data against misrepresentations by the researcher or the 
research participants, and building trust are aspects of prolonged engagement 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Persistent observation has the purpose of identifying 
‘characteristics and elements in the situation that are most relevant to the 
problem or issue being pursued and focusing on them in detail’ (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985, p.304). A secondary concern of persistent observation is to avoid 
spending too little or too long in the field, which can reduce credibility. 
Multiple sources and methods are aspects of triangulation proposed by Lincoln 
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& Guba (1985, p.305), which here requires the use of observations and 
interviews. Triangulation in this way is pertinent to the critical reflexive 
approach as it encourages reflexive engagement, helping to link empirical 
data to theory while ensuring that fieldwork is empirically-driven and theory-
laden. 
 
Combined with these practical techniques for credibility, the trustworthiness 
of the account is enhanced by a critical standpoint in research and analysis 
that does not determine or bias the findings. The researcher does not 
‘‘construct’ the object of study: the same ‘object’ can be examined for a 
large variety of reasons, under a large variety of motivations, and yield the 
same findings’ (Carspecken, 1996, p.6). The empirical findings require caution 
as drawing on triangulation can help to enhance the trustworthiness and 
credibility of the account provided here, but it is not an infallible technique. 
The following discussion describes the methods used in the fieldwork and 
analysis, focusing on the systematic application of the critical reflexive 
methodology. 
 
Methods 
 
The empirical component to this research comprises of qualitative case 
studies of two democratic settings. The empirical research uses methods 
drawn from critical ethnographic research (Carspecken, 1996). This is useful 
for critical-dialectical analysis in which the researcher begins with ‘the 
structural relationships and then undertake[s] an ethnographic inquiry in 
order to facilitate structural analysis’ (Harvey, 1990, p.12). This section 
describes the methods used and a five step guide to the practical process of 
collecting, interpreting and analysing the data in a critically reflexive way, 
and some criticisms of the fieldwork. Ethical issues are considered in the next 
section. 
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Case Studies 
 
Morrow & Brown (1994) argue that the case study method is useful for 
providing explanatory empirical data in relation to critical theoretical 
assertions. This is due to the intensive nature of qualitative research design 
that considers limited cases ‘in terms of a great number of individual 
properties’ (Morrow & Brown, 1994, p.250; Sayer, 1992). A benefit of having a 
theoretical orientation that provides grounding and guides the case study is 
that it can help to focus the vast amount of data generated in qualitative 
work, with attention to particular data that is relevant to the theoretical 
concerns of the research (Yin, 2009). In addition, the case studies draw in 
part on ethnographic methods; direct observations and in-depth interviews, 
but these are used for an explanatory focus (rather than interpretive), and 
aspects of ethnography such as ‘thick description’ and participant observation 
are not necessary to elicit the data required here (Morrow & Brown, 1994, 
pp.251-252). 
 
Hammersley (1992, p.184) defines a case as ‘the phenomenon (located in 
space/time) about which data are collected and/or analysed, and that 
corresponds to the type of phenomena to which the main claims of a study 
relate’. This definition relates to study of a single case, which invites 
criticisms such as the limitations of the method in both analytical power and 
pervasiveness (also generalisability, discussed below) (Verschuren, 2003). 
However, in this research each ‘case’ is ‘bounded by time and activity’ within 
the social setting (Creswell, 2003, p.15; Lofland et al., 2006). Since the 
phenomena under study (objects of inquiry) are participatory democracy and 
social empowerment, the case studies are bounded by theoretical aims of the 
research, and more practically, the ‘processes, activities, and events’ 
pertaining to the research interests within the two democratic settings 
(Creswell, 2003, p.183). 
 
Defining practical boundaries are important in order to situate the objects of 
inquiry and the limits of the case (Yin, 2009). However, while the objects of 
inquiry are participatory democracy and social empowerment in two social 
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settings, this is not a simple demarcation of an area of study. As both are 
critical case studies, the relationship between the bounded cases and wider 
social relations are of central importance to a dialectical analysis (Harvey, 
1990). Hence, in the workplace democracy case study, the boundaries 
pertained to the physical premises of the co-op and individual membership or 
employment at Suma, while the case consists of the democratic principles, 
practices, and social relations that take place in the co-op. For the PB case 
study, the boundaries pertain to the You Choose voting events in a number of 
community buildings, the council officers and citizens participating, along 
with the everyday lifeworlds of the citizens and members of the community 
and voluntary groups that took part, and the principles and practice of local 
democracy in Tameside Council. The case consists broadly of the democratic 
principles, practices and social relations involved in You Choose. 
 
Five Stages of Critical Reflexivity 
 
Carspecken’s (1996; also Verschuren, 2003, pp.131-132) five stages for 
conducting critical qualitative research were used to guide the empirical 
fieldwork and analysis. This process operationalises the theory-laden but 
empirically-driven approach. However, not all aspects of ethnographic 
research were required, such as ‘thick’ description (Carspecken, 1996), due to 
having less emphasis on micro-level interaction in this work in favour of 
individual experiences and broader social relations, along with the time and 
access constraints that were imposed on the cases (this issue is taken up 
further later in this chapter). With a critical realist inflection, the five stages 
are:   
 
1. Observations (monological data generation) 
2. Reflection on observations (reconstructive analysis) 
3. Interviews (dialogical data generation) 
4. Analysis of structural relations in the case (critical reflexivity on data 
and theory) 
5. Explaining findings (assessing the findings in relation to deeper causal 
mechanisms and wider social relations) (adapted from Carspecken, 
1996). 
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The stages are not to be seen as a step-by-step procedure but as a loose 
cyclical guideline (Carspecken, 1996). Stage one requires initial direct 
observations which involves the generation of monological data (data solely 
from the researcher’s perspective) by direct and passive observation. Stage 
two consists of reflection on the observations and a reconstructive analysis 
which articulates ‘those cultural themes and system factors that are not 
observable and are usually unarticulated by the actors themselves’ 
(Carspecken, 1996, p.42). Dialogical data generation through interviews is the 
third stage, which adds the views of the research participants to the account. 
For Carspecken (1996, p.42) this information ‘will often challenge information 
collected in stage one and analysed in stage two’. This process makes data 
collection and analysis a simultaneous process (Merriam, 1988).  
 
The emergent themes and questions generated through movement back and 
forth between stages one to three allows a critical reflexive analysis of the 
data to develop. This is described by Stake (1995, p.133) as the ‘progressive 
focus’ of a case study, whereby the research is driven by emergent empirical 
themes. Stage four emerges as a result of this process, which links more 
explicitly the case findings and themes to the theoretical framing. For 
Merriam (1988, p.125), this analytic process allows the researcher ‘to raise 
concrete relations and happenings observed in a particular setting to a higher 
level of abstraction’. Here a critical reflexive analysis begins the process of 
situating the data in relation to the broader theoretical perspective, 
identifying contradictions and tensions between the cases and wider social 
structure. Stage five develops explanations of the data by linking the 
emergent findings to structures in society. This is framed in critical realist 
terms as linking the empirical findings in the case studies to the broader 
theoretical analysis of deeper structural mechanisms operating in democratic 
societies to propose the possibilities for transformative social action. 
 
Carspecken’s guide was loosely followed in the fieldwork because the two 
case studies required a flexible approach (Yin, 2009). This suggests the 
necessity of adaptability in the field and avoidance of dogmatic adherence to 
specific methodological paradigms (Carspecken, 1996; Harvey, 1990; Mills, 
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1970); a flexibility in practical research which is supported by critical realism 
(Easton, 2010; Seale, 1999b). The workplace democracy case study began 
with direct observations of meetings (stage one) within the first few weeks, 
but to minimise disruption and use time productively interviews began 
immediately and ran alongside the observations. In both cases the 
observations took the form of ‘not so thick’ description that focused on 
general interactions, day-to-day practices, contextual data, and reflection on 
emergent themes for further inquiry. Critical reflections on the emerging data 
took place throughout this process (stages two and three). Attention shifted 
between the first three stages in the first few weeks of the case study.  
 
From this, the themes emerging from observation and interview data within 
the theoretical frame were used to further develop the direction of the 
research (stage four). During the fieldwork the researcher was based on the 
premises for several days a week which allowed for integration into daily life 
at the co-op, and provided a fertile atmosphere to develop a critical reflexive 
analysis (often involving much reflective note-making while waiting to meet 
interviewees). This meant that analysing the relationship between the 
individual experiences of the co-op and wider social structures (stage four) 
was submerged within the process of fieldwork to the extent that upon 
completion of it, the structure of the case study was largely in place. This was 
developed by post-fieldwork analysis that integrated further themes and 
excised less relevant themes. 
 
In the PB case study, monological data from the observations was generated 
at intervals of several weeks due to the You Choose timetable. This meant 
that the research shifted from stage one to stage two immediately after each 
observation as interviews were arranged following each event. Attention to 
linking stage two to stage three followed as interviews were conducted in the 
following weeks at disparate locations in the area. Due to the transitory 
nature of (annual) four-hour voting events in districts of Tameside (apart from 
the organisers, prospective interviewees each attended only one event) the 
level of researcher integration into the democratic setting (and wider local 
culture) and interviewee experience of participatory democracy was less 
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intense. Along with the stop-start nature of the fieldwork in this case, the 
critical reflexive process (moving between stages one to three to develop 
deeper analytical data in stage four) was more fragmented, and developed 
more in the post-fieldwork analysis. Having said this, a number of themes did 
emerge in the fieldwork which allowed for critical reflexive development of 
the interview schedule and field notes, but this was a slow-burning process 
over four months. Stage five was the most difficult to achieve, given the focus 
on two relatively small case studies. Tentative suggestions can only be made 
in Chapters 8 and 9 regarding wider social relations and the possibilities for 
social change. This is because of the contingent nature of the social 
phenomena studied and the limits of critical social science. 
 
Direct Observations & In-depth Interviews 
 
The research was carried out as a known investigator, which necessitated 
information sheets written in non-academic language that highlighted the 
voluntary nature of participation (Lofland et al., 2006). While the workplace 
democracy case study was conducted in a private setting, the PB case study 
largely took place in public settings, although some interviews were at 
participants’ homes, which are private settings (Lofland et al., 2006).  
 
For observations and interviews the role of ‘student’ or ‘acceptable 
incompetent’ was strategically adopted, rather than ‘sociologist’, 
‘researcher’ or ‘expert’, to reduce the risk of intimidation (Lofland et al., 
2006, p.44). This approach worked well in the workplace democracy case 
study, where the research participants were knowledgeable about Suma’s 
democratic practices. However, given the relatively minor experiences of 
participatory democracy by citizens in the PB case study, many interview 
participants looked to the researcher as an expert on the subject. In this case, 
explaining the background to PB helped interviewees to get a better handle 
on the purpose of the interview and encouraged critical reflection on their 
experiences. 
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Direct observations were conducted as a known investigator. Intrusion was 
minimised in order for the researcher to passively observe and take notes. 
The main purpose of the direct observations was to build up practical 
knowledge of day-to-day activites and insights into the culture and practices 
of the two settings and to stimulate lines of inquiry for the in-depth 
interviews. In both cases, it was possible to make detailed notes, as the 
researcher’s presence was announced to those present to secure informed 
consent (Lofland et al., 2006). The workplace democracy case study was 
based on six key observations of meetings (much informal observation took 
place while on site). The PB case study consisted of four observations of You 
Choose events. In both cases critical analysis in the form of initial coding took 
place immediately after as the researcher left the setting and further field 
notes were made that asked open questions to generate themes from the data 
(Lofland et al., 2006). 
 
The field notes were reflexive thoughts and ‘not-so-thick’ description of 
events and included details such as how many people were present, the 
physical character of the setting, a general characterisation of the events that 
took place and emergent themes relating to the research (Lofland et al., 
2006, p.108). For this research, the observations formed a contextual frame 
for developing the interview schedule, for reflection on the democratic 
settings, and dialectical analysis of the case at a holistic level. In both cases, 
the observations were integral to grounding the research in the relationships, 
organisation and practices of the democratic settings. 
 
Interviewees were recruited in different ways. The majority were recruited by 
the gatekeeper in the workplace democracy case (sixteen out of twenty-one). 
The PB case study relied on the researcher approaching and recruiting 
interviewees during breaks at the events (three council officers were 
recruited by the gatekeeper). This required information sheets to be given to 
prospective interviewees that detailed what to expect and the researcher’s 
intentions for the data (Lofland et al., 2006). The interview guide was semi-
structured, including broad questions and themes and was guided by the 
theoretical concerns of the research (Fontana & Frey, 1998). It began with 
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basic questions to ease the interviewee into conversation with key questions 
with probes introduced later (Fielding & Thomas, 2008). Interviews were 
audio-recorded and transcripts were shared with all interviewees to ensure 
accuracy of their statements (Fielding & Thomas, 2008). 
 
In the workplace democracy case study, all interviews took place in a meeting 
room which allowed for clear recording, while in the PB case study, the 
interviews took place in disparate locations including council offices, a pub, a 
coffee shop and participants’ homes. This meant that clear recordings were 
not always possible and flexibility was needed to find suitable locations. In 
addition, while the workplace democracy interviews took place during the 
working day which encouraged critical reflexive engagement, the PB 
interviews were in the weeks following the event, which necessitated further 
introductory discussion about the process to encourage interviewees to reflect 
on their experiences. The interview schedule changed as emerging themes 
from the data developed and new themes were pursued to ensure that the 
research was empirically driven. Discussing emergent ideas and themes with 
interview participants was an important aspect of critical reflexivity in the 
research process, especially to fill in missing contextual data and to focus 
ideas (Merriam, 1988). The analytical process necessitated critical reflection 
based on recognising inconsistencies between ‘action and words in terms of 
structural factors’, along with description of the practices and subjective 
viewpoints of the research participants (Harvey, 1990, p.13). 
 
As Stake (1995, p.72) describes, while researchers ‘have certain protocols 
that help them draw systematically from previous knowledge and cut down on 
misperception… there is much art and much intuitive processing to search for 
meaning’. Similarly, for Merriam (1988) emergence in qualitative research is 
based on hunches, working hypotheses, educated guesses that direct the 
researcher’s focus to emerging data, with repeated investigation to refine or 
verify hunches. This process is ‘intuitive, but it is also systematic and 
informed by the study’s purpose, the [researcher’s] orientation and 
knowledge’, and the ideas and concepts expressed by the participants 
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(Merriam, 1988, p.133). This was a part of the craft of carrying out the direct 
observations and in-depth interviews. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Analysis took place throughout the fieldwork in the form of analytical field 
notes. It is important for qualitative case studies that both first impressions 
and final compilations are as much subject to the analytical process of giving 
meaning to social phenomena (Stake, 1995). In both cases the research ended 
at a point of ‘data saturation’ and with the ‘emergence of regularities’ 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.350). This refers to the researcher’s sense that the 
data collection process had been refined enough, with a holistic 
understanding of the case. While more themes could certainly have been 
developed, at these points in both cases the researcher felt that sufficient 
data had been collected for the purpose of the studies. 
 
On completion of the fieldwork, a cognitive and intensive analytical process 
of grouping data into categories and themes in file folders immediately 
followed (Merriam, 1988). This was organised by topic, rather than 
chronologically. Eschewing computer-aided analysis, this involved a literal cut 
and paste approach to dividing up printed data with scissors and placement of 
each quote or fragment of field notes under a relevant theme using memo 
cards (the search for ‘patterns and regularities’ in the data, Merriam, 1988, 
p.131). This approach allowed the researcher to physically link themes and 
categories by laying out the data on a table. Beyond a personal preference for 
reading in print, this served an analytical advantage of easily moving quotes 
between categories, and categories between themes, establishing links 
between them by making notes on the memo cards, and further emergent 
ideas in a notebook. This also allowed the researcher to view the entire 
constellation of the data at a glance, contrasting the balance within themes, 
overlaps, new categories, positive and negative data within themes, and 
highlighting categories not useful for the case study (keeping key themes in 
focus and pushing less important ones to the margins is integral to developing 
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a deeper analysis, in view of the vast amount of data generated in case 
studies, Stake, 1995). 
 
This followed what Lofland et al. (2006) call initial coding and focused coding. 
Initial coding is where categories begin to emerge from inspection of the 
transcripts and field notes, where open questions are asked of the data, such 
as ‘what does this relate to?’, and tentative grouping of quotes within 
categories. This started during the fieldwork where emerging categories, key 
quotes and reflections were noted by the researcher, but also characterised 
the early stage of post-fieldwork analysis. 
 
This was followed by focused coding in which the quotes and categories 
deemed most important to the aims of the research were grouped together 
under broad themes, while less relevant quotes and notes are jettisoned. 
Given the theory-laden nature of this research the major themes (which were 
file folders into which emergent data was placed) were setting-specific data 
(relating to aspects of the culture, functioning and everyday practices of the 
particular setting), participatory democracy (with initial sub-categories of 
liberty, equality and solidarity which were expanded and transformed by the 
fieldwork process), and social empowerment (with a range of emergent 
themes from the data). Following Merriam (1988) the major-themes represent 
a greater level of abstraction, and within these, categories relating to 
concrete description, researcher thoughts and interviewee perspectives were 
placed. In combination with reflective notes made by the researcher, this 
allowed the two case studies to be written. 
 
Reflections on the Methodology and Methods 
 
Two potential criticisms of the methods of this research are highlighted here; 
the risk of ‘overidentification’ or ‘ideological bias’ and the problem of 
generalisation. The risk of ‘overidentification’ is highlighted by Lofland et al. 
(2006, p.62) as a concern where the researcher becomes immersed in a 
setting to the extent that they identify positively and non-critically with it. A 
parallel to this problem for critical social science is the concern with 
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defending what Lather (1986) calls ‘openly ideological research’. Morrow & 
Brown (1994, p.268) state that ‘[b]ecause research in a given society cannot 
be ideologically neutral, it is legitimate to justify rationally the definition of 
forms of research guided by critical-emancipatory cognitive interests’. 
Following the social quality theory philosophical underpinning, this research 
focuses normatively on the possibilities for participation in more egalitarian 
social relations that enhance capabilities and well-being. 
 
This point demands attention to the researcher’s personal values regarding 
equality and political allegiance with democratic socialism in conducting this 
research (Creswell, 2003). In the workplace democracy case study, the data 
produced was especially positive in highlighting social empowerment and 
participative practices, and along with the intensive nature of this research 
experience, there was a possible risk of developing an un-critical acceptance 
of the emerging themes by the researcher (Punch, 1998). Self-reflexive 
acknowledgement of this risk during the process helped the researcher to 
focus on critical engagement with the principles and practices of the co-op. 
This was supported by the critical reflexive approach as it encourages a 
questioning disposition even for positive data. Moreover, the criticism of 
‘openly ideological’ bias is not limited to qualitative case study research, 
rather this refers to regulative ideas for judging the trustworthiness of the 
researcher and the findings, whatever the methods employed (Verschuren, 
2003). Following a critical reflexive approach ensured an analysis that did not 
‘construct’ the object of study, but was concerned with the emergent themes 
from a normative standpoint, as described by Carspecken (1996) and Sayer 
(1995) in the methodological discussion above. 
 
Hammersley (1992) highlights a second criticism of the case study method 
regarding the lack of generalisation. Given the critical realist orientation of 
this research, regress to an intrepretivist or relativist stance that 
generalisation of case study findings is methodologically undesirable is not 
sufficient. Rather, the issue of statistical generalisation is tentative and 
contingent on deeper structural changes within society. The focus of the 
research is on paradigm cases of a set of social relations and principles of 
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organisation that are relatively rare and at odds with currently prevailing 
social ideas (Harvey, 1990). In other words, the cases are necessarily 
tentative in highlighting the possibility of a more socially empowered society 
that would be characterised by participatory democratic social and economic 
relationships. The findings are analytically generalisable to theoretical 
propositions, rather than to existing populations (Yin, 2009). Broader changes 
are proposed in theoretical terms but these are contingent on human action 
for future policy and practice. 
 
Ethics 
 
Ethical principles have been followed in the design and conduct of this 
research. This section focuses on the key issues of access, informed consent, 
confidentiality, and trust. For both cases, during the process of negotiating 
access the researcher met face-to-face with the gatekeeper and a research 
brief explained in plain English the reasons for the research, including what it 
is about, what will happen, and how the data is to be used and disseminated 
(BSA, 2004). As a condition of access and to ensure reciprocal relations, the 
researcher agreed to write summaries of the research for the two case 
studies. In the workplace democracy case study there was an emphasis on 
minimising disruption to the working day by arranging interviews via email and 
for the gatekeeper to recruit interviewees. This was a compromise agreed to 
by the researcher to ensure access, but it didn’t greatly affect the range of 
interview participants recruited. Likewise in the PB case study, conditions of 
access were to recruit interviewees outside of the voting process, and that 
the assessment panels were off limits due to the legally sensitive nature of 
the discussion, and also that elected members would approach the researcher 
if interested in an interview. The researcher attempted to negotiate access to 
the assessment panels but it was conceded that this was non-negotiable. 
 
In practical terms the workplace democracy case study required democratic 
approval for access and for observations. But while respecting the 
requirement to minimise disruption, the absence of authoritarian chains of 
command in the co-op meant that Suma workers could arrange times for 
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interviews that were flexible. In the PB case study, access to all of the voting 
events was granted and the researcher informed the gatekeeper and 
participants in advance of each observation session. 
 
To ensure informed consent, the researcher produced information sheets that 
detailed the purposes of the research, the voluntary nature of participation 
and the right to withdraw, and measures in place to protect anonymity (BSA, 
2004). In both cases, these were given to participants in advance of interviews 
which gave the prospective interviewee time to consider their participation 
(the researcher also shared further copies at the start of the interview to 
ensure that the participants understood the information). In addition, a 
consent form was provided which restated the voluntary nature of the 
research, clarified that the participant was happy to be recorded, that the 
data would be treated confidentially, and that a copy of the interview 
transcript would be shared with the interviewee. At only one point did an 
interviewee request to speak ‘off the record’ and for this the audio recording 
was stopped and no notes were made.  
 
For the observations information sheets were available upon request (due to 
the nature of meetings or events with up to 150 people present). The 
researcher’s interference was minimised at the request of the gatekeepers. At 
the start of each observation, the Suma meeting/PB event convenor 
announced the researcher’s presence, institutional affiliation, and briefly the 
purpose of the research. While the boundaries between informed consent and 
deception are not always clear (Bulmer, 2001; Punch, 1998), this had the 
potential for some participants to not be fully informed about the 
researcher’s aims. However, this did not amount to harmful deception as this 
was mitigated by the ‘not so thick’ description undertaken: no personal data 
was collected during the observations, and the announcement ensured that 
the research participants were not ‘kept in ignorance of the true identity of 
the researcher’ (Bulmer, 2001, p.55). 
 
Confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity were important factors in the 
research design (Bulmer, 2001). It was decided that the names of the 
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organisations studied would be used. In Suma’s case this is because existing 
research on the co-op is cited in this thesis. For Tameside Council this is 
because as a public authority there is no compelling reason to withhold the 
name of the Council, and existing Council documents have been cited. The 
thesis does not contain any information that could damage the organisations 
studied, such as sensitive financial data. On the other hand, all workers at 
Suma, employees of the council and other participants in the research been 
given pseudonyms, and any identifiable data has been changed (e.g. 
descriptions of people, the names of community groups and any people cited 
or described by interviewees) to avoid possible harm or damage to existing 
relationships. Further, all data has been saved on a password protected 
computer and a memory stick, kept in a locked drawer during this research. 
 
Trust is an important aspect of practicing ethical research to ensure 
reciprocity and openness (Cresswell, 1998). A full interview transcript was 
shared with each research participant, with an opportunity for the 
interviewee to remove or clarify data, or request that the researcher not use 
any particular data (this was requested by one interviewee). Further, as a 
condition of access, but also to support reciprocal relationships between the 
researcher and the gatekeeper, summary reports were produced for both 
cases to ensure that the participants got something out of the research (Clark, 
2010). These have been framed as highlighting ‘good practice’ and 
constructive criticism in the two cases which could be used by the parties 
concerned to facilitate positive changes (Clark, 2010, p.8).   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the philosophical foundations, methodology and 
methods that underpin the research that follows. It began by providing an 
account of the fieldwork, including the thought processes involved in 
selecting the case studies, negotiating access, conducting the research, 
analysing the data and writing it up. This was followed by an exploration of 
the philosophical foundations of this research in social quality theory and 
critical realism. The ontological and epistemological positions that describe 
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the stratified nature of reality and the social nature of knowledge claims draw 
attention to the limits of empirical social science. This has provided the 
philosophical justification for a critical social science approach that is theory-
laden but empirically-driven in order to make sense of social phenomena that 
cannot be explained purely through observation. 
 
The critical methodology that this presupposes uses critical reflexivity in five 
stages as a practical guide for qualitative research, including the movement 
between different research methods and analysis in a way that ensures that 
the data is derived from the empirical work but related to the theoretical 
approach. The case studies use in-depth semi-structured interviews and direct 
observations and are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The following three 
chapters develop the theoretical component in this thesis, beginning with a 
critical review of the concept of power, followed by a chapter on democratic 
theory and institutional design, before examining in more detail the 
normative values that make up democratic societies. 
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Chapter 3 
From Power to Social Empowerment 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter critically reviews theories of power in working towards situating 
the social quality concept of social empowerment within a critical realist 
theory of power. The following discussion builds on the philosophical 
foundations of this thesis in critical realism and social quality to elucidate a 
concept of social empowerment suitable for analysis with reference to the 
democratic dialectic in empirical case studies. In moving from power to social 
empowerment, is necessary to trace the development of power from elite 
theories of power, agent-centred behaviouralist conceptions of power, 
hegemonic critiques that emphasise interest-shaping, to communicative and 
especially realist theories that incorporate empowerment, structure, agency 
and change in theories of power. 
 
A plethora of definitions of power abound, for example, Russell (1938, p.35) 
sees power simply as ‘the production of intended effects’. Wrong (1979, p.2) 
posits that the concept is dispositional, that ‘[p]ower is the capacity of some 
persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others’. For Bottomore 
(1993, p.1) power is ‘the ability of an individual or a social group to pursue a 
course of action (to make and implement decisions, and more broadly to 
determine the agenda for decision making) if necessary against the interests, 
and even against the opposition, of other individuals and groups’. In viewing 
power as a capacity to produce effects, Weber’s (1968, p.926) voluntarist 
perspective also grounds an intentional agent-centred view of power where it 
is ‘the chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will in a 
social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the 
action’.  
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Both the utilitarian and voluntarist variants incorporate the dominant view of 
power in modern Western social science, which is that the concept is a causal, 
agent-centred and an accumulative property (Hindess, 1996). This chapter 
follows Barbalet (1985) in describing how these views stress intentionality, but 
while not incorrect, are incomplete conceptions of power. The chapter begins 
by considering the roots of modern power theory in the philosophy of Hobbes 
(1996). Modern power theories are then discussed which adopt the 
individualistic and mechanistic premise of Hobbes’ account of power. After 
briefly discussing early twentieth century elite theory, central to modern 
theories of power is the ‘faces of power’ debate.  
 
A second strand of power theory is traced by Clegg (1987, 1989; Haugaard & 
Clegg, 2009) from its roots in the political philosophy of Machiavelli (2004) to 
post-modern perspectives on power such as the post-structuralist work of 
Foucault (1977, 1980), built on by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), and Hayward 
(1998). For example, Foucault (1980, p.104) views power as existing deeply 
within modern society to the extent that it is present in all claims to 
knowledge, and has become more complex and disciplinary in contrast to the 
sovereign power of Machiavelli’s Prince: a new mechanism of power that 
‘presupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical 
existence of a sovereign’. Power establishes disciplines that restrict through 
the production of knowledge as ‘there are manifold relations of power which 
permeate, characterise, and constitute the social body, and these relations of 
power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented 
without the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of a 
discourse’ (Foucault, 1980, p.93). However, despite rejecting modern theories 
of power that derive from Hobbesian causality, Foucault’s treatment of power 
‘tends to fall back into the negative view of power to which he is opposed, 
portraying it as a monolithic, unmitigated force of domination’ (Nash, 2000, 
p.23). Given the critical realist philosophical basis for this research (Chapter 
2) and how the claims made by communicative and realist theories of power 
underpin the concept of social empowerment (see below) post-modernist 
theories are not considered in detail in this thesis. 
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The second part of this chapter describes communicative and realist theories 
of power, which elucidate the weaknesses of the faces of power debate (Ball, 
1988; 1992), and emphasise processes of empowerment. The positions 
adopted in the faces of power debate are shown to only conceive of power as 
‘power over’ others, neglecting the positive social relational aspect of the 
collective ‘power to’ act (Göhler, 2000; 2009). They also take a tacitly 
conservative political position on power which fails to critically theorise both 
the structural and agential sources of power (Bates, 2010). For a critical 
analysis a complex terrain must be negotiated between the socio-political 
organisation of democratic societies as they currently exist from the 
normative standpoint of possible alternatives (Benton, 1981; Sayer, 1992). The 
relative strengths and weaknesses of different power theories are assessed in 
working towards a conception of social empowerment (Herrmann, 2012) which 
forms the basis for the discussion of democracy in Chapters 4 and 5. This 
provides the theory-laden basis for the conduct and analysis of the two 
empirical case studies of participatory democracy. 
 
The Hobbesian Roots of Modern Power Theories 
 
Ball (1975) argues that the metaphors of philosophers have become the 
scientific models employed by social scientists. A critical review of modern 
theories of power and empowerment must trace their philosophical origins. 
Much modern political and sociological analysis takes the work of the 
seventeenth century philosopher Hobbes as the foundations for thinking about 
the concept (Ball, 1975; Connolly, 1988; Clegg, 1989; Hindess, 1996). Hobbes 
has influenced theories of power grounded in the philosophical project of 
modernity (Clegg, 1989). Hobbes' (1996, p.62) concept of power draws from 
an instrumental and mechanistic view of the world, and is also a moral value: 
'[t]he power of a Man... is his present means, to obtain some future apparent 
Good'. However, in the context of conditions of scarcity this good equates 
with the satisfaction of individual desires (Ball, 1988).   
 
Power is seen as the cause of movement and motion towards a given end, with 
the effect being the observable and measurable empirical phenomena of the 
49 
 
'push and shove, contact and collision' of human agency (Ball, 1975, pp.213-
217).  Hobbes (cited in Ball, 1975, p.214) states that 
 
Power and Cause are the same thing. Correspondent to cause and 
effect are POWER and ACT; nay, those and these are the same things... 
For whensoever any agent has all those accidents which are necessarily 
requisite for the production of some effect in the patient, then we can 
say that the agent has the power to produce that effect, if it be 
applied to a patient. 
 
By equating power with causality as an observable relationship between 
agents, Hobbes’ theory prescribes an analysis of social relations based on the 
principles of cause and effect, in which power is at the heart of all individual 
interaction. Hobbes (1996) constructs a model of a political community in 
which the sovereign power of the head of state is comprised of the individual 
powers of all members of the community. 
 
Hobbes' motivation for sovereign power at the centre of the ideal political 
community derives in part from his preference for monarchy over democracy, 
but also from a desire for a civil social order (Clegg, 1989). This is based on 
Hobbes' (1996, p.89) assumption that the alternative to the modern civilised 
world is a state of nature in which 
 
there is no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of commodities 
that may be imposed by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments 
of moving, and removing, such things require much force; no 
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no 
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short. 
 
Clegg (1989, p.26) asserts that Hobbes’ claim cannot be substantiated as it 
lacks a suitable ‘anthropological referent’. However, it is from this assumption 
which subsequent power theory has developed. Clegg (1989) argues that 
Hobbes' influence on Western social and political thought is not unique, but 
rather that he was part of a scientific elite in the seventeenth century that 
advocated a mechanistic understanding of the world. This period of scientific 
revolution is characterised by ‘certain attempts by philosophers [such as 
Hobbes] to come to terms with the new science and to extend its models and 
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methods to the study of human behaviour’ (Ball, 1975, p.213). This has tacitly 
provided the foundations for much work on political community and power in 
the social sciences. All protagonists in the faces of power debate draw on a 
concept of power derived from Hobbes. 
 
Elite Power and Faces of Power 
 
The faces of power debate emerged from critiques of American elite theory in 
the 1950s. Firstly, pluralist theories focus on power as competing interests 
(Dahl, 1957, 1958, 1961; Polsby, 1960, 1963) and later revisionists view power 
as decision making and non-decision making (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, 1963, 
1970; Bachrach & Botwinick, 1992). Both of the first two faces of power view 
the concept as the realisation of individual action against the resistance of 
others, in which power is exercised by an agent over another. Lukes’ (1974; 
2005) hegemonic theory of three-dimensional power advances the debate by 
viewing power as also exercised by hegemonic groups in shaping interests. 
Despite Lukes’ claim to a ‘radical’ theory, his account cannot avoid an implicit 
conservative value position of the restrictive sense of ‘power over’, and is 
limited by its agent-centred conception. 
 
Elite studies placed emphasis on power structures and the role of elites in 
ordering society (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956; Pellegrin & Coates, 1956; Schulze, 
1958). The American elite theory of Mills and Hunter can be distinguished 
from the European tradition of elite theory, particularly that of Michels 
(1949), Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1935), as the latter viewed elite power as a 
normatively good value (or inevitable) in democratic societies. In contrast to 
the conservatism of the European elite theorists, Mills and Hunter developed 
critical approaches to studying power elites in American society which took 
the normative position that ruling elites pose a threat to democracy. Hunter's 
(1953, p.1) study emphasised the deficit between the democratic ideal and 
the way it actually functions in the USA: 
 
[t]here appears to be a tenuous line of communication between the 
governors of our society and the governed. This situation does not 
square with the concepts of democracy we have been taught to 
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revere... our democracy is in danger of losing vitality in dealing with 
problems that affect all in common. 
 
Mills (1956) focused on the military-industrial-political complex and 
emphasised the role of social structure in the succession of different epochs 
of dominant groups. For Mills (1956, p.269), ‘[c]hanges in the American 
structure of power have generally come about by institutional shifts in the 
relative positions of the political, the economic, and the military orders’. 
Where the formation of power elites in the mid-nineteenth century was based 
on a plurality of loosely connected groups, the rise of political and corporate 
power in the twentieth century meant that ‘[t]he 'loose cliques' now head 
institutions of a scale and power... well beyond the era of romantic pluralism’ 
(Mills, 1956, p.271). Mills' consideration of the power elite concentrates on 
the rise of Weberian bureaucratic rationality and the transformation of social 
structures in twentieth century capitalism. Important in Mills' understanding 
of the power elite is that institutions and organisations provide the resources 
for exerting influence, rather than the specific individuals that hold 
prominent roles within them. The emphasis in Mills’ account is on structure 
rather than agency. 
 
The ruling elite studies were challenged in the 1950s and 1960s from within 
the American political sciences on the grounds of employing 'un-scientific' 
methods (Dahl, 1957, 1958, 1961; Polsby, 1960, 1963). An emphasis on 
empirical observation in power studies is present in the work of Dahl (1958, 
p.463), who scathingly assesses the perceived lack of analytical rigour in the 
ruling elite model: 
 
[t]here is a type of quasi-metaphysical theory made up of what might 
be called an infinite regress of explanations. The ruling elite model can 
be interpreted in this way. If the overt leaders of a community do not 
appear to constitute a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by 
arguing that behind the overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders 
who do. If subsequent evidence shows that this covert group does not 
make a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that 
behind the first covert group there is another, and so on. 
 
The following sections examine and critique the first two faces of power 
which draws attention to the Hobbesian roots of these accounts and sets the 
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context for the three-dimensional power thesis. It is argued that all three 
positions are deficient due to their common reliance on the Hobbesian view of 
power, which is challenged by the communicative and realist theories of 
power in the final section. 
 
Pluralism 
 
The first ‘face of power’ is found in the pluralist accounts of Polsby and Dahl.  
Polsby (1960) explains that research, such as that of Hunter and Mills, which 
asks 'who runs this community?' makes a fundamental assumption that power 
is stratified in a given community to the extent that one minority group 
dominates over others. Pluralist studies of power instead ask 'does anyone at 
all run this community?' Pluralism prioritises the study of overt, and 
observable, activity (Polsby, 1960). For example, it takes at face value the 
presumption that a banker's primary interest in life is banking, not 
manipulating decision-making in the community. Polsby (1960, pp.480-481, 
original emphasis) claims that empirical observation of the actions of 
individuals means that ‘it is easy to spot the banker who really does run 
community affairs when we presume he does not, because his activities will 
make this fact apparent’.  In contrast, elite theorists are deemed to analyse 
only the 'power bases' or ‘resources available to actors for the exercise of 
power’ rather than actually identifying and analysing the exercise of power 
itself (Polsby, 1960, p.483). 
 
Dahl (1957, p.202-3) defines power as a relation among individuals where ‘A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do’. A does not possess power, but is instead able to use 
power in relation to B and this can only be empirically measured by observed 
evidence of A securing a response from B. In this power relationship, A and B 
may be ‘individuals, groups, roles, offices, governments, nation-states, or 
other human aggregates’ (Dahl, 1957, p.203). 
 
Dahl posits that a full explication of the power relationship between A and B 
must make reference to the bases of power, as elitists do, but also must refer 
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to the means of exerting power, the amount of power A has over B, and the 
scope of this power. For Dahl (1957, p.203), all of these must be observable in 
order for the concept to be measured: 
 
[t]o specify the actors in a power relation – A has power over B – is not 
very interesting, informative, or even accurate. Although the statement 
that the President has (some) power over Congress is not empty, 
neither is it very useful. A much more complete statement would 
include references to (a) the source, domain, or base of the President's 
power over Congress; (b) the means or instruments used by the 
President to exert power over Congress; (c) the amount or extent of his 
power over Congress; and (d) the range or scope of his power over 
Congress.   
 
Dahl (1957, p.204) claims that ‘there is no action 'at a distance', unless there 
is some 'connection' between A and B, then no power relation can be said to 
exist’. Dahl does not make clear what he means by 'connection', only to say 
that an observable flow of influence, control or power must be apparent, 
otherwise an analysis of power can continue no further.  In this conception, 
the most powerful actor is judged to be where A has the highest probability of 
securing a response from B (Dahl, 1957).   
 
Clegg (1989) is critical of the pluralist model on two counts. Firstly, pluralists 
make an oversight in viewing a political community as an ordered totality, 
rather than itself being the product of power relations. In criticising the ruling 
elite model on the grounds of sloppy methodology, pluralism neglects to 
consider an aspect that is useful in ruling elite theory - the role of social 
structure in power relations. This oversight is due to the behaviouralist 
epistemology employed by the pluralists. Behaviouralism emphasises only the 
empirical testing of theories by observation in order make valid explanations 
about social phenomena (Sanders, 2002). It is a narrow approach which 
neglects that which cannot be empirically observed. In critical realist terms 
this position commits the epistemic fallacy by taking ontology as 
unproblematic: the stratified nature of reality is underplayed (Bhaskar, 1989; 
Benton & Craib, 2001). 
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Clegg's (1989) second criticism is that pluralist studies only consider those 
active in the political community to be involved in power relations. Non-
participation is deemed to be non-conflict, and following the behaviouralist 
epistemology, it is assumed that no power relationship is present. Gaventa 
(1980, p.7) states that for pluralist studies ‘[t]he empirical relationship of low 
socio-economic status to low participation gets explained away as the apathy, 
political inefficacy, cynicism or alienation of the impoverished’.   
 
Dahl and Polsby claim to be making dispassionate analyses of the causes and 
effects of power. However, the absence of a consideration of structured social 
inequalities and the consequences of this for non-participation indicates a 
tacit conservatism. The pluralists make assumptions about the social world 
that reinforces a conservative political ideology that emphasises the status 
quo and does not acknowledge unjust power relations. This ideology, at best, 
eschews the issue of non-participation in decision-making, or at worst, blames 
the excluded for their predicament. Polsby (1963, p.131) attributes 
participation to ‘showing interest, willingness to work, and competence’, 
implying that apathy, shiftlessness and lack of ability account for non-
participation. However, Schattschneider (1975, p.102) argues that 
 
abstention reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that 
reflect the needs of the non-participants. It is not necessarily true that 
people with the greatest needs participate in politics most actively – 
whoever decides what the game is about also decides who gets in the 
game.   
 
This suggests an aspect of power concerned with decision-making and non-
decision-making, which is taken up by the attempt to redeem the pluralist 
conception by describing a second face of power. 
 
Two Faces of Power 
 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962; Bachrach, 1963) draw attention to the dispute 
between the sociological studies of elites and the American political science 
studies of plural democracy. They agree with the pluralist criticisms of the 
ruling elite model relating to the assumed power structure, the tendency to 
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emphasise stable power structures over time, and the equation of power 
resources with actual power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). However, as Bachrach 
and Baratz's ‘revisionist’ take on the pluralist theory of power does not extend 
to the level of critiquing its behaviouralist epistemology, the two faces of 
power thesis places the same emphasis on observable activity (Lukes, 2005). 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the distinction made in the two faces 
of power thesis between decision-making and non-decision making. 
 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p.948) point out that the pluralist focus on 
participation in decision-making does not take into account how power can be 
exercised ‘by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively ‘safe 
issues’’. The pluralist propensity to discard ‘unmeasurable elements’ as not 
useful for power analysis has ‘exposed themselves to the same fundamental 
criticism they have so forcefully levelled against the elitists: that their 
approach to and assumptions about power predetermine their findings and 
conclusions’ (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, p.952). With reference to 
Schattschneider's (1975) concept of the ‘mobilisation of bias’, Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962, p.950) argue that attention must be paid to the ‘dominant 
values and the political myths, rituals and institutions which tend to favour 
the vested interests of one or more groups relative to others’.  
 
Bachrach and Baratz attempt to reconcile an elitist study of power with the 
behavioural methods of the pluralists. They do not take up the critique of 
pluralism on the lines of its behavioural epistemology, as Clegg (1989), 
Gaventa (1980), and Lukes (2005) do, but instead seek to accommodate the 
claims of ruling elite theorists with a behavioural approach to the study of 
power.  To do this they claim that along with decision-making, the second face 
of non-decision making is both an exercise of power and can be empirically 
observed (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963). 
 
They advocate the initial study of the dominant values, myths and institutions 
of a community and the existing biases that these contain, from which the 
persons or groups that benefit from the existing relations can be identified. 
This establishes the distribution of power within a given community. For 
56 
 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970, p.8), ‘to the extent that a person or group – 
consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public 
airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power’. Like the pluralists, 
power is expressed as a relation where one actor has ‘power over’ another.  
However, what distinguishes this revisionist position is that power can be 
observed in both action and inaction. Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p.952) argue 
that to analyse both decision-making and non-decision making, the researcher 
 
would examine the extent to which and the manner in which the status 
quo orientated persons and groups influence those community values 
and those political institutions... which tend to limit the scope of 
actual decision-making to ‘safe’ issues. 
 
A non-decision making situation exists when the dominant values and existing 
power relations prevent grievances from becoming fully fledged issues which 
require decisions to be made (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963). With the knowledge 
of the possible restrictions inherent in the distribution of power, Bachrach and 
Baratz posit that researchers can only then go on to utilise the methods of the 
pluralists to analyse power. 
 
The basis of the two faces of power thesis hinges on the claim that the 
mobilisation of bias and latent interests can be empirically observed as 
expressed grievances that are not sufficiently acted upon by democratic 
institutions.  Highlighting these instances in relation to the dominant values of 
a community, they argue, renders non-decision making a subject for 
observation and analysis (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963). However, the claims of 
the two faces of power thesis and its pluralist predecessor have been 
subjected to critique by Lukes (1974; 2005). 
 
Three-dimensional Power 
 
The position taken by Lukes (1974, 2005) emerges out of a series of criticisms 
of the one-dimensional (pluralist) and two-dimensional (revisionist) accounts. 
It is premised on a Gramscian analysis of interest shaping that introduces the 
concept of hegemony into studies of power. Gramsci's (1971) theory of 
hegemony is based on the notion that a dominant group is able to project 
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both cultural domination through ideological shaping of civil society, and 
‘direct domination’ through the state, in which the use of violence in order to 
subordinate a population is no longer necessary.   
 
In the context of hegemonic groups, Lukes' theory is premised on the grounds 
that society is characterised by an unequal distribution of power and 
resources.  From this basis, the three-dimensional power thesis claims to 
advance a critical study of power, whereby the situation in which A 
manipulates B's objective interests invokes a critique of A (Hay, 1997). Lukes’ 
approach develops the faces of power debate, but it is compromised by 
retaining the limited Hobbesian approach that addresses ‘power over’ only. 
 
Lukes (2005) does not reject out of hand the pluralist and revisionist 
accounts, but argues that they have not fully grasped the concept of power. 
His conception of three-dimensional power challenges them on 
methodological terms, by arguing that both accounts place too great an 
emphasis on methodological individualism. In focusing on the underlying 
problem of behaviouralism, Lukes develops three criticisms of the two faces 
of power thesis. The first criticism that Lukes (2005) posits is that the two 
faces view remains concerned only with observable conflict, whether overt or 
latent. While they seek to advance the case that non-decision making can be 
empirically observed, this is limited only to grievances that are articulated 
but not addressed in the public domain. Bachrach and Baratz undermine the 
basis of their own critique of pluralism by retaining a moderately 
behaviouralist position in their analysis.  
 
Secondly, in criticising the methodological individualist perspective as 
revealing a two-dimensional concept of power, Lukes (2005) expands the 
scope to cases where grievances do not come to be articulated because of 
interest shaping. Keen not to provide an overly individualist nor an overly 
structuralist account, Lukes (2005, p.26) posits that power relations must be 
seen as 
 
a function of collective forces and social arrangements... [o]f course, 
such collectivities and organisations are made up of individuals – but 
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the power they exert cannot be simply conceptualised in terms of 
individuals' decisions or behaviour.   
 
The third criticism is closely related to the second. Lukes agrees that power 
may well be exercised in A getting B to do something they otherwise would 
not, as in the pluralist view. He also agrees that power may also be exercised 
in A not acting upon B's grievances, as in the two faces of power thesis. 
Additionally, Lukes (2005, p.27) contends that power is exercised in the 
shaping of interests so that B is not aware of her/his actual grievances: ‘the 
most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent... conflict from arising 
in the first place’.   
 
To address the absence of interest shaping through the collective action of 
groups, classes or institutions, and systemic organisational effects in the first 
two dimensions of power, three-dimensional power assesses not only the 
actions of individuals but also their beliefs. In this sense Lukes provides an 
account that follows the critical theory tradition of ideology critique by 
highlighting the shaping of beliefs and articulated interests through interest 
shaping. Lukes (2005, p.27) states that ‘A may exercise power over B by 
getting him [sic] to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises 
power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants’. 
 
The three-dimensional concept of power retains the analysis of power in 
relation to interests (or wants) but also indicates that the action (or inaction) 
of individuals can be shaped insidiously by other individuals, groups, collective 
forces and social institutions. Lukes retains the concept of ‘power over’ and 
posits that the objective interests of B are manipulated, constrained or 
dominated by the subjective interests of A. Contrastingly, ‘power to’, or 
individual or collective autonomy, is absent in this top-down account of 
hegemonic power relations (Stewart, 2001). Three-dimensional power shifts 
the behaviouralist conceptions towards ideology critique. It relates to 
decision-making and control over the agenda, to issues and potential issues, 
observable and latent conflict, and crucially, to subjective and objective 
interests. 
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The Problem of ‘Objective’ Interests 
 
Lukes’ account is problematic because, on the one hand, it is claimed that 
power is ‘essentially contested’, that the concept will always involve debates 
surrounding its proper uses and characteristics (Lukes, 2005, p.30; also Gallie, 
1956). However, on the other hand, Lukes (2005, p.16) claims that his 
conception of power provides a ‘deeper’ and ‘more satisfactory analysis of 
power relations’ than previous accounts. But Lukes’ purported ‘radical view’ 
of power succumbs to the problem of identifying ‘objective’ interests, whilst 
remaining concerned with the analysis of power in society as it exists. The 
consequence of avoiding an ethical value position means that Lukes’ approach 
is limited and retains a tacit conservatism. Following Hay (1997; 2002) this is 
due to the conflation of analysis and critique in the three dimensions 
perspective. To overcome this, interests must be addressed in relation to 
accounts of power that engage in both analysis and critique from a normative 
standpoint. 
 
A critical theory of power must differentiate between analytical statements 
that identify power in existing social relations, and normative-evaluative 
critical statements concerning the appropriateness of the distribution and 
uses of power in society (Hay, 1997). For Sayer (2011) this relates to the 
distinction between critical evaluations of ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Indeed, all 
perspectives in social science are unavoidably value-laden, normative and 
ethical rather than neutral, empirical or dispassionate (Hay, 2002; Sayer, 
1997; 2009; 2011). For Hay (1997, p.49), ‘much of the appeal of [Lukes'] 
argument resides in his ability to present an essentially value-laden critical 
conception of power as a neutral analytical category’.  However, in doing so, 
the critical aspect of Lukes' account is weakened because the pertinent issue 
of identifying what constitutes ‘objective’ interests is ambiguously left to the 
realm of ethics and moral values.   
 
Lukes (2005, p.146) claims that ‘[t]here can be an empirical basis for 
identifying real interests, which is not up to A, but to B exercising choice 
under conditions of relative autonomy and, in particular, independently of A's 
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power – e.g. through democratic participation’. This statement implies that 
individuals require autonomy and access to information (and the capability to 
use this information meaningfully) in order to make informed democratic 
decisions about what their real interests might be. However, Lukes does not 
commit himself to the concepts of autonomy or democratic participation as 
necessary aspects of ‘objective’ interests. Doing so would require Lukes to 
expand upon this claim in order to consider what form of power relations are 
required for ‘conditions of relative autonomy’. 
 
Hay (2002, pp.183-4) points out that Lukes’ idealised alternative is thus 
implied to be ‘a world free from power relations’ and, therefore ‘power 
becomes a purely pejorative concept... power cannot be exercised 
responsibility or legitimately’. It is here that Hindess (1996) claims that Lukes 
follows much second generation critical theory in adjudicating between ‘false 
needs’ that are manipulated by power as domination in a dichotomy with the 
‘real needs’ which exist in the hitherto unrealised domain of freedom (e.g. 
Marcuse, 1964).  
 
Instead, analysis and critique of existing power relations requires with it 
evaluation, and an ethical conception of how power relations ought to be.  
This entails an account of tensions within and between social institutions and 
organisations, and the actions of individuals and collectives, the role that 
power has in both of these, and the possibility of transforming tensions and 
exploitation in a positive direction. This position is rejected by Lukes (1977) 
who maintains that power can only be agential and never structural.  
 
Realist theories concerning empowerment, discussed below, adopt critical 
standpoints for analysis and critique of power that consider structure and 
agency. However, the relationship between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ is 
disputed.  For example, some claim that the notion of ‘power over’ simply 
fails to describe the concept of power (Arendt, 1958, 1986), while others 
include both ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ in their theories (Gőhler, 2009, 
Isaac, 1987a, 1987b). These more radical views take overtly egalitarian and 
democratic ethical positions to critically analyse power. 
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Benton (1981) provides a useful link between the hegemonic theory of Lukes 
and theories of empowerment. Benton’s (1981, p.171) take on the 
unavoidable value-dependence of claims to 'objective' interests asserts that  
 
[e]ven where a socialist (or libertarian, or communitarian, etc.) form of 
life is used as a mere standard of comparison, without commitment to 
its historical inevitability, the conditions of possibility for such a 
conception of interests include at least: (i) a coherent conception of a 
socialist (etc.) form of life, (ii) the demonstration that such a form of 
life is a real historical possibility, and (iii) a thesis as to the 
preferability of such a form of life over and above the prevailing one.  
 
In light of this, it remains to consider how the issue of ‘objective’ interests 
highlighted by Lukes may be redeemed without regressing to relativism. The 
three dimensional perspective separates ‘interests’ from ‘wants’.  For the 
pluralist and revisionist accounts this distinction is unproblematic, as agents 
act on their actual interests. In other words, interests and wants are the same 
thing.  For Callinicos (2004), these are based on a utilitarian theory of action 
which assumes that the agent’s expressed interests are synonymous with the 
ends chosen. In the case of the first two faces of power, ‘to say that doing x is 
in A’s interest is to give A a reason for doing x’ (Callinicos, 2004, p.139; also 
Connolly, 1983). In both pluralist and revisionist accounts power is treated as 
‘an overtly or covertly conflictual relation between agents coercively 
advancing well-understood, self-defined interests against the interests of 
other agents’ (Digeser, 1992, p.979). 
 
Lukes’ conception of power breaks this association by positing that subjective 
interests (or wants) are shaped by power relations, and counter to this are the 
agents’ ‘objective’ or ‘real’ interests. However, this claim opens up the 
possibility that the social theorist may be arbitrarily imposing his or her views 
about the ‘real’ interests of the agents (Callinicos, 2004). Lukes has either 
resurrected the false consciousness thesis by claiming to be able to ascribe 
objective interests or is open to the charges of moral relativism by being 
unable to provide a special status for values, which negates the critical status 
of his theory (Benton, 1981, for a response see Lukes, 2008).   
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Wright (1978, 1985) proposes a view of interests that moves towards the 
development of genuinely critical perspectives on power, which can also 
analyse power in terms of both social structure and human agency.  For Wright 
(1978, p.88), ‘interests’ can only be those that ‘become actual objectives of 
real struggles’. This refers to interests that are not based on individuals as 
rational utility-maximizing actors, but rather on collectivities and the 
potential inherent in them for collective action (Wright, 1978).   
 
Two types of interests are contained within collectivities, which Wright (1978, 
p.89) views from the perspective of class analysis: ‘[i]mmediate class 
interests constitute interests within a given structure of social relations; 
fundamental interests centre on interests which call into question the 
structure of social relations themselves’. For example, capitalist markets 
frame the immediate economic interests of the working class in struggling for 
higher wages, protecting jobs from cuts and securing access to education.  
However, fundamental interests are those that challenge the structures of 
capitalism in which immediate interests are constituted, with the aim of 
transforming these structures towards an alternative form of social 
organisation, such as democratic socialism (see Wright, 2010). Moreover, 
immediate interests are not considered to be ‘false interests’ or examples of 
‘false consciousness’, but rather are incomplete class interests that do not 
challenge structured power relations. Wright highlights the example of the 
struggle for better wages as an immediate interest that challenges the 
conditions of workers. However, ‘the restriction of struggles to questions of 
wages... reflects an incomplete understanding of the nature of capitalist 
society as a whole, for it fails to grasp the possibility of transcending the 
entire system of capitalist exploitation through socialism’ (Wright, 1978, 
p.90). 
 
In these terms, the fundamental interests of the working class involve an 
increase in freedom and autonomy to fulfil their potential.  This is because in 
Wright’s (1985, p.249) view ‘people in general have a desire for freedom.  In 
so far as the actual capacity that individuals have to make choices and act 
upon them – their real freedom – is shaped systematically by the class 
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structure, they have objective class interests based on this real interest in 
freedom’. The critical standpoint of freedom (or emancipation) is considered 
in the conclusion to this chapter, where it is suggested that the tripartite 
scheme of freedom, equality and solidarity that make up the democratic 
dialectic more adequately develops this view of real interests in democratic 
societies. 
 
Wright’s approach to interests critiques existing social relations, in this case 
along the lines of class, from the standpoint of an alternative possible form of 
social life. This view can be reconciled with the three-dimensional power 
thesis only if one accepts that Lukes’ model is ‘an invitation to an ethical 
critique of power relations as distinct from an analytical technique for the 
identification of power relations’ (Hay, 2002, p.183).  It is from this basis that 
power theories that include the positive aspect of empowerment can make 
critical sense of existing power relations and legitimately argue for social 
changes. 
 
From Power to Social Empowerment 
 
Ball (1988; 1992) highlights three new theories of power that emerged from 
critiques of the faces of power debate: deconstructionist, communicative, 
and realist. Deconstructionist theories of power share some affinity with the 
realist approach (Ball, 1992), but following Foucault (1980), Hayward (1998, 
p.9), for example, is concerned with ‘power as the network of social 
boundaries that delimit fields of possible action’, rather than ‘the productive 
capacity of structures and structured relations’ (Bates, 2010, p.372). Given 
the critical realist basis for this thesis realist and communicative theories are 
more useful for empirical research that focuses on both ‘power to’ and ‘power 
over’, and social structure and human agency, rather than regressing to 
‘power over’ in the post-structuralist form of a fourth face of disciplinary 
power (Digeser, 1992). The following discussion introduces the distinction 
between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ in communicative (Arendt, 1986; 
Habermas, 1977) and realist theories of power (Isaac, 1987a; Bates, 2010). 
Following criticisms of both the faces of power debate and communicative 
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power, it is concluded that realist approaches to power are consistent with 
the need to incorporate ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, and both structure and 
agency into a critical power theory, which shifts the emphasis from analysing 
power located within individual actors, to assessing it as subject to structural 
and agential factors which highlight the transformative capability of power, 
with negative and positive implications. It is posited that the realist 
conception of power sufficiently accounts for both structure and agency, 
which is necessary for grounding the social quality concept of social 
empowerment (Herrmann, 2012).  
 
Communicative and Realist Theories of Power 
 
The communicative and realist theories of power make a key distinction 
between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. Göhler (2009, pp.28-29, original 
emphasis) states that 
 
[e]xcerising power over within a social relation always produces a 
negative result for those subjected to it, because it narrows their field 
of action... A’s autonomy within a power relationship necessarily means 
correspondingly less power for B. Power to, on the other hand... is not 
directed at others, but at the individual or the group as actors 
themselves. The focus is not on the effects of power on others, those 
subjected to it, but on power as the ability to act autonomously. In this 
sense power is constitutive for society. 
 
In distinguishing between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’, Pitkin (1972, p.276) 
asks not what power is, as the faces of power theorists do, but how the word 
‘power’ is used. She is critical of the assumption that power can be equated 
with ‘influence’, ‘authority’, ‘coercion’ or ‘interests’ (Pitkin, 1972, pp.274-
279).  
 
Adopting this critical stance, the communicative conception of power 
emerged primarily from the philosophical thought of Arendt (1958; 1986) and 
Habermas (1977). This section considers how Arendt’s theory of 
communicative power has developed the concept from the faces of power 
debate. Further, Göhler’s (2000; 2009) reworking of Arendt’s theory leads 
towards an account of power that incorporates both ‘power over’ and ‘power 
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to’. This development is taken up by realist conceptions that emphasise social 
power as corresponding to the capacities for action in the context of social 
relations (Isaac, 1987a; 1987b). 
 
Arendt (1958; 1986) provides a radical theory of power which equates the 
concept unequivocally with empowerment. For Arendt (1986) the faces of 
power theorists are referring to the associated concepts of force, strength, 
authority or violence, rather than power. Arendt (1986, pp. 63-64) sees the 
lack of attention to the linguistic meanings of words such as ‘strength’, 
‘force’, ‘authority’, and ‘violence’ as problematic, which are particularly 
conflated in the behaviouralist analysis of power.  For example, Dahl (1957, 
p.202) explains that his ‘simple, intuitive’ concept of power can also refer to 
‘influence’ or ‘control’, which are separate concepts in Arendt’s view. In 
setting out her concept of power, Arendt differentiates between power and 
strength, force, authority or violence.  
 
‘Strength’ refers to a ‘property inherent in an object or person... which may 
prove itself in relation to other things or persons, but is essentially 
independent of them’ (Arendt, 1986, p.64). The word ‘force’ often is related 
to violence or coercion in much power theory but for Arendt (1986, p.65) it 
indicates ‘the energy released by physical or social movements’. ‘Authority’ is 
a property which is vested in persons or offices and is characterised by 
‘unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion 
nor persuasion is needed’ (Arendt, 1986, p.65). Lastly, ‘violence’ is 
instrumental in nature, and is often used for the purpose of multiplying 
natural strength (Arendt, 1986, p.65).  
 
Instead, Arendt (1958, p.200) argues that power should instead be seen as 
‘power to’, or the potential for collective action. It is a communicative 
concept of action because it refers to the capacity for people to speak and 
act in concert, such that power ‘is what keeps the public realm, the potential 
space of appearance between acting and speaking men [sic], in existence’ 
(Arendt, 1958, p.200). In this interpretation, relations of power necessarily 
involve the actions of free and equal people, otherwise it is not power that is 
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being exercised but something else, such as strength, violence, and so on 
(Bell, 1988). Two conditions must be satisfied for this to be so, firstly, agents 
must be equipped with communicative competence, that is, the ability to 
communicate adequately in ‘speech-acts’, and secondly, that other agents 
must be capable of understanding and acting upon a particular ‘speech-act’ 
(Bell, 1988, pp.91-92). For Arendt (1986, p.64), this linguistic 
conceptualisation of power relates specifically to social interactions within 
groups: 
 
[p]ower corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a 
group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps 
together.  When we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually 
refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in 
their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated 
to begin with (potestas in populo, without a people or group there is no 
power), disappears, ‘his power’ also vanishes. 
 
Power is the potential for autonomous action, which is realised through the 
communicative capacities of individuals within groups or communities. It is 
inherently a creative property of social action as ‘[p]ower is actualised... 
where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and 
deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to create new realities’ (Arendt, 
1958, p.200). For Arendt (1986, p.68), power refers explicitly to 
empowerment, and as an end in itself, it ‘needs no justification, being 
inherent in the very existence of political communities’.  In other words, 
power constitutes society.   
 
Arendt’s theory has been critically embraced and developed by Habermas 
(1977), who contrasts the communicative model of action in Arendt’s 
conception of power with the teleological model of action in Weber’s (1968) 
voluntarist view of power. In Weber’s teleological model of action  
 
an individual subject (or a group that can be regarded as an individual) 
chooses the appropriate means to realise a goal that it has set for 
itself... To the extent that his [sic] success depends on the behaviour of 
another subject, the actor must have at his disposal the means to 
instigate the other to the desired behaviour (Habermas, 1977, p.3).   
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This model assumes that people are purposive-rational actors, from whom the 
only motivation is the instrumental success of their own action, secured by 
the threat of sanctions, by persuasion or ‘by a clever channelling of choices’ 
(Habermas, 1977, pp.3-4). The teleological model of action shares affinity 
with agent-centred and rational actor models that influence the faces of 
power debate.   
 
On the other hand, Arendt’s model of action derives from communication: 
‘[t]he fundamental phenomenon of power is not the instrumentalisation of 
another’s will, but the formation of a common will in a communication 
directed to reaching agreement’ (Habermas, 1977, p.4). This model of action 
contains a participatory democratic impulse in that it is not concerned with 
competing individual interests but is oriented to collective agreement reached 
by rational participants. Habermas (1977) identifies a pertinent weakness in 
Arendt’s account concerning her narrow understanding of politics. This is that 
her account is bound to an Aristotelian understanding of politics and public 
life, which is no longer relevant in the context of the modern nation-state and 
capitalist economy. Habermas (1977, p.15) states that  
 
a politics which is cleansed of the administrative processing of socio-
economic issues; an institutionalisation of public liberty which is 
independent of the organisation of public wealth; a radical democracy 
which inhibits its liberating efficacy just at the boundaries where 
political oppression ceases and social repression begins – this path is 
unimaginable for any modern society. 
 
But Habermas (1977) also identifies value in Arendt’s communicative theory 
which relates to the need for legitimate uses of power. Against the Hobbesian 
mechanistic tradition, Habermas (1977, pp.17-18) points out that force or 
violence alone does not endow the actor with power, but rather that power is 
derived from legitimacy, which is secured through communication. In contrast 
to the Hobbesian understanding of ‘power over’,  
 
it is not at all clear that someone should be able to generate legitimate 
power simply because he is in a position to prevent others from 
pursuing their interests. Legitimate power arises only among those who 
form common convictions in unconstrained communication (Habermas, 
1977, p.18, original emphasis). 
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However, Göhler (2000; 2009) argues that it is not necessary to eradicate the 
distinction between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ in favour of the latter, as the 
communicative conception of power does. To reconcile these two aspects of 
power he suggests that while they are ‘intuitively illuminating’, they are both 
‘ambiguous and mutually entwined’ (Göhler, 2009, p.35). On the one hand, 
‘power to’ as potential is ‘the capacity to achieve something’, and on the 
other hand, when ‘power to’ is actualised, it is the continuous process of 
‘generating... the autonomous empowerment of an individual or a group’ 
(Göhler, 2009, p.34). When ‘power over’ is actualised, it refers to ‘manifest 
influence... related to an addressee with a relationship of wills’, and when 
‘power over’ is potential, it is the self-binding of a community to a set of 
fundamental norms and is only questioned when the norm is violated (Göhler, 
2009, p.35).  
 
To make sense of these diverging aspects of power, Göhler proposes transitive 
power and intransitive power. In Göhler’s (2009, p.35) view 
 
[p]ower referring to the outside is transitive power, i.e. power which 
translates the will of an actor into another actor’s will and thereby 
exercises influence. Power referring to the inside, i.e. power as self-
reference, is intransitive power, i.e. power that is produced and 
preserved by itself, by society. 
 
This means that ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ are necessarily bound up with 
each other in their potential and actualisation. The implications of Göhler’s 
distinction between transitive power and intransitive power are that, firstly, 
empowerment is necessarily a part of a more complex theory of power. 
Secondly, the study of power and empowerment within social relations 
requires a focus on the tension between the transitive and intransitive 
dimensions of power, or restrictive and enabling aspects of power. Thirdly, 
agents cannot be the sole locus of power, given the way in which human 
interaction is socially shaped (but not completely determined). This last point 
draws attention to both the structural and agential sources of power (Bates, 
2010). 
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Freire (1993) discusses power in a way that imports normative values into the 
concepts of power, structure and agency. He advocates a critical pedagogy 
whereby those who are oppressed (directly or indirectly subject to actualised 
transitive power) are liberated by the knowledge and capabilities to make 
informed choices about matters that affect their lives by, in Göhler’s terms, 
actualising intransitive power (or as developed below, through processes of 
social empowerment). 
 
Freire (1993, p.37) views a situation of oppression as one in which ‘A 
objectively exploits B or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a 
responsible person’. This (transitive) power, when actualised, creates 
exploitation, domination or oppression for those subjected to it. In exploiting 
others, oppressors deny both the humanity of the oppressed and their own 
humanity. From a normative position of humanisation, Freire posits that 
where A exploits B, A’s use of power over B is a relationship in which both B 
and A are dehumanised. Freire (1993) takes the critical-normative standpoint 
that the purpose of human life is to become conscious of the incompleteness 
of humanity and to follow the vocation of becoming more human. This would 
mean for Göhler’s concept of power that society should seek to minimise 
actualised transitive power (as oppression) and attempt to facilitate the 
actualisation of intransitive power (as social empowerment). This shifts power 
theory from naïve empiricist descriptions of the exercise of power (or agenda 
setting or interest shaping) to analysis and critique of the enabling and 
oppressive aspects of power in social relationships, viewed from the 
standpoint of emancipation (Bhaskar, 1989). 
 
This is expressed in Freire's (1993) thought as a dialectic between oppression, 
exploitation, injustice, and violence on the one hand, and freedom, justice 
and humanity on the other. In pursuing this vocation, action and critical 
reflection are integral to developing the possibility of humanisation. The task 
for Freire’s concept of power is not to provide a utopian vision of a world free 
from power, but rather to conceptualise a social order in which power 
relations exist to enhance freedom, justice and humanity.  
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Integral to Freire’s (1993) assertion is the claim that the flourishing of 
humanity requires both the oppressed and oppressors to become conscious of 
injustice, deprivation and exploitation and resolve to solidarity in collectively 
addressing these problems:  
 
[t]he pursuit of full humanity... cannot be carried out in isolation or 
individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity; therefore it cannot 
unfold in the antagonistic relations between oppressors and oppressed.  
No one can be authentically human while he prevents others from 
being so (Freire, 1993, p.66). 
 
The pursuit of humanity is not determined by history but is enhanced by 
critical reflection and action (praxis) in changing social structures and 
individual consciousness. Central to this assertion is the stipulation that the 
oppressors cannot solely act on behalf of the oppressed as a vanguard, but 
rather ‘[t]he oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their 
redemption’ (Freire, 1993, p.36). This can be achieved through a critical 
pedagogy in two stages. In the first stage, the oppressed become conscious of 
their oppression and through praxis transform themselves and wider social 
relations. In other words, the development of self-binding collectivities 
(through class consciousness, social mobilisation, and so on) is transformed 
into empowerment. In the second stage, the pedagogy becomes a pedagogy of 
all of the people ‘in the process of permanent liberation... through the 
expulsion of the myths, created and developed in the old order’ (Freire, 1993, 
pp.36-7). The resolution of the dialectic between oppressors and oppressed 
has an egalitarian outcome: the disappearance of the dominant class of 
oppressors. 
 
Freire (1993) pre-empts Bhaskar’s transformative model of social action 
(Chapter 2), when he argues that human beings produce social reality through 
their historical interactions, which in time, turn back upon them and 
condition them. The task of human beings is to resist this conditioning and 
historically pursue the transformation of reality. In this way, subjectivity 
(human consciousness) and objectivity (reality) exist in a constant dialectical 
relationship (Freire, 1993). The aim is not to resolve this tension but to 
become critically aware of it, and to act on it and transform it. This requires 
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the relationship between social institutions and organisations, and individuals 
and groups to be reconceived according to power relationships that emphasise 
collective humanisation. This focus on empowerment can be developed 
further as an analytical perspective by the realist understanding of power, 
agency, structure and change (Bates, 2010; Isaac, 1987a, 1987b; Layder, 
1994). 
 
Isaac (1987a, p.14; also Harré & Madden, 1975, pp.82-100) criticises the 
behaviouralism of the faces of power debate which treats power as an 
empirical concept, and ignores the metaphysical aspect of ‘socially structured 
and culturally patterned’ power. Structure in realist terms relates to ‘pre-
existing symbols, norms, and rules... understood as the relatively enduring 
relations in which social agents find themselves, and through which they act 
to achieve their purposes as they understand them’, although in everyday life 
‘structures are usually unacknowledged, and unintentionally reproduced’ 
(Isaac, 1990, p.6).  
 
Giddens (1976, 1979, 1984) provides a rival ‘structuration’ theory, which sees 
structure and agency as a duality, and in which power is located within 
freedom and constraint between actors. This model builds on an earlier 
critique of structural functionalism (Giddens, 1968). However, Giddens has 
been criticised for neglecting the power intrinsic to structure, by separating 
out structure as simply ‘rules and resources’ and systems, as ‘reproduced and 
regular social practices’, which underplays the contextual and relatively 
enduring role of structural power, and like Lukes and the behaviouralists, 
locates power in human agency (Layder, 1994, pp.381-383). In Giddens’ 
model, this reduction implies a voluntarist conception of agency (Patomäki, 
1991). 
 
Instead, setting out the case for a realist conception of power, structure and 
agency, Layder (1994, p.385) states that 
 
[t]he power of agents… cannot be comprehensively understood simply 
from the point of view of the actions of agents [as individuals or 
groups], and specific exercises of power. The power of agents is 
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structurally embodied, and conditions the actions of specific agents. It 
is true of course that specific agents do have power over [others], and 
that their concrete relationships… are characterised by imbalances of 
power, but it must be remembered that these imbalances are 
ultimately founded upon, and maintained by, structural power. 
 
Even Lukes’ (1977) treatment of structure and power limits power to that 
exercised by particular agents. Rather, the realist view of power is ‘concerned 
with the ascription of powers to social agents, and with the explanatory 
reference to agents’ intrinsic natures’ (Isaac, 1987a, p.21, added emphasis). 
These intrinsic natures refer not to ‘their unique characteristics as 
individuals, but their social identities as participants in [relatively] enduring, 
socially structured relationships’ (Isaac, 1987a, p.21). 
 
This shift in emphasis from power located within and used by independent 
individuals to relations of social power draws attention to the underlying 
social structures that determine, enable or constrain social interaction. For 
Isaac (1987a, p.22) social power refers to ‘the capacities to act possessed by 
social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate’. 
This definition of power not only incorporates both ‘power over’ and ‘power 
to’, but allows for analysis of relations of subordination or domination and the 
different and contingent capacities for individuals and groups to act within 
those relations by virtue of their social position, or to contest and transform 
them. Similarly to the dialectic of humanisation proposed by Freire, Bates 
(2010, p.354) states that 
 
[o]nly by understanding fully how social structures motivate, compel, 
constrain, and enable the behaviour of actors and how they 
(potentially) give rise to and connect with transformative action are we 
able to transcend, rather than ameliorate, existing power relations and 
states of affairs. 
 
Contingency and temporality in power relations is important as this draws 
attention to historical change and the relatively enduring nature of social 
structures that are not immutable (Isaac, 1987a; 1987b). This means that 
while both structures and agents intrinsically possess causal powers, they do 
not necessarily exercise them, depending on the contingent conditions of 
human societies. 
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In the realist theory of power, both structures and agents are ontologically 
irreducible, but crucially, are empirically related phenomena (Archer, 1995; 
Bates, 2010). By making this distinction it is possible for a relational concept 
of power which incorporates both its restrictive-dominating and capacity-
building aspects that does not reduce power to the property of rational utility 
maximising or voluntarist individuals on the one hand, or to the determinism 
of structural functionalism on the other hand. As Bates (2010, pp.369-370) 
highlights 
 
[h]uman action is not a mere reflection of structural circumstances and 
agents do not merely fit into or bear their societal position. Rather, 
people will have a multitude of different relations within society, which 
help to define them as individuals and which result in a myriad of 
different, often contrasting beliefs, desires, opinions, interests, etc. 
Furthermore, people are also intentional agents who have their own 
emergent human powers, such as the ability to reflect, consider, 
empathise, etc… which cannot be reduced to structural factors 
(although they can be affected by them). 
 
Bates (2010) cites the example of a worker who loses her job in an economic 
recession. For both Lukes and the behaviouralists, this is not considered to be 
an example of power relations as no agents have acted on the worker: her 
boss may have no rational choice but to terminate her employment in such an 
economic situation. By adopting a realist conception of these social relations, 
power can be identified in the structural relations of capitalist society which 
have the tendency to encourage particular activities and behaviour. However, 
as Bates (2010, p.371, original emphasis) states, 
 
the recession should not be seen as ‘structural’ in the sense of actors 
being powerless and simply enacting and transmitting the dictates of 
the structure. Although recessions and economic crises are an intrinsic 
part of the capitalist system and thus, unavoidable in the long term, 
their specific timing, shape and intensity are affected by a range of 
historical, institutional, and agential factors.  
 
This directs attention of social science to analysing power relations in terms 
of both structural and agential factors (‘powerful actors that could have acted 
otherwise’ Bates, 2010, p.371) in concrete empirical cases. 
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This view is supported by Westergaard and Resler (1976, p.141) who draw 
attention to the role of inequality and conflict, both potential and actualised, 
in capitalist societies: 
 
the pattern of people’s lives and their living conditions take the forms 
they do, not so much because somebody somewhere makes a series of 
decisions to that effect; but in large part because certain social 
mechanisms, principles, assumptions – call them what you will – are 
taken for granted. Typically, of course those mechanisms and 
assumptions favour the interests of this or that group vis-à-vis the rest 
of the population. The favoured group enjoys effective power, even 
when its members take no active steps to exercise power. They do not 
need to do so – for much of the time at least – simply because things 
work their way in any case. 
 
For Barbalet (1985), without regressing to a simple structural determinism, 
this draws attention to structural sources of power that provide the context 
for action, which are available to certain groups but not to others within 
societies stratified by class, gender, hegemony, and so on. In other words, 
determinism is a matter of degree, and the form of social relationships 
constituted by structural power relates to the degree of autonomy available 
to different individuals and groups. However, following the realist theory of 
power, human agents also possess causal power to transform structures. This 
has implications for the concept of social empowerment (discussed below) 
and democracy (Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
Social Empowerment 
 
It is in this context that the social quality concept of social empowerment 
that underpins the analysis and critique of democracy and the two empirical 
case studies in this thesis can be explicated. This perspective is influenced by 
Marshall’s (1981, p.150) view of power as ‘generated by self-realisation’, for 
whom this form of power is linked to the development of political, social, and 
civil rights in democratic societies. Herrmann (2012) posits that existing policy 
on empowerment does not invoke a meaningful critique of power relations or 
social structure and serves to emphasise individual responsibility or else 
adopts governance perspectives that subvert democracy (DCLG, 2008a; 
McLean & Andersson, 2009; Cabinet Office, 2011, see also Rose, 1996; 1999 on 
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governmentality). Rather, social empowerment can be defined as ‘the degree 
to which the personal capabilities and the ability of people to act are 
enhanced by social relations’ (Herrmann, 2012, p.202).  
 
This alternative perspective focuses on social empowerment as a positive 
social process and a relationship aimed at forming collective identities and 
self-realisation, rather than as a liberal indvidualist capability (Herrmann, 
2012, van der Maesen & Walker, 2012; see Chapter 5 for a discussion of liberal 
individualism in Sen’s capability perspective). Attention to this highlights two 
strands of approaches to empowerment, the first being a technical application 
of policies centred on the individual that leave the structural aspects of 
relations of (dis)empowerment uncontested (an aspect of liberalism), and a 
second ‘vision of increasing the power of the individual in control over his/her 
own life’ which necessitates attention to deeper social relational change in 
the processes of empowerment (Herrmann, 2012, p.206).   
 
This dual attention to individuals and social relations is pertinent. Social 
empowerment is strongly related to the realist theory of power as it conceives 
of empowerment as a process relating to both individual and group action and 
social structural relations. Social empowerment is therefore central to social 
quality for Herrmann (2012, p.201; 2005): 
 
as much as social quality aims in general at overcoming the 
methodological individualism which underlies – explicitly or implicitly – 
most of social science, it is in particular the centrality of 
empowerment as an objective component that makes it possible to 
grasp the dialectical relationship between the actor and structure and 
thus between the individual and soci(et)al.     
 
Therefore, distinct from the utilitarian, teleological, and communicative 
models of action, as highlighted by the faces of power debate and Habermas 
above, the social quality approach draws on a dialectical model of action, 
with reference to realism and Freire’s concept of dialectical humanisation 
(Herrmann, 2012). The empirical application of the concept centres not only 
on how the individual can develop the knowledge to ‘cope with given 
structural situations’, but draws attention to the transformative possibilities 
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of enabling ‘the person, individually or socially to adapt to a given situation; 
to cope with changes of situations; and to actively influence societal 
developments, that is to evoke and maintain changes’ (Herrmann, 2012, 
pp.202-203).  
 
This thesis assesses social empowerment in the context of participatory 
democracy in two case studies. The emphasis on participation, capabilities 
and social relations in the social quality approach underpins the central 
research question highlighted in the introductory chapter: to what extent, 
and in what ways, do participative democratic settings display evidence of 
social empowerment? Further, the social quality approach prescribes a series 
of indicators for each of the conditional factors of the model, including social 
empowerment (van der Maesen & Walker, 2005; Herrmann, 2005). The 
indicators are not simple naïve empiricist tools for measuring the quality of 
the social, but rather ‘are means of investigating the borders of a field in 
which relations are established and processes are developing’ (Herrmann, 
2012, p.212). For social quality, the social empowerment indicator especially 
relevant to this thesis is the ‘[e]xistence of processes of consultation and 
direct democracy’ (van der Maesen & Walker, 2005, p.21). This indicator 
establishes the crucial link between participatory democracy and social 
quality, and suggests attention to the social institutional processes of 
democracy, along with the quality of democratic participation and the extent 
that individual self-realisation can develop within participative democratic 
social relationships. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has critically reviewed the faces of power debate, situated in 
terms of its historical antecedents: Hobbes’ political philosophy and early-
twentieth century American elite power theory. It has been argued that the 
faces of power views neglect the tacit conservatism of their analysis, neglect 
structure and have a shared underpinning utilitarian theory of action. The 
second part of this chapter has reviewed communicative power and realist 
power. The communicative conception draws attention to the notion of 
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‘power to’ and cites Arendt’s view of power as the positive ability for a group 
to act in concert (empowerment). Habermas sympathetically critiques 
Arendt’s Aristotelian view of ‘power to’ by highlighting the communicative 
theory of action that underpins this view, compared with a further 
teleological model of action that underpins Weber’s voluntarist view. While 
the teleological and utilitarian models of action weaken conceptions of power 
by conceiving of human interests as unproblematic and acted on by 
intentional humans, Arendt’s concept of ‘power to’ is preferred by Habermas 
in developing a view of the realisation of the ‘power to’ act against 
oppression or suffering as unconstrained communication amongst equals. 
 
However, Göhler argues that it is not necessary to cast aside the distinction 
between positive ‘power to’ and negative ‘power over’. Rather, both are seen 
as intrinsic aspects of the transitive and intransitive dimensions of power. 
Adopting a more complex conception of power draws attention to 
empowerment, but also to the contingency of this within intransitive and 
transitive dimensions, restriction and enablement, and crucially the role of 
structural and agential sources of power and change. Freire’s dialectical 
model of action is taken up by realist theories of power that focus on the 
capacities of individuals as social beings to act by virtue of the enduring social 
relations in which they participate. From this basis, the social quality 
conception of social empowerment focuses positively on the sources of power 
in both social structures and human agency for self-actualisation. 
 
With this in mind, (critical) realists such as Bates (2010) and Bhaskar (1989) 
would argue that a critical analysis of power not only attempts to explain 
power relations but it should do this from the normative standpoint of 
promoting freedom as a form of emancipatory social science. However, the 
concept of freedom is problematic for both critical realism and social quality, 
as ‘it is caught in the tension between individualist (hedonist) and voluntarist 
attitudes on the one hand and a complete loss of individual control and 
decision-making power’ on the other hand (Herrmann, 2012, p.212).   
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Sayer (2009; 2011) addresses the concern with freedom from an emancipatory 
standpoint in critical social science and the dominant view of (negative) 
freedom maintained by libertarian perspectives (Chapter 5). This again runs 
the risk of reduction to an overly individualistic perspective. For Sayer, (2011, 
pp.225-226) freedom is fundamental but not sufficient, as  
 
[i]n one-sidedly emphasising freedom and seeing constraint as 
necessarily problematic, such critiques have a libertarian, individualist 
and masculinist character, and fail to acknowledge that we are 
dependent social beings, only able to live through others, and reliant 
on the care of others for significant parts of our lives.  
 
Rather than arguing for emancipation, drawing on the work of Sen and 
Nussbaum, Sayer (2011) proposes a critical social science that seeks to 
enhance capabilities (issues with the liberal individualist aspect of capabilities 
perspectives are discussed in Chapter 5). As a social relational alternative that 
adopts a realist view of power but avoids the implications of emancipation as 
an end-state, social empowerment focuses on how the capabilities of people 
to participate can be enhanced by social relations. This suggests an emphasis 
on the transformation of both enabling and constraining structures based on 
the terms of a normative value standpoint, such as democratic equality. For 
social empowerment, such an approach would seek, on egalitarian terms, a 
range of freedoms and constraints that would exist in socially structured and 
culturally patterned relationships which emphasise democratic equality, social 
citizenship and the capability of all to participate in society.  
 
The following two chapters introduce the democratic dialectic, which proffers 
a normative standpoint for the analysis of social empowerment in democratic 
settings. This perspective not only emphasises freedom, but avoids the 
potential libertarian individualist implications of the stance of specifically 
emancipatory critical social science, and capabilities perspectives, and 
recognises the inherent relationship between the values of freedom, equality 
and solidarity for social beings in democratic societies. The following two 
chapters argue that for social empowerment and improved social quality, the 
values of the democratic dialectic must be optimised. Participatory 
democratic social relations are posited as conducive to this optimisation.  
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Chapter 4 
Representative and Participatory 
Democracy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Democracy is commonly seen today as a normatively good thing. This has not 
always been the case as the capacity of people to self-govern has long been 
treated with suspicion. Even as the American and French Revolutions in the 
eighteenth century set in motion the formation of today’s modern 
representative democracies, Burke (1968) derided the notion of handing 
power to the ‘swinish multitude’. Since the turn of the twentieth century 
democracy has come to be viewed as a normatively good value that is 
conducive to the well-being of societies (Sen, 1999b), and ‘most regimes 
stake out some sort of claim to the title of ‘democracy’’, as even dictators 
adopt ‘the language of democracy’ (Dahl, 1989, p.2). As Dunn (1993, p.14) 
puts it ‘all states today profess to be democracies because a democracy is 
what is virtuous for a state to be’. Even those who chastise ‘the sudden 
eruption of primitive impulses, infantilisms and criminal propensities’ that 
they characterise as a consequence of popular enfranchisement in democratic 
societies feel the need to defend some form of the concept (Schumpeter, 
1976, p.258). More perniciously, ‘democracy’ has also been used in ideological 
terms to mean ‘the West in relation to both institutions and cultural norms’ 
(Catt, 1999, pp.4-5). 
 
Defining democracy cannot be reduced to a scientific formula or a universally 
agreed concept. Indeed, struggles for democracy throughout the last two and 
a half thousand years have been struggles both for democracy, and for the 
meaning of the concept (Hidalgo, 2008). Democracy is a normative value and 
its meaning is fiercely contested. Moreover, theories of democracy also have 
implications for the power relations in society (Catt, 1999). A distinction can 
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be made between two broad forms of democracy which have historically been 
subject to rival conceptions that are the central concern of this chapter. 
These are representative democracy; ‘a system of rule embracing elected 
‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent’ the interests and/or views of citizens 
within the framework of ‘the rule of law’’ and participatory democracy: ‘a 
system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly 
involved’ (Held, 2006, p.4). Although, Budge (2012, p.25) argues that the 
representative form should properly be seen in practice as ‘party democracy’, 
in which political parties compete by ‘offering alternative policy 
programmes... to the electorate’, who then vote for the programme that they 
prefer overall, and party discipline ensures the support of the programme by 
elected representatives in parliament.  
 
This chapter begins by discussing the growth of democracy as an idea and 
practice from Ancient Greece to modern representative democracies. The 
second section critically reviews representative theories of democracy, 
focusing on competitive elitist, pluralist and neo-pluralist variants. Following 
this, the case made by theorists of participatory democracy is discussed, 
including reference to deliberation as part of the content of participatory 
democracy. The final section applies the rival theories of democracy to liberal 
democracy and social democracy as ideal typologies at opposite (but not 
opposing) ends of a continuum. The prospects for a third participatory 
typology (as yet, unrealised in practice) are discussed with reference to 
empirical experiments in empowered participatory governance (Fung & 
Wright, 2003). This chapter provides the theoretical basis for the discussion of 
the dialectical values of the liberal, social and participatory typologies of 
democracy in Chapter 5. 
 
The History of Democracy 
 
From around 461 BC, Athens was the most notable Greek city-state in which 
democracy was instigated. The polis, a ‘small self-governing, self-sustaining 
entity’, was an autonomous political society rather than as a state in the 
modern sense (Arblaster, 2002, p.16). In the polis, citizens had a direct say in 
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the decision-making process in public assemblies. All citizens within the polis 
were considered to be equal, with only a few of the higher offices requiring 
property qualifications (Robinson, 2004).  In the ecclesia (public assembly), all 
citizens had an equal right to speak, and votes were cast by a show of hands 
(Harrison, 1993).  Indeed, the words demokratia and isonomia (equality) were 
often used interchangeably, the Athenians believing that all citizens had the 
capacity to engage successfully in the business of self-government (James, 
2005). 
 
Athenian democracy was not independent of economic and social inequalities 
however. ‘Citizens’ were defined in a particular way and citizenship was 
limited to propertied men only, to the exclusion of women, slaves, and 
foreigners (Dahl, 1989). The role of women in the home and the appropriation 
of slaves were seen by the Athenians as necessary economic preconditions for 
allowing citizens the freedom to engage in politics (Hornblower, 1992). 
Despite that the majority of the population were denied citizenship this was 
the birth of democracy. 
 
Sceptical of democracy, Aristotle (1984) considered the purpose of politics to 
be to realise the good life through the polis. Athenian democracy was a 
perversion of a form of government befitting citizenship: rule by the poor or 
the ‘indigent’, rather than rule by ‘the virtuous’ or ‘the best’, in which the 
selfish interests of the ‘needy’ are realised and not the common interest of all 
(Aristotle, 1984, pp.61-62). Plato (1955) identified three groups in Athenian 
democracy: firstly, the more energetic and charismatic who dominate – 
sullying claims of equal participation, second, those who are concerned with 
making money out of the system, and the final larger group; the apathetic. 
For Plato (1955), Athenian democracy had the potential to lead to tyranny. 
 
This widely accepted criticism confined democracy to the relative 
achievements of ancient Greece, until popular struggles for democracy were 
resumed from the sixteenth century onwards. In Britain this involved the 
Levellers, and later, the Chartists, the latter seeing ‘suffrage not so much as 
an end in itself’ but as a precursor to ‘revolutionary social and economic 
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change’ (Arblaster, 2002, p.96; Wootton, 1992). But the fear of rule by the 
people creating tyranny remained prevalent (Martin, 1961; Maletz, 2002). Mill 
(1991, p.8) saw democracy as suitable only for a sufficiently educated people: 
the tyranny of the uneducated majority was ‘among the evils against which 
society requires to be on its guard’. He also dismissed direct democracy: 
‘since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate 
personally in any but some very minor portions of public business, it follows 
that the ideal type of government must be representative’ (Mill, 1919, p.28). 
 
The American Revolution was a momentous event for the development of 
modern democracy. The revolutionary leaders sought to eradicate monarchical 
and hereditary privilege, and establish a system of government in which the 
most virtuous and most talented could rule (Wood, 1992). Combining the 
popular appeal of democracy with rule by ‘the best’, representative 
democracy was advocated by the American constitution (Harrison, 1993, 
p.66). The ancient Greek ‘political society’ was negated in viewing the state 
as an entity distinct from society (Wood, 1992). For Hobson (2008), this made 
modern forms of democracy viable in the era of emerging nation-states and 
capitalist economies. It also corresponds with ‘[t]he emergence of an 
individualistic conception of society’ (Bobbio, 1987, p.27).  
 
Advancing private interests became not only politically acceptable, but was 
the cornerstone of American democracy. Tocqueville (1998) remarked that 
democracy in America prioritised work for any end as honourable. The 
European notion of benevolent political rule in the interests of society simply 
did not fit with the new American democratic system that was based on 
competing interests. This reformulation of democracy included ‘the 
perception of society as a collection of disparate and even conflicting 
interests – such as those of rich and poor… [c]lass and inequality are accepted 
as permanent and ineradicable, and are embodied in an uneasy equilibrium 
within the political system itself’ (Arblaster, 2002, p.40). 
 
The French Revolution in 1789 was a further epoch changing event (Fontana, 
1992). It was fuelled, amongst other things, by the republican philosophy of 
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Rousseau (1987). For Rousseau (1987), the general interest of a democratic 
society could not be reduced to the sum of competing interests. Instead, the 
general will was derived not from the votes of self-interested individuals, but 
from a people deciding in the general interest of society. Moreover, without 
common interests, society could not exist. As Rousseau (1987, p.153) put it 
 
only the general will can direct the forces of the state according to the 
purpose for which it was instituted, which is the common good. For if 
the opposition of private interests made necessary the establishment of 
societies, it is the accord of these same interests that made it possible. 
It is what these different interests have in common that forms the 
social bond, and, were there no point of agreement among all these 
interests, no society could exist. For it is utterly on the basis of this 
common interest that society ought to be governed. 
 
Associated with the watchwords of the French Revolution; liberty, equality 
and fraternity, came the view that ‘[a] democratic society was one in which 
the mass of the people played an active rather than a passive role, and in 
which the old traditions of deference and subordination had been replaced by 
a sense of equality among the people’ (Arblaster, 2002, p.43). Though Dahl 
(1989, p.216) argues that despite these rival developments, democracy was in 
practice based on pragmatic modifications of existing institutions: 
‘movements to democratise the governments of national states in Europe and 
America did not begin with a tabula rasa’.  
 
Where liberals and conservatives rallied against the tyranny of the majority, 
more subtle arguments were developed in the twentieth century that warned 
of the dangers posed by ‘mass society’ (Michels, 1949). Among theories of 
twentieth century representative democracy are competitive elitism 
(Schumpeter, 1976), pluralism (Dahl, 1956, 1961; Polsby, 1960, 1963) and neo-
pluralism (Dahl, 1985; Lindblom, 1977, 1982). In these theories the 
democratic process is presented as a system in which the role of the masses is 
not to self-govern but to select from competitive and professional political 
parties, who then get on with the business of government. Alternative 
theories of participatory democracy argue against minimal participation in 
actually existing representative democracies, proposing that the deepening of 
participation in political institutions and extension of democracy further into 
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social and economic life is still an important issue. This concern is found in 
the work of participatory and deliberative theorists of democracy (Cohen & 
Rogers, 1983; Dryzek, 2000; Fung & Wright, 2003; Gould, 1988; Macpherson, 
1977; Pateman, 1970; Wright, 2010). Fuchs (2007, p.36) argues that 
 
[I]f antique democracy is seen as the ideal, modern democracy is 
indeed a pale imitation... Instead of actual self-government, there is 
only choice of the rulers by the ruled and more or less effective control 
of government by the demos. Instead of joint and deliberative opinion-
building by the demos, there are at best advocatory discussions in the 
mass media limited to a small selection of subjects that need to be 
decided. Instead of an authentic popular will that substantively 
constitutes a common good, the decisions made in [representative] 
democracies are a procedural aggregation of particular group interests. 
In modern democracy the demos is not a collective subject but a 
collection of individual subjects. 
 
On this view minimal political equality in the form of equal votes is 
compromised by social and economic inequality. The economic power of 
businesses impinges on political power in capitalist democracies, largely 
making the distinction between the two irrelevant (Thurow, 1996; Lindblom, 
1977; 1982).   
 
The struggle between people and their communities for participation in a 
collective public life on the one hand, and the privatisation of public goods, 
and the power of corporations and the market on the other hand, has the 
legitimacy of elected government and democracy itself at stake in the early 
twenty-first century (Wainwright, 1994, 2009). The history of democracy has 
been played out in the context of vast social and economic transformation. 
Social and economic inequalities, present in the exclusion of the majority 
from citizenship in Athenian democracy to struggles for suffrage, to the 
influence of corporate power on narrow democratic processes today signify 
that democracy has always been constrained by its social and economic 
context. The following section discusses modern representative and 
participatory theories of democracy, while the final section situates these 
theories in ideal typologies of liberal, social and participatory democracy. 
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Representative and Participatory Theories of Democracy 
 
Variants of representative democratic theory can be categorised as elitist, 
pluralist and neo-pluralist. On the other hand, disenchantment with 
representative democracy is found in participatory theories. These include 
cosmopolitan, ‘politics of presence and difference’, ecological, associative, 
party-based direct models (Saward, 2001), along with models of discursive 
democracy (Dryzek, 1990), direct, social, substantive, deliberative, reflexive, 
strong, popular, radical, deep democracy (Pieterse, 2001), and expansive 
democracy (Warren, 1992). Of the new theories of ‘prefix democracy’, 
deliberative democracy is seen as the ‘dominant new strand’ (Saward, 2001, 
p.564). However, these theories all share a common thread of emphasising 
more participative processes, conceived in different values, institutional 
designs and practices.  
 
This section focuses on theories of representative and participatory 
democracy with reference to to social empowerment, in view of the concept’s 
focus on the participation of citizens in social relations that enhance 
capabilities. Differences between representative and participative theories 
are discussed in normative theoretical terms here, and representative 
democracy is developed in terms of liberal and social democratic typologies 
relating to existing societies in the following section, with participatory 
democracy proposed as a possible third typology. While representative 
democracy is often referred to as ‘liberal democracy’ (Fuchs, 2007), liberal 
and social variants of representative democracy are highlighted in this 
chapter. 
 
Representative Democracy 
 
This section describes elitist, pluralist and neo-pluralist theories of 
representative democracy that emerged in the twentieth century. 
Schumpeter’s (1976) competitive elitist view of democracy was part of the 
liberal intellectual tradition of the 1930s and 1940s (Turner, 2008). 
Schumpeter (1976) shared Weber’s belief in the increasing rationalisation and 
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bureaucratisation of social production but lamented that this would signify 
the ‘creative destruction’ of capitalism and the end of the classical liberal 
era. From this, a despotic form of collectivist state-managed socialism would 
emerge. With this pessimistic projection, Schumpeter saw limited use for 
democracy in modern capitalist societies.  
 
Schumpeter (1976, p.269) defined democracy as an ‘institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. Democracy 
does not provide a means to the realisation of normative values such as a 
common good or self-development, and neither does it represent an end in 
itself. Instead it is viewed as a method for selecting political leaders; 
‘democracy cannot, any more than can any other method, be an end in itself’ 
(Schumpeter, 1976, p.242). Moreover, this methodological conception of 
democracy views participation as the act of choosing between two or more 
political parties with sufficiently different policy programs in elections. It is a 
narrow and limited concept of political equality that only corresponds to the 
equal value of each vote. Elite groups of political leaders compete for the 
support of the people, suggesting power held by elites over the majority in a 
stratified society, rather than politicians acting as representatives of the 
popular will of the people or even delegates empowered to act by the people. 
This reduces the role of citizens to that of disempowered and passive 
consumers, choosing between particular brands of political parties that are 
presented to them.   
 
The capacity of people to participate collectively in politics was viewed with 
disdain by Schumpeter. He argued that an elitist system of democracy is 
necessary because the development of mass society has led to ‘the sudden 
disappearance... of moral restraints and civilised modes of thinking and 
feeling, [and] the sudden eruption of primitive impulses, infantilisms and 
criminal propensities’ (Schumpeter, 1976, p.257). Taking the view of humans 
expressed by Freudian psychoanalysis, people are unlikely to be able to think 
beyond issues that directly concern themselves, as they are selfish and 
irrational individuals in need of elite leadership (Schumpeter, 1976).  
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Moreover, a singular classical model was seen by Schumpeter (1976, p.250) as 
the ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realises 
the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the 
election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will’. 
Despite a range of classical models of democracy rather than one model which 
have influenced new participatory theories (Held, 2006, see below), 
Schumpeter rejected the notion of a ‘common good’ as having totalitarian 
implications where people actually have very different wants and needs. 
 
While of descriptive value for actually existing democratic societies, Held 
(2006, p.153) criticises Schumpeter’s assumption ‘that empirical evidence 
about the nature of contemporary democracies could straightforwardly be 
taken as the basis for refuting the normative ideals enshrined in classic 
models’. Femia (1981, p.44) highlights the political inertia of uncritically 
embracing existing democracy, for ‘if abstractions like ‘democracy’ and 
‘liberty’ are identified with existing institutions, this will present a barrier to 
the diffusion of alternative images of society’. Schumpeter’s competitive 
elitist model described the prevalent model of democracy in the West in the 
mid-twentieth century, however, he failed to consider theories of democracy 
that are critiques of existing institutions which propose alternative 
arrangements. In the context of Schumpeter’s rejection of popular 
participation in self-government, Held (2006, p.154) views the proposed 
competing technocratic elites as close to denying the possibility of human 
agency or even the competency of passive and selfish individuals to choose 
good leaders: 
 
it is but a short step to thinking that all ‘the people’ need as 
‘governors’ are engineers capable of making the right technical 
decisions about the ordering of human affairs… a vision which is both 
anti-liberal and anti-democratic… If the electorate is regarded as 
unable to form reasonable judgements about pressing political 
questions, why should it be regarded as capable of discriminating 
between alternative sets of leaders? 
 
This view of democracy implies a centralisation of power in a decision-making 
political elite. An alternative view of democracy that accepts many of the 
assumptions about competing elites but provides a more dispersed view of 
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power in democratic societies is that of Dahl’s (1956, 1961) pluralism. Dahl’s 
conception of democracy builds on his work on power (Chapter 3), but suffers 
from similar criticisms about its methodological individualist basis and 
uncritical embrace of existing social relations. 
 
Dahl’s (1956) study of electoral politics described American representative 
democracy as a polyarchy, in which the historical liberal fear of the ‘tyranny 
of the majority’ is rejected, as is Schumpeter’s view of a technocratic elite, 
in favour of a plural system of power and group competition. In a polyarchy, 
such as the United States 
 
we cannot correctly describe the actual operations of democratic 
societies in terms of the contrasts between majorities and minorities. 
We can only distinguish groups of various types and sizes, all seeking in 
various ways to advance their goals, usually at the expense, at least in 
part, of others (Dahl, 1956, p.131). 
 
Lindblom (1977, p.133) described polyarchy as a system where citizens not 
only elect their leaders but are able to organise into political groups in order 
to inform, misinform and influence elected politicians, which necessitates the 
following rights: 
 
[f]reedom to form and join organisations, freedom of expression, right 
to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to 
compete for support, right of political leaders to compete for votes, 
alternative sources of information, free and fair elections (open, 
honestly conducted, one man-one vote), which decide who is to hold 
top authority, Institutions for making government policies depend on 
votes and other expressions of preference. 
 
There is inequality in the system in that ‘control is unevenly distributed; 
neither individuals nor groups are political equals’ (Dahl, 1956, p.145). 
However, compromise is maintained between powerful groups through a 
‘decentralised bargaining bureaucracy’, which Dahl (1956, p.145, p.150) 
argued, despite its paradoxes, provides ‘a high probability that any active and 
legitimate group will make itself heard effectively at some stage in the 
process of decision’.  Reflecting Dahl’s (1956) treatment of power as relating 
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only to observable conflict, the strength of American democracy was proposed 
to be based on a value consensus between those that are politically active. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, pluralism was revised to better reflect the realities of 
contemporary capitalist democracies in the face of neo-Marxist criticisms of 
the ideological dimensions of democracy, the role of the state, and unequal 
power relations (Miliband, 1973; Poulantzas, 1975, 1978; also Jessop, 1977, 
1990). In addition, criticisms of the inconsistencies between Dahl’s (1956, 
1961) theory of polyarchy and his empirical application of the concept 
(Hoffman, 1988) necessitated the development of a more critical perspective 
(Dahl, 1978, 1985, 1989; see the ‘1976 preface’ in Dahl & Lindblom, 1992). 
Lindblom (1977, 1982) adopts a neo-pluralist view by retaining the concept of 
polyarchy but highlighting the disproportionate influence of business over the 
democratic political process. Three reasons are called in evidence for this 
inegalitarian distortion of pluralist politics; first, elected politicians have the 
authority to organise the support of the people, second, formal equality is 
underpinned by gross social and economic inequalities that negate the 
capacity of the majority of groups to participate, and third, organised interest 
groups have a distinct advantage over the unorganised members of the 
population (Lindblom, 1977).  
 
Market relations in democratic societies challenge the basis of political 
equality, upon which polyarchy is itself dependent. Dahl’s (1989, p.271) more 
critical view highlights this: ‘even in democratic countries citizens are far 
from equal in their political resources and in their influence over the policies 
and conduct of the government of the state’. Moreover, in economic relations 
Dahl (1989, p.326) asks rhetorically 
 
[w]hat consumers are free to spend depends on their income, and 
incomes are not likely to be, almost certainly will not be, distributed 
equally. But if income, wealth and economic position are also political 
resources, and if they are distributed unequally, how can citizens be 
political equals? 
 
For Dahl (1989, p.325, added emphasis), this blindside in modern capitalist 
democracies stems from the absence in neoclassical economics of a 
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consideration of power relations, which conceives of ‘exchanges and contracts 
freely entered into by rational actors’, and the lack of theorisation of ‘non-
rational, primordial bonds and beliefs’. Lindblom (1982, p.329) explores the 
relationship between democratic politics and markets, and suggests that the 
market constrains policy-making to the extent that 
 
the market might be characterised as a prison. For a broad category of 
political/economic affairs, it imprisons policy making, and imprisons 
our attempts to improve our institutions. It greatly cripples our 
attempts to improve the social world because it afflicts us with sluggish 
economic performance and unemployment simply because we begin to 
debate or undertake reform. 
 
Business interests are more than another organised interest group, but 
actually are fundamental to contemporary market societies, appearing 
instead as ‘functionaries performing functions that government officials 
regard as indispensable’ (Lindblom, 1977, p.175). While politicians are 
controlled by a system of commands (by powerful groups, rather than the 
people as a whole), business people play their roles through inducements to 
act by democratically elected politicians, suggesting that business interests 
have enormous and un-democratic power over the political process (Lindblom, 
1982). 
 
Indeed, the very existence of polyarchies is tied up with markets, and in 
particular, corporate actors: ‘[p]olyarchies were established to win and 
protect certain liberties: private property, free enterprise, free contract and 
occupational choice’ (Lindblom, 1977, p.164). For Lindblom (1982, p.332) this 
means that businesses have the privileged position of permitting some 
changes in society and resisting those that conflict with their broader 
interests to the extent that 
 
no market society can achieve a fully developed democracy because 
the market imprisons the policy-making process... For minimal 
democracy, we require a market system. For fuller democracy, we 
require its elimination. 
 
However, Lindblom (1982, p.333) is cautious about the prospects for fuller 
democracy as the market also imprisons thinking about society: ‘[w]e have 
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come to think not of human need and aspiration but of the market system as 
the fixed element in the light of which we think about policy’.  
 
The implication of this is that social science has failed to envision ‘a 
pluralistic polyarchy free of business privilege’ (Lindblom, 1977, p.347). 
Likewise, Dahl’s (1989) critical perspective is limited as he also remains 
sceptical of concrete prospects for participatory alternatives to actually 
existing representative democracies. This is the case even in his proposals for 
democratic ownership of economic enterprises as a means to ensure political 
equality (Dahl, 1985). Dahl (1989, p.217), like many liberals before him, 
treats participatory democracy as regressing to Ancient Greek democracy, as 
it is ignorant of the ‘sheer magnitude’ of modern nation-states. Nevertheless, 
the democratic impasse which neo-pluralism has reached requires 
engagement with these theories in the context of contemporary forms of 
social organisation. As Fuchs (2007, p.35) argues 
 
[s]ince elections do not take place very often and are concerned not so 
much with policy content than with the selection of representatives, 
political participation by citizens in modern democracies can be 
described as occasional and limited. But participation in elections does 
not exclude engagement on the part of citizens in political parties and 
collaboration in civil society voluntary associations. In fact, however, 
only tiny minorities are involved. Precisely this state of affairs together 
with the declining participation in elections to be observed in many 
countries is the source of concern for many observers... which has led 
to the postulate of ‘bringing citizens back in’. 
 
Participatory Democracy 
 
Contemporary theories of participatory democracy emerged from a critique of 
representative democracy in the 1960s and 1970s. They emphasise the need 
for more democratic and egalitarian relationships in society, based on 
institutional changes for increased citizen participation in political and 
economic decision-making (Zittel, 2007b). Pateman (1970), Zittel (2007b) and 
Schugurensky (2010) argue that the dominant paradigm in participatory 
democratic theory concerns the integrative aspect of people learning 
citizenship through the process of democratic participation. In addition to 
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education, Wolfe (1985) adds popular control as a further element of 
participatory democratic theory. 
 
Pateman (1970) sees a major function of participation as educative in the 
widest sense and part of a virtuous circle: the psychological benefits of 
participating in a more open and involved democratic process would itself 
allow individuals to develop greater capacities for democratic participation. 
As Barber (1984, p.265) puts it ‘[t]he taste for participation is whetted by 
participation: democracy breeds democracy’. This is seen as enabling a 
greater social integration through popular acceptance and legitimation of 
collectively derived decisions. In Pateman’s (1970, p.29) view 
 
[i]t is only with a context of popular participatory institutions that... 
we find the basic assertion of the theorists of participatory democracy 
of the interrelationship and connection between individuals, their 
qualities and psychological characteristics, and types of institutions; 
the assertion that responsible social and political action depends 
largely on the sort of institutions within which the individual has, 
politically, to act. 
 
This focuses the theory on the issue of the design of institutions that would 
enable individual self-development and participation in the development of 
capabilities (social empowerment). This is distinct from the pre-social basis of 
individuals in liberal representative democratic theory which is primarily 
concerned with protecting individual (negative) freedoms in a market society 
(Zittel, 2007b). The ontological notion of atomistic individuals is rejected as 
participatory democracy 
 
is built around the central assertion that individuals cannot be 
considered in isolation from one another. The existence of 
representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for 
democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at that level 
socialisation, or ‘social training’, for democracy must take place in 
other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and 
psychological qualities can be developed. This development takes place 
through the process of participation itself (Pateman, 1970, p.42). 
 
This perspective expands the concepts of ‘politics’ and ‘democracy’ beyond 
the formal and narrow concerns of representative democratic political 
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institutions, and proposes that democratic politics can have a role in everyday 
life. A central focus of Pateman’s participatory democratic theory is on the 
sphere of work. The workplace is deemed central to a wider sense of 
democratic participation in society as ‘most individuals spend a great deal of 
their lifetime at work and the business of the workplace provides an 
education in the management of collective affairs’ (Pateman, 1970, p.43). 
The principle of democratic workers’ self-management requires ‘ownership, 
control, and management of each firm by those that work there’ (Gould, 
1988, p.250).  
 
Drawing on the UK experience of worker co-operatives and the Yugoslav 
democratic socialist economy of the 1960s, Pateman (1970) argues that the 
democratisation of working life would enable citizens to develop the skills and 
competencies for a participatory society. While ‘partial participation’ in the 
form of democratic participation in day-to-day decision-making (but not the 
overall running and long-term business strategy) is seen as a minimum 
requirement and a viable aim, the ideal for a fully participative democratic 
society is ‘full participation’: ‘a process where each individual member of a 
decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions’ 
(Pateman, 1970, pp.70-71). This is bound up with the notion of social 
empowerment developed in Chapter 3. Participatory democratic theory 
emphasises social relations, norms, institutions and practices - the structure 
of society, and the possibility of social organisation in such a way that is 
empowering. The democratic aspect of this relates to the need for all citizens 
to have the opportunities to become empowered through their participation 
in social relationships, rather than a system in which the privileged few 
dominate over the many. 
 
The model proposed by Pateman (1970, p.43) is ‘one where maximum input 
(participation) is required and where output includes not just policies 
(decisions) but also the development of the social and political capacities of 
each individual’. While not discounting the vast potential for ‘democratising 
the exercise of power below the state level’, Dunn (1993, p.28 n.67, n.68) 
sees Pateman’s view of this providing the ‘social training’ for nation-state 
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level participatory democracy as ‘somewhat innocent’ or misguided. 
Nevertheless, this indicates that there is scope for deepening participatory 
democracy in society.  
 
Pateman’s theory suggests the self-transformative potential of democratic 
participation (Warren, 1992). Liberal critics of this theory, such as Berlin 
(2002) would argue that such a form of democracy would ‘force’ individuals to 
participate, reducing their (negative) freedom, with potentially totalitarian 
implications (Chapter 5). However, Zittel (2007b, p.12) cites a plurality of 
possible outcomes from participatory democracy: 
 
[p]articipatory theory does not substitute political choice with self-
transformation as totalitarianism does. It argues rather that expanding 
citizens’ rights to affect policy choices has to be paralleled by a 
process of political socialisation and self-transformation to balance the 
pursuit of private interest with a sense of collective responsibility. 
Choice and education stand in complementary relationship rather than 
being substitutes for each other. 
 
This suggests that people are not compelled to participate, but that 
empowered participation may have beneficial societal and individual 
outcomes. Moreover, participatory democracy does not simply require 
institutional change but also ‘changes in the relations among people’ based on 
democratic values (Gould, 1988, p.249). Proposed conceptions of these 
underpinning values of freedom, equality and solidarity are taken up in the 
following chapter, but for participatory democratic theory and self-
transformation, the emphasis is on how ‘participation fosters desirable 
personal and social qualities in democratic citizens’ (Teorell, 2006, p.794). 
 
This is distinct from liberal theories of democracy which neglect the 
transformative effects of democracy on the self, due to the emphasis on the 
individual as pre-socially constituted, or else sees self-development as part of 
the private sphere of individuals and a non-political concept (Warren, 1992). 
Warren (1992, p.8) refers to this as the self-transformation thesis, which 
includes three components that distinguish participatory democracy from 
representative democracy: 
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[t]he first is that increased democracy transforms individualistic and 
conflicting interests into common and non-conflicting ones, in the 
process developing capacities of citizenship that reduce factional 
threats to rights and pluralism. Second, because these transformations 
reduce conflict, they allow reduced use of power [over others] as a 
medium of political interaction. This would increase consensus and 
governability, as well as being desirable in its own right. Third, far 
from being a threat to the dimensions of the self protected by rights 
and freedoms, democracy is necessary to the values of self-
development, autonomy, and self-governance – the values that rights 
and freedoms presumably are designed to protect. 
 
This suggests a relationship between self-transformation in participatory 
democratic social relations and social empowerment. However while 
defendable in normative theoretical terms, this proposal ‘does not meet its 
burden of proof’ (Warren, 1992, p.8). Likewise, Teorell (2006, p.795, original 
emphasis) argues that participatory democratic theory is premised on the 
assumption (without an existing empirical societal referent) that ‘if 
opportunities for participation in direct decision making were widespread – at 
the workplace, in the neighbourhood, in the local community or elsewhere – 
then self-development would ensue’. This thesis contributes both theoretical 
and empirical bases for this claim. 
 
Additionally, Wolfe (1985) focuses not primarily on the educative aspects 
(although learning may well be part of a participatory process), but rather on 
control of political representatives. This is based on the principle that ‘[a] 
participatory democratic leader articulates his [sic] followers’ view, 
translates them into plans that can be effective, and helps obtain agreement 
on a single policy out of various alternatives’ (Wolfe, 1985, p.381). This 
theory of participatory democracy echoes Macpherson (1977) and Shalom 
(2008) in advocating decentralised, but specifically participative and 
empowered democratic relationships in local contexts, with delegated 
representation built into levels above this base where direct participation is 
not possible. This requires ‘small communities committed to achieving 
egalitarian and non-exploitative social relations and their combination into 
larger collectivities’ along with support for delegated leadership conditional 
on their acting out the demands of the membership (Wolfe, 1985, p.386). This 
is an aspect of the structure of the democratic workplace in Chapter 6. 
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Delegated representation is necessarily a part of participatory democratic 
theory due to three key criticisms of direct participation; the complexity of 
modern society, the assumed incapacity of citizens to make good decisions, 
and the potential for instability in a participatory system (Bobbio, 1987; 
Budge, 1996, 2012). While these criticisms are often levelled at the naïve 
view of applying Athenian direct democracy at the societal level in modern 
capitalist societies, Bobbio (1987, pp.52-53) argues that  
 
between pure representative and pure direct democracy there is not 
the qualitative leap which advocates of direct democracy believe… the 
historical forms of representative and direct democracy are so many 
and varied that one cannot pose the issue in terms of either/or, as if 
there was only one possible version of each. The problem of the 
transition from one to the other can only posed in terms of a 
continuum, where it is difficult to say at which one point one finishes 
and the other begins.   
 
While this highlights a necessary distinction between simple direct democracy 
and participatory democracy, which can incorporate elements of direct 
participation and aspects of representation, such as ‘revocable 
representatives’ (Bobbio, 1987, p.53), most participatory theories are more 
nuanced and accept the need for delegated representation. Differences 
between representative and participatory democracy are a matter of degree. 
The central concerns of participatory theories are the transformation of 
structures to increase opportunities for democratic participation, and a 
transformation in social relationships from those based on ‘power over’ to 
social empowerment within society. 
 
For example, Barber (1984, pp.xiv-xv) proposes as close to full participation 
as practically possible: a strong democracy in which  
 
all of the people govern themselves in at least some public matters at 
least some of the time. To legislate and to implement laws at least 
some of the time is to keep alive the meaning and function of 
citizenship in all of us all of the time; whereas to delegate the 
governing power, even if only to representatives who remain bound to 
us by the vote, is to give away not power but civic activity, not 
accountability but civic responsibility, not our secondary rights against 
government but our primary right to govern.  
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Barber’s (1984, p.261) concept of strong democracy emphasises the 
participation of citizens in self-government where possible at local and 
national levels, but focuses on citizen involvement in ‘common talk, common 
decision-making and political judgement’. These refer to the necessity for 
citizens to decide publicly on policies that affect them, to do this through 
discussion amongst themselves, and with concrete actions resulting from their 
deliberations (Barber, 1984). Amongst the institutional changes suggested by 
strong democracy are neighbourhood level assemblies; ‘the basic building 
block of democratic societies… [w]ithout talk, there can be no democracy’ 
(Barber, 1984, p.267). A system of neighbourhood assemblies proposed by 
Barber would begin the development of civic responsibility, along with holding 
elected politicians to account, later developing effective local decision-
making processes. This idea is apparent in the development of participatory 
budgeting in public spending by local governments in many nations across the 
world (Baiocchi & Lerner, 2007; Sintomer et al., 2013).  
 
Other proposals include development of the design of public spaces that 
encourage openness and participation, rather than individualisation and 
privatisation, and electronic democracy (Barber, 1984; Budge, 1996; Fuchs, 
2007; Peixoto, 2010). Like Pateman, Barber (1984, p.305) also views 
democratic workplaces as central to participatory democracy: ‘worker-owned 
operations on the model of the co-operative movement do more for 
citizenship than does the regulation of industry, however necessary such 
regulation should be… [They] not only serve economic egalitarianism but 
foster civic spirit’. 
 
Ultimately, as Zittel (2007a, p.228) points out, transition from representative 
democracy towards a more participatory democracy is less likely to be 
successful if it attempts to directly replace representative structures, but 
rather, a strategy for increasing participation from within the structures of 
representative democracy may well ‘lead to hybrid models of democracy that 
go beyond the dichotomy between [representative] and participatory 
democracy’. Before discussing some of the concrete democratic innovations 
aimed at deepening participatory democracy as an alternative typology to 
98 
 
liberal and social democracy, it is necessary to consider the content of 
participatory democratic practices. There is an emphasis in participatory 
democratic theory on increasing the quality of democratic processes, rather 
than simply the quantity of citizens participating in decisions (Zittel, 2007b). 
As highlighted above, beyond direct voter participation in referenda, this 
refers to a dominant perspective in new democratic theories that emphasises 
deliberation. 
 
Deliberative Democracy 
 
Deliberative democracy is an aspect of participatory democratic theory, 
evidenced in Barber’s desire for ‘democratic talk’. Deliberation concerns the 
content of democratic participation and is now considered, by democratic 
theorists at least, to be ‘[t]he essence of democracy itself’ (Dryzek, 2000, 
p.1). This strand of democratic theory draws on Habermas’ (1984, 1987, 1989, 
1996) view of rational public debate oriented towards consensus, though not 
all deliberative democrats share the emphasis on rational argument or 
consensus (Bohman, 1998; Dryzek, 2000; Young, 1996). For Habermas (2002, 
p.115) though deliberative democracy can be differentiated from 
participatory or direct theories: 
 
the success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting 
citizenry but on the institutionalisation of the corresponding 
procedures and conditions of communication, as well as on the 
interplay of institutionalised deliberative processes with informally 
developed public opinions. 
 
Four conditions are required by Cohen (1989) for the ideal deliberative 
democratic procedure, that citizens be free, capable of public reasoning in 
both articulation of opinions and opportunities to criticise proposals. Citizens 
must also be formally equal in terms of access to the deliberative arena and 
substantively equal in ‘existing distributions of power and resources’, and 
‘ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus’ (Cohen, 
1989, pp.22-23). Though Cohen accepts that even in ideal conditions 
consensus may not be possible, in which case, majority rule is preferable with 
public deliberation than without it. Therefore deliberative democracy  
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must involve discussion on an equal and inclusive basis which operates 
so as to deepen participant knowledge of issues, awareness of the 
interests of others, and the confidence to play an active part in public 
affairs. Deliberative democracy looks to transform people’s (possibly 
ill-informed) preferences and attitudes through open and inclusive 
discussion in which participants are accorded equal respect; in this 
sense, it seeks to go beyond the ‘mere’ design of mechanisms to 
register the preferences that people already have (Saward, 2001, 
p.564). 
 
Deliberative democratic theory is an integral feature of the quality of 
democratic participation and the self-transformation thesis (Cohen, 1989; 
Manin, 1987; Dryzek, 2001). As Fuchs (2007, p.46) argues, increased 
participation also requires deliberation by participants, or else there would be 
‘a direct democracy of isolated individuals and not of interacting citizens’. 
The principle of deliberation ‘downgrades’ the dichotomy between direct or 
participatory versus representative democracy; each are viewed to be more 
democratic if they include deliberative components in decision-making 
processes (Saward, 2001). However, this thesis contends that participatory 
democracy is more conducive to social empowerment.  
 
Teorell (2006, p.791) proposes ‘political discussion’ as a more appropriate 
term for deliberation which emphasises the participative orientation of the 
concept; ‘[s]ince to participate is to engage in some kind of collective 
endeavour, defining deliberation as discussion is more adequate as a concept 
of participation’. The role of participation in the three strands of democratic 
theory highlighted above are summarised by Teorell (2006, p.791): 
 
participation according to the [representative] model is defined as an 
attempt to influence those who have a say in government. According to 
participatory democrats, by contrast, participation is to have a say in 
government oneself. The deliberative model, finally, defines 
participation as a way of finding out what to say. 
 
For participatory democracy, deliberative forms of decision-making (whether 
oriented towards consensus, discursive, or more radical forms of agonistic 
democracy – Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) are integral components. The key 
attribute of democratic transformation is to move from elitist or (neo)pluralist 
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conceptions of representative democracy towards variants more conducive to 
increased and sustained democratic participation.  
 
In relation to power then, this must involve a move away from elite power 
that subverts and limits the definition of democracy to a passive consumerist 
choice from competing policy packages that is disempowering for the 
populace, to one of more meaningful participation on terms which are socially 
empowering and inclusive. This discussion has suggested that, rather than 
contesting the notion of representation in political institutions at the national 
level in large complex societies, the role of participatory democracy and 
democratic social relations should be the expansion of participatory 
democracy the economic and social spheres, and as a supplement to the 
representative system in the local context aimed at holding representatives to 
account. As Bobbio (1987, p.57) puts it 
 
the process of democratisation has not even begun to scratch the 
surface of the two great blocks of descending and hierarchical power in 
every complex society, big business and public administration. And as 
long as these two blocks hold out against the pressures exerted below, 
the democratic transformation of society cannot be said to be 
complete… if the advance of democracy will in future be measured in 
terms of the infiltration of spaces still occupied by non-democratic 
centres of power, these spaces are so numerous and so large, and their 
importance so great, that a fully realised democracy, assuming such a 
goal to be not only desirable but possible, is still a long way off. 
 
Nevertheless, possible aspects of this transformation have been proposed, 
including institutional change through empowered participatory governance 
(Fung & Wright, 2003; Fung, 2004) and democratic innovations (Smith, 2005, 
2009; Geisel & Newton, 2012). These are discussed in the following section, 
which suggests that two main typologies of actually existing representative 
democracy can be identified in liberal and social variants. The proposals for 
deepening democracy proffered above would be part of a shift from these two 
typologies to a third, more participatory type. 
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Liberal, Social and Participatory Typologies of Democratic Society 
 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990; 1999) typologies of welfare regimes can be used to 
situate democratic theories within typologies of democratic societies. This 
section suggests that existing representative democratic societies can be 
viewed on a continuum between the ideal types of liberal democracy and 
social democracy. To move towards the third typology of participatory 
democracy a critical assessment of the values of liberty, equality and 
solidarity that underpin existing democracies is required (Chapter 5). 
 
In a study of post-industrial transformations of welfare regimes, Esping-
Andersen (1999, p.8) asserts that ‘democracy and the welfare state are sewn 
from the same fabric’. Democratic egalitarianism is fundamentally at the 
heart of the theory of the welfare state, which had a 
 
promise of universal social citizenship, of a new social solidarity. The 
notion of a welfare state points immediately to the second, namely full 
democracy (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.7). 
 
This is apparent in Marshall’s (1992) earlier discussion of the development of 
social citizenship in the post-war years which aimed at reducing inequalities 
in income, extending a common culture and enhancing the universality of 
citizenship through schooling and work. However, in practice there have been 
diverging welfare regimes which have changed throughout the twentieth 
century, none of which have approached full democracy. 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990, pp.26-29; 1999, pp.74-86) distinguishes three distinct 
regime types under which welfare states cluster; liberal, conservative and 
social democratic. There have been a number of criticisms of Esping-
Andersen’s three typologies, not least the claim that there may be a distinct 
fourth ‘Mediterranean’ or ‘Southern’ welfare regime (Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 
1996). However, Katrougalos (1996) sees the Mediterranean typology as a 
subcategory of the conservative regime. Further, Korpi & Palme (1998) 
identify five welfare regimes from a ‘bases of entitlement’ perspective and 
Arts & Gelissen (2002) construct typologies of five welfare regimes from the 
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various approaches to welfare regime clusters. Additional criticisms have 
focused on the gendered nature of welfare regimes (Lewis, 1992), and Siaroff 
(1994) posits four regimes in criticising the gendered nature of welfare, along 
with a critique of ethno-centricity in the models (Walker & Wong, 2013). 
Esping-Andersen’s (1999, p.92) reply is to acknowledge the role of families 
(and gender to an extent) in the structure of welfare regimes and to posit 
that ‘[t]he peculiarities of [the proposed fourth and fifth] cases are variations 
within a distinct overall logic, not the foundations of a wholly different logic 
per se’. 
 
As Esping-Andersen (1999, p.73) points out, typologies are useful because they 
allow for ‘greater analytical parsimony’, contribute to understanding the 
underlying logic of movement in social structures, and can help with the 
generation and testing of hypotheses. On the other hand, the emphasis on 
parsimony comes at the price of nuance and typologies are unable to make 
sense of changes over time as they exist as static snapshots of social 
structures in a given moment. However, it is possible to trace general trends 
and movement of nations between ideal types. For example, both the UK and 
the USA broadly align under the liberal democratic typology in both welfare 
regime and democratic senses.  While the USA is closest to the ideal type, the 
UK retains elements of both liberal and social variants, having broken with the 
social democratic consensus in the late 1970s, under the influence of neo-
liberal ideology, in favour of the market as solution to issues of social policy 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999). It could be argued that this might not have been as 
radical a departure as commonly interpreted as ‘Britain [had] failed to take 
the decisive steps towards a social democratic model already in the 1960s’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.173). However, despite the contradictory history of 
Britain’s ‘mutation’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.87), Taylor-Gooby (2011; 
Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011) asserts that the policy direction of recent UK 
Governments is moving Britain closer to the ideal liberal type. 
 
The liberal welfare regime is seen by Esping-Andersen (1999, pp.74-77) as 
restrictive of social rights in its emphasis on ‘an unbounded faith in market 
sovereignty [including] a political commitment to minimise the state, to 
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individualise risks, and to promote market solutions’. Among the countries 
that are characterised as liberal by Esping-Andersen are Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. The general trend for welfare 
states within these nations is to exhibit residual characteristics with a narrow 
definition of eligibility for welfare, a narrow definition of social risks, and an 
emphasis on the market: ‘the residual approach cultivates dualisms: the good 
risks can be self-reliant in the market; the bad ones become ‘welfare 
dependents’’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.76). 
 
The conservative welfare regime contains a combination of status segregation 
and familialism (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.81). Status segmentation is 
evidenced by the much more generous benefits on offer to the civil service 
and, to differing degrees in individual welfare states, ‘corporatist status 
divisions… permeate social security systems’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.82). 
Familialism relates to the emphasis on the family as the locus for welfare with 
a ‘systematic disinclination to provide care services, and the more 
familialistic the welfare state, the less generous are family benefits’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, p.83). Esping-Andersen (1999, p.83) states that the 
conservative regime shares some residual aspects of the liberal regime, 
however, ‘liberal residualism means picking up bad risks left behind by market 
failure; conservative residualism, in contrast, is primarily a response to family 
failure’. This particular welfare regime characterises the welfare states of 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. 
 
In contrast to the first two typologies, the social democratic welfare regime, 
under which the Nordic welfare states of Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden cluster, define rights along the lines of social citizenship, rather than 
contributions or status (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.78). Social democratic 
welfare regimes have historically placed more emphasis on universalism of 
welfare provision, comprehensive risk coverage, decent benefit levels, 
underpinned by egalitarian conceptions of social solidarity and a commitment 
to full employment. The liberal regime and the social democratic regime can 
be seen as polar opposites in their approach to welfare, with the conservative 
regime sitting in between the two. The three worlds of welfare characterise a 
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continuum from liberal to social democratic where, in the ideal case, primary 
responsibility for welfare falls on the individual market actor (liberal), the 
family (conservative) or the state (social democratic).  
 
For present purposes the distinction that Esping-Andersen makes between 
especially the liberal and social democratic regimes is instructive for 
discerning typologies of democracy. Considering the opposite ends of the 
continuum, while liberal regimes emphasise individualism, inequality, and 
welfare support targeted on the poor, the social democratic typology 
promotes collectivism, social citizenship, and universal social security. 
However, liberal and social democratic regimes are not counterpoised: 
 
[s]ocial democracy accepts, rightly or wrongly, that, for all its faults, 
liberal democracy works: it is the fundamental basis for democracy, 
even if it can be improved and reformed for the better. Capitalism is 
accepted – it can deliver growth and wealth. However, capitalism is not 
all good, it can lead to inequalities and deprivation which need to be 
mitigated through government intervention, a characteristic on which 
social democracy begins to differ, in emphasis at least, from many 
liberals and conservatives (Martell, 2001, p.206). 
 
Crucially for the distinction between the representative theories of 
democracy that underpin the liberal and social democratic typologies and a 
participative alternative, Stammers (2001, pp.31-32) argues that ‘[s]ocial 
democracy is largely wedded to an elitist understanding of the potential 
relationship between people and political leadership and tends to assume a 
top-down, hierarchical model of governance’, especially in Britain under the 
influence of the Fabian Society. Though it has historically contained a social 
justice aim as a socialist compromise with capital and market forces, the 
statist and elitist aspect of social democracy ultimately places this typology 
closer to Schumpeter’s competitive elitist view of politics than participatory 
democracy. 
 
In the context of the global development of neo-liberalism in policy and 
ideology since the late 1970s, Esping-Andersen (1999, p.80) reports that with 
declining social benefits the social democratic regime has evidenced a 
‘qualitative retreat from the principle of universalism: the notion of solidarity 
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of risks is being rewritten’. From this basis it can be asserted that the 
typologies of liberal democracy and social democracy, analogous to Esping-
Andersen’s welfare regimes, are increasingly shaped by the rise of neo-
liberalism as a global hegemonic ideology and policy approach (Chapter 5). 
Focusing on the case of Sweden, Ryner (1999, p.48) argues that ‘the prospects 
for Swedish social democracy are intimately tied up with neoliberal 
globalisation and its contradictions’. The economic, political and ideological 
factors involved in the processes of neo-liberal globalisation have contributed 
to a crisis in Swedish social democracy:  
 
the Swedish welfare state has been increasingly hollowed out to 
facilitate ‘self-regulating markets’. Mass unemployment has become a 
reality in what previously was the model of a full employment society. 
Moreover, successive budgets and crisis packages… have reduced social 
insurance entitlement levels and services (Ryner, 1999, p.39). 
 
The changing nature of social democracy in the late twentieth century further 
distinguishes it from the proposed third typology of participatory democracy. 
Martell (2001) and Stammers (2001) argue that a distinction can be made 
between traditional and modernising social democracy. Traditional social 
democracy had Keynesian economics, the universal welfare state, trade 
unions and social solidarity at its ideological and policy core, whereas 
modernising social democracy has divested itself of these and involves a 
change from concerns with equality to minimum opportunities for 
participation the marketplace (Martell, 2001). This new variant of social 
democracy is concerned less with reducing the inequalities produced by 
capitalism through redistribution of wealth, power and resources, than using 
neo-liberal capitalism to ‘pull the world’s poor out of poverty through its 
assumed capacity to deliver wealth through growth’ (Stammers, 2001, pp.42-
43). 
 
In its ‘third way’ modernising guise, to varying extents across different 
countries but especially in the UK, social democracy has been concerned with 
the reorganisation of social welfare and public spending along the lines of 
neo-liberalism which defines ‘citizenship in terms of the right to participate in 
the market and equality as access to the market rather than the redistribution 
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of income’ (Robison, 2006, pp.5-6; Jayasuriya, 2006). However, despite the 
claim that the increased mobility of capital has forced social democratic 
parties to adapt to neo-liberal globalisation in this way, Callaghan (2000, 
p.175) points out that  
 
[t]o talk of the need for internationally ‘competitive tax rates’ and 
flexible labour markets and the obsolescence of ‘tax-and-spend’ 
socialism – a socialism that stood for the redistribution of income and 
the narrowing of inequalities – is to suggest that mobile capital will 
simply punish with impunity countries which deny these truths. But 
there is no evidence to support this conclusion. 
 
Rather, a different approach, which formed part of the Bennite faction of the 
British Labour Party in the 1970s that succumbed to the eventual neo-liberal 
hegemony, was to embrace participatory democracy in industry under the 
aegis of the Alternative Economic Strategy (Callaghan, 2000). Without 
returning to the social and political context of 1970s social democracy and 
internecine politics of the British Labour Party, a third participatory variant of 
democratic regime draws from the participatory theories, and is proposed 
here as a theoretical and empirical alternative to liberal and social democracy 
which has greater potential for social empowerment. 
 
Towards Participatory Democracy  
 
In theoretical terms the shift from representative to participatory democratic 
theory implies a transformation of power relationships, along with the 
extension of democratic participation to social and economic relations. 
Pieterse (2001) argues that three conditions are necessary for the 
development of participatory democracy: local innovations in participatory 
democracy alongside wider democratic renewal, critical engagement with the 
politics of civil society and empowerment, and an inclusive approach that 
views cultural, economic and social reform as part of political change. Fuchs 
(2007, p.38) considers the possibilities of a more participatory democracy but 
argues that  
 
reality imposes restrictions in modern societies that are difficult to 
overcome. But if participatory democracy theory wishes to do more 
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than uphold an ideal without consequences, it cannot entirely eschew 
discussion on how such participation can be motivated and 
institutionalised under contemporary societal conditions. 
 
A distinction can be made between compensatory forms of social democracy 
that attempt to reduce the social costs of capitalism. Countervailing social 
democracy is based on transforming the principles of liberal capitalism in a 
social direction, especially at the EU level (McGowan, 2001). Democratic 
socialism, on the other hand, is a radical variant of countervailing social 
democracy which shares the aim of ‘pursuing change through existing and 
extended institutions of democracy’, but also ‘aims at change to a society 
which in the long run may not be so easily or purely identifiable as capitalism 
but more based on collective control and equality than the dominance of 
private capital and a social structure determined by market forces’ (Martell, 
2001, p.206).  
 
Democratic socialism is commensurable with the transition to participatory 
democracy. As Martell (2001, p.207) points out, ‘[d]emocratic socialists tend 
to be committed to democracy and gradualism [but] do not have an antipathy 
to all that is private or marketised’. As highlighted above this refers to the 
transformation of social relations through the process of participation in 
democratic decision-making in especially the workplace and the community.  
 
Along with the educative aspects of democratic participation, Schugurensky 
(2010) argues that social organisation is required, and that good democratic 
processes do not emerge through chance. While participatory democracy  
 
requires among other things, good access to information, equality 
among participants, and opportunities to deliberate in a safe space… 
for democratic innovations to be successful and overcome some of the 
potential risks associated with these initiatives (co-optation, 
clientelism, tokenism, parochialism, exclusion, internal inequalities, 
etc.), certain enabling conditions and structures need to be present 
(Schugurensky, 2010, p.9). 
 
Enabling conditions include an inclusive environment that is open to a wide 
range of views, clear links between the deliberative process, decisions and 
actions, along with ‘justice-oriented public policies’, while the structures 
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required include institutional design for good governance (top-down 
transformation), but also a mobilised civil society that is concerned with 
grassroots democracy (bottom-up transformation) (Schugurensky, 2010, p.9). 
 
This focus on institutional and structural transformation is apparent in Fung 
and Wright’s (2003) concept of empowered participatory governance (EPG). 
EPG refers to a number of different democratic institutional designs that 
attempt to restructure democratic decision-making (Fung & Wright, 2003). 
EPG can be distinguished from more common models of public decision-
making such as bureaucratic hierarchies that adopt new managerial 
techniques or marketisation processes that divest governments of 
responsibility for public sector services (Fung, 2004; Crouch, 2004). Instead, 
EPG adopts an approach of ‘accountable autonomy’ which decentralises 
power but centralises accountability. It focuses on 
 
building direct avenues of communication and oversight between local 
officials and the citizens they serve... From above, supervisors monitor 
their performance and techniques and call them to account when 
necessary... From below, citizens and clients participate directly in 
determining, implementing, and reviewing the problem-solving 
strategies in partnership with local officials (Fung, 2004, p.14). 
 
To enable this, three design properties of EPG are proposed (Fung & Wright, 
2003). Firstly, power must be devolved to ‘local action units’ such as 
workplaces and neighbourhood councils with the autonomy for devising, 
designing and implementing solutions (Fung & Wright, 2003, p.20). Secondly, 
there must be centralised supervision and co-ordination in order to avoid 
atomisation of autonomous local units. The second point distinguishes EPG 
from traditional New Left approaches ‘in which concerns for liberation lead to 
demands for autonomous decentralisation, [instead EPG] suggests new forms 
of co-ordinated decentralisation’ (Fung & Wright, 2003, p.21). Third, this must 
involve the transformation of the state, rather than bypassing it in favour of a 
volunteeristic approach, as experiments in EPG 
 
generally seek to transform the mechanisms of state power into 
permanently mobilised deliberative-democratic, grassroots forms. Such 
transformations happen as often as not in close co-operation with state 
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agents. These experiments are thus less ‘radical’ than most varieties of 
activist self-help in that their central activity is not ‘fighting the 
power’. But they are more radical in that they have larger reform 
scopes, are authorised by state or corporate bodies to make substantial 
decisions, and most crucially, try to change the central procedures of 
power rather than merely attempting occasionally to shift the vector of 
its exercise (Fung & Wright, 2003, p.22, original emphasis).    
 
Underpinning these properties are three principles; that EPG processes must 
have a practical orientation to address concrete concerns, they must induce 
bottom-up citizen participation, and must draw on open and free deliberation 
(but not necessarily a consensus) in generating solutions  (Fung & Wright, 
2003). A significant weakness of EPG is that existing inequalities based on 
material differences, social class, knowledge, information and skills, 
educational and personal capacities might limit the capabilities of citizens to 
participate (especially working class people). Therefore, a crucial ‘enabling 
condition’ of EPG is that participants must have ‘a rough equality of power, 
for the purposes of deliberative decision-making’ due to their vastly unequal 
backgrounds (Fung & Wright, 2003, p.23). Such an approach attempts to 
develop ‘political wisdom’ in the situated daily experiences of citizens, rather 
than mediated political debate through the news media (Fung & Wright, 2003, 
p.28). 
 
However, developing EPG institutions is fraught with difficulty as Saward 
(2001, p.579) notes that ‘the design of real procedures must work within 
specific political cultures, limited time-frames, fundamental disagreement 
and confusion about means and ends, and with the institutions that exist 
rather than wholly innovative blueprints’. This is not to mention the political 
context in which vested interests may resist giving up power and resources, 
and also resist the transformation of existing social structures and institutions 
in favour of popular participation.  
 
With this in mind, Smith (2005) highlights at least fifty-seven empirical cases 
of innovations in democratic decision-making, which focus on institutional 
designs and range from electoral and consultative innovations to deliberative, 
co-governance, direct, and e-democracy innovations which are more 
participatory in design. Innovations from Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Finland, 
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France, India, Switzerland, the UK and USA are examples in which a range of 
institutional practices incorporate democratic decision-making with different 
extents of participation. 
 
The report is concerned with the relationship between citizens and political 
authorities, and does not consider democratic participation in social 
movements and civil society, voluntary groups or workplace democracy. 
However, these aspects are also fundamental to the notion of democratic 
society, as disparate theorists from Pateman to Dahl have argued. Wright 
(2010, p.82) supports the requirement for workplace democracy: 
 
private decisions made by the owners of capitalist firms often have 
massive collective consequences both for employees and for people not 
directly employed in the firm, and thus the exclusion of such decisions 
from public deliberation and control reduces democracy. A society in 
which there are meaningful forms of workers’ democratic control 
within firms, as well as external democratic public controls, is a more 
democratic society than one which lacks these institutional 
arrangements. 
 
Nevertheless, for Smith (2005, pp.16-17), the focus is on innovations that both 
increase participation (with attention to the social inclusiveness of increased 
participation) and deepen participation, defined as changes which allow ‘a 
more direct, sustained and informed participation by citizens in political 
decisions’. This refers to both the quantity of participants and democratic 
quality of the content of participation. A distinction is made between 
deliberative, direct and co-governance processes, which have implications for 
citizen power and control over participatory democratic innovations. While 
deliberative innovations include deliberative polling, participatory budgeting 
(PB) in Porto Alegre, Brazil and other cities in South America and the British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform are among the most 
successful co-governance innovations (Smith, 2005, 2009; Pearce, 2010b). 
 
Smith (2009) grounds a normative analysis of empirical cases of participatory 
democracy in the democratic goods of inclusiveness, popular control, 
considered judgement and transparency, along with the institutional goods of 
efficiency and transferability. Important for Smith (2009) is that the 
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democratic innovations realise to different extents these democratic goods, 
and also particular processes may combine different aspects of democratic 
innovations, and their associated goods. This focus on the structures and 
institutions that contribute to the realisation of democratic goods means that 
‘it is near meaningless to make generalised statements about the legitimacy 
of citizen participation per se. Institutional design matters’ (Smith, 2009, 
p.188).  
 
In the case of Porto Alegre’s PB (see Chapter 7) a combination of at least 
three types of democracy, including popular assemblies, locally elected 
representatives and regionally elected councillors in direct and deliberative 
forums help to realise a combination of democratic goods. For example, PB in 
Porto Alegre has proven to include the poor and marginalised groups (but not 
the very poorest) in decision-making with redistributive and social justice 
outcomes (Baiocchi, 2004; Smith, 2009). It has operated on a complex 
combination of top-down administrative control and bottom-up direct popular 
control over different aspects of the budgeting process, suggesting popular 
control over decision-making but administrative control (as facilitators and 
mobilisers of the public) over information, experience, technical advice with 
veto powers over decisions (Smith, 2009).  
 
Among the factors involved in the success of PB in Porto Alegre is the 
institutional design of the process that combines direct democratic 
participation, deliberation, accountable representation, transparency, and a 
strong political will. This supports the claim made by Saward (2001, p.576), 
that ultimately, ‘a serious vision of direct democracy today must see it as 
operating alongside, or more clearly as part of, a larger democratic system 
which includes (for example) elected parliaments and political parties’. In the 
case of Brazil, the federal system grants ‘significant municipal autonomy and 
fiscal decentralisation, with extensive executive powers in the hands of the 
mayor, particularly in relation to the city budget’ (Smith, 2009, p.35). 
 
As discussed by Smith (2009), in favourable circumstances a range of 
participatory institutional designs and democratic practices have potential to 
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transform the structures of representative democracy from within towards a 
more participatory democracy. However, the broader concern with democratic 
typologies draws attention to democratic values that underpin different 
societies. Smith (2009) highlights inclusion, control, reflection and 
transparency as key normative aims of his analysis of democratic innovations, 
but it is necessary to elucidate the deeper values concerned with social 
relations and power relations in democratic societies that influence the 
appropriateness of these goods. 
 
Gould (1988) highlights the centrality of democratic values as liberal and 
social ‘democratic societies fail to take seriously the principle of social co-
operation as a condition for full human freedom’ (Gould, 1988, p.248). Gould 
(1988) argues that existing representative democracies do not adequately 
provide the conditions for freedom, equality and social co-operation (or 
solidarity). The relevance of the values of liberty, equality and solidarity for 
democracy is discussed in Chapter 5 which asserts their dialectical 
relationship, and suggests the value changes needed for transforming 
concrete practices and institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by tracing the role of participation and representation in 
the historical development of democracy. It then considered modern theories 
of democracy. The representative variants (in elitist and (neo)pluralist guises) 
were subject to criticisms relating to their basis in disempowering ‘power 
over’ relationships and realisation in the narrow and limited liberal variant, or 
in the problematic compromise between labour and capital in the social 
model. Rather, it has been argued that for the development of social 
empowerment (and the improvement of social quality) a transformation is 
needed towards participatory democratic theory and practice.  
 
While the neo-pluralist theory of democracy and even Schumpeter’s 
competitive elitism have descriptive value in understanding the existing 
practice of liberal and social democracy in industrial and post-industrial 
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societies, the two typologies are underpinned by democratic values which the 
next chapter proposes are dialectically in contradiction. The values that 
underpin participatory democracy are proposed as the optimisation of the 
democratic dialectic. This is necessary for critical-normative analysis of the 
case studies of participatory democracy in action. Attention to deeper 
normative values is important because 
 
[a] government may be progressive but not [the] political processes and 
political culture... social relations in the workplace, in educational and 
cultural institutions, in the family and the household and in gender 
relations [may be] conservative (Pieterse, 2001, p.2). 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 investigate social empowerment in a democratic workplace 
and in a participatory budgeting process, drawing on the values of the 
democratic dialectic. An assessment of this dialectic is the purpose of Chapter 
5 which focuses on liberty, equality and solidarity in the three democratic 
typologies that form the normative guide for the empirical research, and 
considers the influence of neo-liberalism on democracy since the 1970s.  
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Chapter 5 
The Democratic Dialectic 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The democratic dialectic forms the normative guide for the empirical case 
studies of participatory democracy. This chapter assesses how the values of 
liberty, equality and solidarity constitute the democratic dialectic. The values 
are subject to different conceptions relating to the different typologies of 
democratic society described in Chapter 4. As the values are dialectically 
related, all three must be optimised, rather than a situation where one or two 
of the values dominate (Bernard, 1999). For optimisation, this chapter posits a 
desirable shift from liberal or social democracy to participatory democracy. 
 
The first section describes and critically develops the democratic dialectic, 
before discussing the three values of liberty, equality and solidarity in depth. 
Freedom as self-development, relational egalitarianism and social and system 
integration are considered to be most appropriate to the optimisation of the 
dialectic values. The final section historically situates the democratic 
dialectic by contrasting the values with the corrosive influence of neo-
liberalism in contemporary democratic societies. This provides the basis for 
the optimised democratic dialectical values as a normative standpoint for 
analysis of the case studies in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
 
Developing the Democratic Dialectic 
 
The democratic dialectic was originally proposed by Bernard (1999) as a 
conceptual tool that describes a dialectical relationship between the three 
normative values of liberty, equality and solidarity (Figure 5.1). The original 
model emerged from a critique of social cohesion and social capital as a 
‘trendy’ ‘quasi-concepts’ in policy circles; ‘those hybrid mental constructions 
that politics proposes to us more and more often in order to simultaneously 
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detect possible consensuses on a reading of reality, and to forge them’ 
(Bernard, 1999, p.2). The hybrid nature comes from the scientific purchase of 
these concepts, and from the political usefulness of their vagueness in 
application to everyday life. 
 
Figure 5.1 The Democratic Dialectic (from Bernard, 1999).
 
Instead, Bernard (1999) proposes the democratic dialectic to make sense of 
how the absence of solidarity (or either of the other values) can have negative 
consequences for democracy. It can analyse the democratic complexion of 
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different forms of social organisation, but it also includes a normative 
dimension by pointing towards the possibility of resolving contradictions in the 
dialectic to realise democratic potential. The normative aim is to optimise the 
three interrelated values in a ‘positive equilibrium’ (Phillips, 2006, p.161). 
This is distinct from a maximisation of each value individually, which can 
‘damage the fabric of democratic society’ (Phillips, 2006, p.163). From a 
normative standpoint (which would be contested by neo-liberals, for example) 
Bernard (1999, p.7) argues that 
 
true liberty is only possible for people who are relatively equal and who 
share certain values, at least that of liberty; true equality cannot be 
that of slaves, and it is based on a sense of a common destiny; and 
solidarity becomes meaningless if it is not freely assumed and if it does 
not serve to combat social exclusion. On the other hand… liberty, 
especially economic liberty and even more its neo-liberal form, 
obviously threatens equality, and it reduces solidarity to interpersonal 
action; the unchecked pursuit of equality can drown liberty in 
uniformity and prevent solidarity from taking form and demanding a 
commitment; some interpretations of solidarity can become the 
enemies of liberty and serve as a pretext for the perpetuation of 
inequalities. 
 
The values exist in a dialectical relationship because all three relate to each 
other as a totality, but they can also be in contradiction with one another. The 
dialectic conflicts where societies neglect one or more of liberty, equality, or 
solidarity. As a ‘unipolar distortion’, too much emphasis on liberty, especially 
the ‘market is all’ economic liberty of neo-liberalism ‘pushes inequalities 
towards a strong polarisation and provokes a dislocation of the most basic 
social consensus’ (Bernard, 1999, p.8). On the other hand, the drift towards 
equality (especially equality of outcome) leads to ‘abuse by the State’ in the 
worst case, communist despotism and in the best case, ‘a welfare state beset 
by bureaucratisation and inefficiency, dependent client groups and insensitive 
managers’ (Bernard, 1999, p.9). Finally, an inward-looking solidarity ‘press-
gangs people at the expense of liberty’ and imposes domination by the 
strongest, for example, in countries dominated by religious fundamentalism 
(Bernard, 1999, p.10).  
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‘Fragile bipolar equilibria’ are where two values are dominant. Where liberty 
and equality (often in tension) are dominant, Bernard proposes the model of 
‘inclusive democracy’, which refers to a capitalist economy in combination 
with a form of extensive welfare state to provide social protection, for 
example, in Western Europe. Nordic social democracy is proposed as a 
‘participatory democracy’ in which equality and solidarity are more 
prominent, although Bernard (1999, p.12) states, rather confusingly, that 
‘there is no question that these are free countries’. Finally, ‘pluralistic 
democracy’ relates most closely to the USA, and invokes liberty and solidarity 
over equality. In this model solidarity softens the hardships of the market 
economy, and the State promotes consensus over resolving conflicts; ‘an 
appeal to the solidarity of civil society that denies the State’s basic 
egalitarian mission leads to the downloading of responsibilities onto the 
volunteer sector’ (Bernard, 1999, p.13). Like the democratic typologies, the 
dialectic highlights likely tensions and tendencies in different forms of 
democratic society but do not correspond precisely with actually existing 
democracies. 
 
Bernard’s (1999, p.15) conclusion is that in practice, the use of social 
cohesion to temper the increasing sway of neo-liberalism over democracy 
needs to be avoided; ‘[n]ot just because equality must also be taken into 
consideration, but also because dialectic dynamics has much more 
complicated requirements’. This relates to the possibility of optimising the 
values of the democratic dialectic, avoiding unipolar distortions or fragile 
bipolar equilibria, although no societies are close to achieving this. The 
implications of neo-liberalism for democracy are discussed in the final section 
of this chapter. 
 
Phillips (2006, 2007) suggests that the model is helpful for conceptualising the 
‘good society’, especially by including solidarity (‘the essence of cohesion’, 
Phillips, 2007, p.42) in a model of democracy. Despite the simple intuitive 
value of the model, Phillips takes issue with the idea that Swedish social 
democracy (or ‘participatory democracy’) forms a fragile bipolar equilibrium 
between equality and solidarity over liberty. This form of society is relabelled 
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by Phillips (2007, p.42) as ‘democratic centralism’, as it ‘reflects the strongly 
solidaristic and egalitarian – but not libertarian – nature of the pre-1989 Soviet 
and Eastern European state-socialist nations’. However, to develop Phillips’ 
critique, the democratic dialectic values must themselves be contested. 
Exploration of this can help to illuminate the differences between the 
normative standpoints of the three democratic typologies developed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Reassessing Dialectical Values 
 
Each of the typologies, and their associated values fit on a continuum from 
individualistic to more social relational philosophical orientations (Table 5.1). 
This section also relates the values to the typologies of liberal, social and 
participatory democracy.  
 
Table 5.1 Democratic Dialectic Values in Three Typologies of Democracy 
 
Typologies of 
democracy 
 
Liberty 
 
Equality 
 
Solidarity 
 
Philosophical 
orientation 
 
 
Liberal 
democracy 
 
 
 
Negative 
freedom 
 
 
Libertarian 
rights 
 
 
 
 
Social 
capital (by-
product of 
self-interest) 
 
 
Strong 
individualism 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
democracy 
 
 
 
Positive 
freedom 
 
 
Luck 
egalitarianism 
 
 
 
 
Social 
capital 
(solidaristic 
networks) 
 
 
 
Residual 
individualism 
 
 
 
 
 
Participatory 
democracy 
 
 
Self-
development 
 
 
Relational 
egalitarianism 
 
 
Social and 
system 
integration 
 
 
 
Social 
relational 
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The limited notion of democracy in the liberal democracy typology is based on 
a narrow understanding of liberty as negative freedom and, although 
libertarians deny the value of equality, a basic framework of equal rights is 
present. Insofar as liberal democracy incorporates a value of solidarity, this is 
as a by-product by self-interested rational actors. Seen in this light, liberal 
democracy prioritises a particularly narrow understanding of liberty and 
equality, and largely neglects solidarity. Social democracy has a commitment 
to welfare (especially in traditional social democracy, whereas modernising 
social democracy prioritises workfare, Martell, 2001; White, 2004). Liberty is 
the positive freedom to achieve a desired end in the context of state 
regulation and action. In this respect, social democracy moves beyond the 
liberal typology to understand the importance of social relations in a more 
developed conception of democracy. However, as the following discussion 
shows, this view contains a residual individualism, and this weakness is borne 
out in luck egalitarianism and social capital, which concede too much ground 
to the underdeveloped liberal perspective on liberty, equality and solidarity. 
Finally, the participatory democracy typology is commensurable with the 
normative aims of social quality, consisting of freedom as self-development, 
relational egalitarianism, and social and system integration. This is especially 
pertinent for how social relations can provide the conditions for empowered 
participation. 
 
The following discussion critically investigates the concepts of liberty, 
equality and solidarity in turn. The social quality philosophical foundations of 
this analysis (Chapter 2) suggest that each value requires a shift from 
utilitarian or voluntarist individualism to a social relational understanding of 
humans as social beings (while avoiding over-socialisation). This suggests that 
the normative values of participatory democracy reflect the optimisation of 
the democratic dialectic. 
 
Liberty 
 
This section considers negative and positive conceptions of freedom and 
suggests that both are rooted in liberal individualism. While negative freedom 
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aligns with the liberal democracy typology, positive freedom corresponds with 
the social democracy typology. Despite MacCallum’s (1967) triadic concept of 
freedom, to transcend the individualist focus of theories of freedom, freedom 
as self-development is proposed (Gould, 1988). 
 
Negative freedom refers to an area in which an individual may act 
unobstructed by other individuals (Berlin, 2002). Liberalism makes a strong 
distinction between the private and public lives of individuals, and is 
concerned with the limits to which public life can intrude upon the private 
(Gray, 1995). This means that for liberals the role of the state is to protect 
the liberty of the private individual from interference by others (Miller, 2006). 
On the other hand, positive freedom refers to autonomy and the internal 
development of humans as moral actors (Green, 1997). This means that the 
activities of private individuals may well limit the autonomy of others, which 
requires public action to correct this, and that there is a moral dimension to 
freedom. This is in contrast to the supposedly morally ambivalent ‘private 
space’ defended by liberalism. In terms of democratic societies, this second 
view of freedom requires public institutions to be designed to enhance the 
capacity of all for individual autonomy and for rational self-direction (Green, 
1997). 
 
While acknowledging that the two appear to be ‘at no great logical distance 
from each other – no more than negative and positive ways of saying the same 
thing’, Berlin (2002, p.178-9) defends negative freedom. For Berlin (2002, 
p.170), being free means simply ‘not being interfered with by others’. There 
must be limits to negative freedom, however, as it is not possible for humans 
to exist in a state of complete non-interference. Such a society would ‘lead to 
social chaos in which... minimum needs would not be satisfied; or else the 
liberties of the weak would be suppressed by the strong’ (Berlin, 2002, p.170). 
The debate for liberals is over the appropriate amount of personal freedom 
that should be available to individuals: ‘a frontier must be drawn between the 
area of private life and that of public authority’ (Berlin, 2002, p.171). This 
view of freedom equates with the liberal democracy typology and the 
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emphasis on reducing state intervention as much as possible to protect the 
private sphere (individual actors in the market). 
 
On the other hand, Berlin (2002, p.178) suggests that the concept of positive 
freedom leads to a totalitarian ideology based on the freedom to ‘lead one 
prescribed form of life’. By ‘forcing people to be free’, Berlin’s (2002, p.169) 
conception of positive freedom invokes coercion; ‘the deliberate interference 
of other human beings within the area [the individual] could otherwise act’. 
Some limits may be necessary in society, but this cannot be described as 
freedom. 
 
The positive conception of freedom stems from Aristotlean thought: ‘[w]e can 
only be said to be fully or genuinely at liberty... if we actually engage in just 
those activities which are most conducive to eudaimonia or ‘human 
flourishing’, and may therefore be said to embody our deepest human 
purposes’ (Skinner, 1984, p.232). This is a significantly different foundation 
for understanding freedom to that of the liberal view, and justifies the use of 
the state to correct the social injustices of the market in a social democracy. 
 
Green (1997, p.370) sees freedom as more than ‘freedom from’ restraint or 
compulsion, but rather as a central normative aim for a community as ‘its 
attainment is the true end of all our efforts as citizens’. To go beyond the 
individualist basis of negative freedom, liberty must reflect the moral worth 
and the mutual interdependence of people in communities:   
 
[w]e do not mean merely freedom from restraint or compulsion. We do 
not mean merely freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it is 
that we like. We do not mean a freedom that can be enjoyed by one 
man or one set of men at a cost of a loss of freedom to others. When 
we speak of freedom to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power 
or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying and 
[it is] something we do or enjoy in common with others... a power 
which each man [sic] exercises through the help or security given him 
by his fellow-men, and which he in turn helps to secure for them 
(Green, 1997, pp.370-371). 
 
Individual freedom in the negative sense is a precursor to a morally valuable 
positive freedom (Blau, 2004). As humans must live with one another, Green 
122 
 
locates positive freedom in mutual relationships. Green (1997, p.371) 
proposes this to be democratic and egalitarian, as it is immoral to recognise 
the attainment of freedom by ‘an exceptional individual or exceptional class 
as an advance towards the true freedom of man [sic], if it is founded on a 
refusal of the same opportunity to other men’. Negative freedom is only 
valuable insofar as it is a means to a greater end: ‘the liberation of the 
powers of all men [sic] equally for contributions to a common good’ (Green, 
1997, p.372). 
 
The role of the state is crucial in this, both as protector of individual 
(negative) freedom, and enabler of social (positive) freedom: 
 
it is the business of the state... to maintain the conditions without 
which a free exercise of the human faculties is impossible... the outcry 
against state interference is often raised by men whose real objection 
is not to state interference but to centralisation, to the constant 
aggression of the central executive upon local authorities (Green, 1997, 
p.374). 
 
This indicates that the assertions of Berlin and other liberals against 
‘interference’ fail to make an adequate distinction between state 
intervention in the positive sense, and the centralisation of power in an 
authoritarian state. Nevertheless, it is over the role of the state and the 
formation of the ‘common good’ that liberal criticisms of the positive sense of 
freedom are made. Skinner (1984, p.231) cites Raphael’s (1976) criticism of 
positive freedom as typical of the liberal retort: 
 
‘when we speak of having or not having liberty or freedom in a political 
context, we are referring to freedom of action or social freedom, i.e., 
the absence of restraint or compulsion by human agency, including 
compulsion by the State’. To suggest, therefore, that ‘compulsion by 
the State can make a man more free’ is not merely to state a 
paradoxical conclusion; it is to present an ‘extraordinary view’ that 
simply consists of confusing together two polar opposites, freedom and 
constraint.  
 
While Berlin (2002) sought to defend negative freedom against the abuses of 
liberty by the state, his individualist account also indicates that some 
constraints must be upheld, through compelling children to be educated or by 
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forbidding public executions, for example. For Berlin (2002, p.215), negative 
freedom is one from a number of values that may constitute a society, as the 
extent to which people have the liberty to live without interference 
 
must be weighed against the claims of many other values, of which 
equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are 
perhaps the most obvious examples.  For this reason, it cannot be 
unlimited... the liberty of the strong, whether their strength is physical 
or economic, must be restrained.   
 
A plurality of values means that negative freedom may necessarily have to be 
reasonably curtailed in a democratic society.  But the question arises of how 
to judge between these different values, unless some conception of the 
common good is present?  Berlin does not make clear the commensurability of 
these values, nor does he examine the moral choices about which values are 
appropriate, for this would necessitate the positive sense of freedom 
described by Green (Blau, 2004).  
 
Williams (2001, p.9) criticises negative freedom using the example of ‘happy 
slaves’. Unlikely as it may seem, slaves that do not suffer any physical harm 
may not actually want to do anything that their slavery prevents them from 
doing. They may be content in their slavery to their master. But it would be 
absurd to claim that the slaves are free. Under the negative conception of 
freedom, they would be deemed to be free, as their desired actions are not 
interfered with, restrained or coerced. However, should the slaves become 
discontented when reformers show them what they are missing, following 
Berlin’s logic, it could be argued that the reformers have taken away the 
freedom of the slaves (Williams, 2001). With this argument, Williams shows 
that negative freedom is inadequate as a sole conception of liberty due to its 
basis in liberal individualism and the absence of a normative dimension. 
 
Indeed, negative freedom is viewed as ‘primitive freedom’ by Williams (2001, 
p.8), on the account that it is a basic precursor to a more complex and 
relational understanding necessary for human societies. Heyman (1992, p.86) 
suggests that is not adequate to say that liberty can only refer to the private 
freedom of the individual, as it must at the same time include the positive 
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political liberty of ‘the power of the community to govern itself, and that of 
citizens to participate in self-government’. People may require the negative 
freedom from external constraint, but a fuller understanding must also 
explicate the positive aspect of pursuing actions that are ‘worthwhile and 
sociable’ (Blau, 2004, p.551), in such a way that transcends the liberal 
individualist dichotomy between freedom and constraint.  
 
MacCallum (1967) posits a triadic conception that proposes to resolve this 
problem. For MacCallum (1967, p.314), analysis of freedom must identify an 
agent (x), preventing conditions (y) such as constraints or interferences, and 
actions (z) or ‘conditions of character or circumstance’, and freedom can thus 
be described as ‘x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) 
z’. In this view, liberty always involves a negative and a positive sense. 
However, MacCallum is ultimately still concerned with absence of external 
constraint at the level of the individual. It is unclear how positive freedom in 
this view is not simply the result of the successful exercise of negative liberty.  
 
Instead, Gould’s (1988) conception of freedom as self-development includes 
both negative and positive aspects of liberty, but shares the social quality 
understanding of constitutive interdependency (Chapter 2) by adopting a view 
of humans as social individuals, rather than the isolated pre-social individuals 
of liberal accounts, or the residual individualism present in both positive and 
triadic freedom. The social ontology that underpins the competing theories of 
freedom is the basis for Gould’s (1988) elaboration of a democratic ontology 
and the view of freedom as self-development. Like social quality theory, 
Gould (1988, p.94) rejects the liberal individualist ontology of ‘isolated egos’ 
which 
 
fails to take into account the fact that in social life, the purposes and 
actions of individuals develop and change in their relations with others 
and are affected by these interactions. Thus these individuals are not 
isolated, but rather become who they are through their social 
relations. These relations therefore are not external but ought to be 
characterised properly as internal relations. That is, individuals who 
stand to each other in these relations are essentially changed in and 
through them.  
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Gould’s (1988) social ontology ensures that individuals are central, but that 
their activities include relational properties, which are also essential to 
viewing individuals as social beings. This means that distinct from triadic 
freedom, individuals must have both ‘the absence of constraining conditions, 
and presence of enabling conditions’ (Gould, 1988, p.109).  
 
To be compatible with participatory democracy that extends beyond formal 
politics into social and economic life, freedom must consider ‘the activity of 
self-development, requiring not only the absence of external constraint but 
also the availability of social and material conditions necessary for the 
achievement of purposes or plans’ (Gould, 1988, p.32). Social conditions 
include ‘co-operative forms of social interaction, reciprocal recognition of 
each one’s free agency, and access to training, education, and various social 
institutions’, while material conditions refer to the means and quality of 
subsistence, labour and leisure activities (Gould, 1988, p.41). This emphasis 
on conditions is more fully realised here because Gould (1988, p.49) views 
humans as social individuals in which ‘their own self-development depends 
on… social relations and… the extent to which these others are themselves 
self-developing’ rather than an absence of constraint (or not) to achieve an 
individual end or by moral compulsion (however beneficent). 
 
Self-development is defined as ‘the freedom to develop oneself through one’s 
actions, or as a process of realising one’s projects through activity in the 
course of which forms one’s character and develops capacities’ (Gould, 1988, 
p.40). Negative freedom is a presupposition for self-development in the form 
of civil liberties and political rights, but also requires the positive freedom of 
the open-ended development of individual capacities over time (Gould, 1988). 
Due to its social ontology self-development has no singular end-point (such as 
the one ‘true freedom’ prescribed by totalitarians, as described by Berlin), 
but instead is a process that allows the formation of ‘new capacities in the 
elaboration and enrichment of existing ones’, whereby ‘individuals may be 
said to widen their range of actions and social interactions and intensify or 
improve the quality of particular modes of action or social relation’ in 
achieving long-term goals (Gould, 1988, p.47). 
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While the liberal conception of freedom as negative liberty correlates with 
the liberal democratic typology in providing a defence of the private sphere 
and the market, and the positive view of freedom underpins the welfare 
concerns of social democracy, a fully realised concept of freedom as self-
development is argued here to be commensurable with participatory 
democracy. Self-development overcomes individualism and recognises the 
relational characteristics of humans as social beings as it highlights how  
 
social and economic domination may not entail direct or forceful 
coercion of one person or group by another as an exercise of external 
constraint but rather control over the range or direction of one 
person’s (or group’s) actions by another, by means of control over the 
conditions that are necessary to carry out those actions (Gould, 1988, 
p.42). 
 
In recognising this, democratic participation by individuals in setting the 
terms of their social relations is necessary for freedom as self-development. 
However, a further issue relates to the relationship between freedom and 
equality, especially relating to the extent of equality necessary for 
democracy. As pointed out by Gould (and in a less-developed sense, by 
Green), equal access to the conditions of self-development is paramount. 
However, as the following discussion attests, the different typologies of 
democracy interpret equality (and its relative limits) in different ways. 
 
Equality 
 
Lockwood (1996, p.535) states that ‘equality of civil and political rights is an 
absolutely basic requirement [which is] constitutive of capitalist democracy as 
such’. However, while a formal political equality is necessary for all three 
democratic typologies, questions of social and economic inequality remain 
highly contentious (Marshall, 1992). Moreover, social and economic 
inequalities in especially liberal democratic societies can undermine the 
formal principle of political and civil equality (Dahl, 1985; Nagel, 1979). 
 
Equality is subject to different conceptions, although rarely, if ever, is 
absolute or simple equality advocated (Tawney, 1952).  Simple equality is the 
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idea that people ‘are on the whole, very similar in their natural endowments 
of character and intelligence’ (Tawney, 1952, p.35). The equation of ‘equality’ 
with ‘sameness’ is usually made by right wing critics of egalitarianism (Miller, 
c1997). The notion of ‘equality of outcome’ as producing the same end result 
for every single person is a caricature of much more complex understandings 
of egalitarianism: ‘[e]quality is not uniformity. The idea that it entails the 
suppression of individual difference is nonsense’ (Callinicos, 2000, p.79).   
 
Sen (1992) argues against simple equality on the grounds that this would be an 
unequal distribution of the capability to participate in social life for some. In 
a system of equal incomes, a disabled person may not be able to function in 
the way an able-bodied person would do. Rather, incomes would have to be 
skewed in favour of those less able to participate equally: ‘equal 
consideration for all may demand very unequal treatment in favour of the 
disadvantaged’ (Sen, 1992, p.1). Egalitarian theories must negotiate 
differences in both the external characteristics of humans in terms of 
inherited wealth and environmental conditions, but also the personal 
characteristics such as age, sex, gender, and physical and mental abilities, in 
considering equality (Sen, 1992). 
 
The capabilities approach to equality has been influential in reconceptualising 
equality in the context of the development of neo-liberalism as antithetical to 
democracy (Sen, 1999a). Sen’s (1982, 1992, 1999b) view of capabilities has 
been critically developed as relational egalitarianism (Anderson, 1999, 2003; 
also Kibe, 2011; Scheffler, 2005; Wolff, 1998), and is posited here as an aspect 
of the participatory democracy typology. This is contrasted with the social 
democratic concept of equality of fortune, which incorporates a range 
competing positions that largely concern the distribution of goods (Arneson, 
1989, Cohen, 1989; Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b; Rawls, 1999) and the liberal 
democratic argument for equality of libertarian rights (Hayek, 1960; Nozick, 
1974), although the latter often deny the value of equality at all.  
 
Theories of justice are crucial for examining equality. Equality of libertarian 
rights is based on justice as entitlement (Nozick, 1973), while equality of 
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fortune appeals to justice as fairness (Rawls, 1999). Relational egalitarianism 
is based on justice as fundamental relationships of equality between people 
(Anderson, 1999). In contrast to distributive theories of justice, relational 
egalitarianism addresses the social relationships in which goods are 
distributed as well as the actual distribution of goods. Therefore, like the 
previous discussion of liberty, moving from theories of equality in the liberal 
and social typologies of democracy to one that reflects the optimisation of 
the dialectic requiring a shift from liberal individualism to a social relational 
understanding of equality. 
 
All contemporary theories of social organisation demand equality of something 
between humans, or equality in some space or domain, to which inequalities 
must be justified (Sen, 1992). Williams (1973, p.232) calls this a ‘relevant 
reasons approach’ whereby a given inequality can only be justified by appeal 
to a relevant reason, usually a moral principle or value. Therefore, all 
theories of social organisation must start from a presumed level of equality 
between people. However, this presumed equality may be empirically 
obscured by social arrangements (Williams, 1973). This is the basis for Sen’s 
(1982, p.353) claim that contemporary debates place more emphasis on 
‘equality of what?’ than ‘why equality?’, although both remain important 
questions.  
 
Sen’s (1992, p.12) claim that any normative theory of social organisation 
which ‘has at all stood the test of time’ requires equality in one space or 
another is pertinent for Nozick’s (1973, 1974) libertarianism. Nozick (1974) 
argues for a theory of justice as entitlement to holdings. This theory resonates 
most closely with the liberal democracy typology. This is because Nozick 
(1974, p.155) opposes equality achieved through state intervention on the 
grounds that it would require ‘patterned distributions’ based on ‘end-state 
principles’ which contradict the basic historical right to ownership of 
property: ‘historical principles of justice hold that past circumstances or 
actions of people can create different entitlements’. Justice as entitlement is 
strongly opposed to the notion of the welfare state, which is seen as an unjust 
interference with the free choices and actions of individuals (Nozick, 1974).  
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Nozick’s (1974) theory of entitlement unfolds in three stages. Firstly, in the 
‘original acquisition of holdings’ someone comes to hold an ‘unheld object’ 
(Nozick, 1974, p.150). Ownership of property is constituted by ‘mixing’ labour 
with ‘unowned objects’; ‘because one owns one’s labour… one comes to own 
a previously unowned thing that becomes permeated with what one owns’ 
(Nozick, 1974, p.174). The acquisition of unowned objects is just on the 
Lockean proviso that there must be ‘enough and as good left in common for 
others’ (Nozick, 1974, p.175). The second principle is that these holdings may 
only be transferred by voluntary exchange, the giving of gifts, or according to 
the conventions of a given society. This refers to the right wing ideal of a 
market society (but obscures the tendency towards monopoly in markets). 
Finally, no holdings can be legitimately made without the repeated 
applications of the first two principles. This means that any form of 
redistribution of money or goods by the state is considered to be unjust. 
Nozick (1974, p.169) thus considers ‘[t]axation of earnings from labour [to be] 
on a par with forced labour’.   
 
Nozick (1974) defends the theory as being comprised of historical principles of 
justice, and that any attempt to change existing distributions must account 
for the history of appropriation and transfer of holdings.  Efforts to create a 
more equal social distribution of basic goods, money or capabilities for 
example, are in conflict with the liberty of people who have historically, and 
justly, come to own or voluntarily transfer goods or money in the entitlement 
theory; ‘[a]ny distributional pattern with any egalitarian component is 
overturnable by the voluntary actions of individual persons over time’ (Nozick, 
1974, p.164). This means that redistribution according to some principle of 
egalitarian justice in a ‘socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts 
between consenting adults’ (Nozick, 1974, p.163).   
 
As it is concerned with the absence of interference in individual action and 
appropriation of property, Nozick adopts Berlin’s (2002) limited concept of 
negative freedom. Given this, Nozick’s libertarian interpretation of liberty is 
proposed to be in direct contradiction with equality as a constraint on 
individual freedom. Any form of distributive equality requires  
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the use of resources, and so it… involves worsening the situation of 
some: those from whom the holdings are taken in order to improve the 
situations of others. But [according to the entitlement theory of 
justice,] holdings to which these people are entitled may not be seized, 
even to provide equality of opportunity for others (Nozick, 1974, 
p.235). 
 
While justice as entitlement proposes to be an anti-egalitarian theory, Sen 
(1992, p.22) states that this appears to be the case due to a ‘category 
mistake’. Liberty and equality should not be conflicting values in a zero-sum 
relationship but rather ‘[l]iberty is among the possible fields of application of 
equality, and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty’ 
(Sen, 1992, pp.22-23).  Therefore, if liberty is a value that is to be argued for, 
a supplementary question to this is, how equal must this liberty be? Even 
Nozick demands equality of something: ‘Nozick may not demand equality of 
utility or equality of holdings of primary goods, but he does demand equality 
of libertarian rights – no one has any more right to liberty than anyone else’ 
(Sen, 1992, p.13).   
 
A number of theorists have responded to the acceptance of Nozick’s 
libertarian conception of justice, particularly in Britain and the US, by the 
New Right and the infusion of Nozickean ideas into social and economic 
policies. These theorists are concerned with equality of fortune or ‘luck 
egalitarianism’ (Anderson, 1999). The liberal philosopher Rawls (1999) is the 
forbearer to this tradition in advocating the equality of ‘primary social goods’. 
Integral to the equality of fortune perspective are the subsequent 
developments of Rawls’ approach by Dworkin (1981a; 1981b) who favours 
‘equality of resources’, Arneson’s (1989) ‘equality of opportunity for welfare’ 
and Cohen’s (1989) ‘equality of access to advantages’.   
 
Scheffler (2003) argues that the luck egalitarianism debate has been at odds 
with the prevailing political practice of many Western democracies since the 
1980s with the primacy of neo-liberalism over social welfare. While luck 
egalitarianism can be most closely associated with the various forms of social 
democracy (Esping-Andersen, 1990), it is true that modernising social 
democracy in practice has been less equal than the kind of egalitarianism that 
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is advocated by these theorists.  Nonetheless, the principle is present in 
European social democratic conceptions of the role of the welfare state in 
capitalist society. As discussed in the final section of this chapter, the 
influence of neo-liberal ideology has significantly impacted on social 
democratic views of welfare. 
 
Luck egalitarians are broadly concerned with either some form of equality of 
welfare or equality of resources (or both) (Anderson, 1999). In Arneson’s 
(1989, p.82) view, welfare equates with self-interested preference 
satisfaction; ‘[t]he more an individual’s preferences are satisfied, as weighted 
by their importance to that very individual, the higher her welfare’. This can 
only be achieved by individuals seeking their own advantage through rational 
deliberation ‘with full pertinent information, in a calm mood, while thinking 
clearly and making no reasoning errors’ (Arneson, 1989, pp.82-83).   
 
Equality of opportunity for welfare is distinct from ‘straight’ equality of 
welfare, which can be rejected on the basis that some require higher welfare 
than others to be equal (Arneson, 1989). The problem of individual agency is 
relevant to luck egalitarianism, suggesting that the likely absence of ‘full 
pertinent information’ would lead to a de-facto equal distribution; ‘we may 
be up to our necks in the free will problem, but that is just tough luck’ 
(Cohen, 1989, p.934). Arneson (1989, p.86) attempts to placate this concern 
by stating that equality of opportunity for welfare is based on a soft 
determinism or indeterminism; [w]hen persons enjoy equal opportunity for 
welfare… any actual inequality of welfare in the positions they reach is due to 
factors within the individual’s control’. If subject to a hard determinism, then 
there can be no distinction between equal opportunity for welfare and 
equality of welfare. 
 
For distributive equality, therefore, each individual must have the opportunity 
to satisfy their preferences, although ‘it is morally fitting to hold individuals 
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their voluntary choices’ 
(Arneson, 1989, p.88, added emphasis). In suggesting the ability of individual 
people to foresee the consequences of choices made by free will, Arneson 
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includes in his theory one of the central premises of Nozick’s entitlement 
theory, that voluntary choices can justly upset the equal distribution of 
welfare. This limits the role of distributive justice to provide equal 
opportunity; whatever unequal distributions arise out of the deliberatively 
rational choices of people is therefore just.   
 
Cohen’s (1989, p.907) equality of access to advantage theory differs slightly 
from Arneson because it is more comprehensive; ‘‘advantage’ is understood to 
include, but to be wider than, welfare. Under equal access to advantage, the 
fundamental distinction for an egalitarian is between choice and luck in the 
shaping of people’s fates’. Compensating for bad luck, rather than providing 
the conditions for the satisfaction of preferences, leads Cohen (1989, p.916) 
to place much more emphasis eliminating cases of ‘involuntary disadvantage… 
disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible’.  
 
One of the central preoccupations of luck egalitarians is with the difference 
between ‘brute luck’ and ‘option luck’, where the aim is to compensate for 
the former, but not for the latter. Although the differences between the two 
are a matter of degree, Dworkin (1981b, p.293) states that 
 
[o]ption luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn 
out – whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk 
he or she should have anticipated and might have declined. Brute luck 
is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate 
gambles. If I buy a stock on the exchange that rises, then my option 
luck is good. If I am hit by a falling meteorite whose course could not 
have been predicted, then my bad luck is brute (even though I could 
have moved just before it struck if I had any reason to know where it 
would strike). 
 
This distinction has practical implications for policy. For example, if a smoker 
developed lung cancer, then this would be bad option luck, but if there were 
‘no particular decision to which we can point as a gamble risking the disease’, 
then this would be considered to be a case of bad brute luck (Dworkin, 1981b, 
p.293).  In the latter instance the person would require compensation for bad 
brute luck, but in the former instance, the person would be responsible for 
their choices and must face the consequences alone. Like Arneson, this 
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introduces the traditional values of right-wing anti-egalitarianism, such as 
choice and responsibility into egalitarian theory: ‘Dworkin has… performed for 
egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within it the most 
powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice 
and responsibility’ (Cohen, 1989, p.933).  
 
The project within egalitarian theory to develop a responsibility and choice 
based conception of distributive justice is in response to the dominant 
political criticisms of the welfare state by the New Right in Britain and the US 
(Scheffler, 2005). However, this move concedes too much ground towards the 
anti-egalitarian position. In its most raw formulation, ‘[l]uck egalitarians tell 
the victims of very bad option luck that, having chosen to run their risks, they 
deserve their misfortune, so society need not secure them against destitution 
and exploitation’ (Anderson, 1999, p.301). This approach is suited to the 
modernising social democratic use of conditionality in the welfare state 
(White, 2004).  
 
This approach does not fulfil the requirements of egalitarian theory by 
refusing to treat each person, even the imprudent, with equal respect and 
concern. Anderson (1999, p.288) is critical of equality of fortune or luck 
egalitarianism as having a narrow focus on ‘the distribution of divisible, 
privately appropriated goods, such as income and resources, or privately 
enjoyed goods such as welfare’. For Anderson (1999, p.289), equality of 
fortune fails to uphold ‘the principles of equal respect and concern for all’ by 
excluding some citizens by blaming them for their predicament, exuding pity 
and judging some as inferior in redistributing goods from the lucky to the 
unfortunate, and making judgements about people’s capacities to exercise 
responsibility for their choices which are both demeaning and intrusive. These 
claims are especially pertinent in light of the criticism above that libertarian 
theories begin from an individualist conception of liberty, a basic position to 
which luck egalitarians also implicitly commit themselves.   
 
Luck egalitarianism prescribes a ‘rugged individualism: let the distribution of 
goods be governed by capitalist markets and other voluntary agreements’ 
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(Anderson, 1999, p.292).  Rather than challenging the oppression that is 
manifested by social and economic inequalities, luck egalitarianism 
compromises democratic equality by advocating the competitive individualism 
of markets with a commitment to some form of minimal welfare provision to 
compensate for ‘bad brute luck’. This would reproduce the stigmatic terms of 
‘deserving poor’ and ‘undeserving poor’ whereby ‘citizens lay claim to aid 
from the state on the condition that they accept inferior status’ (Anderson, 
1999, p.311).  
 
Relational egalitarianism instead pays greater attention to both individual 
choices and social conditions. It invokes the theory of democratic equality 
(Anderson, 1999) which itself builds on Sen’s (1992, 1999b) capabilities 
understanding of equality. In conceptualising equality, ‘individual claims are 
not to be assessed in terms of the resources or primary goods the persons 
respectively hold, but by the freedoms they actually enjoy to choose the lives 
they have reason to value’ (Sen, 1992, p.81).  Freedom and equality are 
closely aligned in Sen’s theory, as the capabilities approach concerns itself 
with the freedom that all people equally have to achieve well-being, or the 
‘functionings’ (‘beings and doings’) that they value (Sen, 1992, p.40).  For Sen 
(1992, p.39) 
 
relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things as being 
adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable 
morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to more complex 
achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in 
the life of the community and so on. 
 
The capabilities approach is distinct from equality of fortune, which focuses 
on the distribution of goods, resources or welfare, and is more substantive 
than equality of libertarian rights.  It incorporates a pluralistic and normative 
conception of the good life into egalitarian theory, as different functionings 
and capabilities may not be equally valuable to every person.  
 
Callinicos (2000, pp.59-60) argues that the capabilities approach provides a 
‘positive rational for equality’, rather than the negative justification by luck 
egalitarians regarding avoiding disadvantage in a market society. Instead, the 
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capabilities approach values equality for the more positive purpose of using 
freedom to achieve well-being. However, Sen’s capabilities approach is 
subject to three interrelated criticisms which necessitate the adoption of a 
social relational understanding of equality for the optimisation of the 
democratic dialectic. Dean (2009) argues that Sen’s capabilities approach 
either ignores or sidelines the interdependent nature of human beings, the 
problem of liberalism and exploitative power relationships. Firstly, Sen’s 
approach is limited by its focus on capabilities at the individual level. Dean 
(2009, p.267) argues that 
 
the capability approach to equality is framed in terms of freedom, but 
not solidarity. It is a liberal-individualist approach… the priority is 
individual liberty, not social solidarity, the freedom to choose, not the 
need to belong. 
 
The implication of this is that Sen’s capabilities approach to equality is not 
adequate for optimising the democratic dialectic. While his treatment of 
liberty and equality highlights a way out of the zero-sum impasse of overly 
individualistic accounts, capabilities is also limited by its liberal individualist 
basis. In her list of central human capabilities, Nussbaum (2003, pp.41) 
includes ‘affiliation’, which refers to the capability to ‘live with and toward 
others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, to engage with 
various forms of social interaction, to be able to imagine the situation of 
another’. However, Dean (2009, p.268) argues that even this development of 
capabilities implies disconnection as a starting point by emphasising ‘a person 
and ‘the other’… as the abstract bearers of capabilities’, rather than 
considering a more substantive interrelationship. Sen’s reluctance to provide 
a list of capabilities also indicates his unwillingness to engage with the 
contingent and relative nature of values that requires a more relational 
understanding of capabilities than his individualist account can provide (Dean, 
2009).   
 
This is related to the second criticism regarding the developments of the 
theory which point to participation in public deliberation (‘public reasoning’ 
in Sen’s (2005) terms), as a key aspect of capabilities (Dean, 2009; Nussbaum, 
2001). Without directly challenging existing social relations of oppression, 
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advocating public participation from the basis of Sen’s liberal individualism 
may have the undesired consequence of reinforcing ‘prevailing hegemonic 
assumptions’ including ‘the dominant liberal notion of what constitutes ‘the 
public’’ (Dean, 2009, p.270).  
 
The third criticism is that the capabilities approach fails to usefully 
acknowledge the ‘systematic impediments to human freedom that are 
associated with the capitalist mode of production’ (Dean, 2009, pp.271-272). 
For the capabilities approach to provide an adequate theory of equality the 
liberal individualist basis for it must be replaced by a more relational 
understanding of equality. 
 
Anderson’s (1999, p.319) concept of relational egalitarianism is derived from 
the Kantian categorical imperative:  
 
[t]he counterpart to an individual’s inalienable right to the social 
conditions of her freedom is the unconditional obligation of others to 
respect her dignity or moral equality… [Moreover,] every individual has 
a worth or dignity that is not conditional upon anyone’s desires or 
preferences, not even the individual’s own desires. 
 
Relational egalitarianism is expressed as a universal moral equality between 
people that can be seen in the negative sense of abolishing oppressive 
relationships such as those where people are dominated, exploited, 
marginalised, or demeaned by others, while in the positive sense, this view 
advocates a democratic society which is premised upon people standing in 
relations of equality (Anderson, 1999). This suggests ‘equal rights to the 
conditions of self-development’ (Gould, 1988, p.60), as distinct from rights to 
entitlements or to liberal egalitarian principles of distributive justice. 
 
This view resonates with Tawney’s (1952) understanding of equal 
consideration and respect for all persons, while the other approaches are 
concerned with justifying the distributions of certain goods.  For Tawney 
(1952, p.38) 
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[t]he equality which [is] desirable is not equality of capacity or 
attainment, but of circumstances, institutions, and manner of life.  The 
inequality which [is deplorable] is not inequality of personal gifts, but 
of the social and economic environment… [S]ocial institutions – 
property rights, and the organisation of industry, and the system of 
public health and education – should be planned, as far as possible, to 
emphasise and strengthen, not the class differences which divide, but 
the common humanity which unites. 
 
Anderson (1999, p.313) argues that democracy is central to equality, in the 
sense of ‘collective self-determination by means of open discussion among 
equals, in accordance with rules acceptable to all’. For the freedom to self-
develop, democratic equality requires access to sufficient capabilities over an 
entire lifetime; democratic equality ‘is not a starting-gate theory, in which 
people could lose their access to equal standing through bad option luck’ 
(Anderson, 1999, p.319). This conception of democratic equality 
 
regards two people as equal when each accepts the obligation to justify 
their actions and principles acceptable to the other, and in which they 
take mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted... 
democratic egalitarians are fundamentally concerned with the 
relationships within which goods are distributed, not only with the 
distribution of goods themselves (Anderson, 1999, pp.313-314).   
 
This broader approach to equality suggests the transformation of the social 
structure of public institutions, norms, and practices, rather than solely to 
dispute the distribution of resources within an existing system according to 
principles of either entitlement or fairness. This necessitates the 
transformation of conditions, not the amelioration of states of affairs 
(Bhaskar, 1989). The economy must be seen as a system of ‘co-operative joint 
production’, because ‘[t]hose occupying more productive roles owe much of 
their productivity to the fact that those occupying less productive roles have 
freed them from the need to spend their time on low-skill tasks’ (Anderson, 
1999, p.326). Democratic equality would ensure that all citizens are entitled 
to a ‘decent set of freedoms, sufficient for functioning as an equal in society’ 
(Anderson, 1999, p.326), which includes meaningful participation in political, 
social, and economic life for self-development.   
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In a participatory democratic society, income inequalities are not immediately 
problematic provided that people would no longer be able to convert 
economic income into status inequality through political influence, social 
status and denigration of the social bases of self-respect of others; ‘[t]he 
stronger the barriers against commodifying social status, political influence, 
and the like, the more acceptable are significant income inequalities’ 
(Anderson, 1999, p.326). Vast inequalities of wealth, however, would not be 
compatible with the requirement for relationships of equal respect and moral 
worth. The issue of personal irresponsibility is avoided as democratic equality 
insures individuals against the loss of guaranteed goods; a set of capabilities 
that allow people to function as free and equal citizens and to avoid 
repression.  
 
Having highlighted the liberal individualist weaknesses of equality of 
libertarian rights and equality of fortune, Anderson’s (1999) relational 
egalitarian approach is posited here to be necessary for the optimisation of 
the democratic dialectic. This is realised in practice as equality of 
relationships, moral worth and rights to the conditions of self-development, 
and processes of enablement in participatory democratic social relations. 
 
Solidarity 
 
This section discusses contemporary theories of solidarity which align with the 
different typologies of democracy. Like social cohesion, social capital has in 
the last two decades become a buzz term for policy makers and academics 
(Farr, 2004; Fine, 2010). It has become a prominent concern in World Bank 
policies (World Bank, 1998; also Phillips, 2006; Fine, 2008). For liberal 
democracy, Coleman’s (1988, 1990) rational actor theory of social capital 
describes the atomistic nature of the liberal emphasis on economic individuals 
with the negative freedom to compete in the market, equality of libertarian 
rights, and a limited formal political equality. For social democracy, Putnam’s 
(1993, 1995, 2000) view of bridging and bonding social capital complements 
the emphasis on compromising between capitalist markets and a commitment 
to a welfare state through positive freedom and equality of fortune. 
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Bourdieu’s (1986; 1992) radical sociology introduces a more critical 
conception of social capital but is also subject to weaknesses. Finally, again in 
shifting from individual-centred conceptions to one that acknowledges the 
social relational and constitutively interdependent nature of humans, 
Lockwood’s (1996; 1999) social and system integration view of solidarity is 
developed. This concept is commensurable with freedom as self-development 
and relational egalitarianism for the optimisation of the democratic dialectic. 
 
Coleman’s (1988) social capital integrates an economic model of rational 
action within a sociological account of social structure. Rational action theory 
assumes that individuals are motivated only by self-interest and not by the 
needs of others (Field, 2003). For Coleman (1988, pp.100-101), social capital 
is viewed as a particular kind of resource available to rational actors, which 
exists ‘in the relations among persons’. By imputing into the rational actor 
model the notion of social capital, Coleman (1988, p.105) asserts that  
 
[a]ll social relations and social structures facilitate some forms of social 
capital; actors establish relations purposefully and continue them when 
they continue to provide benefits.   
 
Coleman’s theory contends that social capital can be facilitated by self-
interested actors pursuing their ends within particular forms of social 
structure. In other words, humans do not purposefully set out to create social 
capital, but rather it is a by-product of individual self-interest within certain 
social conditions (Field, 2003). 
 
As individuals engage with others to achieve instrumental ends, social capital 
can be used, like financial capital, human capital or physical capital, as a 
means towards individual success. Coleman (1988) highlights aspects of social 
structures which can increase social capital, such as general trustworthiness 
within a community, the flow of information and social norms of acceptable 
behaviour.  Anchoring the self-interested conception of social capital are 
obligations and expectations in social relationships which establish and 
maintain trust and social norms. Coleman (1988) cites the example of the 
wholesale diamond market in New York, where merchants will allow 
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prospective buyers to take away bags of the expensive stones to examine in 
private. Trust exists between the seller and buyer because the wholesale 
diamond market in New York is a closed Jewish community. Family and 
religious affiliation preclude the possibility that a prospective buyer might 
steal the stones as the thief would be sanctioned by the loss of all family, 
religious and community ties. Compliance to the social norm is secured 
through fear of exclusion. Unlike highly individualistic economic theories of 
rational action, such as public choice (Buchanan & Tullock, 1965), the threat 
of sanctions can compel individuals to create social capital within social 
groups.   
 
This view of social capital adds a sociological dimension to rational action 
theory, in the form of co-operative solidarity between competitive rational 
individuals in the form of trust, obligations and social norms. However, this is 
theorised from a methodological individualist basis which assumes that 
humans engage in social relationships and access social capital as rational 
utility-maximisers. Despite incorporating social structures, solidarity in 
Coleman’s conception of social capital remains of an atomistic kind. In effect, 
Coleman’s social capital sees solidarity as a means among others such as 
financial, physical or human capital, towards the end of individual success in 
a market society. This view of social capital is rooted in the commitment to 
negative freedom and equality of libertarian rights, and the market principles 
governing social relationships characteristic of the liberal democracy typology. 
 
In the post-war years, solidarity in social democracy was associated with 
Marshall’s (1992) notion of social citizenship as a further set of citizenship 
rights that deepened the civil rights won in the eighteenth century and the 
political rights fought for in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Marshall (1992) saw the development of social rights as a move towards a 
concept of democratic citizenship in which structures of economic and social 
inequality would be reduced as wide disparities in wealth and class would no 
longer be justifiable in a fully democratic society. This was part of a social 
democratic movement involving three factors: 
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[f]irst, the compression, at both ends, of the scale of income 
distribution. Second, the great extension of the area of common 
culture and common experience. And third, the enrichment of the 
universal status of citizenship, combined with the recognition and 
stabilisation of certain status differences chiefly through the linked 
systems of education and occupation (Marshall, 1992, p.44). 
 
For Marshall (1992, p.45), in the mid-twentieth century ‘the preservation of 
economic inequalities has been made more difficult by the enrichment of the 
status of citizenship’, but he warned that ‘[c]lass distinctions may survive 
which have no appropriate economic function, and economic differences 
which do not correspond with accepted class distinctions’. However, by the 
late-twentieth and early twenty-first century, with the rise of neoliberal 
ideology in the global economy and the capitulation of the social democratic 
project to this political and economic doctrine (discussed in the next section), 
social capital has become prominent in social democratic thought. Putnam 
(1993, 1995, 2000) theorises social capital as a social democratic conception 
of solidarity.   
 
Putnam’s (1995, pp. 664-665) theory of social capital refers to ‘features of 
social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’. Networks, norms and 
trust are interrelated as in modern democracy social trust emerges from 
‘norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement’ (Putnam, 1993, 
p.171). Enhancing the social democratic credentials of Putnam’s (1995, p.671) 
account is the commensurability of social capital with both capitalism and the 
welfare state.  Contrary to Fukuyama’s (1995) claim that the ‘bigger’ the 
state, the lower social capital will be, Putnam (1995, p.671, original 
emphasis) asserts that in the US, ‘differences in social capital in free-spending 
states are no less trusting or engaged than citizens in frugal ones’, and 
drawing on comparative research of nineteen Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries; ‘indicators of social capital are, if 
anything, positively correlated with the size of the state’. Important for 
Putnam (1993) is that the norms of generalised reciprocity that govern social 
relationships can preclude the domination of self-interest over solidarity, 
suggesting that this concept shares some affinity with Marshall’s social 
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democratic view, however, social capital does not contain a normative aim of 
developing an active democratic citizenship in Marshall’s sense. 
 
Although the words ‘community’, ‘collectivism’ and ‘solidarity’ are all used to 
describe social capital, Putnam (2000) describes two different kinds of social 
capital; bridging and bonding. Bridging social capital is inclusive and relates to 
social relationships between different groups, communities or families while 
bonding social capital is exclusive and mobilises solidarity within a social 
group.  This implicitly implies zero-sum relationships within a society; social 
capital can only include some by excluding others (Fine, 2010). Although 
bonding social capital is deemed integral for solidarity, too much of it can 
lead to what Putnam (2000, p.358) calls the ‘dark side of social capital’; an 
inward looking, illiberal and intolerant sense of solidarity fermented in closed 
communities, which is inappropriate for an open democratic society. Balance 
is stressed in this account of social capital between bonding and bridging links 
which can enhance a pluralistic democratic society based on horizontal social 
networks: ‘[t]he performance of our democratic institutions depends in 
measurable ways upon social capital’ (Putnam, 2000, p.349). This view 
proposes that solidarity is a social problem, rather than a political problem 
(Marshall’s view) or an economic problem (Coleman’s view). 
 
Distinct from the democratic pluralism stressed by Putnam, Bourdieu (1986, 
1992) interprets social capital from a critical perspective of historical class 
analysis.  Where Coleman attempts to reconcile economics with sociology, 
Bourdieu (1986, p.242) points to the deficiencies of economics, stating that 
social scientists should study ‘capital all its forms, and not solely in the one 
form recognised by economic theory’. Indeed, missing from both Putnam’s 
and Coleman’s accounts of social capital is a critical consideration of the 
relationship between social capital and the structures and institutions of 
democracy (proposed by either liberal or social variants) and capitalism. 
Bourdieu (1986) asserts that there are three different forms of capital: social 
capital, cultural capital, and at the root of both of them, economic capital. 
Economic capital can be converted into money as well as social capital, and is 
institutionalised in property rights. Cultural capital is institutionalised in the 
143 
 
form of educational qualifications and social capital is institutionalised in 
titles of nobility or status (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu’s approach broadens 
class analysis from its roots in economic inequality to show how inequalities in 
social capital and cultural capital contribute to maintaining the class status 
and power of elites over the majority of the population.   
 
Power is present, if often unacknowledged, in theories of social capital.  
Bourdieu (1986), for example, sees power and capital as amounting to the 
same thing. Putnam tacitly interprets social capital as a positive resource of 
‘power to’ whereas Bourdieu describes social capital as wholly ‘power over’ in 
class stratified societies. While Putnam emphasises how social capital can 
create the power to act for disempowered groups and individuals the wider 
structural context of social, economic and cultural inequalities are marginal in 
his account. Conversely, Bourdieu criticises social capital in relation to class 
stratification as a resource that helps to transfer and widen social, cultural 
and economic inequalities across generations, but neglects human agency in 
challenging this. 
 
These theorists also differ on the form that social capital takes.  As Phillips 
(2006, p.133) highlights, Bourdieu sees it as a social resource owned by 
individuals, and Putnam sees it as a ‘social glue’ that links networks of 
individuals. The critical interpretation put forward by Bourdieu indicates that 
Coleman’s and Putnam’s theories of social capital are insufficient treatments 
of solidarity. However, Bourdieu’s concept of social capital is itself susceptible 
to the charge of functionalism, for it does not incorporate an adequate theory 
of social change in describing a largely static stratification between powerful 
elite groups over larger disempowered groups across generations. Again, the 
adoption of a social relational perspective, eschewing both individualism and 
structuralism can overcome the weaknesses in these conceptions of solidarity. 
 
Smith and Kulynych (2002) and Fine (2001, 2010) discuss the weakness of 
conceptualising solidarity in the economic language of social capital. Smith 
and Kulynych (2002) point out that the ideals of aggressive individualism, 
competition with winners and losers, and pursuit of money are contradictory 
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to the logic of civic virtue and democratic public participation for collective 
ends desirable for social solidarity. The concept as described by Putnam and 
others brings a view of ‘the social’ back into recent politics and policy-
making, which is dominated by free market economics (see the following 
section). But the concepts and language of economics are retained in doing 
so. Viewing solidarity as social capital therefore helps to legitimate market 
capitalism and obscure how it inherently weakens democracy (Smith & 
Kulynych, 2002). Even Bourdieu retains terms such as ‘interest’, ‘profit’ and 
‘investment’ which root the concept in the liberal economic conception of 
self-interested individuals (Smith & Kulynych, 2002). As Smith and Kulynych 
(2002, p.150) put it: 
 
to characterise civic engagement and the preconditions of democracy 
as social capital is to foster the view that community involvement and 
political participation are forms of economic activity, thus blurring 
important distinctions and, among other things, undermining the 
development of all-encompassing, genuine forms of democracy. 
 
Coleman and Putnam suggest that the disadvantaged and disempowered can 
use social capital as countervailing power to become more independent, self-
reliant and competitive in a market society. However, this approach weakens 
democracy and negates the dialectic by conceding too much to the market-
based perspective of aggressive individualism, and a passive consumer variant 
of citizenship. For social democracy, Putnam’s concept of social capital 
fundamentally reworks the notion of social citizenship in the terms of 
capitalism: the ‘social’ is assessed from capital’s point of view (Farr, 2004). 
This legitimates capitalism as both natural and inevitable, and limits the 
development of democratic citizenship: 
 
[b]y describing the political resources of ordinary citizens, the poor, 
and the working class as merely another form of capital as well as by 
applying the word capital to bowling leagues, dance troupes, church 
groups, and a wide range of other institutions, the term social capital 
makes it more difficult than it otherwise would be to conceptualise 
political and social life in a vocabulary other than that associated with 
capitalism (Smith & Kulynych, 2002, p.175).   
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This point leads to the central criticism of social capital in the context of the 
democratic dialectic, which is that theories of solidarity as social capital 
undermine the need for greater participatory democracy (Chapter 4). Rather 
than attempting to integrate selfish individualism into a concept of social 
solidarity, ‘[d]eliberative and participatory versions of democracy require an 
atmosphere and attitude where people see their political interactions as 
motivated by the search for the best, most just solutions to public problems’ 
(Smith & Kulynych, 2002, pp.167-168). A theory of solidarity suitable for the 
democratic dialectic must enhance democracy, well-being and social 
empowerment by acknowledging the relationship between micro-level of 
social relationships and the macro-level context of social structures and 
institutions of citizenship. 
 
Lockwood’s (1996; 1999) social and system integration perspective provides an 
account of solidarity that develops this point further. While social capital 
conceptualises the social sphere (or civil society) as separate from the 
economic sphere, social and system integration pays attention to the 
interrelationships between the social, political and economic: 
 
the primary reference point for the analysis of social integration has to 
be the complex unity of democratic, market and welfare state relations 
whose claim to legitimacy is based on their embodiment of the rights of 
political, civil and social citizenship (Lockwood, 1996, p.532). 
 
Lockwood (1999) makes a distinction between social integration (individual 
relationships) and system integration (relations between the institutions of a 
society) which range from integration to dissolution. System integration is 
comprised of civic integration, which refers to the macro-level institutional 
order of ‘the civil, political and social rights of citizenship’, and is threatened 
by civic dissolution (Lockwood, 1999, p.64). Secondly, social integration 
involves social cohesion, which refers to micro and meso-level ‘kinship and 
other primary networks... voluntary associations and mutual aid’, which in 
turn, are threatened by a break up of these networks in processes of social 
dissolution (Lockwood, 1999, pp.64-65). Beck et al. (2001) point to the need 
to look beyond the local community for social cohesion with the development 
of global communication networks, but add that this global scope must not 
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neglect the vital importance of face-to-face relationships in a locality – and 
associated inequalities. While Lockwood has accounted for the notion of social 
capital in the micro-level of social cohesion, social integration is much more 
comprehensive, incorporating macro and meso level social relations, along 
with attention to social structure (system integration) in a model of social 
solidarity. This suggests an attention to solidarity in social relations. 
 
Lockwood (1996, p.535) describes how democratic societies (liberal and social 
typologies) have attempted to balance the different aspects of social and 
system integration: 
 
[s]ince equality of civil and political rights is an absolute basic 
requirement, constitutive of capitalist democracy as such, the endemic 
contradiction between citizenship and capital has so far been managed 
by the fine-tuning of social rights: that is by seeking a balance between 
the system-integrative need for ‘efficiency’, and the social-integrative 
need to provide ‘acceptable’ or ‘tolerable’ levels of social welfare.   
 
As a critical development of the model, Beck et al. (2001, pp.343-348) 
consider both the conflicts between integration and dissolution, but also the 
relationships between human agents and social structures. This puts Marshall’s 
(1992) concern with the concept of democratic citizenship firmly back into a 
theory of solidarity.  Beck et al. (2001, p.346) posit that ‘[c]itizenship refers 
to the possibility of participation in economic, political, social and cultural 
systems and institutions’. From the perspective of social quality, social 
integration requires the creation of open and participatory democratic 
structures that highlight the inherent interrelationship between different 
systems and sub-systems of society: ‘nobody is only educated, nobody 
participates only in monetary actions, nobody leads a specific political, 
scientific, familial or religious life’ (Beck et al., 2001, pp.347-348). The 
conditions for a participatory democratic society requires this form of 
integration in combination with equality of respect and moral worth of all 
citizens, who have equal rights to the conditions of their self-development 
(freedom). This considers the social relational nature of democratic citizens 
and suggests that organising social and economic life on participatory 
democratic principles may empower people and improve social quality.  
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This section has discussed the values of liberty, equality and solidarity in the 
democratic dialectic and has highlighted how different interpretations of 
these values correspond with different typologies of democracy. The 
variations in these values, and the contingencies of democratic societies, 
suggest the necessity of change in order to optimise the democratic dialectic. 
This transition from the values that underpin liberal democracy and social 
democracy would require the adoption of freedom as self-development, 
relational egalitarianism, and social and system integration in everyday social 
relationships and in the social and institutional arrangements of society that 
underpin them. With their focus on democratic participation, these values 
form the normative guide to the study of social empowerment in the case 
studies. The possibilities for transformation in everyday life are compounded 
however, by the existence of a neo-liberal hegemonic ideology that threatens 
all forms of democracy. 
 
Neo-liberalism against the Democratic Dialectic 
 
To relate the normative guide of the democratic dialectic to the everyday 
context of British democratic society in the empirical case studies, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the pervasive influence of neo-liberalism and the 
corrosive effect that it has. This discussion builds on the criticisms of neo-
liberalism and globalisation in relation to democratic politics highlighted by 
Hay (2007) in Chapter 1. For Hoffman (1988, p.197), influenced by the 
political project of the New Right, ‘the values of liberalism are now being 
championed in more or less explicit opposition to the values of democracy’. 
This suggests a reduction in possibilities for the improvement of social quality 
and social empowerment with the adoption of more participatory democratic 
social relations and institutions (as the optimisation of the democratic 
dialectic). This section examines neo-liberalism as a hegemonic political 
project that has extended its reach to global institutions. This discussion 
suggests that the development of participatory democracy ought to be 
situated within a counter hegemonic alternative to neo-liberalism, proposed 
in this thesis to be social quality (Beck et al., 1998; 2001; van der Maesen & 
Walker, 2012). 
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Social quality is relevant because neo-liberalism prioritises economic 
relationships over social relationships (Walker, 2005). The outcome of this is a 
contradiction in the democratic dialectic between social and economic forces 
that remain a part of the same totality (Bernard, 1999). This suggests that the 
presence of negative liberty in neo-liberalism is destructive of equality and 
solidarity. Alternatively, social quality argues that ‘social protection is an 
indispensable precondition of economic performance’ (Walker & Deacon, 
2003, p.12). Contrary to neo-liberalism, social quality is premised instead on 
‘a rationale for growth and a vision of society in which social goals dictate the 
direction of economic policies’ (Walker & Deacon, 2003, p.14). Given this aim, 
the relative compatibility of social quality in policy terms with either liberal 
democracy or social democracy in the context of neo-liberalism is a further 
issue that is discussed in the conclusion to this thesis. This present work is 
focused on assessing participatory democracy and social empowerment in 
social and economic settings. 
 
The historical circumstances of the 1970s and 1980s have subsumed the 
possibility of more participatory democracy under the neo-liberal concept of 
consumer-citizenship and market-led processes of economic globalisation. It is 
necessary to situate the argument for the democratic dialectic values 
described above within the historical development of neo-liberalism as a 
hegemonic ideology by examining the concept in theory and practice, and its 
global rise. 
 
Neo-liberalism and Hegemony 
 
The dominant ideology thesis is associated with Gramsci’s (1971) concept of 
hegemony.  Hegemony is usually obtained by consent secured by ‘intellectual 
and moral leadership’, rather than conflict, and refers to ‘an order in which a 
common social-moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is 
dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour’ 
(Femia, 1981, p.24). Gamble (1994) asserts that studying hegemony involves 
attention to political and economic relations as well as ideology. Levitas 
(1986a, p.17) argues that a dominant ideology becomes dominant ‘because it 
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is propagated and supported by the institutions of civil society and the state’ 
in policy and practice, and incorporating the majority of the population is not 
always necessary given that often the purpose of a dominant ideology is to 
‘prevent the formation of coherent counter-ideologies’. Ideology is 
interrelated with the concrete everyday practices of social life and normative 
values underpinning a society:  
 
[i]deologies become rooted in communities by their capacity to order 
daily practice.  Ruling groups consequently have a head start over the 
rest of us, not only because they control (though they may) the 
institutions of civil society but their control of the state exerts a 
(sometimes coercive) control over the range of practices available 
(Levitas, 1986a, p.18). 
 
Neo-liberalism is hegemonic because the development of the market state in 
the last forty years has required ‘broad legitimacy across society and at least 
some measure of support and engagement from popular social forces’ 
(Robison, 2006, p.5). Cerny (2008) argues that while the development of neo-
liberalism was driven by the Right in the 1970s and 1980s, now with few 
exceptions most state actors of both Left and Right are neo-liberal.   
 
In a globalising world, with multilevel actors and institutions, Cerny (2008) 
posits that there at least two variants of neo-liberalism have developed. In 
addition to the rise of ‘regulatory’ neo-liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, a 
‘social’ variant emerged in the 1990s. Modernising social democracy adapted 
the welfare state to the demands of globalising neo-liberalism in the US, 
Europe and elsewhere (though there has been moderately successful 
resistance to this by left-wing governments in South America, see Harris, 
2007; Goldfrank & Schrank, 2009). Following the financial crisis of 2008, a 
second wave of neo-liberalism is beginning in earnest, especially in Britain, 
where austerity policies have been imposed (often drawing on the rhetoric of 
localism and empowerment) with the aim of further making the market the 
dominant feature in society (Birch & Mykhnenko, 2010; Corbett & Walker, 
2012, 2013; Crouch, 2011; Fine, 2010; Jessop, 2010; Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 
2011). Fine (2010, p.164) describes this change: 
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whilst the first phase involved state promotion of interests through the 
market, especially liberalising financial markets, the second phase is 
faced with both ameliorating the consequences of this shock therapy 
and of continuing to intervene to allow it to be sustained. The 
emphasis, in principle, is upon how to make markets socially 
acceptable. 
 
The next sections discuss the development of neo-liberalism from its 
theoretical origins, to its empirical application, and global development. 
 
Neo-liberal Theory 
 
Neo-liberalism originated as ideas emanating from liberal economists and 
philosophers from North America and Western Europe in the mid-twentieth 
century (Turner, 2008). Neo-liberalism refers to ‘a revival of a set of ideas 
dating to eighteenth and nineteenth century England, re-tooled to fit the 
institutions and politics of the late post-war environment and updated with 
the concepts and technologies of an increasingly competitive and 
mathematical economics profession’ (Mudge, 2008, pp.714-715). Forming the 
Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, the neo-liberals developed and disseminated 
their ideas in the hope of ‘persuading intellectuals, and hence the masses and 
their political leaders’ to reject collectivism in favour of a re-emergence of 
classical liberal individualist society and a deregulated capitalist market order 
(Turner, 2008, p.71).   
 
Hout (2006, p.217) describes this as a ‘politically inspired project to limit the 
influence of the state over economic transactions’. Neo-liberalism is ‘a theory 
of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best 
be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005, p.2). The state must be 
strong, or even dictatorial, but manifestly not interventionist, in order to 
‘create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices’ 
(Harvey, 2005, p.2; MacEwan, 2005).   
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In theorising neo-liberalism, Friedman champions the market, while Hayek 
warns of the totalitarian dangers of state intervention. As Levitas (1986b, 
p.82) puts it  
 
Friedman’s main objection to intervention is that it limits economic 
growth; Hayek fears that any such intervention, including attempts to 
redistribute wealth through progressive income tax, will not lead just 
to less growth, but to increasing public expenditure, politicisation and 
totalitarianism.   
 
Hayek’s (cited in Turner, 2008, p.70) desire for the dissemination of neo-
liberal ideas necessitated a drawn out ideological contest with the social 
democratic consensus, requiring ‘an alteration in the character of the 
people’. Hayek (1960; 2007) sought to reclaim individual freedom from 
collectivist, and potentially, totalitarian ideologies in Western democracies. 
This line of argument has obvious references to Berlin and Nozick above.  
 
Hayek (2007) reasserted classical economics by taking the rational economic 
individual as the root of his analysis. He argued that the move towards state 
intervention in the economy in preparation for a post-war settlement was 
dangerous because  
 
it fails to comprehend that the coordination of multifarious individual 
efforts in a complex society must take account of facts that no 
individual can completely survey. And it fails to see that, unless this 
complex society is to be destroyed, the only alternative to submission 
to the impersonal and seemingly irrational forces of the market is 
submission to an equally uncontrollable and therefore arbitrary power 
of other men… This is not only the path to totalitarianism but the path 
to the destruction of our civilisation and a certain way to block 
progress (Hayek, 2007, p.212). 
 
For Hayek (1960), liberty is the central moral value from which his defence of 
the neo-liberal market order proceeds. Like Berlin’s view, liberty is limited to 
its negative sense only as the ‘state of liberty’ refers to ‘that condition of 
men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in 
society’ (Hayek, 1960, p.11). But unlike Berlin, the exalting of negative 
liberty is not tempered by the requirement for other values in society beyond 
a procedural notion of justice. To this end, political liberty is also dismissed 
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by Hayek (1960, p.14) as distinct from individual (economic) liberty, and often 
found to be in contradiction of it: ‘we have seen millions voting themselves 
into complete dependence on a tyrant… to choose one’s government is not 
necessarily to secure freedom’.  
 
Given this, Hayek (1960, p.32) is deeply distrustful of democracy, seeking to 
extract his ideal of liberty as economic freedom from its democratic 
interrelationship with equality and solidarity: it is ‘better for all that some 
should be free than none and also that many enjoy full freedom than that all 
should have restricted freedom’. This narrow and economistic zero-sum 
conception of freedom is subject to the same individualist limitations of 
Berlin’s view, which neglects to consider humans as social beings with needs 
and interdependent with other humans in society. 
 
Where Hayek begins from criticisms of the totalitarian dangers of centralised 
government, Friedman (1962) starts from a position of advocating the market 
order as the best form of society, with the problem of government as a 
secondary (but necessary) issue. The benefits of unfettered market 
capitalism, for Friedman (1962; Friedman & Friedman, 1980) include the 
claims that it protects individual freedom, that it has produced less inequality 
than previous economic systems, and that it counters discrimination in the 
labour market. Moreover, Friedman (1962, p.170) asserts that market 
capitalism benefits ‘the masses’ more generally: ‘[t]he chief characteristic of 
progress and development over the past century is that it has freed the 
masses from back breaking toil and has made available to them the products 
and services that were formerly the monopoly of the upper classes’. 
 
The principle of voluntary agreements and exchange, and an absence of 
coercion are at the heart of this defence of capitalism: ‘no society… has ever 
achieved prosperity and freedom unless voluntary exchange has been its 
dominant principle of organisation’ (Friedman & Friedman, 1980, p.29). For 
Friedman (1962) there can be no coercion in a market system, so long as 
monopolies are avoided. Unequal power relationships are unproblematic as 
Friedman (1962, pp.14-15) sees the relationship between capital and labour as 
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mutually beneficial and voluntary: ‘the employee is protected from coercion 
by the employer because of other employers for whom he can work… the 
market does this impersonally and without centralised authority’. 
 
The ideas promulgated by neo-liberals such as Hayek and Friedman were 
largely ignored until the crisis of the post-war social democratic consensus in 
the 1970s (Caldwell, 2007). However, this provided the political and economic 
circumstances for neo-liberalism to be adopted by the New Right in Britain 
and the USA, which set in motion the development of neo-liberalism into a 
global hegemonic project. 
 
Neo-liberalism in Practice 
 
The late 1970s and 1980s saw an incorporation of neo-liberalism with populist 
neo-conservatism in the ideology and politics of the New Right, especially 
under Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the USA (Bosanquet, 1983). This 
constituted the first wave of neo-liberalism as both political ideology and 
policy. But this shift goes beyond party affiliation as the drift towards 
neoliberal policies in Britain began under Thatcher’s predecessor, the Labour 
Government of Callaghan, with the adoption of monetarist policies as a 
condition of receiving IMF loans in the midst of the OPEC oil crisis (Hall & 
Jacques, 1983b; Gilbert, 2004). However, it is with the policy and ideology of 
the Thatcher Governments from 1979 that the New Right incorporated and 
established neo-liberal hegemony. 
 
Belsey (1986) argues that the neo-liberal and neo-conservative strands of New 
Right social and political theory have been subject to much tension and 
contradiction. The New Right infusion of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism 
differs in their respective emphasis on the individual/the nation, freedom of 
choice/hierarchy and subordination, market society/disciplined society, 
laissez-faire/social authoritarianism, minimal government/strong  government 
(Belsey, 1986). However, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism both sought to 
regress to nineteenth century forms of liberalism and conservatism, an era 
‘prior to contamination by the ‘socialist’ ideals of the welfare state’ (Levitas, 
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1986a, p.4), embodied by classical capitalist market economics and ‘Victorian 
values’.   
 
The combination of contradictory and distinct strands constituted the rise of 
the New Right; while neo-liberalism emphasises freedom for the economic 
individual, neo-conservatism has a distinctly authoritarian character in the 
preference for hierarchy and nationalism (Levitas, 1986a). This has continued 
in the present second-wave of neo-liberalism in which conservative 
communitarianiam, the rhetoric of empowerment and the apparently radical 
rediscovery of ‘the social’ masks neo-liberal entrenchment (Corbett & Walker, 
2013). Losses of political power by the social democratic and socialist left 
since the late 1970s have substantially limited the possibilities for the 
adoption of a new labour-capital compromise or genuine alternatives. 
 
Hall and Jacques (1983a, pp.10-11) see neo-liberalism’s dominance as 
coalescing in ‘authoritarian populism’, whereby the Thatcherist preference 
for unfettered markets and a strong state consists of a project to ‘reverse the 
whole post-war drift of British society, to roll back the historic gains of the 
labour movement and other progressive forces, and to force-march the 
society, vigorously into the past’. The culmination of this is the adoption of 
the ‘belief that the best policy is to allow markets to operate with as few 
impediments as possible’ coupled with the authoritarian view that ‘for the 
free market to reach its full potential the state has to be active in creating 
and sustaining the institutions which make that possible’ (Gamble, 2006, 
pp.21-22). This dual aim has been largely achieved through defining justice in 
procedural terms (Nozick’s entitlement view), concerned only with the rule of 
law rather than social and economic justice, and promoting negative liberty 
which sees individuals, irrespective of their personal circumstances, as free 
within the market order. For the New Right, in a market society both rich 
bankers and homeless people, for example, are ‘free’ due to the primitive 
concept of negative liberty invoked (Belsey, 1986). In Hayek’s (1960, p.18) 
justification of inequality he defends negative liberty (over equality and 
solidarity) with the assertion that ‘the penniless vagabond who lives 
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precariously by constant improvisation is indeed freer than [for example] the 
conscripted soldier with all his security and relative comfort’. 
 
The contradictory nature of this claim is clear as neo-liberalism limits 
individual and collective freedom (in terms of self-development) to the 
primitive freedom to ‘participate’ in the capitalist market order, for which 
the neo-conservatism of the New Right has ‘no objection to an increase in 
state power to enforce their ‘freedom’’ (Belsey, 1986, p.192).  Thus,  
 
[t]he neo-liberals, with their proclamation of freedom, suppress any 
conception that for many people a decent life means a constant 
struggle against the ‘impersonal’ decisions of the market. However, the 
unemployed, single parents, the disabled, the elderly, ethnic 
minorities, women, are unlikely to be impressed by the news that their 
disadvantaged positions are sure signs of their freedom, and by the 
insistence that any attempt to organise collective assistance for them 
will rob them of their liberty (Belsey, 1986, p.193). 
 
This is described by Walker (1990) as the strategy of inequality. It has the 
consequence that neo-liberalism is parasitic on the values of liberal 
democracy, and is vehemently opposed to social democracy (even more so 
participatory democracy as this proposes structural transformations in the 
existing distribution of power). The strategy of inequality has a chief target of 
the residualisation (even destruction) of the welfare state ‘because it 
represents the embodiment of the extended state created and legitimised by 
social democracy’ (Walker, 1990, p.29). Walker (1990, p.33) describes five 
practical strands of the neo-liberal strategy of inequality; cutting social 
expenditure, using the state to subsidise the privatisation and marketisation 
of previously public institutions and services (including the welfare state), 
opposing universalism in favour of targeted residual social security, reducing 
taxation, encouraging private and voluntary forms of welfare, and centralising 
power in the strong state while decentralising responsibility ‘thereby 
neutralising any potential power of welfare state users to increase the share 
of public expenditure devoted to them’. This suggests that neo-liberalism is 
inherently anti-democratic and promotes social and economic inequality 
under the guise of consumer choice. 
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Neo-liberalism in the Global Context 
 
Duménil and Lévy (2004; 2005) see globalising economic neo-liberalism as the 
resurgence of class domination by restoring the income and wealth of the 
upper fractions of the ruling classes at the expense of the population as a 
whole. This was highlighted in the UK by Dorling (2011) in Chapter 1. The 
consequences of this include vast increases in social and economic inequality 
both within the rich democratic societies in the Global North, and between 
the North and ‘developing’ countries in the Global South (Duménil & Lévy, 
2005, p.17).  Hall & Jacques (1983a, p.13) view this class project as furthering 
the cause of ‘disorganising the labour movement and progressive forces… 
shifting the terms of political debate… reorganising the political terrain and in 
changing the balance of political forces in favour of capital and the right’. 
Through a critique of the state and sustained attacks on the labour 
movement, the New Right were able to break significantly and decisively with 
the era of state monopoly capitalism and preclude the development of 
democratic socialist alternatives (Levitas, 1986a).  
 
In the 1990s and into the early twenty-first century, social democratic parties, 
notably in Britain and Germany, acquiesced to the hegemony of neo-liberalism 
under the guise of the ‘third way’ (Giddens, 1998; Callinicos, 2001; Martell, 
2001). Although, Martell (2001, p.212) notes that ‘these are third ways in the 
plural, there being different Third Ways rather than just one, varying by 
national background amongst other factors’. This has involved to different 
extents a change from the central role of the welfare state in providing socio-
economic security that underpinned the post-war social democratic consensus 
to less secure forms of workfare or ‘flexicurity’ (Jessop, 2002, p.156).  
 
Jessop (2010) argues that there are four variants of neo-liberalisation 
processes. The first form is ‘neo-liberal system transformation’, which relates 
specifically to states emerging out of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
late 1980s and ‘involved a tabla rasa approach in which ‘creative destruction’ 
of state socialist institutions was expected to lead somehow to the 
spontaneous emergence of a fully functioning liberal market economy and 
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society and a more gradual development of liberal democracy’ (Jessop, 2010, 
p.172). The second form is ‘neo-liberal regime shifts’ in liberal democratic 
nations, which has involved ‘a shift from the accumulation regimes and modes 
of regulation associated with post-war compromises between capital and 
labour in Atlantic Fordism to regimes and modes of regulation that 
systematically privilege capital over labour’ (Jessop, 2010, p.172). This form 
relates especially to Britain, the USA, Australia and Canada, amongst others, 
which are to differing extents closer to the liberal democratic typology than 
the social democratic one.  
 
The third form of neo-liberalisation refers to countries that are closer to the 
social democratic end of the continuum, such as the Nordic social 
democracies and Rhenish capitalist nations (France, Germany, cf. Albert, 
1993), and involves potentially reversible adaptations through ‘neo-liberal 
policy adjustments’. This variant is less susceptible to the deeper regime 
shifts characteristic of liberal democracies, which instead ‘comprise modest 
changes deemed necessary to maintain alternative economic and social 
models in the face of internationalisation and a global shift in the balance of 
forces’ (Jessop, 2010, p.174).  
 
The rise of neo-liberalism as an entrenched global hegemonic ideology 
provides a further level of resistance to genuinely social democratic or 
socialist counter-hegemonic projects. This was further aided by the 
transatlantic consensus. With the development of global institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation, which were 
concerned with freeing up financial transactions from state control, neo-
liberalism began to establish itself as a global hegemonic ideology through a 
specific form of finance capital-led economic globalisation in the 1980s 
(Gamble, 2006). This has involved a fourth form of neo-liberalisation process 
highlighted by Jessop (2010, p.173): ‘neo-liberal structural adjustment 
programmes’, which were imposed in a top-down fashion on countries in the 
Global South emerging ‘from external imposition by the leading capitalist 
power and/or transnational economic institutions and organisations’. 
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The transatlantic consensus, pursued through economic shock therapy (Klein, 
2007), top-down ‘structural adjustment’, regime shifts (and to a lesser extent 
policy adjustments) operationalises the strategy of inequality at the global 
level, as it is based on 
 
systemic reforms such as labour-market deregulation, privatisation, 
marketisation, the switch from universal social security provision to 
selective or means-tested benefits, the switch from universal services 
to a combination of self-help and user charges, and the heavy emphasis 
on activation (Walker, 2005, pp.38-39).  
 
The transatlantic consensus ‘assumes that rising inequality is the inevitable 
result of technological change or the liberalisation of international trade and 
increased competition, or a combination of the two’ (Walker & Deacon, 2003, 
p.4). The implications of this are that the nation is often portrayed as 
powerless in the face of global markets and is opposed to redistribution of 
wealth on the grounds of ‘competitiveness’ as highlighted in Chapter 1. As 
Walker and Deacon (2003, p.5) point out ‘[s]tripped to its bare bones this is 
the case for minimum state intervention and a residual welfare state. 
Globalisation is seen as the engine of turbo-capitalism, which commodifies 
human beings and, indeed, every aspect of culture’. 
 
In contradiction to democratic social relations then, neo-liberalism proposes 
to create the conditions for the maximisation of an economic understanding 
of negative liberty in the form of ‘the economic freedom of the market order, 
rather than the political freedom of the democratic order’ (Turner, 2008, 
p.66). Neo-liberalism is therefore destructive of democracy, as highlighted 
above by Bernard’s (1999) explication of the democratic dialectic; the 
centrality of negative (market) liberty creates polarisation and dislocation in 
society, and eradicates the democratic values of equality and solidarity 
(however interpreted). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold: to highlight the competing 
values of democracy: liberty, equality and solidarity and to argue towards 
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conceptions of these appropriate to the optimisation of the democratic 
dialectic. Secondly, to examine the ideology and policy context that 
influences both national governments to international institutions, and which 
restrict democracy and the full realisation of its normative values.  
 
The democratic dialectic is a normative guide which is used to assess the two 
case studies of participatory democracy that follow. The theory-laden but 
empirically-driven approach to this research means that the qualitative case 
studies were carried out with reference to the theoretical proposition that a 
genuine participatory democracy is likely to have a tendency towards 
promoting freedom as self-development, relational egalitarianism and social 
and system integration in the ideal case (although real world cases are 
unlikely to fully appropriate this). The extent to which the two case studies 
display evidence of this, and also whether participatory democratic settings 
are conducive to social empowerment, is evidenced in Chapters 6 and 7 and 
analysed in Chapter 8. 
 
The last section in this chapter has also situated the democratic dialectic 
within the hegemonic dominance of neo-liberalism in ideology and policy-
making. This discussion has shown that despite the existence of two actually 
existing typologies of liberal and social democracy, both are subject to the 
distortion of dialectical values caused by neo-liberalism, which prioritises a 
narrow economistic concept of negative liberty and equality of libertarian 
rights over all others, to the denigration of democracy itself. The discussion 
has explored how neo-liberalism has become a global hegemonic ideology 
which is destructive of the values of the democratic dialectic. This indicates a 
deep contradiction in the existing liberal and social models of democracy and 
reduces the prospects for the development of a participative optimisation of 
the dialectic in this context. The following empirical case studies in the next 
two chapters highlight the possibilities contained within participatory 
democracy in the workplace and the local community, while the wider issue of 
neo-liberalism is revisited in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 6 
Case Study: Suma Wholefoods 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This case study addresses participatory democracy and social empowerment in 
a workplace. It begins with a brief overview of the history of the co-operative 
movement and examines the distinction between worker co-operatives and 
economic democracy. Following this, a discussion of the historical 
development of the democratic workplace draws on existing research on this 
particular case study (Macfarlane, 1987; Cornforth, 1995; Jones, 1998). Next, 
demographic data relating to the current workforce and organisational 
structure of the co-op are explored. This provides the context for explaining 
the co-operative’s participatory democracy in the key themes of self-
management, consensus-based decision-making, active participation and 
democratic legitimacy. The case study argues that this democratic structure 
provides the conditions for social empowerment. The research is based on two 
months in the field, during which the researcher observed six meetings (along 
with informal observation on a daily basis), and interviewed twenty-one 
workers (see Chapter 2). The findings suggest a strong egalitarian culture is 
central to workplace democracy, and provides evidence of social 
empowerment which posits multiple dimensions of the concept that relate to 
the extent of participation in the co-op’s democratic structures. Chapter 8 
analyses these findings in more detail in relation to the democratic dialectic 
and the social quality theory.  
 
The History of Worker Co-operatives 
 
A worker co-op can be defined as ‘an autonomous association of persons 
united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs 
and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled 
enterprise’ (in Gaudsen et al., c.2008, p.13). Estrin and Pérotin (1987, p.153) 
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cite the Rochdale Pioneers as key innovators in the development of the British 
co-operative movement in the early nineteenth century which aimed for ‘a 
system of cooperation emerging from contemporary local working class needs 
rather than middle class philanthropy’. The co-operative movement is based 
on the principles of autonomy, empowerment and democratic control over 
working lives in the principle of collective labour hiring capital, and avoiding 
the disempowerment and exploitation inherent in the situation of capital 
hiring labour (Estrin, 1989). 
 
The nineteenth century co-operative movement aimed to change the 
individualist nature of industrial capitalism towards a more co-operative and 
collective order, but it was also based in part on a romantic regression to an 
idealised pre-capitalist period of rural villages and medieval guilds (Mellor et 
al., 1988). By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was a ‘minor strand 
of the broader labour movement, whose efforts were largely directed towards 
furthering workers’ interests via public ownership of the means of production’ 
(Estrin & Pérotin, 1987, p.155). With this the wider vision of creating a ‘co-
operative commonwealth’ was lost in the practicalities of production and 
consumption, with many co-operatives formed out of need for subsistence by 
the working class, rather than as a vision of a new world (Mellor et al., 1988).   
 
Guild socialism was a notable early-twentieth century endorsement of the co-
operative tradition (Cole, 1944). While guild socialists argued for workers’ 
control of workplaces, they also desired state ownership of industry so that 
‘people as consumers would be protected by government and as producers by 
their own self-management’ (Mellor et al., 1988, p.27). Despite success in the 
construction industry in the early 1920s, the systemic changes envisioned by 
the guild socialist movement never transpired (Mellor et al., 1988). 
 
It is with the later development of British ‘alternative co-operatives’ in the 
1970s that the subject of this case study, Suma Wholefoods, emerged. During 
their growth in the 1970s and 1980s alternative co-operatives rejected 
hierarchical working practices and placed a greater emphasis on social needs 
over profit. The number of co-ops in Britain rose from 17 in 1970 to 1,400 in 
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1985, with the numbers of those working in co-operatives rising from 1,600 to 
around 10,000 (Estrin & Pérotin, 1987). However, this accounted for a 
miniscule proportion of the 20 million strong workforce in the UK in the mid-
1980s, and setting up co-operatives was often a counter to the dramatic rise 
in unemployment, with many ‘job creation co-ops’ set up by groups of 
unemployed people (Estrin & Pérotin, 1987, p.157, p.164). Further, the 
majority of co-operatives in this period were set up from scratch, rather than 
by rescuing businesses from bankruptcy and workers from redundancy, or by 
converting successful capitalist firms into co-operatives (Estrin & Pérotin, 
1987).   
 
The co-operative sector in the UK today consists of around 400 independent 
co-ops, and around 2,000 workers (Gaudsen et al., c.2008). This reduction in 
the relative size of the sector could be explained by tensions between the 
social and political aims of co-ops and globalising neo-liberalism. The current 
Worker Co-operative Code of Governance states that  
 
[w]e all want our worker co-operatives to succeed, both as businesses 
and as democratic co-operatives. Yet we often seem to be forced to 
choose between these ideals. The co-operative dream is submerged by 
business needs, or arguments about co-operative principles get in the 
way of managing the business (Gaudsen et al., c.2008, p.3). 
 
Estrin and Pérotin (1987, p.169) argue that this is an issue for co-operatives, 
particularly in relation to democratic decision-making, as on the one hand, 
‘finance and managerial problems go together in explaining commercial non-
viability’, and on the other hand, ‘weakening internal democracy frequently 
presages degeneration to the capitalist form’. When a co-op is founded by 
conversion from a private organisation, such as the John Lewis Partnership, a 
key problem can be establishing genuine democratic control, and co-ops 
founded on egalitarian principles can find the reverse problem of integrating 
democratic ideals with professional managerial skills to engage with the 
capitalist market economy (Estrin & Pérotin, 1987). The latter is the 
experience of Suma Wholefoods as it has sought to avoid degeneration to the 
capitalist form. This case study explores how Suma has successfully engaged 
with this issue. 
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To achieve a balance between business success in a capitalist society and 
genuine democracy, Gaudsen et al. (c.2008) describe seven principles. Firstly, 
membership of a co-op is voluntary but must include rights and 
responsibilities which should be clear to members. Training should be 
included for workers to become members of the co-op following a 
probationary period and the majority of workers must be members and the 
majority of members must be workers. Secondly, the co-op must be 
democratically controlled through active participation in its governance with 
delegated authority accountable to all members. This principle suggests the 
concept of ‘accountable autonomy’ described in Chapter 4. Thirdly, capital in 
the business must be democratically controlled and profits used to build up 
collectively owned financial reserves, to pay members, and other uses as 
agreed by the co-op. Fourthly, any financial arrangements with external 
parties must acknowledge the co-op’s status as an autonomous and 
independent enterprise to avoid dependency on other suppliers, funders or 
customers. Fifthly, education and training must be provided for members, 
with an emphasis on current and future needs. This encourages multi-skilling 
and flexibility in many aspects of the business. Sixthly, networks of co-
operatives need to be established that strengthen the co-operative movement 
by working together at national, regional and international levels. This aims 
to develop member-to-member links, co-op to co-op trading, and to secure 
long-term business development. Finally, the seventh principle emphasises 
the community orientated nature of a co-operative: it must engage in ethical 
and sustainable initiatives, limit its environmental impact, and promote co-
operative principles in the wider community. 
 
Worker Co-operatives and Economic Democracy 
 
Rather than compromising with private capital through union bargaining and 
corporate taxation there is a ‘longstanding socialist tradition which argues 
that fundamental changes in society must be intimately bound up with 
changes in the way that work is organised’ (Estrin, 1989, p.165). In a 
democratically controlled workplace, extremely high executive salaries and 
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perks that contribute to vast inequalities in income are unlikely if subject to 
‘open scrutiny and democratic vote by other employees’ (Estrin, 1989, p.171).  
 
Mellor et al. (1988) point out that the history of the co-operative movement is 
subject to dualities and contradictions, not least between the accommodation 
of co-operatives with capitalism and the aim to secure its transcendence. 
Jossa (2005) highlights how co-operatives are seen as an intermediate form of 
organisation for the dialectical transition from capitalism to socialism, or 
whether, as argued by Webb and Webb (1921; Potter, 1987), they sustain 
capitalism by allowing workers to become ‘their own capitalists’. This is 
reflected in the potential inward-collectivist problem (similar to the ‘dark 
side of social capital’ described in Chapter 5) that ‘there is nothing to stop 
[individual co-operatives] acting selfishly with respect to the broader society. 
An economy of this sort is workers’ capitalism, not socialism, with capitalists 
replaced by selfish worker-owners’ (Estrin, 1989, p.185).   
 
Jossa (2005) posits that co-operatives are compatible with a socialist order as 
long as they abolish the possibility of hiring wage labour (all workers must be 
members of the co-operative). Further, ‘producer co-operatives… are not only 
non-capitalistic firms, but socialist firms proper, since compared with their 
capitalistic counterparts they effectively reverse the capital-labour 
relationship’ (Jossa, 2005, p.15). This suggests the possibility of a system of 
co-operatives as providing the economic conditions for a dialectical 
transformation of the existing order through the development of economic 
democracy (Schweickart, 2002; Restakis, 2010). As part of the change in 
values necessary to contest the current order and to pursue more democratic 
and participatory alternatives (Macpherson, 1977), the collective ownership 
structure of co-operatives may well be sites for social empowerment. 
 
Jossa (2005, p.5) argues that ‘one main advantage of producer co-operatives 
(from the perspective of a critic of capitalism) is to realise economic 
democracy as an essential component of political democracy’. Following the 
discussion in Chapters 4 and 5, deepening democracy in social and economic 
life are possible aspects of the societal development of participatory 
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democracy, an increase in social quality, and the retrenchment of neo-
liberalism. This study examines Suma’s participatory democracy and how this 
creates social empowerment. The following sections critically describe Suma’s 
history, its current structure, its democracy and aspects of social 
empowerment identified in the case study. 
 
The History of Suma 
 
In 1977, Suma, an organic, vegetarian and fairtrade food wholesaler, was 
formed in Leeds, West Yorkshire. The co-op was a focal point of the 
Federation of Northern Wholefood Co-operatives, and initially supplied many 
wholefood co-ops in the North (Cockerton et al., 1980), before expansion 
established a global customer base. Suma has grown in membership from 
seven founders to around sixty in the early 2000s, to over 120 members in 
2012. Suma is socially owned, and conforms to Industrial Common Ownership 
Movement rules, whereby the business is not formally owned by the workers, 
and therefore cannot be subject to takeover by other businesses. Instead, 
each worker retains a £1 share in the business which has no re-sale value, so 
that no member can make a claim to Suma’s assets. This ensures that while 
every member has a right to use the assets, none of the membership can 
make personal financial gain from the business itself (Jones, 1998). 
 
The network of suppliers and customers in which Suma is integrated, the 
emphasis on good working conditions and the burgeoning market for 
wholefoods are likely to have contributed to the longevity of the organisation. 
Not only is the co-op’s aim to secure good working conditions for its members, 
but it also has the political aim of proving itself financially successful amongst 
other ‘regular’ businesses in order to promote co-operativism in the 
marketplace (Jones, 1998). The tension between co-operative principles and 
financial success, highlighted in the previous discussion, underpins many 
aspects of this case study.  Despite that the co-op does not need to generate 
vast profits to appease shareholders (simply breaking even will ensure that 
the workers get paid and customer orders are fulfilled), it has continued to 
grow profitably. Between 2002 and 2011, turnover increased from £14.3 
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million to £27.8 million per year, while the wage bill grew from £1.7 million 
to £4.3 million per year. However, net profit averaged at £245,008 per year 
throughout this period, with a low of £5,653 in 2003 and a high of £397,791 in 
2011 (data from email communication). 
 
Change is central to the continued success of Suma. The desire by members to 
renew the way in which the co-op works shows awareness that new and 
innovative ways of working and managing must be found for it to continue to 
grow, and to avoid degeneration to the capitalist form (Cornforth, 1995). The 
degeneration thesis states that worker co-operatives will eventually be forced 
to adopt the principles and organisational forms of regular capitalist 
businesses in order to survive in the marketplace: specifically, a managerial 
elite comes to dominate, undermining the democratic process (Cornforth, 
1995). An awareness of both the danger of elites coming to dominate over 
democracy and the adaption of the democratic system in response to 
expanding membership and business success has helped Suma to avoid 
degeneration, and to regenerate its democratic system when the need has 
arisen. The adoption of capitalist management techniques, subjected to 
democratic control and imbued with a collectivist (rather than hierarchical) 
ethos, have contributed to this success (Macfarlane, 1987).  
 
Three key phases of change are identifiable as Suma has grown in 
membership; direct democracy in the 1970s and early 1980s, delegated 
representation incorporated with participatory democracy in the 1980s and 
1990s, first with the ‘hub and sector’ model, followed by the current flat 
management structure. This required a self-reflexive engagement with the 
structure of the organisation by the membership and the building of consensus 
for change. This makes change a complex, slow, and especially democratic 
process. 
 
Jones (1998, p.206) describes the changing structure of Suma as an ‘emergent 
strategy’, whereby the historical context impacts upon its future 
development. The early structure of Suma adopted the co-operative principles 
of informal participation in decision-making, personal development and a 
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diverse and open culture that ‘respected a wide range of opinions and types 
of people’ (despite that most of the initial members also lived in the same 
housing co-op) (Jones, 1998, p.208). In the early period decision-making was 
informal and on a daily basis between the original seven members. However, 
as the organisation grew in membership, a formal weekly General Meeting 
(GM) was set up, whereby members would debate and make direct decisions 
for the business (Cockerton et al., 1980; Jones, 1998). 
 
By the 1980s a number of problems were arising with direct democracy at 
Suma.  Guy, a member, argued that in the early years of Suma, the principles 
espoused by the membership were not realised in practice:  
 
[Suma] wasn’t equal… there was an inner clique of members, then 
there was an outer periphery of members who didn’t have a lot of say 
in what went on, and then there were a group of casual workers who 
basically just survived, and there were no rules really… it was all 
personalities, and that’s the way a lot of worker co-ops operate… when 
you don’t have agreed authority processes in an organisation the bullies 
take over.   
 
By the mid-1980s, GM decision-making, which involved disputes between 
members that held-up the process, saw a decline in participation for the then 
forty-strong membership (Jones, 1998). The relative structurelessness of the 
co-op outside of the GM meant that equality and the freedom to participate 
was compromised (Freeman, 1972). Suma was unable to react to competition 
in the wholefoods market and the business began to decline. Macfarlane 
(1987, p.61) sees this as an individualistic ‘expert power’ culture which was 
subsequently transformed into a more co-operative and collectivist ethos.   
 
To save the business in the 1980s, a ‘unitarist strategy’ was adopted, which 
incorporated some aspects of a ‘top-down’ model of democracy within the 
participatory culture, whereby delegated specialist groups were formed and 
participation was no longer always direct for every member (Jones, 1998, 
p.213). The ‘hub and sector’ model attempted to avoid conventional 
management hierarchies by having the various sectors of the business meet 
daily, which then fed into the hub committee of delegates that agreed 
decisions based on the reports from the sector meetings (Jones, 1998). The 
168 
 
information would circulate ‘from sector to the hub, to all sectors and then 
back to the hub for confirmation and ratification’, allowing members to input 
their views at various stages of the process, which changed ‘direct 
participation’ into more indirect ‘worker involvement’ in decision-making 
(Jones, 1998, pp. 215-216). 
 
This new system attempted to formalise the pluralist principles of 
accountability and decentralised power in Suma’s emergent democracy. 
However, the hub and sector model only lasted a few years due to 
dissatisfaction as the members found that the checks and balances in the 
system delayed decision-making, and despite efforts to the contrary, ‘power 
cliques’ were developing surrounding the people that attended meetings 
within certain sectors; ‘primarily [in] the sales, marketing, buying and 
personnel departments’ (Jones, 1998, pp.218-219). This ‘old boys’ network’ 
was deemed to be undemocratic and counter to Suma’s aims (Jones, 1998, 
p.233). 
 
In 1994, the hub and sector model was jettisoned in favour of the current flat 
management structure (Jones, 1998). The flat management structure requires 
the election of a Management Committee (MC) that is charged with day-to-
day decision-making. The flat management structure is described in detail in 
the following section. A concern with avoiding centralised power remains, as 
the MC is a system of delegated authority. It is granted the power to 
implement the democratically agreed business plan. If the MC is perceived to 
not be acting in the interests of the co-op, then the membership can recall 
the delegates. Along with opening up forums for debate and minutes from 
meetings freely available to all workers, this has contributed to improving 
transparency and accountability in Suma (Jones, 1998). This suggests that the 
extent of representation and participation in Suma is a matter of degree. It is 
also a structure that is in flux due to the reflexivity of democratic control. 
 
The current structure has been in place for eighteen years, but further 
changes may be occurring as the co-op adopts more networked governance 
structures and increases the use of information and communication 
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technologies (ICTs). Before discussing democracy and social empowerment 
(and some of the problems with both of these at Suma), it is necessary to 
describe the current structure, including flat management, Quarterly General 
Meetings, equal wages, multi-skilling and job rotation. Along with the 
diversity of membership, the structure of Suma is integral to the functioning 
of participatory democracy and social empowerment.    
 
The Workers and the Current Structure 
 
People have come from diverse occupations, including teaching, banking, 
corporate business, self-employment and law, to take on relatively lower paid 
work at Suma. For Susan, a member, open-mindedness and a commitment to 
collective working principles draws people from other spheres of work. 
‘Buying-in’ to these principles, including equal pay, equal rights to participate 
and shared responsibilities, are integral to the functioning of the co-op. Suma 
currently has 153 workers (105 male and 48 female), of which there are 122 
members (80 male and 42 female), 11 non-members, 12 short term seasonal 
workers, and 8 trial members. 104 workers are full time, and 49 are part time 
(Table 6.1). There is a gender ratio of approximately 70/30 in favour of male 
workers (including non-members). There have been conscious efforts to 
create a more equal gender balance within the organisation. This is to avoid a 
male-dominated warehouse and an office staffed by females, and to promote 
a more equal balance between the two areas by recruiting more female 
workers. 
 
The desire for more female workers is seen as a part of a need to avoid ‘them 
and us’ relationships between different departments, and especially between 
office workers and warehouse workers. This promotes an egalitarian and co-
operative workplace culture. Equal wages, multi-skilling, job rotation, and 
democratic participation are other factors to this end (discussed below). 
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Table 6.1 Composition of Suma’s Workforce 
Total 
workers 
Members Trial 
members 
Non-
members 
Short term 
seasonal 
workers 
Work 
contracts 
153 122 8 11 12 104 full 
time 
105 male 80 male 49 part 
time 48 female 42 female 
Source: from email correspondence 
 
Short term seasonal workers provide relief cover during the summer months 
when many members take holidays. Eleven non-members (often referred to as 
contracted workers) have opted out of being members of the co-op. They 
retain all the benefits of membership but are unable to vote, stand for 
election or have any responsibility for finance. Some interviewees stress that 
non-members have been encouraged to become full members of the co-op, 
but there is a grudging acceptance of the non-members. For example, Brian is 
a non-member that has worked in the warehouse and as a driver for fourteen 
years. He hasn’t desired membership due to the responsibilities that it entails 
and his preference for physical work.  
 
The workforce has recently seen a significant expansion. Membership has risen 
from 59 in 2003 to 122 in 2012. Table 6.2 shows that the majority of workers 
have joined in the last ten years (60 per cent, or 93 new workers). There are 
22 workers that have been at Suma for over 20 years, some since the 
formation of the co-op in 1977.   
 
Table 6.2 Length of Service 
Length of service (years) Number of workers % of workforce 
Less than 5 36 23 
Between 5 and 10 57 37 
Between 10 and 20 39 25 
Over 20 22 14 
Source: from email correspondence 
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Table 6.3 shows the ages of Suma’s workforce. The greatest number of 
workers are between the ages of 35 and 55 (100 workers, or 65% of the total 
workforce), and 34 (22%) are under the age of 35. 
 
Table 6.3 Age of Workers 
Age Number of workers % of workforce 
18 to 25 8 5 
25 to 35 26 17 
35 to 45 51 33 
45 to 55 49 32 
55 and over 20 13 
Source: from email correspondence 
 
Suma’s governance structure includes decision-making spread between the 
quarterly general meetings (QGMs), which are open to all members and non-
members (only members may vote), an elected management committee (MC), 
appointed Function Area Co-ordinators (FACs) for the different areas (export, 
sales, marketing, warehouse, delivery), officers (personnel, finance), and the 
workers themselves (Cannell, 2009). The next section describes the 
management functions along with equal wages and job mobility to elaborate 
on the structure of Suma. This section will also highlight the impact of 
divisions of labour and class distinctions, before discussing participatory 
democracy and social empowerment. 
 
Flat-management Structure 
 
The membership directly elects six representatives to serve two year terms on 
the Management Committee (MC). The MC is charged with week-to-week 
decision making, largely through the four hour MC meeting. The MC meeting 
includes discussion with members from different departments and an open 
forum for members to raise issues and discuss on-going projects. Members of 
the MC have the option to stand for re-election and there are provisions in 
place so that at least a third of the MC is female. Tina, a current MC member, 
described the MC as directing the democratically agreed decisions from QGMs, 
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while the FAC teams and officers to carry out the work. This means that 
members of the MC ‘have got a lot of responsibility, [but not] authority’. This 
limits the MC’s power over the co-op to overseeing the democratically agreed 
business plan. Further, should the MC contravene the business plan, the 
membership can recall MC members. This suggests a combination of direct 
democracy, deliberative democracy and delegated representation in Suma’s 
participatory democratic structure, which is accountable to the membership. 
 
Function Area Co-ordinators (FACs) are charged with co-ordinating work in 
various departments, and are less democratically accountable, owing to the 
needs of the business. FAC roles are advertised internally, and FACs are 
appointed following an interview process with a personnel officer and an MC 
member. A two hour FAC meeting takes place weekly in which issues within 
the various departments are discussed, and then forwarded to the MC for 
action. While the FACs have responsibility for the smooth running of different 
departments at Suma, they do not have managerial authority to instruct 
workers to do certain tasks (in line with co-operative and egalitarian 
principles of shared ownership and self-management).  Guy highlighted this 
point: 
 
the way to survive in [the FAC] job is to make yourself vulnerable, to 
admit your mistakes and your doubts and your lack of confidence, and 
to say ‘help’… but if they try and behave like an ordinary manager, 
then their team members will just think, ‘well I don’t have to try 
anymore, they can deal with all the shit’, and then eventually they 
burn out… But that’s scary for people, the idea of letting go, to 
actually be stronger. 
 
Research in the 1980s highlighted the risk of a ‘recognised elite’ coming to 
dominate (Macfarlane, 1987, p.78). When the MC was created, accountability 
and transparency in the form of freely available minutes from meetings, open 
forums and QGMs were seen as correctives to this (Jones, 1998). In addition, 
the egalitarian and co-operative culture of Suma encourages the view of jobs 
as ‘functions’, rather than as status roles. This has helped avoid capitalistic 
degeneration to hierarchical structures or domination by power elites.  
Malcolm explained how this distinction is maintained in his interaction with 
Gary, a FAC: 
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Gary would say to me, ‘Malcolm, I want you to do so and so’ because 
that is his role at that point… it’s not Gary as a person; it’s the role he 
fulfils at that point in time. So at that point in time he was being 
distribution FAC and he was talking to a driver and saying ‘I would like 
you to go and do this’, a perfectly legitimate request, and yet the next 
day, because I am also the Operator’s Licence holder… I might sit down 
with Gary and review him and say ‘Gary, I want you to do this, that and 
the other’, in my role now not as driver, but as license holder. 
 
While FACs are appointed to co-ordinate without the requirement for 
democratic legitimacy, the MC has directly elected and recallable 
representatives. However, the powers of FACs are limited by virtue of all 
members being equal owners of Suma and the egalitarian culture which 
promotes status ‘roles’ as ‘functions’. Thus, in distinction to authority of 
status or hierarchical rank, co-operative and egalitarian strategies must be 
used by FACs to organise and ensure the successful operation of the different 
departments in the business. 
 
Quarterly General Meetings (QGMs) and Forums 
 
QGMs are open for all co-op members and non-members to attend, though 
only members may vote. They take place every three months, and 
approximately ninety workers attended the QGM observed for this case study. 
The QGM involves presentations of sales figures and other information, and 
votes for various proposals which are put forward by individual members. This 
is the formal democratic body of Suma which involves direct participation in 
decision-making by the collective, although much decision-making also takes 
place within the MC and in day-to-day work.   
 
There are lunch time forums that run in the week leading up to the QGM for 
members to raise issues for the agenda. Richard viewed forums as an 
opportunity for less confident members to air their views: ‘a lot of people, 
including myself, don’t feel quite comfortable talking openly in front of the 
majority of the co-op, so the half hour sessions that we have in the week 
leading up to it is much better’. 
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At the QGM observed for this case study there was a sense of formality in the 
voting process. This suggests that the role of the lunch time forums and 
general discussion of the issues in the weeks leading up to the QGM are 
integral to consensus-based democratic decision-making. However, not all 
members see this system as ideal. Tina described her frustration with the 
QGM voting: 
 
[o]n the night, I don’t think you’re best informed to make the right 
decision… so although for a least a week there will be stuff in the 
public arena; you’re expected to read it… and be fully informed. I try 
and make sure that I am… [But] I don’t believe everybody has time or 
the ability to get the extra information. 
 
Paul argued that by opening up lunch time forums to the whole co-op a 
greater reflexivity and input from a wider range of people is encouraged. 
Lunch time forums are ‘a way of getting people to stand back from their 
ordinary day jobs, and just think I wonder if there is a better way of doing 
sales orders. Not the sort of the thing that you typically think about’ in day-
to-day work. While QGMs offer the space for formal collective decision-
making, lunch time forums provide the deliberative and reflexive content of 
participatory democracy. 
 
Equal Pay Structure and Job Mobility 
 
Every worker receives an equal net wage, relative to hours worked per week. 
As part time workers pay less tax they receive a lower gross hourly wage than 
full time workers, so that the net hourly wage is equal for every worker. This 
principle applies across all job functions in the co-op, from warehouse goods 
picker to a member of the MC. This is not common to other co-ops, where 
differential or incremental pay are often used. Job mobility in the practices 
of multi-skilling and job rotation are integral to legitimate the principle of 
equal wages as they allow members to share a broadly equal range and 
balance of jobs, although in practice the division of labour can sometimes be 
problematic, as discussed at the end of this section. 
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Currently, the equal wage structure includes gross wages of £26,000 per 
annum for a five day week, a profit related Christmas bonus, free cooked 
lunches, enhanced sick pay (three months on full pay), staff shopping at trade 
price, the option to take leave of up to six months, and a health plan. This 
central principle establishes the formal equality of the workers within the 
organisation, and it is clear from the interviews that equal pay is popular at 
Suma and a source of pride. Paul stated that 
 
I detest the idea of an unequal wage structure. [Equal wages is] 
massively radical. It massively changes the way you respect other 
people’s work and the jobs that they do and the importance of every 
part of an operation for it to be successful. I don’t care that I get paid 
the same as other people. I’m honoured to be paid the same as other 
people. 
 
Christine echoed this view by arguing that the job functions themselves are 
supported by equal respect and moral worth. Important for this is the value of 
every 
 
link in the chain… an elected officer role is only one link in the chain 
and, granted they are holding an important position and I think they 
should be respected for the responsibility and the position they are 
undertaking, but… the link that puts the pallets on the truck, and gets 
out of bed at one o’clock in the morning to go drive the truck is an 
equal link in the chain. 
 
The legitimation of equal pay as just is related to job rotation and multi-
skilling. Job rotation is where members change the jobs that they do within 
Suma over time, while multi-skilling refers to opportunities for doing different 
work tasks within a given week.  For example, one interviewee, over the 
course of three decades at Suma has rotated jobs, including periods spent as a 
delivery driver, buyer, designer, marketer and personnel officer, and another 
interviewee presently multi-tasks weekly between picking stock in the 
warehouse, cooking, working in the export office and driving a delivery lorry. 
Often jobs are advertised internally, stating a demand for ‘two days’ work for 
at least two years’ for example, which allows the Suma worker a degree of 
freedom to shape and change the weekly range of job roles that they 
undertake. As Thomas put it 
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[equal pay] works purely and simply because of the job rotation. [The 
wage] is probably below the industry standard for management rates of 
pay, but well above for manual rates of pay. But it only works because 
we are allowed to work both, and swap around… you can balance that 
out, you’re not taking responsibility and giving yourself a headache five 
days a week, you can go into the warehouse and take out your 
frustrations on manual work. 
 
Paul viewed multi-skilling and job rotation as instilling a greater awareness on 
the part of the workers for the business as a whole: 
 
you work throughout the business, and we all have, to varying degrees, 
a thorough understanding of the entire operation and of each other’s 
work roles, and we are therefore able to resolve problems collectively 
in a way that you couldn’t if you just had somebody working in 
customer care and that’s all they did. 
 
However, increasing specialisation of some jobs, such as those in the export 
department for example, mean that time spent doing other tasks can 
compromise the need to swiftly arrange business deals. Catherine argued that 
multi-skilling can be a weakness in practice: ‘I don’t see the point of putting 
somebody who is a superb buyer behind the wheel of a truck, or a superb 
driver into the buying office… I’m not 100% sure multi-skilling permanently 
works; you have to get the best people for the job’. 
 
Efficiency and inefficiency are discussed in the next section. Furthermore, 
there is a perception amongst some members that office work is more 
desirable, or of higher (informal) status. However, legislating that all 
members (exempting those with health issues) perform a set minimum amount 
of manual work has never been seriously considered. This is due to the 
democratic right that all members have to not be coerced into work that they 
do not want to do. Instead, multi-skilling in this way is formally an aspiration 
for members, though most interviewees stress that a large majority of 
members do multi-skill by taking a share of both manual and desk-based work. 
 
Malcolm emphasised how long-term aspects of job rotation and multi-skilling 
fit with the idea of equal pay. He cited how if people struggle to do a 
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particular job in a conventional or ‘straight’ business, they often have little 
choice but to leave and seek alternative employment: 
 
whereas at Suma, you can go back to, metaphorically speaking, the 
floor; picking or driving a truck. You get same rate of pay… and in fact, 
people who have tried and failed at one job might well, three or four 
years later, come back renewed, refreshed, in a different space, and 
actually contribute much more than they would have done previously.  
So we’ve often seen that up and down, sideways [movement] of 
contribution. [Rather than] comparing people with people at any one 
snap shot in time and saying ‘these people are contributing more than 
those people, why don’t we get rid of those people, pay them less?’… I 
see [the equal pay structure] from the point of view of the individual 
going through their career path. Now I can think of times when I’ve 
been underpaid for what I do, [and] I can think of days when I’ve come 
in here and I’ve been paid to do [very little]. 
 
Equal pay is at the heart of Suma’s egalitarian culture. Job mobility provides 
an in-work system of welfare support and job security, as workers have 
flexibility and variety in their work which they can actively change to suit 
their life circumstances. Welfare, security and flexibility are discussed below 
as dimensions of social empowerment. 
 
Class and the Division of Labour 
 
In the early years, Suma was perceived to be middle class, owing to the 
backgrounds and degree level of education of the vast majority of members. 
However, with moves from Leeds to Halifax, and then Elland, the composition 
of the workforce began to change. This change increased the diversity of class 
backgrounds at Suma. Jake saw the democratic socialist principles that 
underpin Suma as more appealing to people of ‘lower middle class’ and 
‘working class’ backgrounds. He indicated that the diversity, flexibility and 
mobility of the workers can transcend existing class boundaries; ‘we’ve got 
plenty of well-educated, articulate people driving trucks, and we have got 
people who, maybe before they came to Suma had never used a computer, 
but are now working in sales or working in accounts’. Mobility within Suma is 
facilitated by the emphasis on learning new skills, taking responsibility and 
self-management. Charles emphasised how Suma provides the opportunity to 
learn new skills, though there are some limitations to this: 
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I never did any manual jobs before getting here so all that was a 
process of learning… you can [learn] financial skills… management 
skills. I never did managing at these levels, [but] some jobs might be 
more difficult than others to learn. 
 
Despite job mobility, there are some perceptions of divisions between ‘office 
workers’ and ‘warehouse workers’. Karen described how those who work in 
the warehouse most of the time can feel less involved with the management 
of the co-op; ‘the people that are just out there in the freezing cold [doing 
manual work], at this time of year, day in and day out… they can’t log on [to 
a computer]… I think they don’t feel part of the business’. 
 
Paul supported this by indicating that empowerment is relative to different 
areas of the business: 
 
we’re not necessarily good at empowering people who have non-desk 
jobs… to have the time to mull over the stuff that is coming up at 
general meetings, or to be part of that, and I think some parts of our 
business are much more participative than others. So typically the 
warehousing operation is the least participative part. Although you are 
collaborating together as a team to get a job done all the time, you’re 
not necessarily thinking about whether this is the best way of doing this 
job or not. 
 
These points highlight the importance of multi-skilling for ensuring that the 
equal wage structure is perceived to be a fair system, and for the workers to 
feel broadly equally a part of the democratic ownership of the business. 
Indeed, Neil posited that there is a ‘them and us’ culture, but that it is not a 
huge problem: ‘there are some people who will only work in the warehouse, 
there are some people who only work in the office, but the vast majority of us 
do both or have done both in the recent past and have enough knowledge of 
the other sections of the business to have more empathy with each other’.  
 
This section has described the workforce and the structure of Suma, how 
equal wages, job mobility (multi-skilling and job rotation) are integral to the 
organisation, and how these principles and practices to some degree reduce 
divisions of labour and class. The following section explores democracy in 
more detail. It focuses on the themes of self-management, consensus-based 
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decision-making, active participation and legitimacy, and highlights some of 
the problems associated with participatory democracy in Suma. 
 
Participatory Democracy 
 
There is a crucial difference at Suma between the co-operative structure and 
the democratic structure. Co-ops can be collectively owned by members but 
hierarchical in organisation and not democratically run. In Suma, ‘co-
operative’ refers to the fact that it is collectively owned by its members. 
‘Democracy’ means that each member has, in principle, the equal opportunity 
to participate in the formal decision-making processes. The two often overlap 
in this case as equal ownership translates into an equal right to participate. 
Though, David pointed out that there are legal responsibilities that come with 
co-operative ownership, which aren’t codified for workplace democracy. 
While this case study focuses on the democratic structure, it is also important 
to refer to the co-operative structure.   
 
Participation is only possible because of the democratic ownership of Suma by 
its members and a strong commitment to equality. Indeed, in previous 
research on Suma, Macfarlane (1987, pp.75-76) points out that 
 
[t]he ability to control the way they do their tasks, and the 
relationships with the people they work with… are essentially by-
products of democratic control of the business: arising from the belief 
in the equality of each person and the congregation of people who 
want to work in a non-hierarchical way. 
 
This section discusses key aspects of the participatory democratic structure: 
self-management, consensus-based decision-making, active participation and 
legitimacy. However, informal hierarchies, habituation to democracy and 
inefficiency are issues for Suma. 
 
Self-management 
 
The Suma members’ job description includes the following seven ‘tasks’: 
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1. To make active contributions to collective management functions 
and processes including; General Meetings, Management 
Committee and discussion groups, working groups, departmental 
meetings, etc. 
2. To seek and undertake training and personal development in 
order to be a more effective member and collective manager. 
3. To seek and accept responsibility within the co-operative. 
4. To promote worker self-management (and co-operative 
principles). 
5. To communicate openly and honestly with other members. 
6. To heed, read and listen to communications from other 
members. 
7. To work collectively for the good of the collective, not for self-
interest. 
 
The first four points stress active participation, self-development, 
responsibility and self-management. The members’ job description highlights 
how coercion is resisted in the organisation, as workers must collectively and 
autonomously manage the business through the flat management structure 
and self-management.  Jake explained this point further as ‘part of your 
membership duty is to take managerial responsibility, because we are the 
managers as well as the workers… if all you did was pick you would not be 
fulfilling your membership job description… it’s all part of the ethos’. 
 
Thomas argued that a very small number of people (‘one or two here at the 
moment’) abuse the non-coercive self-management principle to opt out of 
taking any responsibility for multi-skilling. This could be a consequence of the 
absence of legal compulsion to participate democratically or to multi-skill 
equally. Richard saw a weakness in Suma’s non-coercive egalitarian culture 
whereby members are unable to exercise authority over others; ‘[n]obody is 
going to pull them up and say ‘you’ve had 10 tea breaks today’, well actually, 
I have done that with one or two people and it doesn’t go down very well’. 
Nonetheless, self-management is core to Suma’s democracy, as Thomas stated 
that 
 
you have to take responsibility for what’s going on… we all have to chip 
in… if there is a picking crisis, everybody mucks in. People come down 
from the warehouse to help because… our business is supplying items of 
food to our customers… and there’s no option of going home without 
that happening. 
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Consensus-based Decision-making 
 
Along with self-managerial responsibility, decision-making is based on building 
consensus. This reflects points five, six and seven in the members’ job 
description above: workers must communicate openly and honestly, be 
actively involved in deliberations and must work together for collective 
interests. 
 
Formal decision-making takes place by the process of one member, one vote 
in QGMs. However, there is a need for communication and deliberation on a 
day-to-day basis to build consensus for proposals submitted to QGM-based 
decision-making, and to self-manage during the working week, as the general 
meeting is viewed as too big for serious discussion and reflection by members.  
 
Stewart described how building this consensus within the group might 
typically take place: 
 
you need to develop backing for [an idea or proposal] by basically 
canvassing the membership, getting people behind it… there still might 
be people who are vocally against it which can cause problems… [the 
more that] people are behind an idea the more likely it is to succeed 
because obviously everyone needs to be involved to get it to work. 
 
Richard described how the opportunity to trade with a company in Israel 
posed an ethical dilemma, owing to political support for the plight of 
Palestinians amongst some members of Suma. Richard needed consensus 
before trading with the company. He sent out an ‘all work email’, explaining 
what the deal would bring to Suma and to gauge the levels of support for the 
venture. He stated that 
 
I’ve got to make a decision tomorrow… 98% are saying yes at the 
moment.  [So] I’ll just go with what the majority say; it’s the 
democratic way to go I suppose. But, I will speak to those individuals 
that have said ‘no’… I didn’t want to… just take the customer on board 
and do it, and then upset those people. 
 
This shows how consensus decision-making can take place on a day-to-day 
basis amongst members, but also, it highlights how individuals can be 
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empowered to act with democratic legitimacy. However, those unable to 
access email would not have been able to indicate their preference. This 
suggests a possible digital divide between those with access to ICTs in Suma 
and those without. Despite this, building consensus can be empowering, as 
Richard put it: 
 
everybody is involved in that decision process… which makes me feel 
more secure that what I am proposing is actually what we should be 
doing as a business. So it builds your confidence really. 
 
David viewed democratic decision-making as producing ‘higher quality’ 
decisions by virtue of consensus, and Christine added that, in her experience, 
majority decisions tend to be ‘right’. However, not all attempts to change 
Suma are able to gather a consensus, and the co-op also contains 
conservatism in the sense of resisting change and maintaining the status quo. 
But it is a conservative aspect of an egalitarian culture, in contrast to political 
conservatism. This is especially pertinent in relation to welfare issues, and 
perhaps to the detriment of being even more competitive in the neo-liberal 
economy and generating larger profits. Malcolm stated that in-work welfare is 
an important aspect of consensus-based decisions: ‘you’ll often find that huge 
decisions get nodded through with very little democracy, but that only 
happens in finance, it hardly happens at all with people issues’. 
 
The principle of consensus-based decision-making at Suma reduces power 
hierarchies and empowers the membership to effect change. But the 
commitment to in-work welfare indicates a proviso: change can only come if 
it is deemed beneficial to the welfare of the collective. This indicates that 
both the conservative and radical ideals of the co-operative movement are 
present at Suma. 
 
Active Participation & Legitimacy 
 
Democratic participation is at the heart of Suma, which requires an active 
majority to ensure legitimacy. Though Paul stated that, compared with 
smaller co-ops where total participation is necessary; ‘a big organisation like 
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Suma is able to actually take some passengers; it is possible to have a workers 
co-op of 120 people and for some of the people to not to be very engaged 
with it and it can still work’. As long as there is majority participation and 
opportunities for all members to participate, then legitimacy is less likely to 
be compromised. Jason described how the right to participate is important for 
him: ‘I’ve got the right to air my views without fear or favour… we’ve all got 
access to the FAC group, we’ve all got access to the MC group and we’ve all 
got free access to each other via email, and if you make a valid point, it will 
get discussed’. 
 
Legitimacy is conferred and respected, even by those that disagree with the 
decision, due to the democratic and egalitarian culture. Susan stated that 
‘sometimes [a decision] might not work for you but it works for the majority 
and at the end of the day it’s what we at Suma agree to’. However, despite 
the link between participation and democratic legitimacy, not all members 
actively participate. Jake argued that the opportunity for all members to 
participate is equal in principle, but not necessarily in practice: 
 
it would be false to say all members are actively engaged in all decision 
making processes… but there’s no reason why they couldn’t be… we 
don’t need all of us to be involved in everything, but as long as 
everyone has got that opportunity… some people aren’t that bothered, 
they just want a job really, they just want job security and a 
reasonable wage, and reasonable working conditions, they’re not that 
bothered about getting involved with the management, but they could 
do, there is nothing stopping them. 
 
Differences between those that are more active within the co-op’s democracy 
and those that are perceived to contribute less is discussed further below in 
relation to informal hierarchies. Moreover, degrees of active participation 
differentiate between dimensions of social empowerment (discussed in the 
following section). 
 
Stewart elaborated on how different perceptions may neglect the 
contributions that people actually make to the co-op: 
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people who are active in the business, I think they don’t understand 
[why] people don’t want to be involved… they see them as a bit lazy… 
[although] people contribute in different ways… people who work five 
days in the warehouse and don’t contribute to management might be 
doing ten or twelve hour shifts in the warehouse to make sure the 
boxes get out the door. There’s different kinds of commitment.   
 
This reflects the point made by Christine above about the equal value of each 
‘link’ in the organisation. Further, levels of participation by individual 
members can change over time as Malcolm’s statement above alludes to this 
regarding job mobility in the long-term. This section has described how self-
management, consensus-based decision-making, participation and legitimacy 
are central aspects of Suma’s participatory democracy. The following 
discussion highlights three problems for the democratic structure. 
 
Informal Hierarchies, Habituation and Inefficiency 
 
Despite formal wage equality, decentralised power, and the egalitarian 
culture, there are hierarchies within the co-op. They are not seen as 
problematic by all at Suma, though they have the potential to weaken the 
democratic system should certain hierarchies come to dominate. MC and FAC 
job functions have the potential to be powerful positions in the absence of 
effective democratic safeguards. However, Tina argued that, unlike ‘straight’ 
businesses with formalised hierarchies, MC members do not have sufficient 
power over others to enforce their preferences.   
 
For some the notion of hierarchies goes against the egalitarian culture and 
structure: certain groups are said to be sometimes able to influence decisions 
more than others by virtue of their standing within the group, levels of 
expertise, or strength of personality. These hierarchies are viewed by many as 
‘natural’ and actually complementary to the democratic system, due to a 
crucial distinction between multiple hierarchies based on skills and knowledge 
that recognise the talents of individuals, and those based on power 
(Macfarlane, 1987). 
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For Malcolm, while there are hierarchies of personality, length of service, 
main job functions, ability and knowledge, they are not static or formalised: 
 
there are no glass ceilings, so you can move from one hierarchy to 
another… two people can be talking to each other, and in one situation 
one of them is supervising the other, and yet the next day in different 
roles [because of multi-skilling], the person who was the person being 
told what to do, is now telling the other person what to do. 
 
Perceptions of some jobs being more desirable, or of some members being 
able to articulate their views in charismatic or forceful ways in the 
democratic arena, are problems caused by informal hierarchies. Indeed, for 
Paula ‘because of their knowledge, their positions, their experience within 
the company… some people have a larger sway than others’.  However, Jake 
stressed that it is the perception of this by individuals, rather than a 
fundamental problem with participatory democracy: 
 
there’s always that perception that some jobs are more high profile or 
more valued… [but] because we’ve got job rotation, nobody’s ever 
stuck doing the same thing five days a week unless they really want to 
be… there’s also perceptions [where some people say that] ‘so and so 
always gets their own way because they are much better at standing up 
and convincing a group of people to go with them’… and really a lot of 
the time its people’s own perceptions that are holding them back. 
 
The culture of equality, participatory democratic system, and critical 
awareness of the need to avoid formal hierarchies, appears to be an effective 
bulwark against informal hierarchical relationships turning into power 
hierarchies that impede upon and weaken the participatory democratic 
process. 
 
However, over time democracy can come to be taken for granted. This has 
the potential to disempower members of the co-operative if active 
participation declines. George illustrated how people can come to view 
Suma’s democracy as the norm rather than the exception: ‘I think very 
quickly you just come to accept it as being normal. You forget really that 
other places don’t work like that’. As a consequence, Paula highlighted how 
habituation can mean that people do not make the most of participation: ‘we 
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often take our vote and our chance to just stand up and say ‘I don’t agree 
with that’, or ‘I think this is a good idea’… for granted and… we don’t use our 
vote well enough for things like the business plan’. More reflexive discussion 
and awareness of the importance of Suma’s democratic practices may 
strengthen the enthusiasm for participation. 
 
There are three perceptions of inefficiency: the slowness of democratic 
decision-making, the inability to take advantage of flexible labour in the neo-
liberal marketplace, and the strains of job mobility on specialisation. 
However, the purpose of the co-op is not solely to generate profit, but to 
ensure good working conditions for its members and use profits to this end. 
Nevertheless, Anthony argued that ‘it can take an awful lot of time to 
implement something… [But] You just have to accept, because everyone is 
equal, and it’s joint decision making, that’s just the way it’s going to be’. 
 
Suma employs some short term contracted workers, but ethical concerns 
about ownership and equality mean that the co-op is unable to make 
extensive use of flexible labour markets. George pointed out that it 
 
would be a logical financial decision to outsource the warehouse, 
outsource the driving, outsource all the admin jobs… they’re logical 
from a perspective of just pure business, but not necessarily from [the 
perspective of] a worker co-op where the people doing those jobs own 
the business. 
 
Similarly, for Richard, the desire to make profit can be at odds with 
egalitarian principles. For example, multi-skilling can be seen as hampering 
the possibilities for making business deals: 
 
we need people in the roles that can manage that part of the business.  
Rather than just having them flitting around [multi-skilling]… because 
[for example,] customers overseas are asking for stuff and phoning up 
and [we say] ‘oh no, he’s in the warehouse today’. 
 
There are some who would rather that Suma makes more profit, allowing the 
workers to pay themselves more and purchase better equipment, but, there 
are also people that are less interested in increasing wages, and focus on 
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ethical business principles and welfare issues in the workplace. However, Joe 
saw these two aspects as balanced by democracy: 
 
we fight hard in the market place… I’m probably on the far right of that 
balance, I’m always saying ‘no, more money, more money’, and ‘let’s 
grow over X competitor or whatever’, whatever it takes to get more 
money, but then that is balanced by people who say ‘no, these are our 
principles’, and I don’t mind that, I think it comes out about right… the 
end result is stability… democracy leads to stability. 
 
The welfare costs of competitiveness are therefore held in check by an 
effective and democratic system of workers’ control. Suma is at odds with a 
vast majority of British business to the extent that this apparent weakness is 
also a strength of the organisation. By having welfare in work, it creates 
empowered and productive workers. This section has discussed the 
democratic principles of self-management, consensus-based decision-making, 
participation and democratic legitimacy in order to explain how Suma’s 
democracy and egalitarian culture is sustained through day-to-day work 
practices. Despite the problems of informal hierarchies, habituation and 
inefficiency highlighted by some interviewees, Suma’s democracy appears to 
be robust in limiting the effect that these threats have on the business and 
the workers. The following section addresses the extent and in what ways this 
case study evidences social empowerment. 
 
Social Empowerment 
 
The democratic structure in Suma decentralises power in the membership and 
avoids the centralisation of power in an elite. This decreases the capacity for 
individuals to exert power over others and suggests that democratic social 
relations enhance social empowerment: the ability of individuals to fulfil their 
capabilities. Some interviewees stated that empowerment is facilitated by the 
structure of the organisation, but it is up to the individual to use Suma’s 
democracy to become empowered. Table 6.4 shows nine dimensions of social 
empowerment in Suma. They range from the solidaristic bases of security, 
stability and collective identity, to the passive dimensions of autonomy, 
welfare, and flexibility, to active dimensions of self-development, ownership 
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and control. Each set of dimensions is equated with greater participation in 
democracy and greater empowerment. The passive/active distinction is 
broadly made on the basis of membership, but active empowerment is more 
likely to be realised by those members that participate in Suma’s democracy. 
Passive empowerment is broadly available to all. This section addresses each 
of the dimensions in turn. 
 
Table 6.4: Dimensions of Social Empowerment at Suma  
 
Solidaristic 
bases of social 
empowerment 
 
 
 
Security 
 
 
Stability 
 
 
Collective 
identity 
 
 
Available to 
all workers 
 
Passive 
dimensions of 
social 
empowerment 
 
 
 
Autonomy 
 
 
Welfare 
 
 
Flexibility 
 
Available to 
all workers, 
but 
especially to 
members 
 
 
Active 
dimensions of 
social 
empowerment 
 
 
 
 
Self-
development 
 
 
 
 
Ownership 
 
 
 
 
Control 
 
Available to 
members 
that actively 
participate in 
Suma’s 
democratic 
structure 
 
 
The Solidaristic Bases of Social Empowerment 
 
Security, stability and collective identity form the solidaristic bases of social 
empowerment. On the one hand, these values integrate individuals into the 
group, and on the other hand, they are fundamental supports for 
empowerment. These dimensions are especially open to all Suma workers.  
They promote social cohesion in the group (social integration), and also 
encourage members to ‘buy-in’ to the democratic and egalitarian culture and 
practices (system integration). 
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Security  
 
Collective ownership, access to Suma’s financial information, and the absence 
of the threat of the sack (except in cases of gross misconduct) suggest a high 
degree of job security. Security may be less extensive for non-members, as 
they do not have democratic control. Nevertheless, Brian, a non-member, 
described why job security is important to him: 
 
[t]he biggest thing for me has been knowing what’s going on. I’ve 
actually been made redundant four times in my career. Three of those 
four times I didn’t even see it coming, no idea that it was going to 
happen, it was just basically a letter on my desk and that was it… so 
from that perspective Suma is a lot better because it’s so open, the 
whole process, the whole democracy is very open; you can read 
minutes of meetings, go to meetings, I don’t have a vote ‘cause I’m not 
a member, but I can still participate and put my point of view forward. 
 
This is empowering because it allows members to have more control over 
their own working lives, to be more informed about the health of the 
business, and take ownership of their work without threat of dismissal. Multi-
skilling and rotating job functions can improve job security. Alice stated that 
members can move to different job functions, so ‘you’re not out of a job, 
you’re not on the street if a particular job role doesn’t work out, or a 
particular role just comes to an end’. 
 
As a non-coercive organisation, a negative aspect of this high degree of job 
security is that Suma has weak processes for removing poorly performing 
workers.  Malcolm highlighted how if a FAC was underperforming and 
struggling to adequately fulfil the job function, he or she would be left to do 
the job until the pressure builds to stop. This has the potential to be 
demoralising, disruptive and inefficient. But nevertheless, in such a situation, 
the member would still be empowered with the security and knowledge that 
they can move to a less demanding role within the co-op, rather than be 
forced to leave. 
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Stability  
 
Like security, stability is a basic source of empowerment in the co-op. Jason 
cited instability in his previous workplace as a reason for joining Suma. He 
previously worked at a local brewery: 
 
that got taken over by a bigger brewery, [and then] got taken over by 
Fosters from Australia, then got taken over by somebody else. You got 
to the point where you felt that your life was not really in your own 
control, decisions were made remotely; it might be from London, it 
might be from Sydney, it might be from anywhere. And however good a 
performance you might be putting in… ultimately you were just a figure 
on an accountant’s book… however hard you worked that’s all it was 
about really. [It was] managed by accountants [in the interests of] 
short term shareholder value… [Whereas Suma is] one company, on one 
site; so every decision is made here… you’re actually involved… it’s not 
somebody making a decision; ‘10% redundant there, and 10% redundant 
here’.  
 
Guy indicated that stability is a basis for social empowerment as ‘this job is 
going to be here as long as you want it, whereas most of the people working 
on this [industrial] estate can’t even look more than two years ahead, they’ve 
no idea what’s going to happen to those businesses’. At the heart of this 
stability is the democratic and co-operative ownership of the business which 
precludes hostile takeovers, and consensus-based decision-making also means 
that Suma is less likely to make risky business decisions. Thomas stated that 
‘because it’s so slow, everybody gets input into that decision… [one or two] 
people cannot make the decision to go out and buy something like another 
firm, and merge with someone else, without everybody having their say’. 
 
As mentioned by Joe above, democracy acts as an empowering check against 
instability. Again, both members and non-members can be empowered by 
stability.  As a non-member, Brian described how having a stable and secure 
job at Suma has enabled him to cope with other events in his life in the past: 
 
I was quite happy just driving and order picking and switching off at the 
end of the day and going home. I had gone through a divorce, I split up 
from my ex-wife a few months before I started at Suma. I was self-
employed at that time and I fell apart, and I needed some kind of 
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structured/organised work to do, and I ended up in Suma, and it kind of 
saved me in a way did Suma ‘cause I had no friends, I had nothing.   
 
Collective Identity  
 
Along with security and stability, the third basis for social empowerment is 
the strong sense of pride that Suma workers have which creates a collective 
identity and integrates the individual within the group. This is linked to 
democracy. For Richard, democratic participation confers ‘a passion… to take 
Suma forward, and a pride in Suma as well’. Christine asserted that 
democracy allows a plurality of views to be expressed about how Suma can be 
improved, which binds people together in a common aim; ‘ultimately, 
everyone is proud of Suma and wants Suma to continue going forward’. 
 
For Malcolm, legitimacy derived from the democratic process also helps to 
create a sense of collective identity, as taking part in decision-making allows 
members to 
 
identify with the group; ‘because I took part in that decision, I identify 
with it’. Unless of course you disagree… [but] let’s say there is a 
majority decision, most people would think ‘well, I at least 
participated in that decision and therefore I endorse it, and therefore I 
will seek not to block it in whatever way I might interact with that the 
results of that decision’.   
 
While the first three dimensions of social empowerment form the solidaristic 
base, the following set of dimensions are open, to varying degrees, to all 
workers. 
 
Passive Dimensions of Social Empowerment 
 
The passive dimensions of social empowerment are autonomy, welfare and 
flexibility. These are derived from the people-centred work practices that 
Suma’s democracy upholds and are conferred through membership or 
employment by the co-op. The active dimensions that follow this section of 
self-development, ownership and democratic control are open to members 
that are actively engaged within the democratic structure of the co-op. Not 
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all of the dimensions of social empowerment are taken up by all workers 
however, due to factors intrinsic to Suma, such as informal hierarchies, 
habituation and inefficiency, and extrinsic factors such as class background, 
education levels, ability, communicative skills, and commitment. 
 
Autonomy  
 
The democratic structure at Suma creates opportunities for members and, to 
a lesser degree, non-members, to act autonomously in their work. This can be 
through direct participation in management functions, and in day-to-day self-
management of work tasks.  Guy posited that 
 
co-operation is about being autonomous… it doesn’t mean you’ve got to 
be the same as [other people], or that everybody has to agree before 
you can do anything, it just means that you can be a human being, so 
long as you recognise you’re a social human being (added emphasis). 
 
Autonomy necessitates the recognition that the interests of the individual are 
embedded within the group. Stewart emphasised autonomy when he stated 
that ‘I can be involved as much or a little as I want to be. If I want to take a 
step back from something, I don’t need to get involved. There’s enough 
people here to take on responsibility… it’s called a collective because 
everyone puts a bit in’. Likewise, Jake saw empowerment in the membership 
simply having the autonomy to participate in decision-making if they wish to 
do so, whether or not they act on this opportunity: 
 
knowing that their voice would be heard stops people from needing to 
raise it. It’s like something you’ve got in a locker that maybe you don’t 
want to squander, you think ‘if I really needed to stand up in front of 
the membership and say something, they would listen to me’, and just 
that knowledge in itself can be enough. 
 
Outside of the formal democracy, Suma workers arguably have a high degree 
of autonomy in relation to hierarchical workplaces. Malcolm described how 
autonomous decision-making can take place on a day-to-day basis: 
 
I was discussing with Jeanie about how we should go about training 
people to use VDUs, often ideas come at that level; ‘here’s a problem… 
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how do we do something about it?’… it may not need to go to a GM, it 
may not even need to go to MC, or even FAC level. It might just be 
said, ‘let’s just do that, and then we can formalise it in this way’… that 
sort of thing goes on all the time. 
 
As well as decision-making, Suma members have autonomy in their day-to-day 
jobs. Susan highlighted how she feels empowered by having autonomy in her 
work: 
 
in certain situations I can take charge and be directive with others… I 
don’t feel as though anyone is going to say ‘who made you boss?’… 
when the others come to you for advice as well, that’s empowering. It 
makes you feel like ‘actually I do know something after all’… when you 
have been here a while and worked through different departments you 
forget how much knowledge you carry, so it makes you feel good about 
yourself. 
 
However, Jason suggested that while there is autonomy, the co-op doesn’t 
have sufficient systems in place to monitor the productivity of the workers: 
 
the job is very much mine to do as much as I want [and] to a certain 
degree, do it my own way, within the constraints of what needs to be 
done.  Perhaps frustration comes in because I’m equally at liberty to do 
as little as I want. 
 
Jason’s statement indicates that the democratic right to be autonomous, and 
not coerced, can sometimes be a negative aspect of Suma. In addition to the 
absence of sufficient regulation of autonomous workers, Alice pointed out 
how extrinsic factors might influence the degree of autonomy that is 
exercised by Suma members: 
 
you have to be pro-active in seeking out responsibility and then the 
organisation will meet you the other way… what doesn’t always work is 
if you have individuals who might be very capable but aren’t 
particularly confident, or maybe haven’t got ‘nice middle class’ 
communication skills, or experience of working in that sort of co-
operative environment. 
 
The point that the capability of individuals to learn new skills autonomously 
may vary between members is critical. This shows that, on the one hand, the 
structure of Suma creates formally equal conditions for social empowerment, 
194 
 
and on the other hand, differing capabilities to participate autonomously 
contribute to unequal levels of empowerment within the co-op. 
 
Welfare  
 
The strong emphasis on welfare, secured by democratic ownership, is 
evidenced by the benefits that membership confers, empowered working 
conditions, and the ability to proactively control and shape working life 
through job mobility. Malcolm pointed out that 
 
we don’t intend to [make much net profit], we have no shareholders, 
we don’t need to take our gross profit [and] squeeze our overheads and 
produce a large net profit, much of which then goes to shareholders 
external to Suma, that doesn’t happen. What we do is we try to use the 
money we have… to enhance our working conditions, so we buy the 
best trucks we can, we buy top quality gear [and] by and large we 
don’t stint on equipment or things for people. 
 
Welfare can also be understood as the ability to create conditions favourable 
to the individual in everyday working life. As George pointed out 
 
[t]he jobs I do are ones that I’ve chosen to do and the hours that I do 
work for me… getting holiday approved here is a lot easier than in 
other businesses… the personnel side of the business work very hard to 
try and fit with peoples’ requests really… It’s a difficult balance… 
people go out of their way really to try and ensure that people’s 
working weeks are what they want them to be, whilst keeping a 
business running as well… overall it works pretty well. 
 
For Tina, the emphasis on welfare is expressed by the key role that the 
Personnel Department plays in Suma, whereby ‘Personnel… has a role in 
supporting the individual… [if] you can match the needs of Suma to the needs 
of the individual, then you’re not coercing, you’re actually understanding that 
person’s needs’.  Furthermore, David highlighted how in-work welfare allows 
a greater security in moving from job to job, and also the recognition that 
sometimes people have difficult times in their life that affect their capacity 
to work productively: 
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I recently stepped down from a higher profile job than I currently have 
now at Suma, and I’m totally unaffected in terms of my remuneration, 
in terms of my job security.  [Also, due to personal issues] I had a lot of 
time off, and I was helped immensely by the personnel team… it’s 
enabled me to leave a particular role and still receive the same 
benefits, and still receive the same care… it’s probably a more 
sustainable way for individuals to maintain a lengthy working life. 
 
There is also worker control over wages, having democratically agreed a 5% 
annual increase, and other benefits such as increased holidays and fully paid 
sick leave. Despite the high wage costs, the lack of pressure to make profit 
for external shareholders means that Suma is less subject to instability in 
volatile market conditions. However, should the co-op’s turnover significantly 
decrease, reducing the wage would be subject to a democratic vote, and a 
test of the solidarity within the group. 
 
Flexibility  
 
Empowered flexibility (in contrast to flexible labour markets where workers 
are often significantly disempowered, Standing, 2009) means that people can 
apply for different jobs within Suma, and they are able to change job 
functions without penalty. Multi-skilling and job rotation are empowering 
factors here. Susan pointed out that ‘not only is it good for your health, 
getting some exercise as well as a balance of a sitting down job, it’s good for 
your mental well-being as well to be able to do different things’.  
 
For Susan, the flexible nature of multi-skilling also means that if people 
aren’t feeling well enough for a manual shift, for example, then jobs can be 
switched around and, consequently, workers are likely to still come in to 
work; ‘I think flexibility is key here, otherwise you get an awful lot of people 
bringing sick notes and things like that’. In addition, the opportunity to rotate 
jobs over time has benefits for in-work welfare. Christine pointed to her 
experience in the finance department: 
 
I wanted a change… [I spent] most of the year working in the 
warehouse, I did a lot of driving, and I recharged effectively, and then I 
went back into finance and I had a certain level of mental energy… I 
like having the two together… I find that I do quite a lot of my finance 
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thinking when I’m out driving, and I come back with ideas… that were 
just beyond me when I was sat looking at that particular computer 
screen. 
 
Empowering Suma members with the flexibility to set their own life/work 
balance is also derived from democratic control. Jason pointed out that 
‘people are able to manage their working weeks according to their lifestyle at 
that particular time’. However, the success of empowered flexibility in work 
also requires members to commit to job mobility. Aside from those that are 
unable to multi-skill for health reasons, a tension between specialisation and 
multi-skilling was highlighted by Charles: 
 
we have people that don’t want to move from their positions, which 
sometimes can be a negative thing for the co-op, when you see [some 
don’t] share responsibilities, [or don’t] share manual jobs, for 
example… [but instead] just want to be in an office position…  we try 
to avoid that but we still have cases like that. 
 
As described above, the structure of the democratic workplace means that 
members cannot be coerced into doing particular jobs. Nonetheless, Suma 
provides autonomy, welfare and flexibility for the individual, which are 
dimensions of social empowerment. 
 
Active Dimensions of Social Empowerment  
 
The active dimensions apply only to those members who have ‘bought-in’ to 
Suma’s culture and actively participate in the democracy. Self-development, 
ownership, and control reflect the link between participatory democracy and 
social empowerment. These dimensions are considered to be at a higher level 
due to the need for stronger commitment to the principles of the co-op in 
order to achieve them; active membership and fulfilment of the requirements 
of the members’ job description. 
 
Self-development 
 
Suma members are empowered with the ability to self-develop through 
learning new skills and taking on a range of responsibilities. Susan explained 
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how learning can be both formal through training and informal through shared 
knowledge: ‘I came here with hardly any IT skills but it didn’t stop me from 
going for jobs advertised that involved IT because I knew I would get the 
training… you can get guidance whenever you need it’. 
 
Opportunities for self-development go beyond formal job skills.  As English is 
not Charles’ first language he was supported by the co-op to have paid leave 
for English lessons, as a requirement of membership. The opportunity to self-
develop through taking on managerial responsibility is crucially open to all 
actively participating members. Paula stated that ‘I’ve learned so much here 
that I’d never have learned anywhere else… I got on the management 
committee when I was 23… no one else would have given me that 
responsibility at such a young age’. 
 
For Guy, opportunities for training, self-development, and the requirements 
of membership for multi-skilling, encourage people to gain experience of both 
office-based work and manual work, even if this proves difficult in some 
cases, and not everyone takes advantage of these opportunities. Thomas 
viewed some people as lacking the initiative to seek out opportunities for self-
development by themselves, and Brian saw his lack of ICT skills as a major 
stumbling block to taking membership and a more active role. This is a skills 
deficit that leaves some manual workers feeling isolated from the co-op. 
While self-development offers many opportunities for members that are 
equipped with confidence, ICT skills and individual initiative, it is important 
to acknowledge that some do not necessarily have recourse to the skills to 
make the most of social empowerment, or may not want to develop greater 
competencies for a variety of job roles. 
 
Ownership and Control 
 
The final two dimensions of social empowerment can be considered together. 
Equality of ownership for members is secured through democracy. The flat 
management structure requires the delegation of authority to the MC 
members and FACs, but decentralised power means that this does not 
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compromise the ownership and participation that all members have in the 
business. 
 
While the MC performs the management function, they are enacting and 
guiding policies that have been democratically consented to, rather than 
dictated by management. Consequently, all members of Suma are in principle 
empowered with the ability to act as equal owners of the business with 
formally equal statuses. This highlights how the absence of power hierarchies 
is necessary for empowering the collective. Alice stated that 
 
I feel empowered because I have the power to bring about change and 
to challenge what is going on if I don’t like it. No one can actually tell 
me what to do without my consent… there is no one here that is in a 
position to order me to do something or who’s in a position to try and 
to treat me without respect because their status is equal to mine. 
 
Jason explained why ownership is important; ‘what empowers me… is [the 
fact that we own] our own business… and to know [that] we are all working 
together, and that we’ve got all equal opportunities and equal 
responsibilities’. Likewise, the ability to participate, which stems from 
ownership, was seen by Jake as an integral aspect of empowerment. He 
pointed out that the structure of Suma creates the possibility for social 
empowerment, although not all members take advantage of this opportunity: 
 
I’ve had a direct impact on my own work environment, I’ve changed 
the way things are done… I feel I’ve improved things… I’ve brought 
proposals to QGMs, so I personally do feel extremely empowered by this 
work environment. Unfortunately, I know that that isn’t shared by 
everyone here… for instance I have no problems standing up and 
speaking in front of a large group of people, but I know that a lot of 
people find that really difficult… in theory, yes, anybody can stand up 
and make their point, but some people really struggle to do that. 
 
Control is distinct from ownership because co-ops can be collectively run but 
not democratically controlled. Both democratic control over the business and 
individual control over day-to-day work can be empowering in Suma. 
Democratic control is apparent in Alice’s statement about responsibilities and 
opportunities to vote: 
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everyone has got a dual role as a member; as a member you are 
responsible for being part of the management of the company, so 
whatever you might be doing in your day to day work, once every three 
months you’re in a position to vote, or not vote, for proposals and in a 
position to put proposals [forward]. 
 
On the other hand, Stewart argued that control can also be exerted by 
members of Suma in their day-to-day working life: 
 
You’ve got control of what you do, democracy is not just about being 
able to vote… if you go into Personnel and say ‘can I have a day off 
tomorrow?’ they will be more lenient to that because you own the 
business, you’ve got a responsibility to be responsible for the business 
as well as your own personal needs. 
 
Given that members can be empowered by flexible jobs and a greater 
autonomy in shaping the working week, there are also some limitations to 
control over certain job functions, as Tina pointed out: ‘you might not have 
control over the way you do your job because the systems limit you… but you 
can have control over the jobs which you do to a certain extent’. This relates 
to some of the practical requirements of manual job functions or telephone-
based work. 
 
However, as with many of the dimensions of social empowerment, the 
structure of Suma provides the opportunity for individuals to take control over 
their working lives, but it is also up to the individual to have the skills and 
confidence to actively take advantage of the possibilities for empowerment. 
Jake enunciated this point; ‘I think the structures are there for people to 
have control of their working lives, but it’s not going to be handed to you, 
you’ve got to stick your head above the parapet, you’ve got to be willing to 
take a bit of flack sometimes, to push your ideas forward and potentially have 
them turned down’. Suma’s democratic structure confers empowerment in 
the form of self-development, ownership and control for those members that 
are actively participating.  
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Conclusion 
 
This case study has highlighted how Suma’s democratic structure and 
egalitarian culture provide the circumstances by which members of the 
organisation are able to realise dimensions of social empowerment. The 
findings are analysed further in Chapter 8. Four points from the above 
discussion may be restated.  Firstly, Suma’s history has involved a transition 
from an organisation that espoused equality and co-operation, but at various 
points found itself subject to ‘power cliques’ which meant that these 
principles were less likely to be achieved in practice. This case study has 
shown that the latest incarnation of Suma’s democratic structure has 
generally managed to avoid obvious problems of elite power and static 
hierarchies. Reflexive attention to this by critically engaged members has 
been integral to revitalising the co-op. Given that Suma is not absolutely 
equal in this regard - some interviewees complained that certain individuals 
were able to argue their cases more forcefully to achieve their ends, this is 
largely an issue of communicative competence within Suma’s public sphere, 
and is to an extent mitigated by a democratic system which crucially rests on 
majority consensus. In addition, some participate and are empowered much 
more than others in the current structure. Factors intrinsic and extrinsic to 
Suma are identified as aspects of this below.  
 
Secondly, and relatedly, the current structure of Suma is an effective system 
of decentralised power. It limits power over relationships from developing 
between individuals or between groups and increases social empowerment 
within the whole group, at the very least for some. Again, while this may be a 
matter of degree, it is the case that no single member or clique of members 
can come to dominate over the group due to the structure of the co-op. This 
is a marked difference compared to Suma’s early years. 
 
Thirdly, the relational egalitarian culture of Suma partly enforces the 
decentralised power structure, and is repeatedly emphasised in this case 
study. While equal pay is a formal principle that establishes equality between 
workers (and, along with democratic ownership, legitimises decentralised 
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power) there are other aspects that reinforce the culture of equality. These 
include viewing jobs as ‘functions’ rather than formal status roles, that 
members must ‘buy-in’ to, and enact, democratic and co-operative work 
practices, the reflexive awareness of the danger that formal hierarchies pose 
for Suma’s democracy (the degeneration thesis), established rules that 
maintain the principle of democratic consensus-based decision-making, and 
the emphasis on job mobility as an aspect of sharing workloads amongst the 
group.  
 
Fourthly, the concern with participatory democracy and social empowerment 
in this case study can be explained as a two-sided process.  In terms of 
structure, the power relationships described above underpin democracy in 
such a way that social empowerment exists within the group and confers the 
power to act within the terms of democratic legitimacy amongst equals. In 
terms of agency, while the individual is supported and enabled by the 
structure, initiative, capability, and confidence are necessary capabilities to 
develop the individual’s own sense of empowerment. Jake’s take on the 
structural and individual aspects of this succinctly encapsulates social 
empowerment: 
 
It’s definitely a two part process; the environment has to exist, for 
people [to become] empowered or it is very difficult, but also 
empowerment has to come from within by its very nature… you can be 
shown the door, but ultimately you have to choose to walk through it 
really. I think no-one else can do that for you… some people don’t want 
that because it’s too scary, they want to be led really… but then you 
are never going to say that those people are going to become properly 
empowered, because they don’t want to, no matter what kind of 
environment you provide for them; if they don’t have it within them to 
want to walk through that door then they are not going to. 
 
Aside from those that freely eschew empowerment, this draws attention to 
the intrinsic factors of informal hierarchies, habituation to democracy, and 
conflicts with the perceived need for greater efficiency from within the co-op 
that may impede social empowerment. It also highlights extrinsic factors such 
as class background, ability, confidence, education, knowledge, personality, 
and commitment which are derived from the individual within the wider social 
structure of British society. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Suma member 
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remains part of a broadly liberal democratic society that is based on very 
different values to those found in Suma. This means that, along with 
individual choice, the inequities of British society can, to an extent, limit the 
possibilities for social empowerment in Suma. Therefore, it is necessary to 
evaluate this case study with the acknowledgement that Suma does not exist 
as an oasis in the desert of neo-liberalism, but is in a dialectical relationship 
with the wider social and economic structure. This is especially pertinent in 
view of the co-op’s work practices which could be deemed to be antagonistic 
to dominant modes of production, with transformative potential, should they 
be adopted in more workplaces.  
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Chapter 7 
Case Study: You Choose 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This case study addresses the extent of social empowerment in a participatory 
democratic local government grants-making process. The case study focuses 
on a participatory budgeting process that takes place at the intersection of 
civil society (voluntary and community organisations) and local politics (local 
government). Participatory budgeting (PB) is a form of decision-making which 
allows ‘the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or 
allocation of public finances’ (Sintomer et al., 2008, p.168). Often this is 
through democratic deliberation and voting on a given issue, but not all PBs 
are democratic; the simple core of PB is ‘citizens deciding public spending’ 
(Lerner, 2011, p.32). This chapter begins with a discussion of the history of 
participatory budgeting, including its origins in Brazil, adoption by the World 
Bank and implementation in the UK. Next the UK PB case study is explained 
with reference to the local context, including a public cynical about politics, 
and describes the PB process (including some demographic data). 
Participatory democracy in the PB process is then discussed and the themes of 
transparency, trust, participation, voting, critical engagement, 
equality/inequality, and inclusion/exclusion. Lastly, the potential for social 
empowerment in this democratic setting is explored.  
 
This case study is based on four months in the field, with observations of four 
PB events, and interviews with 23 people, including 15 members of 
community groups (1 non-member of a group), 3 Councillors, and 4 Council 
Officers. The findings suggest that there are limits to participatory democracy 
in this case, stemming from little civil society mobilisation for democratic 
participation, lack of political will and an absence of citizen control and 
ownership over the process. As a consequence, there are incipient dimensions 
of social empowerment, including voting, critical engagement, strengthening 
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civil society groups, awareness, self-development, networking and community 
participation. Some of these are intrinsic to the institutional design and 
others are unanticipated empowering aspects, but all lack the necessary 
citizen ownership and control to be considered socially empowering. 
 
The History of Participatory Budgeting 
 
Sintomer et al. (2008) describe two models of PB (amongst other, more 
consultative variants) that are of relevance to this case study: the original 
Porto Alegre model (often seen as the ideal type of PB) and the ‘community 
funds at local and city level’ model (described below). Sintomer et al. (2008, 
p.175) view these as the two variants most conducive to empowerment as 
‘the citizenry... directly (or through highly controlled delegates) assumes 
decision-making power’. Wider levels of social mobilisation and the centrality 
of the working class to the process are viewed as additional caveats for 
empowerment otherwise there is a risk of a more consultative model 
(Sintomer at al., 2008).  
 
Beyond citizen involvement in budgeting, the original Porto Alegre model also 
aims to revitalise citizenship, improve scrutiny of local government, and 
improve service provision (Goldfrank, 2007). This section discusses the Porto 
Alegre model, and describes how PB has spread across the globe, setting the 
context for the case study of a ‘community funds at the local and city level’ 
PB process in Northern England. 
 
From Porto Alegre to the World Bank 
 
PB originates in the late 1980s in Porto Alegre, Brazil. It was instigated by the 
left wing Workers’ Party, which was formed in 1980 out of a coalition of 
grassroots activists, labour unions, left wing militants and intellectuals in 
opposition to the military dictatorship (Abers, 1998). The grassroots origins of 
the Workers’ Party are an important aspect of the growth and success of the 
participatory budget, until the Party fell from power in 2004. Following their 
1989 election, the Workers’ Party pledged to create ‘participatory councils’ 
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to allow ordinary citizens to be involved in genuinely democratic decision-
making (Abers, 1998). After a few years of struggle in the transition from 
military dictatorship to democracy it grew to involve over 17,000 people per 
year in budget assemblies (Baierle, 2010).   
 
The participatory budget is a yearlong process that incorporates deliberation 
and participatory democracy along with community-based representative 
democracy, and has involved up to 20% of Porto Alegre’s total budget 
(Baierle, 2005; Pateman, 2012). It operates on three levels: assemblies in 16 
districts of the city are open for all citizens to debate and vote on budget 
priorities and elect citizen-representatives to the participatory budget 
council, along with thematic assemblies that address different areas such as 
education, transportation or health policy which are also open to all 
(Pateman, 2012). The second level is Regional Budget Forums where citizens 
may observe, but it is the elected delegates that discuss the investment 
priorities put forward by the neighbourhood assemblies and agree on 
priorities. The third level, the Council of the Participatory Budget decides on 
the distribution of investment across the city, and once accepted by the 
mayor, discusses the rules that will govern the following year’s budget. The 
third level is also open for citizens to observe, but the elected delegates 
participate in it.  
 
While community-based representative democracy forms much of the 
decision-making, the participatory budget is truly bottom-up and socially 
empowering. Priorities are established by grassroots participants which are 
enacted by elected delegates from the local areas who are recallable by the 
public (Baiocchi, 2005; Baierle, 2010). To improve budget literacy and to gain 
a greater understanding of collective decision-making processes, training is 
provided for citizens to develop the necessary skills and competencies 
(Latendresse, 2005). 
 
Three basic principles underpin the participatory budget; grassroots 
democracy, social justice and citizen control (Sintomer et al., 2008). The 
initial grassroots assemblies include as many local citizens as possible, with 
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‘one person, one vote’ decision-making. The allocation of funds is based on 
social justice: district level distribution of funds must ‘ensure that districts 
with deficient infrastructure receive more funds than areas with a high 
quality of life’, which promotes equality and redistribution (Sintomer et al., 
2008, p.167). Citizen control supports grassroots democracy by ensuring that 
delegated representatives can effectively ‘co-plan’ the budget with the 
political administration (Sintomer et al., 2008, p.167).  
 
The aim for relationships of equality between people (otherwise vastly 
unequal in social and economic terms) did allow the poor, working class, and 
women, to use the participatory budget more effectively, and it enabled 
around one fifth of the city’s 1.3 million population to participate at least 
once (Baierle, 2010). Baierle (2010, p.54) describes this process: 
 
[t]he singularity of the [participatory budget] lay in the opening of a 
space for direct participation with deliberative power, that is, on the 
principle of the ‘individual as a subject of citizenship’… the decision 
had been made that societal demands should emerge through 
participants themselves rather than [collective bargaining]… that is, 
[by] direct participation. 
 
A central benefit of the participatory budget has been the inclusion of the 
‘unorganised’ members of the population in decision-making (Baiocchi, 2004). 
As Abers (1998, p.530) puts it ‘the processes of civic organising… have been 
particularly intense for social groups that have been historically 
disempowered in Brazil: poor and working-class people living in an urban 
periphery grossly lacking in basic services and infrastructure’. This has 
increased investment in public resources in poorer areas, especially in the 
main priorities of housing, paving, sanitation and education (Baierle, 2005). 
Although the very poorest, living a largely transient existence in favelas 
remain excluded (Smith, 2009). Tangible changes to local communities also 
built support for the participatory budget – and the governing Workers’ Party - 
amongst the working class. The middle class broadly supported the 
participatory budget in this period due to the openness and accountability of 
the process in rejecting long-running problems in local Brazilian politics: 
clientelism, corruption, and misuse of government funds. The process also 
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significantly increased participation in neighbourhood associations from 
citizens outside of the Workers’ Party, improving the strength of civil society 
in the city (Abers, 1998). 
 
Abers (1998, p.528) highlights how sustained participation in the participatory 
budget over time contributed to citizens questioning and challenging their 
views: 
 
people not only began to feel solidarity for others but also began to see 
their interests more broadly. Many of the people who began to 
participate for the sake of their street were, a year or two later, 
champions of ‘districtwide’ issues, defending projects that would 
promote the economic revitalisation of the southern part of the city or 
protect ecological reserves in the rural area of the municipality. 
 
This had particular salience where ‘[p]articipants from better-off areas began 
to recognise that some neighbourhoods had far greater needs and began to 
give preference to them’ (Abers, 1998, p.528). This redistributive effect 
allowed the participatory budget to improve basic services such as water, 
public transport, waste collection, schooling, and housing for the poorest 
areas (Baierle, 2010).   
 
However, in 2004, a neo-liberal administration was elected and changed the 
emphasis towards capitalist development by highlighting the ‘exclusion’ of 
private companies, foundations, universities, churches and state agencies 
from the participatory budget, rather than continue the social justice aims of 
empowering the poor (Chavez, 2008; Baierle, 2010). For Baierle (2010) the 
current status of the participatory budget, where the aim of the local 
administration is to regenerate the city for profit, rather than for the 
priorities of citizens means that ‘[a] dual-society is on the horizon: the super-
rich connected people and the slow mass of poor people. In this scenario, [the 
participatory budget] becomes a welfare sub-sphere’. This indicates that even 
the participatory budget was not immune to capture by anti-democratic neo-
liberal impulses (Chapter 5). 
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Part of the change in the participatory budget in Porto Alegre was driven by 
the adoption and adaptation of it across the world, especially under the 
auspices of the World Bank (Shah, 2007). Hundreds of cities across every 
continent now have some form of PB (Goldfrank, 2012; Sintomer et al., 2013). 
The World Bank contains some advocates of the democratising potential of 
PB, but this view is a minority within the organisation (Goldfrank, 2012). 
Instead, the dominant trend within the Bank is to use the language of 
‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ to further a hegemonic neo-liberal 
marketisation agenda (Cammack, 2004). The World Bank interpretation of PB 
has been criticised as a ‘trimmed-down’ variant (or ‘PB-lite’, Chavez, 2008), 
which has helped to shift blame for problems away from international 
organisations and onto national governments, particularly in Africa (Lerner, 
2011). Echoing the consultative emphasis of some PB models, Pateman (2012, 
p.14) describes the World Bank as using PB to describe ‘a variety of measures 
in developing countries to allow for citizens or NGOs to send signals to 
government, to provide feedback, to be consulted or to monitor government 
performance’. These uses of PB reduce its democratising and empowering 
potential. 
 
Baierle (2010, pp.51-52) is critical of the World Bank uses of PB as a ‘tool for 
good governance’ which allows governments to improve transparency and 
accountability while retaining a neo-liberal orientation, and asserts the value 
of PB as ‘a proposed social contract built from the bottom up, aiming to 
invert the priorities of the municipal budget through direct citizen 
participation (above all from the poor and working class) and based on the 
criteria of social justice’. Pateman (2012) echoes this view by warning of the 
dangers of PB being used to legitimate neo-liberal capitalism, rather than 
‘democratising democracy’. These views highlight a crucial debate over 
whether PB can be used as a ‘radical innovation’ to redistribute power, or as 
a ‘technical fix’ to shore up existing power relationships (Blakey, 2007).   
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PB in the UK 
 
There have been over 200 PB events in the UK (Lerner, 2011), and while some 
of these have involved housing associations, children’s trusts, schools, 
highways, and youth services, the majority have been for small amounts of 
money as part of local government grants-making for community and 
voluntary organisations (Hall, 2010), though not all have been democratic 
(Hall & Röcke, 2013). This fits the ‘community funds at the local and city 
level’ model highlighted by Sintomer et al. (2008). This model usually involves 
small discretionary funds for community groups, often relatively independent 
of the municipal budget, which are allocated by vote by citizens and members 
of community groups, although business interests are usually excluded from 
the process (Sintomer et al., 2008). While concerning small amounts of 
money, this model does contain some potential for the redistribution of funds 
through direct citizen participation and decision-making power. The political 
aspect of citizen control over municipal budgets is much less present, 
suggesting that the principles of grassroots democracy, social justice and 
citizen control may be less likely to develop from this model (Sintomer et al., 
2008). 
 
This has prompted criticisms that PB in the UK is tokenistic whereby relatively 
minor amounts of public spending are opened up to citizens without allowing 
scope for the transformative possibilities (Lerner, 2011). The Porto Alegre 
model was developed in a vastly different political culture and socio-
economic circumstances and the desire and demand for participation could 
well be more likely to take root in the context of a denial of democratic rights 
and significant levels of absolute poverty. Although, the current 
disillusionment with British politics (Hay, 2007) could also provide the 
conditions for civil society demands for participatory democracy, for example, 
in the Occupy, UK Uncut, and other progressive social movements.  
 
PB in Porto Alegre was driven by grassroots movements, trade unions and the 
left-wing Workers’ Party at a municipal city-level, with the context of the 
relative autonomy of local government in the Brazilian political system 
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(Smith, 2009). On the other hand, in the UK, PB has been driven by 
campaigning NGOs such as PB Unit and by National Government level strategy 
proposals under the previous New Labour administration (DCLG, 2008b). This 
top-down emphasis on training courses and consultancy in support of PB 
processes as ‘tools’ for good governance suggests that the uses of PB in the UK 
tend more towards the World Bank variant than the ideal Porto Alegre model. 
Blakey (2007, p.12) doubts the social justice aims of this approach as ‘[t]he 
general culture of participation in the UK facilitates this ‘technological’ 
means-to-an-end, non-political presentation of PB... the new participatory 
space is increasingly a depoliticised space, which ‘privatises’ overtly political 
voices’.  
 
This case study accepts that the uses of PB in the UK entail the broader risks 
of a PB-lite that does not effectively empower citizens, but in practice shifts 
responsibility – but not power – away from the state and onto individuals and 
communities as part of the second wave of neo-liberal welfare state 
retrenchment, especially under the ‘big society’ agenda (Corbett & Walker, 
2012, 2013; Kisby, 2010). This makes for a very different context to that of 
Porto Alegre in the late 1980s. As Sintomer et al. (2008, p.176) point out 
 
[p]articipatory budgeting can be a powerful process for achieving more 
democracy, social justice and transparent administration... [i]ts 
‘success’ partly depends on the political and financial autonomy of 
local governments but it cannot, in the long run, be imposed only in a 
top-down manner, without any ‘countervailing power’ [in civil society].  
 
As described by Smith (2009) in Chapter 4, the success of the participatory 
budget in Porto Alegre derived from both grassroots democracy and 
centralised co-ordination, or as Fung and Wright (2003) posit, through 
‘accountable autonomy’. Thus, this case study of a participatory grants-
making process describes a qualitatively different experience of local 
democracy that has some genuinely participatory aspects and possibilities for 
social empowerment. It is suggested that this PB process could be significantly 
deepened and developed in order to facilitate greater social empowerment. 
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‘You Choose’ 
 
This section describes how You Choose has developed, how it is funded, what 
happens in the voting events, the way in which citizens are involved in You 
Choose, and the changing relationships between local government and 
citizens.  
 
About Tameside 
  
Tameside is a metropolitan borough in the North West of England. It has a 
population of around 215,000 and historically, industry was based on 
manufacturing, especially textiles and engineering, food industries and 
computer products, while the service industries are now the largest 
employment sector in the borough (CCCP, 2009). Tameside Metropolitan 
Borough Council has been controlled by the Labour Party since 1968. In the 
local elections of May 2012, a total of 52 Labour Councillors were elected and 
five Conservative Councillors. One of Tameside Council’s functions is to 
provide a local strategic partnership which involves 
 
[a] diverse set of partners from the public, private, voluntary and 
community sectors to agree key aims, objectives and priorities for… 
community-wide economic, social and environmental issues… [and] 
includes a number of local organisations such as the council, police, 
health service, Tameside College and Greater Manchester Probation 
Trust, community organisation and key private sector stakeholders to 
improve the quality of life in [the] borough (TSP, no date). 
 
The sustainable community strategy is ‘driven by the vision of reducing 
inequalities across the borough and improving quality of life by delivering 
agreed aims and priorities’ (TSP, 2009b, p.8).  This is part of the guiding 
framework for making You Choose accountable, as applicants must show that 
they are meeting at least one of these priorities (Table 7.1 below). The voting 
process requires citizens to judge the extent to which they think the groups 
will contribute to their stated priority.  
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Disillusionment and British Politics 
 
It is necessary to acknowledge that You Choose exists in the British context of 
disillusionment with politics, as discussed in Chapter 1. This was apparent at 
the local level as a number of interviewees expressed disillusionment about 
the ‘politics of the borough’, especially given the long running control of 
Tameside Council by the Labour Party with little effective opposition.  
 
Cynicism about local and national politics was apparent in many comments 
made by citizens in this research. Susan, a youth club organiser, was cynical 
even in the case of You Choose, when discussing a town twinning project that 
was put forward for the public vote: ‘I felt that was one Councillors might find 
particularly attractive ‘cause I think there’s a lot of scope for Councillors to 
have nice trips and days out!’ Other participants guardedly saw You Choose as 
an antidote to a cynical political culture. Harry, a member of a religious 
group, cited the problem of ‘disconnect and the sense of inertia and lethargy 
in the system and… ‘we’ve always done it like this, we know best’ 
paternalistic attitudes’ of local government in general. He pointed out that 
there is a perception held by some that Tameside Council doesn’t genuinely 
act on the views of the public. Even in the case of public consultations, there 
is a sense of decisions already made: ‘the problem is that actually that 
disempowers, it feeds into this cynical view of ‘they’ll do what they like 
anyway’’. 
 
Attempts at creating more citizen engagement and empowerment have been 
a long running concern of local government in the UK, with mixed-levels of 
success (Wilson & Game, 2011). The TSP’s (2009a, p.7) Engagement Strategy, 
Empowering Tameside, emphasises ‘communities, Councillors and partners’ 
working together to ‘improve well-being, guided by local priorities and a 
shared sense of what matters’. This document posits that in 2009, 38% of 
residents responding to an opinion survey agreed that they can influence local 
decisions, especially through surveys, voting in local elections, and contacting 
the council directly (TSP, 2009a). Since 2009, Tameside Council has developed 
213 
 
You Choose as a form of participatory grants-making that is more democratic 
than previous attempts at citizen engagement. 
 
The Development of You Choose 
 
You Choose funds local voluntary and community groups which provide sports 
clubs, youth centres, residents’ associations, allotments associations, pre-
school clubs and other community-based projects. You Choose is run by 
Tameside Council officers in partnership with Tameside 3rd Sector Coalition 
(T3SC), a council for voluntary service that supports and advises community, 
voluntary and faith sector groups in the area. While Tameside Council co-
ordinate the application process, T3SC offer support and advice to applicants, 
and both organisations run the events.  
 
The process originated in a 2010 PB pilot called Up2U which was run by the 
local police and funded by the Home Office (PB Unit, 2009). With the 
endorsement of the Leader of the Council, You Choose was implemented 
across the borough the next year with one event in each of the eight District 
Assemblies in Tameside; Ashton-under-Lyne, Denton & Audenshaw, Droylsden, 
Dukinfield, Hyde, Longdendale & Hattersley, Mossley, and Stalybridge. This 
ensures that local community and voluntary groups in each District Assembly 
are able to access their own pot of money. You Choose funds are for not-for-
profit activities, rather than private companies. 
 
You Choose replaced several small grants funds and discretionary funds that 
Councillors could personally allocate, such as the Community Chest, which 
allocated money via a closed-panel system. This new process aimed to ‘create 
a single point of access for groups trying to secure funding, cutting down the 
number of available avenues and associated administrative burdens [and] in 
the current climate of shrinking public sector resources... an improved and 
co-ordinated and strategic approach to ensure best value and keep track of 
public money’ (Tameside Council, 2011). The pooling of community funding 
money into one stream has also coincided with a significant reduction in the 
funding available from Tameside Council, which is likely to be under further 
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strain as the cuts to local government continue under the national governing 
coalition (Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011). For example, total You Choose 
funding in 2011 of £500,000 replaced the £1m allocated to Community Chest 
and other smaller budgets in 2010 (in 2012 this was reduced further to 
£440,000). Groups were given a maximum of £2,000-£2,500 to apply for in 
2012, compared with £5,000 through Community Chest in 2010. Even retaining 
a commitment to You Choose is difficult, as a Councillor stated: 
 
for a council to be losing hundred and ten million pound and yet still be 
giving money to these community groups - the view we have is if we 
didn’t they would collapse, and... we would be picking up the bill 
somewhere else, we do everything we can to make sure the work 
continues which is going to be difficult [in view of future cuts]. 
 
It could also be argued that You Choose could create a more positive public 
perception of Councillors and Tameside Council, who are themselves acting 
under the constraints of reduced funding streams from national government. 
Positive reactions, especially from those active in the community, could also 
deflect criticism of reduced community group funds. A Councillor highlighted 
this theme when reflecting on the You Choose vote: 
 
they’re not saying ‘[the Councillors] didn’t give us any You Choose 
money’... what they are saying is ‘no, we didn’t get any money; the 
panel, the room, didn’t give us any money’, and the ones that are 
getting the money think that we’ve done it! 
 
The proposal for You Choose received an initial scepticism on the part of some 
Councillors regarding whether a PB process can be flexible enough with 
limited money, whether the money is spread as widely as possible, and 
concerns that some smaller groups may not have enough resources or 
capabilities to take part. It is suggested that a large majority of the 
Councillors have been convinced of the merits of You Choose through 
experiencing it, as a member of T3SC highlighted ‘at least a minority that 
have been very upset about [You Choose]. We did win over quite a lot of 
those people, including real turnarounds from people who were utterly 
opposed at first’. 
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‘You Recycle, You Choose’ 
 
You Choose is funded by the savings made by Tameside Council’s recycling 
programme. The funds come from the reduction in landfill tax paid by 
Tameside Council, and this creates a tangible link between the actions of 
citizens in recycling household waste, and money granted for local projects. 
This is the result of a political decision by Tameside Council not to count the 
reduction in landfill tax paid as a saving, but to commit the difference to You 
Choose: in the words of a Councillor; ‘without the recycling money, You 
Choose doesn’t exist’.  
 
The link between citizen action in recycling and participation in You Choose is 
part of Tameside Council’s advertising campaign, based around the slogan 
‘you recycle, you choose’. The sense of ownership of the money through 
having participated in recycling was emphasised by Lynsey, a residents’ group 
member: ‘it’s our money... If we have earned the money then we should be 
able to say where it’s going’. 
 
This sense of direct involvement suggests that, for example, a tangible link 
between paying council tax and participation in decisions over the services 
provided as a result could be part of a wider project of democratic 
participation and citizen ownership of public services. However, the anti-
social solidarity aspect of liberal individualism must also be considered. Harry 
suggested that You Choose participants ‘‘get it’, but… if you went and 
knocked on a dozen doors most people wouldn’t have a clue what it was... 
some would argue ‘I would rather have the money off my council tax bill, 
thank you, rather than giving it to these community groups’’. 
 
Assessment Panels 
 
Following the call for applications a panel consisting of mainly Councillors, 
and some members of the public, meet to assess the suitability of the 
proposals based on local knowledge and technical criteria. A number of 
proposals will typically be turned down at this stage. For example, the 
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Ashton-under-Lyne event had 35 presentations from an original application list 
of 55 groups/projects.  
 
This is described by one Councillor as a necessary non-public and technical 
aspect of You Choose: 
 
I don’t know how we could make it more open; it really would get very 
bureaucratic… the panel are not shortlisting people because they don’t 
like them… we didn’t shortlist somebody because they had £500,000 in 
the bank!... so it all has to be filtered… basically [the public have] got 
to trust that we are going to be fair and honest. 
 
A Council Officer explains the purpose of the assessment panel: ‘we are not 
trying to take some of the responsibility away from the community, we want 
the community to be the one to decide which groups, but we’re making sure 
that the ones that they vote on… fit the criteria’. However, this is viewed 
differently by a number of You Choose participants, again reflecting cynical 
views of local government, and also stemming from a lack of publicly 
available information about the purpose of the assessment panel. Sally, a 
member of an environmental group, made this point: 
 
It’s a bit cloak and dagger when you look at it from the outside. Maybe 
if they said ‘well it’s because of checking out the legalities’ people 
would think ‘that’s great, they are actually doing some homework on 
these people before they even get to this stage’, but… it comes across 
as ‘you put your application in and we’ll think whether its worthy or 
not to get on the list’. 
 
The Events 
 
You Choose votes run on Saturdays in a community centre in each District 
Assembly. They usually last 3-4 hours and involve two presenting and voting 
sessions in which completed voting forms are collected after every five 
presentations, and after a short break the successful applicants are 
announced. Each group has three minutes to present their project and explain 
how they will use the money to the participants. Following each presentation 
voters must rank the extent to which the group’s project answers four 
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questions on a five-point Likert scale and give a total mark to the group 
before moving onto the next presentation. The four questions are: 
 
1. Do you think this proposal will benefit the [District Assembly] area or 
the people living there? 
2. Will this proposal help to achieve the Tameside Priority detailed in the 
box on the left? (Different for each group) 
3. Do you think that the group can deliver on their proposal? 
4. Do you think this proposal is a good use of public money? 
 
Table 7.1 shows how the six Tameside sustainable community strategy 
priorities are presented in the voting packs. This framework is intended to 
link You Choose to the TSP’s aims to improve quality of life in the borough 
(discussed above). 
 
Table 7.1 Tameside’s Sustainable Community Strategy Priorities 
Theme Tameside Priorities 
Supportive Tameside Support communities to work together 
Help people to live independently 
Prosperous Tameside Improve the economy of the area 
Help residents gain new skills or find 
employment 
Learning Tameside Help children and young people to do 
well at school 
Help children and young families to 
have a better life 
Attractive Tameside Improve the way the borough looks 
Promote environmental projects 
Safe Tameside Reduce burglary, vehicle crime and 
robbery, and the harm caused by 
drugs and alcohol 
Reduce violent crime 
Improve residents’ feelings of safety 
Reduce offending 
Healthy Tameside Support residents to be healthy and 
live healthier lives 
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If the vote is taken seriously by participants (all interviewees indicated that 
they did), this process requires some critical reflection on the part of the 
voters in making decisions about the value of each project for their local 
community, rather than just picking their favourite groups. Crucially, 
participants must attend for the duration of the vote and must also vote for 
every group, meaning they are required to consider the merits and demerits 
of each presentation. These aspects of the vote are discussed further in the 
following section on participatory democracy.   
 
In 2012, 189 groups received funding, while 985 residents attended, with 810 
voting. For this case study the four events listed in Table 7.2 were observed 
(two larger District Assemblies and two smaller District Assemblies). Table 7.2 
shows that between two and four groups were unsuccessful in each event and 
the most common groups that were funded were sports groups (23 across the 
four events), music groups (8), scouts/cubs (7), and residents’ associations 
(7). The maximum funds available of £2,000 and £2,500 were determined by 
Tameside Council according to size of the District Assembly and relative 
deprivation in the area. 
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Table 7.2 You Choose Events Observed 
 You Choose event 
Ashton-under-
Lyne 
Denton & 
Audenshaw 
 
Dukinfield 
 
Stalybridge 
 
Total 
funds/money 
per application 
 
£70,000/ 
£2,500 
 
£70,000/ 
£2,500 
 
£30,000/ 
£2,000 
 
£30,000/ 
£2,000 
 
No. of groups 
presented/ 
funded 
 
33/29 
 
32/29 
 
18/16 
 
25/23 
 
Community 
and voluntary 
groups funded 
 
Community 1 
Credit Union 1 
Environmental 1 
Gardens 3 
Health & fitness 
4 
Music 2 
Parks 3 
Religious 1 
Residents 3 
Scouts 2 
Social 2 
Sports 5 
Youth 1 
 
Allotments 1 
Carnival 1 
Community 3 
Debt advice 1 
Food bank 1 
Music 2 
Newspaper 1 
Parks 1 
Pre-
school/school
3 
Residents 1 
Scouts 2 
Sports 8 
Twinning 1 
Walking 1 
Youth 2 
 
Allotments 1 
Community 1 
Health 2 
Music 1 
Parks 1 
Pre-school 1 
Religious 2 
Residents 2 
Sports 4 
Twinning 1 
 
Business 
Forum 1 
Carnival 1 
Music 3 
Recycling 1 
Religious 4 
Residents 1 
School 1 
Scouts/cubs 3 
Sports 6 
Veterans 1 
Walking 1 
 
 
Est. number of 
attendees (not 
all voted) 
 
150 
 
140 
 
90 
 
100 
 
Table 7.3 shows the age ranges of participants at the events observed who 
responded to a T3SC feedback survey. This shows that the most common age 
range among respondents was 40 – 64 for all events apart from Dukinfield, 
which had a larger 65+ cohort.  
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Table 7.3 Age Ranges of Participants Responding to T3SC Feedback Survey 
Age ranges You Choose event 
Ashton-
under-Lyne 
Denton & 
Audenshaw 
Dukinfield Stalybridge 
13 – 19 10 (9.5%) 6 (5%) 0 4 (7.4%) 
20 – 39 7 (6.7%) 25 (22.1%) 3 (6.2%) 6 (11.1%) 
40 – 64 45 (42.9%) 49 (43.4%) 19 (39.6%) 24 (44.4%) 
65 < 43 (40.9%) 33 (29.2%) 26 (54.2%) 20 (37%) 
 
Table 7.4 shows the gender distribution of the four events. While Stalybridge 
shows an even split, the majority of participants at Dukinfield, and Denton & 
Audenshaw were female, while the reverse was the case at Ashton-under-
Lyne. 
 
Table 7.4 Gender of Participants Responding to T3SC Feedback Survey 
Gender You Choose event 
Ashton-
under-Lyne 
Denton & 
Audenshaw 
Dukinfield Stalybridge 
Female 41 (41.4%) 66 (60%) 29 (60.4%) 28 (50.9%) 
Male 58 (58.6%) 44 (40%) 19 (39.6%) 27 (49.1%) 
 
The vast majority of participants identified as White British, with only Ashton-
under-Lyne having a significant BME population attending, where 46% of the 
participants were Asian or Asian British. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Each group must use the funds within twelve months for the purpose that they 
applied. This is monitored by the council, and indications are that this is 
largely successful. There was one case of money being returned that wasn’t 
spent and only three out of over 150 funded groups in 2011 are under 
investigation for using the money inappropriately. However, beyond ensuring 
that the groups spend money on what they say they will there are no 
indications that Tameside Council has any guiding framework in place to 
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measure the outcomes of You Choose funding for quality of life in the local 
area. This is especially pertinent given the council’s commitment to improving 
quality of life in the community strategy (TSP, 2009b). A Councillor 
highlighted this point: ‘[i]f we’re addressing things like healthy eating [by 
funding healthy eating groups in You Choose], the impact on that is not going 
to be known by us, we won’t be able to find out what the impact of it is’. This 
suggests that social quality indicators could be used to measure outcomes. 
 
Citizen Involvement in You Choose 
 
You Choose participants must provide their postcode to vote in the event 
appropriate to their address. To ensure that well-resourced and large groups 
aren’t able to dominate the voting process, only five members of each group 
are allowed to attend and vote, along with the group’s presenter. Questions 
have been raised by citizens about the ability to police this and the effect of 
large groups on the vote, or whether the issue needs to be policed at all 
provided that all group members are also local residents. Analysis of voting 
patterns by T3SC suggests that there is no evidence of larger groups 
attempting to rig the vote. This is also supported by the requirement that 
participants vote seriously for all groups (where one or two projects are given 
full marks and all the others low marks the voting form is invalidated by 
council officers).   
 
For the groups that participated, getting money was their primary aim, as 
Tom, a member of a youth centre, put it; ‘[i]t was more about getting the 
money, that’s what everybody was more interested in’. Of the sixteen people 
interviewed for this research, only one of them was participating as a voter 
with no vested interest in a group. It is unlikely that many of the participants 
didn’t have a vested interest in a group. A Council Officer was sceptical about 
the participatory democratic aspirations of You Choose and raised the point of 
the very small number of citizens taking part without a vested interest in a 
group (‘probably… less than a dozen’) out of district populations in the tens of 
thousands. It was suggested that Councillors, elected by the wider population, 
have a more legitimate democratic mandate to make decisions. 
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As the voting process requires participants to consider the merits of the other 
groups, rather than just voting for their preferred group, vested interests are 
largely negated. There is also the possibility of reaching more ‘ordinary’ 
citizens in future as many that participated said they would do so again, even 
if they weren’t supporting a particular group.  
 
Relationships between Councillors and Citizens in You Choose 
 
The role of the Councillors has changed from having the discretion to provide 
funds to one of using their local expertise in managing the selection of groups 
for You Choose, and appearing at the votes in a ‘public leadership’ role at the 
front of the hall. Along with its more limited size and scope, this 
differentiates You Choose from the Porto Alegre model, as power is not 
decentralised and citizens cannot shape the event at the grassroots level. 
However, responsibility for decision-making and some empowerment is 
transferred to citizens by virtue of the public vote. One Councillor stated 
that, prior to You Choose 
 
there was an ‘us and them’ type thing, and [the public] didn’t even see 
you when you were doing the Community Chest… whereas here with 
You Choose its open and everyone can see who is there, they all know 
who you are, they can approach you if they want… you’re not sat in 
some little office discussing who is going to get the money. 
 
Another Councillor asserted that this change requires significant use of the 
Councillors’ local knowledge: ‘Councillor[s] will have more knowledge than 
anybody about those groups about the needs in that area’. This suggests that 
Councillors retain a leadership role by virtue of their expertise and position as 
elected representatives. Harry was encouraged by the more open 
relationships between Councillors and citizens that are forged by You Choose: 
 
it’s quite good for the community to see the Councillors listening to 
what the community are doing... and for Councillors to hear that and 
have a face to face in a sense with a group, and maybe just to note 
there’s that group doing that over there, I think that’s all good 
information for them that they wouldn’t get otherwise. 
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The appeal of opening up decision-making to citizen involvement is also an 
example of how the public can gain a greater understanding of the ‘finite pots 
of money’ available to Tameside Council, although some citizens were critical 
about whether the money is arbitrarily allocated to You Choose. This 
statement from one Councillor highlighted the difficulties of managing 
reduced funding streams and public perceptions as a democratic 
representative: 
 
the more authority you have [in the local context] the less likely you 
are to be able to achieve what you want to be able to achieve because 
you’re restricted. Community itself is not restricted; they might have a 
moan, they might have a separate issue - the closing of a library… that 
decision is made by one tier of government because the other tier of 
government has refused its money… we tend to be more pragmatic as 
Councillors... the cake is only so big; do I put the money into adult 
care, childcare, education or do I put it into planting a few flowers?  
 
Without a renewal of trust in elected politicians in general and a deeper level 
of public engagement and scrutiny of local decision-making through more 
extensive PB, these problems are likely to continue. In addition, the public 
arena of You Choose leads some to question even more the role of 
Councillors, as Clive put it: 
 
there were four or five Councillors actually at that event, out of a 
possible twelve… This is the most important thing that will happen in 
Denton, as far as the people are concerned, for twelve months. If the 
Councillors are not there… what message does that bring to the people 
that were there? 
 
While You Choose has gone beyond other pilots in the UK to develop a 
coherent program of participatory grants-making, it has developed as a 
narrow and slimmed-down version of PB similar to that espoused by the World 
Bank. You Choose may be suitable for Tameside Council’s aim to fund local 
groups, but for the purpose of this case study, it shows important, but 
limited, aspects of participatory democracy and social empowerment. As Clive 
suggested: ‘getting onto the serious business of how you actually do budgeting 
at the Tameside-wide level... it’s a million miles away from that’. Although 
some saw You Choose as taking power away from Councillors, the agency and 
autonomy of Councillors in their previously more discretionary role is 
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restricted by the need to form a panel to assess local groups. Whether the 
power to decide is effectively translated into a meaningful democratic 
process involving citizens is perhaps overstated, as only two or three groups 
lose out in the You Choose vote. This means that the list of groups funded is 
broadly that decided by Councillors and the assessment panel. 
 
Questions could be raised over whether it is worth the considerable time and 
effort to organise You Choose events for relatively small amounts of money 
beyond being a positive public event for the council, or even an attempt to 
engage with the ‘big society’ agenda, by shifting responsibility for funding 
onto the public. However, as the following discussion attests, participants 
generally viewed You Choose in positive terms, which could create more 
engaged and critical attitudes to politics as it does allow the public some 
opportunity to participate in decision-making. 
 
Participatory Democracy 
 
This section discusses how You Choose is perceived to be more transparent 
than previous grants-making, and based on trust between participants. It then 
discusses the democratic vote and critical engagement in decision-making 
that this encourages, before highlighting equality and inequality, inclusion 
and exclusion. Lastly, the limits of You Choose and the circumstances in which 
a more participatory democratic culture may emerge are discussed. 
 
Transparency and Trust  
 
You Choose was considered a positive experience by the vast majority of 
interviewees. Some concerns were raised over the extent to which it is 
genuinely democratic, especially regarding Council control of the application 
process. Although, almost all agreed that You Choose is good for local 
democracy, especially in terms of transparency and trust. Nigel highlighted 
how this compares with his previous experience of District Assemblies: 
 
it’s… even more democratic than the District Assembly because I do 
have some reservations about democracy on that - it tends to be rather 
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cut and dried, it’s not really a true public vote; when [there is] a vote 
there, it’s voted by the Councillors, but whereas this was significantly 
different than anything I have been to; to have a purely public vote. 
 
Rebecca argued that having a public vote avoids ‘closed door’ decision-
making. Although he accepts that discretionary funding in the past also served 
good causes, Harry posits that with You Choose; ‘you have criteria you are 
being measured against, you have the public involved in voting, it’s actually 
all out there in the open... [this] gives some authenticity to what you’re 
doing... and if [your presentation] doesn’t stand up to that scrutiny then fair 
enough’. This theme was picked up by one Councillor, who argued that a 
democratic public vote has the effect of being more transparent and reliant 
on a wider range of local knowledge beyond that of the Councillors: ‘if the 
Councillors themselves choose you’re always going to leave out someone you 
weren’t aware of, and it causes a little bit of consternation [for] groups that 
have been overlooked’. 
 
Rebecca saw an additional benefit as You Choose money ‘gets into services 
directly, there’s no messing about, it doesn’t get diluted, it doesn’t get 
rationed off, part of it isn’t for administration... it goes to where it’s going to 
go’. Despite this, Clive questioned whether more citizen involvement in 
setting the terms of the vote would further increase transparency: ‘there was 
an amount of money, now I don’t know how that amount was determined... 
that’s not transparent... and how each of the various districts got this 
particular amount of money, and I think some involvement could’ve been got 
from the community to see how this money is actually distributed’. 
 
Susan argued that trust in citizens to consider the public good is also 
important; ‘I had a lot of faith in the credibility and integrity of those people; 
that they would actually choose what they thought would be valuable to the 
community... I do like the feeling that it’s almost the village taking the 
decisions and not the government’. Transparency and trust have been 
identified as aspects of democracy in You Choose. The next section considers 
how citizens participate in the PB process. 
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Participation, Voting and Critical Engagement  
 
You Choose is formally open and equal for anyone from the local area to 
attend and participate in the vote. Public participation in democratic scrutiny 
of groups was important to David, a member of the public that attended just 
to vote, as groups ‘want the money for damn good reasons... the more they 
can get across to us the reasons the better, so I still believe that one vote, 
one person is the right way of going’. Likewise, Susan saw You Choose as a 
more participatory process that can bring out the best in people, stating that 
the usual way in which local government does decision-making is ‘almost like 
saying ‘you’re not qualified to make these decisions’, once you say ‘yes, you 
are, and we want to know’, I do think people rise to it’. Although, Sally 
questioned the necessity of public participation in a democratic vote on the 
grounds of desert, stating that ‘if you’ve got a good viable organisation that’s 
genuinely working for the community then it should get the funding regardless 
of whether they can turn six people out [at You Choose] and keep them there 
for half a day’. 
 
Acknowledging the limitations of citizen power expressed in the previous 
section, participation in You Choose is a qualitatively different kind of 
democratic experience to liberal representative politics. This creates 
opportunities for citizens to reflectively and critically engage with local 
groups, especially through the voting process. All of the interviewees in this 
case study reported that they approached the vote critically and reflectively. 
Josie, a member of a community news group posited that she ‘did feel 
responsible... all of [the groups] were worthy, but I felt like others were more 
worthwhile so yeah, you do feel responsible’. The use of local knowledge was 
important for Tom: ‘if you’re sat there and you see something that would be 
absolutely no good for this area at all, you get to then decide and say ‘well no 
it’s not good, it’s not for this area, whereas that, I agree with that, that 
would be ideal here’’. 
 
The majority of interviewees cited whether the money was going to the local 
area and whether it was for activities that could involve the wider public, 
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rather than a small ‘niche’ group, as key factors in allocating their vote. This 
reflects two of the voting form questions that asked whether the project will 
benefit the local area and whether it is a good use of public money. As David 
pointed out ‘my first priority was it had to be in Dukinfield, my second 
priority; it had to help the wider community rather than just a little circle of 
people... I tried to be objective and think ‘let me listen to the ones I don’t 
know about and see if they can convince me’’. Similarly, for Nigel it ‘was 
about benefit to the community… I was thinking in terms of how many people 
are going to be affected’.  
 
A strong sense of local identity was apparent, especially at the Dukinfield 
event, which also had a generally older audience (Table 7.3 above). Lynsey 
emphasised local knowledge; ‘we found we were talking about this estate. 
The residents of Dukinfield know about Central estate, and I knew about the 
other clubs that were bidding for money’. The perceived publicness of 
projects also influenced Karen in making her voting choices: 
 
I was interested the medical practice that wanted the garden... it 
happens to be the medical practice that I go to and I thought ‘that’s 
interesting because I have never seen that door open and I don’t see 
how the public could come in unless they belong to the practice’, so I 
was a little bit cynical really... I gave it a three. 
 
Regarding this group, Lynsey stated that the garden ‘wasn’t for the wider 
people of Dukinfield… it wasn’t going to benefit me or my neighbours at all’. 
This suggests that a strong sense of local identity, local knowledge and 
perceptions of public use guided voting choices. However, this could also lead 
to parochial attitudes, as one Council Officer pointed out, at the Dukinfield 
event two groups ‘played it wrong because they didn’t say ‘we are in 
Dukinfield!’... it seemed to be not coincidental that those are the two that 
didn’t get voted for’. 
 
For Josie, a further consideration was the interests of future generations; 
‘[the] tots group and lots of children’s activities… [I] voted quite high on them 
things… being pregnant and thinking of the future and wanting all of these 
things to remain in the community; that probably did influence my vote… 
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‘cause I’m thinking it will be great if my child when it grows up, it’s got this 
and it’s got that... I wouldn’t have thought about that a year ago so that has 
swayed my decision’. 
 
This form of reflective voting also allowed Rebecca to engage critically and 
question her pre-conceptions, in the case of a church group that provided a 
debt service: 
 
I have an understanding about churches being a bit judgemental… [but] 
then it got me thinking well hold on a minute that’s my judgement. If 
that community has links to people that are in poverty then surely, any 
hand of help, any way of getting help is a good thing, so I changed my 
opinion; had to challenge myself really, and my own judgements. 
 
Despite this evidence of critical engagement, Clive questioned whether there 
is sufficient knowledge about Tameside Council’s strategic aims for the 
community; 
 
if you didn’t know what the community strategy was it was... that’s 
where it became a little bit difficult... I’m not sure if the summary was 
actually good enough really, accurate enough, with regard to the 
community strategy… ‘cause actually... how many people are 
particularly interested in the community strategy?, because no one is 
involved in it. 
 
Clive’s statement indicates that increased citizen participation in the TSP 
might deepen the democratic nature of the You Choose experience. Whether 
enough citizens would desire such a role is an important issue, but should they 
be able to participate in designing the local community strategy as equal 
partners with the council, then the corresponding level of citizen power and 
control over the You Choose process could increase. This point, along with the 
transitory nature of participating once a year at You Choose, mean that this 
case study has less possibilities for social empowerment in relation to the 
Porto Alegre model, and also less than the case study of Suma in Chapter 6, 
where the structure of non-hierarchical and democratic ownership and control 
translate more directly into day-to-day experience.  
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Equality and Inequality, Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
In You Choose equality can be assessed in three ways: formal equality in the 
vote, the extent of equality of access to the event, and whether there is 
equality between those who participate. Beyond the formal equality of 
participating in the vote issues of inclusion and exclusion feature in relation 
to the size of groups that and the extent to which they can access networks of 
information and support for putting together bids, applying and presenting. 
The relationships between citizens, and between citizens and Councillors, can 
be assessed by the extent to which there is relational equality in the 
democratic setting. 
 
You Choose has a formal democratic equality in one person, one vote, and 
that everyone in the local area can attend. A member of T3SC highlighted the 
central role of equality in the voting process: ‘it is about equality in that it is 
a public event anyone can take part. That’s not how it works in a vast 
majority of other decision-making about local issues, so there is an absolute 
foundational commitment to equality’. Tom supported this view, pointing out 
that at You Choose ‘everybody is entitled to their own vote… regardless of 
their walk of life’. Anita, a member of a religious group, saw the requirement 
that every group must receive a vote as important: ‘everybody [that 
participated had] the power to vote on each other’s [projects]… it is equal, 
it’s across the board, and we were told you have to vote on each one, so you 
couldn’t pick and choose who to vote for’. 
 
On the one hand, the openness of the application process and formal equality 
of citizens to vote means that anyone can take part, but on the other hand, 
there are socio-economic barriers to participation. The capabilities of groups 
to put together bids and of individuals to present their aims to the public are 
issues of unequal access that could be exclusionary. Councillors and Council 
Officers were concerned with access. A Council Officer highlighted how 
‘people who are socially excluded anyway will be excluded from this process, 
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people who are really struggling or the poor, or the elderly lonely’ in favour 
of the more articulate and organised. As one Councillor put it: 
 
I don’t think there’s equal access to all groups, equality... should be 
fundamental to You Choose... the easy to reach people will always be 
there, it’s the harder to reach people that won’t always know, that 
won’t have the opportunity, [for example,] they’re too small to have a 
constitution. 
 
As a great deal of information about You Choose is online, further concerns 
were raised for people that don’t have internet access, meaning that the 
Councillors, along with T3SC, must inform groups in their local area and help 
them to become equipped with the knowledge and organisation to take part. 
Another Councillor: ‘St Peters Ward [is] a deprived area so there are a lot of 
people that might not have access to a computer. It’s better to speak to them 
word of mouth’. Despite these attempts, and the work of T3SC, a Council 
Officer highlights the struggle to get more groups to apply to You Choose as 
unlike in the past, ‘there simply aren’t as many grassroots community 
engaging workers who are out there to help the blokes in the pub who run the 
brass band [and] show them the process’. 
 
This had led one Councillor to be very concerned as to whether over time 
larger groups will come to dominate You Choose: ‘you’ve got to have that 
access to other groups or in my view it just becomes an income stream to 
select groups of community activists’. Accepting that well known groups still 
apply, another Councillor was more optimistic: ‘groups are turning up that we 
didn’t know about... I am seeing more groups who are on the fringe who don’t 
have form fillers... we’ve used T3SC to get them the bank account, and to get 
them a constitution, and I understand that a small community group [might] 
want the money but they haven’t got the expertise to do that, and it’s our 
job to help them through that’. Some groups that get through the application 
process find the requirement of a public presentation to be daunting, as David 
stated regarding presenters; ‘some of them are quite savvy and are good, and 
then you get the other people who have probably never spoken in front of an 
audience before, and found it difficult to get their case across’.   
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The issue over access relates to wider issues about equality, solidarity and 
inclusion which go beyond You Choose’s remit of funding community groups. 
However, given that there are attempts to mitigate for this through increasing 
awareness and offering support through T3SC, barriers to democratic 
participation could in the future be reduced for those that want to take part, 
especially if You Choose grows each year, and PB processes become a bigger 
part of the local political culture. Though there are no indications that this is 
happening.  
 
Equality was also emphasised by Lynsey, regarding the relationship between 
participants and the Councillors, stating that her experience of You Choose 
was: 
 
so nice because you’re talking to your peers, it didn’t feel like you 
were begging for humble pie from the governors, it was from our 
friends and neighbours... I go to the District Assemblies and it’s 
definitely ‘them and us’… but [at You Choose], they are equals; one of 
the Councillors lives up the road and you speak to them on a daily basis 
- he’s no better than me, but in that scenario it felt as if… there was no 
differential. 
 
Susan supported this by describing a sense of equality between the 
participants because ‘we probably could recognise that we were part of a 
similar process’. This is linked to the requirement for equal consideration of 
the groups in the application process, which helped to ferment a more 
solidaristic experience for Rebecca: ‘I can’t speak for the people that judged 
the applications, I’m assuming fairly... we were equal in that sense... that 
also means that everybody is in the same boat and then you’re no longer 
competing against each other, you are kind of together on it... you could 
support one another’. 
 
This point was clear in the four observations of You Choose events for this 
case study: there was a general good natured and enthusiastic spirit at the 
events, and at the end, a sense of having had a positive shared experience 
amongst the vast majority of participants. However, while both Susan and 
Rebecca saw relationships of equality between citizens taking part, they were 
also critical of the leadership role of the Councillors in the event, and their 
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positioning at the front of the hall, facing the public. Susan stated that ‘I felt 
like [the Councillors] were the court, you know the royal court... not at the 
end ‘cause they looked more friendly, maybe they were a bit tense because it 
was decisions... the royal table at the front kind of thing... [it was] like we 
were the peasants {laughs}’. 
 
Similarly, Rebecca posited that 
 
the Councillors were sat behind a desk, which... to me signified 
authority, they were dressed in suits, they were dressed like 
Councillors apart from [one of them], who didn’t sit behind the table, 
he stood at the back and was in his jeans and what have you... they 
have come to the event, which is great, but do they actually agree with 
it?, are they as enthusiastic as the people taking part? 
 
This situation prompted David to suggest that You Choose should avoid making 
such distinctions: ‘they need to get it as far away from the Council as they 
possibly can... what really [the Councillors] should do is come and sit in the 
audience’. 
 
Participatory Democratic Culture 
 
Most interviewees expressed a desire for more citizen participation in 
democratic decision-making. However, many tempered this with doubts about 
whether citizens have the ability to make more complex and technical 
decisions. Susan stated that this form of participatory democracy is something 
she’d like to see develop as part of ‘people’s culture’ in the local area. 
Lynsey agreed: ‘it’s starting off small with this You Choose in your local area, 
but why not borough-wide and then city-wide eventually?’ 
 
Clive argued that the lack of an effective opposition means that local politics 
is failing to be open and innovative. He cited more citizen participation in 
public debate as a possible antidote to this: 
 
we need to know what the issues are, and I think people need to be 
involved in it... who decided the size of the pot?, who decided who got 
what?, who decided the rules for it?, how it should get funded?... the 
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politics of the borough, because the opposition parties are so few, you 
just don’t actually hear from them at all really, so you never get an 
open debate... I think participatory budgeting goes hand in hand with 
something like that. 
 
Rebecca also picked up on this theme: 
 
there does need to be a shift in how decisions are made... the only way 
to do that is to include the community, the people who are in receipt 
of services do need to have a voice in how those services are shaped, 
otherwise what happens is you end up shaping services to meet 
somebody’s understanding sat in an office. I think if you have the 
community part of the decision-making and part of the spending of 
money, then the services will have a better chance of meeting the 
needs of the community in the way in which they want them to be 
met… people are unhappy about politicians and local government... 
and maybe that is a reflection of what is happening at the moment at a 
wider [national] level but...let’s do something, let’s change things, 
let’s not sit back thinking it’s somebody else’s job… let’s shape things 
together to make it how we want it to be; a much more worthwhile 
meaningful existence than sitting and moaning about life really! 
 
However, without a deeper culture of democratic participation, the current 
inception of You Choose is limited. In addition to issues of exclusion, time 
constraints for citizens, and parochialism highlighted above, the lack of 
technical knowledge and the money incentive are also seen as problems.  
Karen is supportive of You Choose but is also concerned about making sure 
people have enough information and knowledge to make effective decisions: 
‘you can end up with an unwise situation where people are putting votes to 
things that they actually really don’t understand’. Similarly, Anita was 
sceptical about PB being used for mainstream council budgets; ‘that’s what 
you pay your Councillors for, that’s what you pay the council workers for; 
that’s their decision... You’d never get an agreement [between the public]!’ 
 
A Councillor was sceptical about the opportunities for developing You Choose 
to reach the wider public and prospects for a more participatory democratic 
culture: ‘[each You Choose has around] 150 people out of... 9,000 [in the 
Councillor’s ward]. 150 might think we’re the best thing since sliced bread, 
but 8,850 don’t even know we’ve done it, and they’re not even bothered 
we’ve done it’. Clive questioned whether using monetary incentives to 
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support local groups is appropriate for citizens to reflectively vote on funding 
with the public good in mind: 
 
the interest many of the people; it’s not in this participative 
democracy; it’s getting their money for their particular project... 
everyone went for the maximum [amount of money]... I don’t think 
that this is necessarily a good thing, that hey presto exactly the amount 
of money they need for the project is the amount on offer and if it is 
£500 less they would’ve gone for that, £500 more they would’ve gone 
for that. So I think in terms of the economics of it it’s not a very good 
system. 
 
This suggests that a development of You Choose to be a more flexible and 
involved deliberative process might allow participants to question the content 
of bids more, and have more agency in allocating different amounts to 
different groups. 
 
This section has discussed issues relating to You Choose’s participatory 
democracy, highlighting transparency, trust, critical reflection and active 
participation in the vote, using local knowledge and developing social 
relationships between citizens based on equality and solidarity as positive 
aspects associated with the PB process.  However, on the other hand, issues 
to do with exclusion, wider inequalities, council control over the process, 
concerns about the technical knowledge required, monetary incentives, and 
parochialism are limitations of You Choose. This suggests that changes in 
public perceptions, more openness of information, and equipping citizens with 
technical knowledge, along with changes in political culture, council 
structures and practices, would be required should Tameside Council and the 
public seek to develop deeper citizen participation in local democracy 
through a more extensive PB.   
 
Social Empowerment 
  
There are also opportunities for empowerment within this form of 
participatory democracy, despite the issues described above. This section 
discusses three dimensions of empowerment that are intrinsic to the 
institutional design of You Choose: voting, critical engagement and 
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strengthening local groups. Then it discusses four dimensions that are 
unintentional by-products that are ancillary to You Choose: self-development, 
awareness, networking and community participation. While the former have 
been purposefully included in the design of You Choose by the Council, the 
latter have emerged from the participatory democratic setting as a ‘spin off’ 
from the Council’s intentions. Table 7.5 highlights these seven dimensions. 
They are incipient because they indicate potential for social empowerment, 
rather than a full realisation of the concept. Deepening participatory 
democracy is necessary to encourage some of the qualities that characterise 
social empowerment, such as autonomy, control and ownership (see Chapters 
3 and 6). 
 
Table 7.5: Incipient Dimensions of Social Empowerment in You Choose 
 
Intrinsic 
empowerment 
 
Voting  
 
Critical 
engagement 
 
Strengthening local 
groups 
 
Ancillary 
empowerment 
 
Self-
development 
(confidence 
and 
assertiveness) 
 
Awareness of 
local 
community 
 
Networking  
 
 
Community 
participation 
 
 
Given that only two annual You Choose cycles have taken place, these 
findings are tentative indications of the extent to which You Choose has 
potential for social empowerment. If the process continues to develop over a 
number of years, further longitudinal studies of the impact that You Choose 
has for the community could enhance these findings. 
 
Intrinsic Empowerment 
 
The previous section highlighted how those that took the vote seriously were 
critically and reflectively engaged in local democracy. The opportunity to 
participate in the vote was viewed as empowering and significantly different 
to Lynsey’s experience of recent politics: 
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over the last twenty or thirty years of my adult life I have always felt a 
little bit patronised by politicians: ‘let the little people have their say 
but we’ll ignore them’… but in this I really felt as if I was listened to, 
and I obviously was listened to, and so were the other people there, 
because we voted, our votes were counted and we were told the 
results there and then. That is so empowering, I felt great, they’ve 
listened to me, they’ve heard me, and they’re doing it! 
 
This sense of empowered participation also encourages citizens to be critical 
about the process and local government, and may lead to a desire for more 
participation (as Barber suggested in Chapter 4 that experiencing democratic 
participation creates an appetite for more democracy).  
 
Critical engagement was important for Gavin, a member of a community news 
group, who reflected Barber’s perspective: ‘once you… start letting people 
decide… people want more… it’s like when you give people a bit of education, 
they start asking questions and they don’t accept what was going on before, 
and they start challenging’. This view is also reflected by a member of T3SC: 
 
right from the start, people ask really good questions, and once they 
take part they ask even better questions about ‘how is that being 
decided?’, and ‘who is making that decision?’, ‘is that the best way?’ 
and ‘could we do this more?’… for there to be real democracy, for 
there to be real participation, we need people’s skills and 
understandings to be increased. 
 
This suggests that in the right circumstances You Choose has the potential to 
develop into a more empowering process of participatory democracy, 
reflecting the educative aspects of democratic participation highlighted by 
Pateman and Schugurensky in Chapter 4. In a discussion on whether power is 
effectively decentralised in You Choose, a Councillor stated that 
‘[e]mpowering community groups to me is not decentralising [power], but at 
least its giving them a bigger say in what is happening in their community 
than they would have voting once every year for a Councillor or an MP’. 
Again, Gavin: ‘people do feel empowered there, but... feeling empowered 
doesn’t mean you are’. The limits are described by Sally as an absence of 
citizen control over the process: 
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you had a chance to go along and vote for what you like, but [the 
council] had already sorted out who was going to be allowed to be in 
that selection, so it wasn’t a totally free decision. I might have wanted 
to vote for one of those people that didn’t make it through the 
selection panel if I’d known about them. 
 
In the application process where groups are required to develop a formal 
structure, which in time may strengthen groups in the local area, making 
them more stable and secure. A Council Officer described this: 
 
part of the process [is that] groups have to be constituted, they have to 
have a bank account and… one of the criticisms of PB [is] getting small 
groups to be constituted, but actually… groups were constituting 
themselves, getting organised, getting bank accounts in order to apply 
for this money, and so it gave them some kind of formal footing, and it 
gave them some legitimacy, and it gave them a structure. 
 
This is reflected in Dorothy’s endorsement of the groups that have gone 
through the assessment process and presented. This ensured that ‘it’s a 
proper organised group that need the money and are going to spend it in the 
right way’. However, as discussed in the section on participatory democracy, 
a negative aspect of the requirement that groups be formally structured is 
that smaller and more socially excluded groups that aren’t on the Tameside 
Council and T3SC radars could be excluded from You Choose. These aspects of 
empowerment are embedded within the institutional design of You Choose. 
This suggests the potential of You Choose for developing empowering 
structures that facilitate greater meaningful citizen involvement and social 
empowerment. 
 
Ancillary Empowerment 
 
The organisation of the event and democratic relations involved create 
ancillary possibilities for the development of social empowerment, including 
self-development, awareness, networking and increased community 
participation. Presenting to the community in a democratic setting can 
contribute to self-development through improving citizens’ capabilities for 
communicating their aims confidently, and with assertiveness. As Lysney 
highlighted in the democracy section, the sense of presenting amongst equals 
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in the community is likely to increase feelings of empowerment. Josie 
described how it felt to present to the community; ‘it’s not my comfort area, 
but I’ve purposely done it ‘cause I thought right, experience something new, 
push myself out there’. For Harry, taking part as a group can improve 
people’s confidence through ‘actually feeling an endorsement from the 
community… the community are glad we are doing this and so let’s do more of 
it’.  
 
Tom described the effect that presenting to the community and winning 
funding had on his co-presenter in terms of her self-confidence: 
 
the young person that I [presented] with… she is in foster care, she has 
had a bit of a tough time and she really didn’t want to do it [but] she 
did it… that was only three weeks ago, the event, and you can see 
there’s a little bit more confidence, little bit of a swagger in her walk, 
and that little cocksureness of her… as if to say, ‘yeah if I can stand 
there in front of all them and do that, I can do anything’. 
 
Susan agreed that taking part in You Choose and feeling equal to others can 
empower people in vulnerable circumstances, through self-validation and 
being valued by others: 
 
until you actually experience [it], you don’t really understand what 
people’s needs [are] or how it feels to put that back in the hands of the 
people. Not only would you be better able to meet their needs, I also 
think it’s this reflective process whereby to get a vulnerable or 
disadvantaged person to be able to say ‘I need this’, and identify what 
they need is really empowering… and know that actually by saying it is 
going to make a difference. I think just by valuing them enough, or 
recognising them enough, to be able to say ‘tell us what you need’ is 
massive… because I think a lot of the things when people are 
vulnerable, or really disadvantaged, I think they lack confidence and 
self-esteem… that’s very validating to be able to say ‘yeah, this is me, 
and I actually, this would help me’. 
 
This could encourage individuals to become more assertive and engaged in 
their communities. A council officer explained why this would be desirable: 
‘anything which makes Tameside people think that they can have a voice, and 
they can have good aspirations [is good]’.  
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Participating in You Choose empowers people with greater knowledge and 
awareness of the activities taking part in the local area. This can also 
encourage groups as part of greater efforts to improve the local area, building 
solidarity in the local community. Echoing comments made by others, Nigel 
described his surprise at the range of local groups: ‘even though I have been 
on the District Assembly, I did not realise just how much was going on in my 
own town. That was remarkable’. 
 
Susan stated that participating in You Choose ‘raise[s] awareness in the 
community about projects, but also it encourages other people to reflect on 
the value of what is going on… it might inspire people to get involved’. Mary 
developed an increased awareness of groups that are vital for vulnerable 
citizens in the area: 
 
there were groups there I didn’t even know existed and I didn’t realise 
how poor some of these areas were, so like the food bank, which you 
just don’t imagine. I don’t know if I walk around with my eyes shut, but 
I don’t expect that to be happening in this day and age, that people do 
desperately need food. 
 
A Councillor also emphasised how this critical awareness can translate into a 
greater understanding of the needs of the community: 
 
the knock-on benefits of You Choose are phenomenal really. Not only is 
it benefitting the community, its improving their basic understanding of 
what community is all about… it helps them to identify needs in their 
own area. 
 
For Tom, this increased awareness could translate into a greater sense of 
social solidarity and shared identity between people: 
 
although you have an idea of what a group is about you will never 
understand or know about that group till you… go and spend some time 
at an event like this where they’ll have a placard up with all the 
information… it’s about building that community spirit, togetherness… 
a sense of well-being… a sense of ‘I’m part of that’. 
 
Karen also pointed out that building a sense of solidarity on the day had to be 
carefully managed due to the competitive nature of the process; ‘T3SC were… 
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encouraging people not to see other groups as the enemy but to actually see 
them as people who are proactive in this community’. 
 
Along with awareness, the democratic setting and the sense of equality 
amongst citizens creates the conditions in which groups may become more 
assertive and collaborate by networking. Anita argued that networking is a 
feature of community organisation irrespective of the participatory 
democratic setting, and stated that ‘if you put the people that were there 
together in any room it would happen’. However, a Council Officer disagrees, 
highlighting the more interactive nature of You Choose ‘I don’t think it 
necessarily would [happen at any event] because if you just put them into a 
room they wouldn’t stand up and do presentations to each other’. 
 
Clive expanded on this theme by pointing out that ‘after the presentation… 
people came up and wanted to get involved… they said ‘I didn’t know, can I 
join or can I get involved?’’. A Councillor also stated that ‘[o]ne of the people 
from the mums and tots… came to me and said ‘I’ve had a booking for the 
room!’ ‘cause she plugged it at [You Choose]’. The sense that individuals can 
approach groups is likely to be enhanced by being a part of a participatory 
democratic event, especially in view of relational equality and opportunities 
for more assertiveness. 
 
In addition, while various associations for allotment groups or residents’ 
groups exist, You Choose allows groups in different areas of voluntary and 
community activity to network and integrate. Susan highlighted this: 
 
I’ve got ideas from [other groups] for [my music group] which we could 
probably work with them, so I think you can get more working across 
projects… you can share resources, whether its human of material of 
whatever… [Meeting different groups at You Choose has] given me ideas 
for an entrepreneurial employability skills project so that we can go 
beyond the music project. 
 
The final ancillary dimension is the potential to increase community 
participation. Josie describes how participating in You Choose gave her the 
opportunity to get involved with other groups: 
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I felt a bit of a buzz about it… I did feel empowered; it then inspired 
me… they had a leaflet there, a newsletter… I then found some 
courses… it spurred me on to then thinking ‘I could do chair skills’, 
which I attended, and also there are other things going on, so it 
empowered me to actually go on and maybe look into other areas. 
 
Similarly, Karen saw the possibilities for more groups to organise from 
participating in You Choose: ‘[Participants] can see what’s possible and it may 
well be that they think ‘right, well next year actually I’ll come because I’d 
like to see this happen… I could form a residents association’’. 
 
A T3SC member described how being a part of You Choose and engaging with 
other groups as equals in the process can translate into wider social solidarity 
by encouraging individuals and groups to allow others the chance to 
participate: 
 
some groups said to us ‘oh yeah well we were successful at You Choose 
last year, but because we knew that other groups weren’t, we don’t 
want to apply this year we want to let other people have a chance to 
get money’. Now, you would never have that happen in a normal grants 
process because you never are exposed to the losers, as well as the 
winners, so the fact that people are being quite selfless, even though a 
lot of those groups will need the money just as much… that shows quite 
a lot to me that we have actually impacted people quite deeply. 
 
This section has described how participants are empowered through the 
institutional design of You Choose. This includes the democratic vote, the 
critical engagement that this encourages, and strengthening of local voluntary 
and community groups. In addition, unintended effects of the democratic 
process are the potential for self-development, especially in terms of 
confidence and assertiveness, an increased awareness of local activities, 
networking (suggesting an increase in social integration), and an increase in 
community participation. The potential for social empowerment is enhanced 
by the crucial role that relational egalitarianism and social solidarity plays in 
the democratic setting. However, these findings must be tempered by the 
transitory and limited nature of You Choose participation – stemming from a 
lack of citizen control over the process as a whole and the relatively slimmed 
down variant of PB used. This point is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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Conclusion 
 
This case study has analysed the participatory democratic nature of a 
‘community grants at the local level’ PB process. In its most successful 
period, the original Porto Alegre model was shown to advance the aims of 
social justice, grassroots democracy, and citizen control. Although You Choose 
is taking place in very different societal conditions, it is suggested that this 
much narrower process of participatory democracy promotes equality and 
solidarity in social relationships, can be inclusive, encourages critical 
engagement and community participation, and creates a positive view of local 
democracy. Some of the negative aspects are exclusion of already socially 
excluded groups, the impact of wider inequalities, and parochialism. This is 
happening in the context of growing societal disillusionment and anger at 
political, media, and economic elites in the UK (Hay, 2007). The use of You 
Choose in this context begs the question raised by Blakey (2007) of whether 
PB in the UK is a technical fix for an increasingly discredited political system, 
or whether it is a genuinely new and radical innovation which could transform 
politics and empower communities. 
 
Key to answering this is the concept of social empowerment. As social 
empowerment from a social quality perspective (Chapter 3) is concerned how 
social relations can enhance personal capabilities and abilities, the second 
focus of this case study has been on participation in the social relations of You 
Choose, and the relationships that the democratic setting facilitates. It has 
been suggested that there is evidence of incipient social empowerment in the 
aspects of voting, critical engagement, strengthening groups, self-
development, awareness, networking, and increased community participation. 
Although voting, critical engagement and strengthening groups are directly 
related to the democratic process, and the other dimensions are unintentional 
ancillary factors which You Choose encourages, and this emerges through the 
development of relational egalitarianism and solidarity between citizens 
participating. 
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These dimensions contain much potential for social empowerment should You 
Choose continue and grow to include more citizens or more decision-making 
areas of local government. However, empowerment is limited by an absence 
of democratic citizen control over the process. This is apparent in many of the 
critical statements made by participants questioning the organisation of the 
event, selection process, establishment of community strategy priorities, and 
amount of funds allocated to different District Assemblies. In addition, 
participation is transitory given that the vote takes place once a year for 
citizens in the eight District Assemblies. This suggests that the regular 
interaction of citizens and council needed for a stronger culture of democratic 
participation is far from being realised. Along with this is the question of 
whether there is sufficient desire amongst the local population, and within 
Tameside Council, to change local politics in this way.  
 
On the other hand, the source of funding and advertising of You Choose based 
on ‘you recycle, you choose’ suggests that a tangible link between citizens’ 
actions in recycling efforts across the borough creates a burgeoning sense of 
ownership over You Choose funds, and a right to have a say over how they are 
spent. This indicates that while You Choose may be to an extent a technical 
fix, especially given the reduced funds for voluntary and community activity 
supplied by national government, and its increased transparency compared 
with local questions over the closed-door nature of previous community 
funding, it also contains much potential. This is especially so in terms of 
creating more social empowerment and active participation in local decision-
making by improving self-confidence and assertiveness, creating greater 
awareness of local community activity, possibly more community 
participation, networking and social integration between groups, formally 
strengthening groups, and a desire for more participation amongst many 
interviewees. However, without demands and activism from organised civil 
society actors similar to those found in Porto Alegre in the 1980s, further 
deepening of participatory democracy and social empowerment in future 
would depend on the politics and power of Tameside Council, and the 
enthusiasm of third sector partners, such as T3SC, to instigate this kind of 
transformation.  
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Chapter 8 
Optimising the Democratic Dialectic: 
Social Empowerment in the Workplace 
and Local Community 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The discussion of participatory democracy and dialectical values that underpin 
it in Chapters 4 and 5 has described how the expansion of participation in 
social and economic contexts could optimise the democratic dialectic. The 
case studies presented in Chapters 6 and 7 of workplace democracy and local 
community democracy have investigated this in an economic context and in a 
civil society-local government context. Both case studies have focused on 
describing the nature of the participatory democratic settings and the 
experiences that interviewees have had in these settings with attention to the 
relationships between democratic structures, democratic practices, human 
actions, and social empowerment.  
 
This chapter brings together the discussion so far. It links the theoretical 
exploration of social empowerment, participatory democracy and the 
democratic dialectic to the empirical findings. The implications of this for the 
wider democratic complexion of the UK are considered in the concluding 
chapter. This chapter firstly restates the key findings of the two participatory 
democratic settings and relates them to the values of liberty, equality and 
solidarity as part of the democratic dialectic (Chapter 5). Secondly, it 
discusses evidence of social empowerment in the two democratic settings. 
Thirdly, differences and similarities between the two cases are briefly 
compared. Fourthly, by returning to the discussion in Chapter 2 on the 
philosophical foundations of the thesis, the critical realism and social quality 
perspectives that underpin the cases are discussed in relation to the findings. 
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The Democratic Dialectic in Suma and You Choose 
 
Chapter 5 posits that liberal and social democratic societies fail to realise 
their democratic potential. Analysed in terms of the democratic dialectic 
values of liberty, equality and solidarity, a third participatory typology is 
proposed for the optimisation of these values. From the social quality 
perspective, these values are not properties belonging to individuals but 
emerge out of social relations. This section addresses each value in turn and 
discusses the extent to which the two case studies evidence the participatory 
democratic values of freedom as self-development, equality as relational 
egalitarianism and solidarity as system and social integration. The evidence 
for this is displayed in Table 8.1 below, while criticisms of the two settings 
are also discussed. 
 
Freedom 
 
For the optimisation of the democratic dialectic freedom is redefined from 
negative liberty (liberal democracy) or positive liberty (social democracy) to a 
view of freedom as self-development, which includes both negative and 
positive senses, but recognises the social relational aspect of the concept. 
Avoiding the strong pre-social liberal individualism of negative liberty (Berlin, 
2002) and residual individualism of positive liberty (Green, 1997) by 
conceptualising humans as social individuals, freedom is viewed by Gould 
(1988) as self-development.  
 
In terms of structure, this necessitates a presence of enabling conditions 
(positive liberty) as well as an absence of constraining conditions (negative 
liberty), and in terms of agency, this requires the freedom to self-develop by 
actions and processes of improving capacities and abilities through social 
relationships (Gould, 1988). This conception recognises the limits of viewing 
emancipation as the end of progressive social change, which has libertarian 
implications (Sayer, 2011). Instead, freedom within the democratic dialectic 
recognises the inherent interdependence and reliance on others in social 
relationships for realising the self in democratic society (or constitutive 
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interdependency in social quality terms, discussed below). As argued in 
Chapter 5, participatory democracy, and its associated values of equality and 
solidarity, is posited as a locus for enabling this conception of freedom. 
 
Table 8.1 Democratic Dialectic Values in the Two Case Studies 
Dialectical values of 
the participatory 
democracy typology 
 
 
Suma 
 
You Choose 
Self-development 
(freedom) 
Job mobility (multi-skilling 
and job rotation), 
opportunities to learn new 
skills and take on 
responsibilities (self-
management), links to 
social empowerment 
dimensions of autonomy, 
flexibility, self-
development and 
ownership. 
Increased community 
involvement, opportunities to 
develop capacities, 
assertiveness, confidence and 
knowledge. Links to 
empowerment values of 
critical engagement, self-
development, awareness and 
increased community 
participation.  
Relational 
egalitarianism 
(equality) 
Equal wages, equal votes, 
equal status of job roles, 
reflexivity about threat of 
hierarchies (formal and 
informal), links to all social 
empowerment dimensions. 
Egalitarian culture 
fundamental to Suma. 
Formal equality of 
presentations and voting 
process, some relational 
egalitarianism between 
participants, but inequalities 
of access and capabilities. 
Links to empowerment values 
of voting, self-development, 
networking and community 
participation. 
System and social 
integration 
(solidarity) 
Democratic structure 
(system) and democratic 
relationships (social), 
shared ownership and 
control, links to social 
empowerment dimensions 
of security, stability and 
collective identity 
(solidaristic bases of social 
empowerment). 
Strengthening groups and 
inclusion in democratic 
structure (system), increasing 
networks and community 
participation, collective 
identity (social). Links to 
empowerment values of 
critical engagement, wider 
awareness, strengthening 
groups, networking, and 
increasing community 
participation. 
 
In Suma freedom is apparent in how the structure of the organisation provides 
the positive conditions for job mobility through the practices of multi-skilling 
and job rotation, and opportunities for learning new skills. The Suma case 
study describes instances where individuals have experienced a wide range of 
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jobs from manual to office-based over their working lives, increasing holistic 
awareness of the business and a general acceptance of the principles of multi-
skilling and job rotation by members as a necessary aspect of a democratic 
workplace, despite some concerns over efficiency (the desire for 
specialisation and market principles). 
 
This is linked to agential opportunities secured by the democratic right to 
undertake (also effectively the right to choose not to undertake) a wide range 
of activities in the workplace, described in Suma as self-management. In 
principle, no single Suma member has the authority to instruct another to 
carry out another task as all are equal owners of the business. Even in the 
situation where a Function Area Co-ordinator (FAC) asks a member to carry 
out a task, this is based on a co-operative understanding of the need to work 
together and that the role of FAC is to co-ordinate the work, rather than a 
demarcation of status. Guy (p.172) pointed out that those who ‘act like a 
boss’ will struggle to be successful in Suma, and for those taking on co-
ordinating roles, actually letting go of authoritative power in favour of 
collaborative working can make the organisation stronger.  
 
This view of self-management therefore does not prescribe an atomistic 
understanding of individuals. Indeed, the Suma members’ job description 
(which has been subject to democratic agreement) describes a number of 
relationships that comprise the activity of self-management, including 
communication, acknowledging, respecting and considering the views of 
others and a strong sense of work as a collective endeavour, alongside 
individual actions such as undergoing training, accepting responsibility and 
participating in the democratic process. As self-development, this encourages 
the improvement of capabilities in the democratic workplace. For 
participatory democracy in Suma negative liberty and positive liberty are 
enhanced by freedom in the social relational sense.   
 
In You Choose, opportunities for freedom as self-development are limited by 
the transitory participation that people have in the once yearly votes, Council 
control over it, and the relatively procedural nature of the process. The 
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design of the democratic innovation involves citizens directly in the vote, but 
the process is carefully managed by the Council and there are no 
opportunities for citizens to reflexively challenge and change aspects of You 
Choose. Some interviewees were critically engaged and questioned the source 
of funding, allocation mechanism, scope of PB and the local area priorities 
that You Choose was established to address. This indicates a desire by some 
for more involvement in the design and administration of You Choose which 
could increase self-development. Other participants were sceptical though, 
and doubt the capacities of ‘ordinary’ people to draw on the technical 
knowledge required, preferring elected representatives and Council Officers 
to have control over You Choose and other areas of local decision-making. 
This suggests scepticism of the educative function of participatory democracy 
described in Chapter 4 (though this could also stem from unfamiliarity with 
learning through participation, the limited model of PB used, the wider 
combination of liberal democratic and social democratic values, and 
especially, the pervasive influence of neo-liberal thinking in Britain (Chapter 
5)). 
 
An absence of citizen control over the process suggests significant 
constraining conditions in You Choose, but there are also enabling conditions 
for self-development, suggesting that some aspects of the relational concept 
of freedom are present. Participants discovered more opportunities for 
community involvement and development of capabilities by attending You 
Choose. For example, in the case study Josie (p.241) described how 
participating in the vote encouraged her to take some courses and attend 
other groups, enhancing her well-being. 
 
The democratic process has the potential to increase relational freedom by 
increasing feelings of assertiveness, confidence and a sense of validation from 
presenting amongst equals and securing the votes of others in the community. 
Tom (p.238) noticed that the young woman that he presented with had 
become more assertive and confident following participation and success in 
You Choose, despite her prior reluctance to take part. Based on the accounts 
of interviewees, this sense of self-development as enabling individuals to 
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expand capacities (Gould, 1988) is tentative but may arise from You Choose, 
especially in relation to those from disadvantaged or vulnerable backgrounds. 
 
Equality 
 
Relational egalitarianism (Anderson, 1999) is described in Chapter 5 as 
conducive to the optimisation of the democratic dialectic. Unlike the 
‘starting-gate’ luck egalitarianism prescribed by social democracy or the 
residual equality of libertarian entitlement rights in liberal democracy, 
relational egalitarianism draws on Tawney’s (1952, p.38) classic view of a 
universal equality of ‘circumstances, institutions and manner of life’. Where 
libertarian views such as that of Nozick (1973, 1974) require, at minimum, 
equality of rights (but not means) to acquire private property with at best, a 
residual welfare state (liberal democracy) and luck egalitarianism advocates a 
stronger form of welfare state that mitigates ‘bad brute luck’ in capitalist 
societies but not bad choices made by responsible individuals (Dworkin, 
1981a, 1981b), relational egalitarianism is concerned with the social 
relationships in which goods are distributed in society (as well as the actual 
distribution of goods) (Anderson, 1999). 
 
This links relational egalitarianism to democracy and freedom as self-
development as it requires that every person stands in a relationship of equal 
respect and moral worth and the abolition of oppressive relationships 
(Anderson, 1999). This suggests attention to social structure and the 
transformation of institutions, norms and practices towards egalitarianism and 
participation rather than rival conceptions of the extent of equal distribution 
of goods sufficient for representative democracy. A key aspect of relational 
egalitarianism is that it reduces the chances of ‘commodifying social status, 
political influence, and the like’ (Anderson, 1999, p.326). By standing in 
relationships of equality, individuals and groups would not be able to convert 
superior income and wealth into inequalities of status or political power, but 
would have the freedom for self-development.  
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Equality is fundamental for Suma and the case study describes an egalitarian 
culture that has underpinned the structural transformation of the organisation 
since 1977, the commitment to democracy in the workplace, and to a large 
extent, the day-to-day practices and experiences of members. However, this 
is tempered by the impact of informal hierarchies and class relationships 
determined to an extent by wider British society and culture, which suggests 
the need for participatory democratic values to take hold at the societal level 
(Chapter 9). Within Suma, a reflexive attention to minimising status 
inequalities suggests the presence of relational egalitarianism as equal 
respect and moral worth. 
 
The reconfiguration of the participatory structure has been a means of 
avoiding degeneration to the capitalist form (Cornforth, 1995). Suma was 
founded on the principle of democratic equality but has had to undergo three 
major organisational changes in order to address concerns about an elite or 
‘old boys network’ coming to dominate the co-op (Jones, 1998, p.223), 
especially with the expansion of membership from seven founders to over 120 
in 2012. This involved changes from direct democracy to participatory 
democracy with delegated representation in two models, firstly, the ‘hub and 
sector’ model and secondly, the current flat management structure. For 
Macfarlane (1987), these changes have encouraged a more co-operative and 
collectivist ethos. Through structural changes then, an egalitarian culture has 
been entrenched in Suma. 
 
The egalitarian culture is underpinned by formal equality of wages. The 
acceptance and legitimacy of equal wages is supported by the opportunity for 
job mobility. This indicates an interdependency between freedom as self-
development and relational egalitarianism in Suma. Interviewees generally 
shared a commitment to equal wages, with an acceptance that at some stages 
of their working lives and in certain roles they are effectively underpaid, and 
at other times overpaid. At different times in the members’ lives they can 
choose to take on responsibility or take a step back and ‘go back to the 
[warehouse] floor’ without financial penalty, rather than be forced to quit the 
co-op (Malcolm, p.177). This not only highlights the flexibility of a democratic 
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egalitarian organisation but also shows how stability and security contribute 
to solidarity at Suma (discussed below). Key is the respect for each member 
as an equal ‘link in the chain’ (Christine, p.175) or respect for the different 
types of work that contribute to the collective (Paul, p.175), which justify 
equal wages. This suggests equal respect and moral worth is supported by 
Suma’s equal wage structure. 
 
There is a basic democratic principle of equal votes in Suma. Though the case 
study describes a sense of formality of the voting process at QGMs, much 
debate takes place in lunch time forums and in informal decision-making on a 
daily basis. Examples are used in the case study of Suma members building 
consensus on a decision in day-to-day interaction with others. On the one 
hand, this can give democratic legitimacy as each member has an opportunity 
to influence decisions that affect them and ‘higher quality’ decisions result 
from majority support (David, p.182). However, on the other hand, this 
process suggests the capacity for charismatic or articulate members of the co-
op to take the lead in decision-making. This is reflected in the view that Suma 
creates the conditions for people to become empowered, but individual 
characteristics and the individual’s background also enable certain people to 
make better use of the structures of the co-op than others. This isn’t 
necessarily a problem as highlighted by Walker and Walker (2011) in Chapter 1 
the difference between equality of conditions and equality of abilities 
suggests that only the former must be defended. 
 
Both equal wages and equal votes ground the egalitarian culture in the 
democratic structure of Suma, but the practice of job roles being seen as 
‘functions’ rather than ‘status roles’ also indicates relational egalitarianism. 
This is elaborated by Malcolm (p.173), who described how in one role he may 
ask another member to complete a task for him, but in the same week, the 
other member might, in the role of FAC, ask Malcolm to carry out a task. 
Taken together, formal equality in the structure provides the conditions for 
relational egalitarianism in the form of the absence of hierarchies and status 
roles. Although there are informal hierarchies, threats to the democratic 
252 
 
setting are reduced due to the principles of consensus-based decision-making, 
democratic votes and delegated representation (described in Chapter 6). 
 
You Choose displays formal equality in the processes of presenting (three 
minutes per group) and voting (one person, one vote). The event is also open 
to anyone who lives in the postcode area to attend and vote, indicating the 
inclusiveness of You Choose. This was reflected on by Tom (p.229), who 
considered everyone present entitled to an equal vote ‘regardless of their 
walk of life’. This is seen in the case study as ‘foundational’ to the event, 
along with the requirement that citizens allocate a vote (involving a reflective 
process of answering questions related to the project) to every group that 
presents. Though it may be offset by the affiliation of a vast majority of 
participants with at least one group taking part, this voting process deepens 
the sense of formal voting equality by asking people to reflectively consider 
the merits and demerits of each group equally, rather than only voting for 
their preferred groups and ignoring others. Almost all of the participants 
interviewed in the case study said that they approached this task seriously 
and considered all groups equally (beyond their affiliated group). 
 
Access is a further issue for formal equality in You Choose and the case study 
indicates a mixed picture here. On the one hand, there is a basic equality that 
any voluntary or community group with finances below £50,000 in the local 
area can apply for You Choose funds, provided that they meet certain legality 
criteria. But on the other hand, wider socio-economic barriers restrict this 
access: groups already socially excluded are likely to be excluded from You 
Choose. Groups that don’t feel that they have the capabilities to write bids, 
present and bring supporters are likely to be excluded, along with the 
possibility of digital exclusion as much You Choose information is online. 
 
Building on the formal equality of the event for those that do apply (and are 
shortlisted by the assessment panel) relational egalitarianism between 
participants is described in the case study. This was located by Lynsey (p.231) 
in the sense that groups were presenting and voting amongst equals: ‘peers, 
friends and neighbours’. This was also traced to the shared process, sense of 
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togetherness and by not seeing other groups as competitors but ‘in the same 
boat’ (Rebecca, p.231), which also indicates social integration (discussed 
below).  
 
A criticism was raised about the role of the Councillors. Interviewees were 
more positive about individual Councillors who they viewed as being amongst 
the people (by dressing less formally and sitting with the voters) rather than 
‘leaders’ of the process at the front of the hall. The case study suggests that 
formal and relational equality are both integral to empowerment. Structural 
changes to the process and greater relational egalitarianism in Council-public 
relationships could deepen citizen participation and control, increasing the 
possibilities for social empowerment. Though, such changes are likely to occur 
as part of broader social and political changes that encourage stronger 
political will and social mobilisation. 
 
Solidarity 
 
The third constitutive value of the democratic dialectic is solidarity. Liberal 
democracy includes solidarity insofar as it is a by-product of individual 
rational utility-maximiation: people seeking competitive advantage. This is 
seen by Coleman (1988, 1990) as the existence of trust, obligations and social 
norms that facilitate social capital. Such a view is bound up with freedom as 
negative liberty, equality as libertarian rights and solidarity insofar as it is a 
means towards individual success in a market society (under the influence of 
neo-liberalism this becomes anti-solidarity). This is contrasted with the social 
democratic variant of solidarity in the late twentieth century as social capital 
(Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000). This view sees social capital as social glue that 
creates networks between groups and bonds within groups, and such a civil 
society positively supports the social democratic ideal of capitalism 
buttressed by a strong welfare state (Putnam, 1995). However, it is argued in 
Chapter 5 that the adoption of the language and concepts of neo-liberal 
capitalism and the residual individualism of social capital weakens the 
democratic value of solidarity. 
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In contrast to these is the social and system integration perspective on 
solidarity which develops the concept of social citizenship (Lockwood, 1996, 
1999; Marshall, 1992). This perspective distinguishes between social 
integration as individual relationships that range between social cohesion and 
social dissolution and system integration as institutional relations within a 
society on a continuum between civic integration and civic dissolution. Beck 
et al. (2001) add to this the relational and temporal aspect of structure and 
agency in realist terms (Chapter 2) which indicates that to move along the 
continuum towards both social cohesion and civic integration in democratic 
societies, participation by humans in economic, political, social and cultural 
life is necessary. This also develops Marshall's (1981; 1992) view of social 
rights as part of the process of self-realisation. Such a view grounds the 
optimisation of the democratic dialectic by emphasising system integration 
and social relationships between members of a society in participatory 
democratic institutions and structures that encourage self-development 
within relationships of equal respect and moral worth. 
 
For Suma, social and system integration are apparent in the social 
relationships between members and in the democratic structure. As described 
above equal wages and votes encourage an egalitarian culture with an 
emphasis on democratic participation. In addition, collective and democratic 
member ownership and control over work practices, norms and rules of the 
organisation enhance in-work welfare and contribute to stability, security and 
collective identity, described in the case study as the solidaristic bases of 
social empowerment. This indicates the link between participatory democracy 
and social empowerment and is discussed below. 
  
These factors are posited to be conducive to solidarity as social and system 
integration. However, relating to social integration, some members (and non-
members) are less included in day-to-day decision-making at Suma, especially 
those who work primarily in manual areas of the business. Nevertheless, the 
interviewees responded that the majority of members do multi-skill and 
rotate jobs and are likely to have opportunities to participate, enhancing 
social cohesion within Suma. This serves to emphasise the point that 
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egalitarian principles and practices, coupled with the freedom to self-develop 
can encourage more ‘empathy’ for other members (Neil, p.179), which in turn 
can increase solidarity. 
 
Participation in system and social integration that produces civic integration 
and social cohesion can be assessed in You Choose. As discussed above, within 
the democratic setting the emphasis on formal equality in the structure of the 
event is to some extent integrative for the groups that participate. To be 
selected for the event groups must be formally constituted and have a bank 
account. Along with the validation that successful groups get from the 
democratic vote (Harry, p.238) this technical requirement has the potential to 
strengthen groups and embed them within wider civil society in the local 
area. In addition to this, the requirement that all participants vote for each 
group (an aspect of equality) increases awareness of the work of the groups in 
the area. These system integration factors provide the conditions for social 
integration.  
 
There is potential for social integration as participating in the vote increases 
opportunities for citizens to engage in more community participation and the 
sense of ‘togetherness’ (Rebecca, p.231), ‘community spirit’ (Tom, p.239), 
and shared experience of the process (Susan, p.231) encourage networking 
between groups. The case study describes potential projects that were 
facilitated by participation in You Choose, such as a music group putting on a 
concert for the local scout groups (Susan, p.240). This indicates the potential 
for a greater collective identity both within You Choose (as equal 
participants) and outside it (as members of civil society). However, a caveat 
to this is the risk of parochialism in voting decisions (for example, groups from 
the Audenshaw area lost out at the vote held in the Denton area of the 
Denton and Audenshaw district). Also, the exclusion of some smaller, less 
constituted and confident groups and competition (in the context of 
increasingly scarce local government funds) may have negative effects on the 
generation of solidarity through system and social integration in You Choose. 
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Assessment of Dialectic Values 
 
Having considered the extent to which the three participatory democratic 
values are present in the two cases it can be stated that Suma displays very 
strongly the conditions for the optimisation of the democratic dialectic. 
Relational egalitarianism is the central core to Suma’s participatory 
democracy. The culture of equality, as evidenced both formally in 
institutional design and also in the values and practices of Suma members in 
rejecting status roles and reflexively transforming the structures of the 
organisation over time to reduce the influence of power hierarchies and 
cliques, underpins the other values of the democratic dialectic. This is 
tempered by the exclusion of some members and non-members from Suma, 
often on the basis of informal hierarchies, class backgrounds and personal 
preferences for more remote manual work. This is considered in the case 
study to be largely the result of factors extrinsic to Suma’s democracy. This 
could be negated if participatory democratic values were present more widely 
in especially the economy, politics and, moreover, society. 
 
In the case of You Choose the picture is less clear. Both formal and relational 
equality are aspects of its participatory democracy, and solidarity is present 
both in the event (collective identity and togetherness) and in the wider 
Tameside community (increased opportunities for community participation). 
Although, whether there actually is a significant increase in wider community 
involvement as a result of You Choose is beyond the remit of this case study. 
The accounts provided by interviewees in this case study suggest that positive 
effects from You Choose are greater awareness and participation. Freedom as 
self-development is also present but less realised than in Suma, mainly due to 
the lack of citizen control of You Choose. The democratic dialectic in You 
Choose is less optimised due to this and is skewed more towards solidarity and 
equality than freedom as self-development. 
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Social Empowerment in Suma and You Choose 
 
Social empowerment is discussed in Chapter 3 as a development of the realist 
theory of power (Isaac 1987a, 1987b; Bates, 2010). Unlike individualist 
theories of power, such as those in the ‘faces of power’ debate (Dahl, 1957; 
Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 2005), realist power sees social power as 
relating to the social identities of individuals as participants in non-
determined (Barbalet, 1985), and socially structured and culturally patterned 
relationships (Isaac, 1987a). From the social quality perspective, social 
empowerment focuses this conception of power on positive social change: 
‘the degree to which the personal capabilities and the ability of people to act 
are enhanced by social relations’ (Herrmann, 2012, p.202). 
 
From the analysis so far in this chapter it is apparent that the optimisation of 
the democratic dialectic values in Suma’s participatory democratic structures 
provides the conditions to realise multiple dimensions of social 
empowerment. These include security, stability and collective identity as 
solidaristic bases of social empowerment that support individual engagement 
in the democratic process. Passive dimensions of social empowerment; 
autonomy, welfare and flexibility, are possible for all workers (and especially 
members) as they require relatively little engagement with Suma’s 
participatory democracy. Active dimensions of social empowerment are 
available for members that actively participate. These are self-development, 
ownership and control. Though social empowerment is formally present, 
individuals may be limited by their preferences, informal hierarchies, class 
backgrounds and habituation to workplace democracy. 
 
The case study of Suma indicates the presence of social empowerment as 
bound up with the participatory democratic structure, and this can also be 
understood in terms of the realist concern with structure and agency. The 
changes to the participatory democratic structure over time has reduced the 
capacity for individuals to have 'power over' others, although at times cliques 
have come to dominate the co-op. Reflexive attention to this has enabled the 
members to transform the structures of Suma towards a more egalitarian and 
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solidaristic system that broadly provides the conditions for freedom as self-
development. However, a tension exists between the enabling conditions of 
social empowerment and the capability (even desire) of individuals to make 
use of them.    
 
While the solidaristic bases of social empowerment provide the conditions to 
integrate individuals within the group through a sense of security, stability 
and collective identity, this also provides the conditions for individuals to 
become empowered. While non-members may be less secure, job security is 
provided in the form of democratic ownership and relatedly, no threat of the 
sack (except for gross misconduct) and the openness of financial information 
(which limits the chances of sudden redundancies or staff cutbacks). There is 
a strong sense of pride in Suma which also allows individuals to identify with 
democratically derived decisions. In terms of stability, individuals in Suma 
cannot force through changes without democratic consent. Therefore, 
democracy acts as a check against instability and risk-taking behaviour, and 
indicates that system integration is related to the democratic structure. This 
solidarity also provides the conditions for social empowerment.  
 
The passive (or primary) dimensions of social empowerment are autonomy, 
welfare and flexibility. Membership of Suma is conditional for primary social 
empowerment (although non-members may have some flexibility and welfare 
in work). Autonomy is social relational due to the emphasis on the 
embeddedness of individuals within the group. This autonomy emerges from 
direct participation in the democratic structure, suggesting that control is 
integral to social empowerment, but also from day-to-day autonomy in most 
work (less likely in manual work), which relates to self-management. Although 
the case study states that this is enabled by the democratic right to 
autonomous working practices, individuals have different capabilities to 
achieve autonomy. Extrinsic factors were cited by Alice (p.193) such as 
confidence, previous co-operative experience and 'nice middle class' 
communication skills. This suggests that the democratic setting creates formal 
conditions for autonomy but an unequal experience of this is had by Suma 
members. 
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Welfare in work is also secured by democratic control by the membership. 
The benefits of membership allow individuals to control and shape their 
everyday working lives in practical terms. The Personnel Department plays a 
crucial role in co-ordinating this on a daily basis. Overall democratic control 
negates the need to generate profit for external share-holders but also means 
that Suma can maintain a high wage bill, decent pay rises and holiday 
entitlements. This also links to security for Suma members: whatever job 
function they undertake the wage remains the same, though remuneration in 
terms of job satisfaction and skill development may vary.  
 
Flexibility is supported by multi-skilling and job rotation. As many members 
rotate through the job functions, this allows a greater flexibility with regards 
to illness and life circumstances that might restrict the capabilities of 
individuals to fulfil a particular job at a given point in time. This is a further 
primary dimension of social empowerment that is conferred by overall 
democratic control and the emphasis on self-development in the co-op. These 
three dimensions are available to individuals by virtue of their membership as 
democratic equals in Suma and again highlight the tension between the 
socially empowering structure and individual capabilities to achieve these 
aspects of social empowerment. 
 
For Suma members that actively participate in decision-making, active (or 
secondary) dimensions are self-development, ownership and control. Although 
primary dimensions derive from democratic worker ownership and control, 
these dimensions are accessible only to those members that have 'bought in' 
to the egalitarian and participatory culture. Self-development can be 
considered to be an aspect of social empowerment (as well as participatory 
democracy) because of the emphasis on enhancing capabilities. Suma supports 
members to learn new skills (through multi-skilling), to learn ICT skills (a 
requirement of membership), for non-English speakers to learn the language, 
and for actively participating members to take on managerial responsibilities 
(both autonomous self-management and delegated management functions). 
That said Thomas (p.197) viewed a lack of enthusiasm on the part of some 
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members to develop these aspects. This could be due to unwillingness to 
engage with Suma’s democracy or the problem of becoming habituated to 
workplace democracy over a number of years in the co-op and subsequently 
taking participation for granted. This also suggests a difference between the 
more passive form of social empowerment and these more active dimensions. 
 
As reflected in the above discussion, the final two dimensions of ownership 
and control are integral to social empowerment. Co-ops can be democratically 
owned but not democratically controlled, and this distinction is necessary to 
highlight both democratic ownership and democratic control in Suma. The 
structure of Suma's democracy, in which the membership are equally 
empowered with decision-making power, while responsibility is delegated to 
representatives in MC and FAC functions (accountable autonomy), ensures 
that democratic control is conducive to effective empowerment. Moreover, 
democratic ownership and control reflect relational egalitarianism as Alice 
(p.199) stated in the case study: 'I have the power to bring about change' and 
no one is 'in a position to order me to do something or... to treat me without 
respect because their status is equal to mine'. 
 
Central to the dimensions of social empowerment described above is the 
tension between empowering democratic structures in the co-op and the 
capabilities and desire for individuals to take advantage of these 
opportunities. While the case study indicates that some do not due to 
personal and extrinsic factors, the emphasis on developing skills and gaining a 
wide range of knowledge by self-development and the underpinning relational 
egalitarian culture encourage members of Suma to develop their capabilities 
and abilities to act in the context of participatory democratic social relations. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the emphasis of relational egalitarianism is not on 
‘simple’ equality of outcome or a poorly conceptualised equality as 
‘sameness’, but on equality of conditions and manner of life. Suma broadly 
achieves this in a way that is socially empowering. 
 
You Choose has less evidence of social empowerment due to the absence of 
citizen ownership and control over the process. This can be reflected in both 
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the top-down institutional design and from the absence of bottom-up 
demands from within civil society (Wright, 2010). Attention to the two aspects 
of institutional design and societal demands (Chapter 4) is necessary because 
of the interrelationship between genuine participation in democratic 
relationships, and the focus of social empowerment on how participatory 
democratic social relations enhance personal capabilities and abilities to act. 
Nevertheless, the case study describes voting, critical engagement, 
strengthening groups, some self-development, awareness, networking and 
community participation as values of empowerment in You Choose. These are 
posited as incipient dimensions of social empowerment because they are 
limited but have potential. With the development of a more participative 
variant of PB (closer to the Porto Alegre model than the World Bank model – 
Chapter 7) these values could become more socially empowering. 
 
There have only been two annual cycles of this relatively small PB process. 
This suggests that not only deepening the participatory democratic aspects of 
citizen control, ownership and autonomy would be necessary for social 
empowerment, but also, increasing citizen awareness and involvement in the 
process and the expansion of You Choose to consider other areas of local 
government over time (although there are no indications that the Council are 
considering this). 
 
The You Choose vote is viewed by some interviewees as a starting point for 
citizen involvement, which could be developed further. But, for critical 
engagement to be truly empowering ownership and control could also be 
necessary, as Sally (p.237) pointed out ‘you had a chance to go along and 
vote… but [the Council] had already sorted out who was going to be allowed 
to be in that selection’. For others, the democratic vote itself is likely to 
increase critical engagement in the local area. Echoing the educative function 
of participatory democracy, Gavin (p.236) argued that people may start asking 
more questions about local government and the local area and desire more of 
a say. However, this is tempered by a T3SC member (p.236) who stated in the 
case study that 'for there to be real participation, we need people's skills and 
understandings to be increased'. The strengthening of voluntary and 
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community groups in civil society through the application process was a 
further dimension, although this could be exclusionary for already socially 
excluded or very small groups, lacking in network connections, confidence or 
resources. 
 
Ancillary aspects of empowerment include the value of self-development. This 
is linked to presenting a project amongst equals in You Choose. The case 
study argues that this can improve capabilities for formulating and confidently 
asserting aims and demands by group members. This was evidenced in the 
statements by Tom and Susan (p.238) which highlighted the positive effect 
that this had on young people from disadvantaged backgrounds who were 
successful in receiving You Choose funds for their groups. In addition, 
endorsement of groups by the community through the public vote can 
empower individuals and groups to continue to be (or become more) engaged 
in their local communities (Harry, p.238). This was supported by a Council 
Officer (p.239) who viewed anything that encourages people to have a voice 
and participate in their local community as a positive for the area. 
 
Increasing awareness of groups by participants can also empower people to 
take part and strengthen civil society. As stated by Nigel (p.239) in the case 
study: 'I did not realise just how much was going on in my own town'. This has 
to be a tentative claim given the limits to this case study. 
 
An additional aspect of empowerment is networking. It is suggested in the 
case study that groups could forge stronger links outside of You Choose for 
mutual benefit. This could increase social integration in the local area, 
though it is ultimately the money incentive that draws groups to the PB vote, 
rather than a desire for more solidarity. These factors combined, as discussed 
in the democratic dialectic section above, could induce greater community 
participation, with the associated empowerment that this brings for the local 
community. 
 
From this discussion of empowerment in You Choose the potential for the 
more extensive and participatory concept of social empowerment is 
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tentatively apparent in the structures of the process and experiences of those 
interviewed for the case study. This would require a significant political 
decision by Tameside Council to open up to greater citizen ownership, control 
and autonomy of the PB process (along with a possible expansion of it) and 
local civil society demands for such involvement, which are presently 
unforthcoming. While the case study suggests that greater community 
participation is an outcome of You Choose, there is little evidence of wider 
social mobilisation in support of participatory budgeting. This is likely to be 
due to little experience and knowledge of this form of democracy, although 
those that did take part did express a desire for more participation. 
Articulating these demands requires much wider and deeper social 
mobilisation.  
 
Moreover, the source of You Choose funds from the household recycling 
scheme, along with the advertising slogan ‘you recycle, you choose’ may 
create a tangible link between the daily actions of people in recycling 
household waste and the resulting public money. Development of this aspect 
of You Choose could increase demands for citizen ownership of the process. 
As Lynsey (p.215) stated: ‘it’s our money… we should be able to say where it 
is going’. Underpinning this relatively limited empowerment at present is 
relational egalitarianism (between citizens, but not between the Council and 
citizens) and aspects of system and social integration in You Choose. This 
serves to highlight the link between the democratic dialectic values in the 
participatory democracy typology and the possibilities that they contain for 
social empowerment.    
 
Comparing the Case Studies 
 
Although the primary aim of this research is not comparative, but rather to 
highlight two different examples of participatory democracy in action, some 
similarities and differences between the cases invite reflection. The approach 
to this research is similar to that of Pearce (2010a, p.329; 2010b) in that by 
studying two examples of participatory democracy, the central aim has not 
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been to compare the cases but to highlight ‘the way in which participation 
unfolded according to different variables at play in the experiments’.  
 
However, a brief comparison of similarities and differences is especially 
pertinent given the emphasis on the extension of democracy to the social and 
economic spheres in participatory democratic theory, and the possibility of 
participatory democracy at the societal level proposed in Chapter 4. In 
comparing Suma and You Choose the different societal spheres that these 
democratic settings exist within can be considered, along with the extent to 
which participatory democratic values are embedded, their geographical 
locations and historical contexts, and similarities and differences in their 
institutional design. 
 
The two cases take place within different societal spheres. Suma relates to 
the economic sphere and democracy takes place within primarily economic 
relationships between Suma members. On the other hand, You Choose takes 
place at the intersection between civil society and local government, which 
can be considered to consist of social and political relationships between 
citizens, and between citizens and elected representatives in local 
government. Pateman (1970) sees workplace democracy as an essential 
training-ground for developing participatory democracy at the wider level, 
which allows people to develop their competencies for this form of social 
relationship through day-to-day experiences. This raises the question of 
whether members of Suma would also have a desire to take part in 
participatory budgeting within their local communities, further deepening and 
extending their experience of participatory democracy.  
 
The less intensive experience of participation in You Choose, and the 
assertion of several interviewees that this form of participatory democracy 
has limits, suggests that You Choose has not as yet imbued a thirst for further 
democratisation of social and economic life. However, the interrelation 
between workplace democracy and participatory budgeting within a wider 
participatory model lacks an empirical referent and can only be hinted from 
theoretical assertions. Chapters 4 and 5 have indicated that the successful 
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development of more participatory democracy in economic, social and 
political relationships would necessitate wider structural and value changes in 
Britain. 
 
Related to the different societal spheres is the extent of the embeddedness of 
participatory democratic values in everyday life in the cases. As already 
indicated Suma has a strongly egalitarian culture and is close to optimising 
the democratic dialectic values, while You Choose indicates some aspects of 
social integration, relational egalitarianism and self-development, but the full 
realisation of these is limited by the institutional design of the process, 
Council control and the absence of civil society mobilisation for participatory 
democracy. The experience of this form of democracy for You Choose 
participants in one afternoon-long event, many for the first time in their lives, 
was miniscule, and only one citizen interviewed mentioned participatory 
budgeting. This can be compared with the daily immersion of Suma members 
in the practices of a democratic workplace over years (and for some, 
decades).  
 
This is likely to have a huge impact on the democratic knowledge and skills of 
the interviewees, along with influencing their perceptions of the value and 
viability of participatory democracy. Indeed, the account of the fieldwork in 
Chapter 2 highlighted how as a consequence of this, different approaches 
were required by the researcher in the two case studies. While in Suma the 
participants displayed expert knowledge of workplace democracy, which led 
the researcher to adopt the role of ‘acceptable incompetent’, in You Choose 
many of the participants had little experience of participatory democracy and 
looked to the researcher as ‘expert’. 
 
Both cases are located in Northern England, which has a history of a particular 
variant of northern socialism that is highly collectivist and often (small ‘c’) 
conservative, extending back to the origins of British co-operativism in 
Rochdale, Lancashire (Birchall, 1997; Salveson, 2012). This suggests that 
Suma, based in West Yorkshire, and originally founded by members of a 
housing co-operative in nearby Hebden Bridge, is rooted in this local history, 
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which could predispose the organisation to co-operative socialist practices. 
You Choose on the other hand derives from a democratic process initiated in 
the Global South and transferred to the Global North as part of a technical fix 
aimed at increasing transparency, rather than a radical innovation (Blakey, 
2007, Chapter 7). It has been implemented, like other PB processes in the UK, 
under the influence of neo-liberal managerial politics, despite being a process 
initiated by a local left-wing political party in a northern metropolitan 
borough, the heartlands of English labourism. 
 
The institutional designs of the two cases also differ. You Choose is a direct 
democracy in the form of the vote with an internally deliberative element 
involved in the reflexive voting process. While Suma has a similar direct 
democratic aspect in the Quarterly General Meetings, as described in the case 
study much decision-making takes place within day-to-day work, and exhibits 
different aspects of democratic institutional design. The use of delegated 
representatives (management committee) and the principle of self-
management operationalise the approach of ‘accountable autonomy’ 
described by Fung (2004) in Chapter 4. Power is effectively decentralised by 
providing the conditions for Suma members to exercise autonomy in their 
working lives, while accountability is centralised in the challenging task of co-
ordinating collectively derived decisions relating to long-term strategy in the 
management committee. Given the very different societal spheres it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the institutional design of the two case studies are 
different. Nevertheless, these cases show that ‘accountable autonomy’ can be 
evidenced in the democratic workplace. The achievement of this in local 
community democracy in Britain would necessitate two factors: top-down 
institutional change which requires political will and the restructuring of local 
government funding mechanisms, and bottom-up grassroots demands for 
participation which require civil society movements to unite behind a vision of 
a participatory democratic society. The democratic dialectic and social 
quality could provide normative bases for the development of these two 
processes. 
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The Findings and Social Quality 
 
Returning the ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis in 
social quality theory, the case studies and this analysis suggest that 
participatory democracy is fundamental to the development of social quality 
in practice. Social empowerment is viewed by Herrmann (2005) as central to 
the concept of social quality, despite being presented as one among the other 
conditional factors of socio-economic security, social cohesion and social 
inclusion in the theory. Therefore, in terms of social empowerment at least, 
Suma would appear from the above analysis to have a greater social quality 
than You Choose. 
 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 it is indicated that participatory democratic theory and 
practice is strongly related to the social quality theory. This is because of the 
emphasis on participation conducive to capabilities and well-being in social 
quality and the presence of the self-transformation thesis and learning 
through participation as part of participatory democratic theory. In 
operationalising the notion of participation in social relations that enhance 
capabilities (social empowerment), the democratic dialectic in Chapter 5 
proposes the three values of self-development, relational egalitarianism and 
social and system integration as fundamental to a concept of democracy that 
is commensurable with social quality theory. This can be developed by 
relating the findings to the six assumptions of social quality theory which 
underpin this research (Chapter 2). 
 
The first assumption is the social nature of human beings (Beck et al., 2012). 
The social relational implications of this for participatory democracy guide 
the research. This is distinct from the liberal individualist view of self-
realisation as a pre-social or pre-political process (which grounds the liberal 
democracy and social democracy typologies). Acknowledgement of this has 
enabled the analysis to consider humans as social beings and highlights 
interdependent social relationships in the settings. 
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Constitutive interdependency is a fundamental aspect of social quality and is 
present in the case studies. This is the second assumption of social quality; 
that self-realisation for an individual is enabled through interaction with 
collective identities, especially in the interplay between opportunities 
(societal processes and biographical processes) and interactions (systems and 
communities) (Beck et al., 2012). This emphasises contingency, theorises the 
social as a product of human relationships, and distinguishes social quality 
from sociological accounts that are either too individualistic or overly 
structural. In the research the participatory democratic settings are linked to 
the social quality concern with the configuration of human relationships in 
organisations, institutions and companies. This attention to the institutional 
context of a workplace and a local community in relation to social 
empowerment and the experiences of interview participants has enabled the 
operationalisation of social quality theory in this empirical research. The third 
assumption is related to constitutive interdependency as it emphasises the 
historical context of action (and inaction). 
 
In Suma, constitutive interdependency is apparent in the solidaristic bases of 
social empowerment (stability, security and collective identity) which provide 
the conditions for the other dimensions of social empowerment. The 
interactions of Suma members with this participative democratic setting 
provide opportunities for the development of capabilities through learning 
new skills, experiencing responsibilities, having autonomy, ownership and 
control over their working lives and collectively, over the business, decent 
working conditions and in-work welfare, and is underpinned by a strong 
collective identity as both a workplace (commitment to Suma, commitment to 
equality and trust in colleagues) and as a democracy (identifying with 
collectively derived decisions). Moreover, the sustained participation of Suma 
members in their daily working life over a number of years helps to deepen 
the participatory and egalitarian culture and facilitate the socially 
empowering processes of constitutive interdependency. 
 
In You Choose the relationship between interactions and opportunities of 
constitutive interdependency is less clear and more tentative. This could be 
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due to the less socially empowering institutional design of the PB process, but 
it can also be simply from the smaller degree of citizen involvement in this 
democratic setting. The presenters and voters may identify as participants in 
a democratic decision-making process in their local community, which creates 
opportunities for more assertiveness and increased community participation. 
This could indicate a socially empowering outcome of self-realisation in the 
democratic setting. Further research would be necessary to investigate this. 
The temporary engagement in You Choose (one afternoon), the recent 
development of it and limited citizen control over the process are likely to 
seriously impair the possibilities for citizens to develop collective identities as 
participants in You Choose. 
 
The fourth assumption of social quality theory relates to varying points of 
departure for analysis. For the conditional factor of social empowerment, 
human capacity is defined as a constitutional factor and human dignity as a 
normative factor in social quality theory (Beck et al., 2012). These have been 
reinterpreted to apply to specifically democratic social settings. Therefore in 
assessing the conditional factor of social empowerment, participatory 
democracy is the constitutional factor and the normative guide underpinning 
the research is the democratic dialectic.  
 
As described in Chapter 2, the normative guide forms an ethical consideration 
for analysis of social empowerment in the cases. This is the fifth assumption 
of social quality theory. This research could also assess social empowerment 
in liberal democratic, social democratic or non-democratic settings but the 
theoretical argument developed in Chapter 5 suggests that these would not 
realise social quality to the extent that participatory democratic settings do. 
However, this theoretical assertion could be developed in future comparative 
research. The sixth assumption proposes that analysis of the constitutive 
interdependency of the two cases could produce new points of departure for 
policy options which are theoretically and historically grounded (Beck et al., 
2012). There are implications for policy and practitioners of participatory 
democracy from this research related to workplace democracy and 
participatory budgeting. These are considered in the concluding chapter. 
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The associated critical realist theory of transformative action also has 
relevance, as social and system integration in the democratic dialectic 
provide the conditions for social transformation. This can be explained in 
terms of the critical realist understanding of structure and agency (Chapter 
2). There is evidence for transformative action to different extents in the two 
cases – system (structural) changes towards integration on participatory 
democratic terms provide the conditions for social (agential) integration in 
social relationships. This has been shown to be more successful in Suma than 
You Choose.  
 
Reflexive action by the workers in Suma, endowed with democratic autonomy, 
ownership and control over the co-operative to transform it, has sought to 
move the co-op in an egalitarian direction. This has necessitated those who 
have had the opportunity to dominate the decision-making structures of Suma 
(the ‘old boys network’) to intentionally (or possibly unintentionally, in the 
context of majoritarian democratic decisions) engage in transformative 
processes, effectively reducing the (unofficially) powerful positions that they 
had accrued in the past. In terms of Bhaskar’s model of transformative action, 
this suggests the possibility of humans acting in concert to transform 
structures, and the case study findings suggest that optimised democratic 
dialectic values have driven this change. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed and synthesised the data collected in the two case 
studies. This has been linked back to the concept of social empowerment and 
the democratic dialectic values developed in Chapters 3 and 5. While the case 
studies have shown how social empowerment can be analysed in different 
democratic settings, they have also elucidated how the concept of social 
empowerment in practice can be evidenced in a range of dimensions 
contingent on the social settings and the form of democratic relationships 
involved. Ultimately, the central assertion of this research is that the 
participatory democratic settings can create the conditions for social 
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empowerment, thus enhancing social quality. As the discussion above and the 
two case studies show, this is realised to a greater extent in Suma than in You 
Choose. 
 
The need for sustained research over a longer time-frame (provided 
appropriate political and economic conditions remain and/or develop) is 
necessary to build on these findings, although both are relatively unique 
cases, suggesting a dearth of empirical alternatives for further study. The 
consideration in the workplace democracy case study of previous research 
that has evidenced Suma’s democratic transformation over three decades 
indicates that reflexive engagement with democratic structures and the 
development of an egalitarian culture can enhance social empowerment in a 
participatory setting over time. Indeed, Dahl (1985, p.98), a sceptic of the 
self-transformation thesis in participatory democratic theory, reflects on 
earlier studies of worker-ownership in the former Yugoslavia: 
 
all the present evidence is very short-term, since it is derived from 
studies of workers who were already rather fully formed by their 
society. We cannot confidently predict what changes in character or 
personality might ensue, not in the short space of months or years, but 
over many generations.  
 
While Suma’s long history provides some evidence of this, the You Choose 
case study does not have anything approaching this level of engagement and 
historical development. Given that PB is still viewed largely in the World 
Bank’s transparency and accountability terms in the UK, rather than the 
democratic citizenship and social justice aims of its original incarnation, this 
is unlikely to inculcate the democratic dialectic values, participatory 
democratic institutional design or social empowerment necessary in the 
foreseeable future. 
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Chapter 9  
Conclusion: the Social Quality of 
Participatory Democracy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis began by discussing the current disenchantment with democratic 
politics evidenced by the decline in voting turnout at elections and a decline 
in trust in both politicians and government information. The introduction 
suggested that this problem stems, not just from a cynical or disillusioned 
discrediting of the ‘political’ or the untrustworthiness of representative 
democratic politics, but more significantly from a denial of the ‘social’ in 
contemporary democratic societies.  
 
Social quality theory critically engages with the notion of the ‘social’ from a 
position that opposes the domination of (especially neo-liberal) economic 
concerns in theory and policy-making in contemporary democratic societies 
(Walker, 2005). Influenced by left wing theorists associated with critical 
analysis of the welfare state in the twentieth century, including Marshall, 
Titmuss, Tawney and Townsend, social quality theory argues that to increase 
the quality of the ‘social’, empowered participation in social relations that 
enhances the capacities, potential and well-being of all is necessary (Beck et 
al., 2012).  
 
As a theme that runs throughout this thesis, the relationship between 
democracy and social quality draws attention to the extent and quality of 
democratic participation, the areas of social life appropriate for democratic 
relationships, along with the normative values that underpin forms of 
democratic social organisation and the institutions necessary. This has 
required a critical social science approach that focuses on power and 
empowerment, competing theories of democracy, and possible forms of 
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democratic society, which provide the grounding for the empirical case 
studies. 
 
This concluding chapter firstly discusses how the research questions set out in 
the introductory chapter have been answered. Secondly, it summarises the 
main contributions of this research. This section discusses the theoretical and 
empirical findings and their implications for social quality and participatory 
democracy in theory and practice. Thirdly, the implications of this research 
for policy-makers and for practitioners of participatory democracy are 
examined. Fourthly, suggestions for future research to develop this work are 
considered. 
 
The Research Questions 
 
To address the two objects of study - participatory democracy and social 
empowerment - this thesis has considered the following three broad research 
questions: 
 
 How can the democratic dialectic values of liberty, equality and 
solidarity be optimised in a ‘positive equilibrium’ most appropriate for 
democratic society? 
 
 What kind of democratic society is the optimisation of the democratic 
dialectic most suited to? 
 
 To what extent, and in what ways, do participatory democratic 
settings display evidence of social empowerment? 
 
As social quality theory provides the philosophical foundations of this research 
(Chapter 2), these questions are set in terms of the political aim of improving 
social quality (especially social empowerment). With this proviso, the answers 
to the first two questions are interlinked and have been addressed in 
theoretical terms in Chapters 4 and 5. This has been achieved through a 
consideration of democratic theory, the application of this to typologies of 
democracy, and an exploration of the three values that make up the 
democratic dialectic. The ‘positive equilibrium’ described by Phillips (2006) is 
where the values of liberty, equality and solidarity are optimised, rather than 
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where one or two values dominate. However, in order to theoretically posit a 
positive equilibrium, Chapter 5 investigated a plurality of conceptions of the 
dialectical values. This has included a sustained discussion of the relative 
merits of negative freedom, positive freedom, triadic freedom and freedom as 
self-development, equality of libertarian rights, luck egalitarianism, 
capabilities, and relational egalitarianism, social capital (in rational actor and 
trust network variants), and social and system integration. It was argued that 
self-development, relational egalitarianism, and social and system integration 
optimise the democratic dialectic in terms commensurable with social quality 
theory. 
 
The reasoning for this is also linked to the consideration of democratic 
typologies in Chapter 4 (which also addresses the second research question 
above). Representative and participatory theories of democracy have been 
related to typologies of liberal, social and participatory democratic societies. 
The typologies follow Esping-Andersen (1990) in providing ideal types that 
enhance ‘analytical parsimony’ but do not confirm precisely with existing 
nation-states. The liberal and social typologies do have broad empirical and 
historical referents, and can be characterised as opposite ends of a 
continuum, with the Anglo-American countries closer to the liberal typology 
and the Nordic countries closer to the social typology.  
 
The third participatory typology in Chapter 4 was hinted at with some 
propositions based on existing theoretical and empirical research. This was 
achieved by considering the participatory theories, empowered participatory 
governance and democratic innovations. The link between Chapters 4 and 5 is 
that the optimised democratic dialectic values are posited to be 
commensurable with a participatory democratic society. The discussion is 
tempered with caution, by viewing the actually existing models in terms of a 
continuum rather than a dichotomy, which means that the participatory 
model is an alternative which aims to resolve contradictions in the liberal and 
social typologies. Therefore in each case it is a matter of degree, and a more 
participatory democracy that is closer to the optimised values of the 
democratic dialectic is more likely to increase social quality. 
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In order to answer the third research question, the democratic dialectic 
values formed the normative guide for two case studies of participatory 
democratic settings, presented in Chapters 6 and 7 and analysed in Chapter 8.  
These have shown that the workplace democracy case study strongly displays 
evidence of social empowerment in a range of dimensions, which are linked to 
an increase in participation in the democratic structure. The participatory 
budgeting case study identified incipient dimensions of social empowerment. 
While some of these were central to the institutional design of the process, 
others were ancillary and have developed alongside the process. It was 
suggested that the deeper daily immersion in participatory democratic social 
relations in the workplace, and the co-op’s egalitarian culture contributed to 
Suma realising social empowerment to a greater extent than You Choose. 
Moreover, social empowerment as participation in social relations that 
enhance capabilities can be seen in a multitude of ways relating to the 
multiple dimensions evidenced in the case studies. These are discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
The Social Quality of Participatory Democracy 
 
This thesis has assessed the social quality of participatory democracy in 
theory-laden but empirically-driven case studies of social empowerment in 
workplace democracy and local community democracy. It has made several 
key contributions to academic research, especially relating to the exploratory 
use of the social quality concept of social empowerment and the democratic 
dialectic to qualitatively analyse cases of participatory democracy in the UK 
for the first time. The findings indicate that the social quality theory and 
central concept of social empowerment have relevance for participatory 
democracy. The participatory democratic settings explored indicate evidence 
of social empowerment and suggest that when applied to concrete practice 
there are multiple dimensions that characterise the concept. However, the 
cases exhibit different dimensions of social empowerment and they do this to 
differing extents. The discussion of social quality and democracy also raises 
the issue of disciplinary divides in the social sciences, given the breadth of 
literature drawn on here in combining a perspective from social policy with 
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political theory and political science, and qualitative sociological research 
techniques.  
 
The link between theory and empirical data is pertinent for understanding the 
role that contingent social structures play in providing the conditions for 
democratic participation and social empowerment. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
following Outhwaite (1987), the ontological implications of the research are 
bold; participatory democracy is likely to contribute to an improvement of 
social quality through social empowerment, but the empirical findings differ 
in the two settings and must be considered with caution. They refer to 
tendencies rather than causal relationships and are contingent on structural 
and historical context. The use of typologies of democracy that are subject to 
change over time also supports this point (e.g. traditional and modernising 
social democracy). The next section briefly restates the case study findings 
that have been discussed extensively in relation to the democratic dialectic 
values and social empowerment in Chapter 8. It then elaborates on the 
relationship between social quality and the case studies, and discusses the 
broader implications of participatory democracy, social quality and the 
democratic dialectic for wider society. 
 
The Case Study Findings 
 
The findings of the empirical component of the research suggest that in the 
case of workplace democracy in Suma, a viable participatory democracy and 
multiple dimensions of social empowerment (stability, security, collective 
identity, autonomy, welfare, flexibility, self-management, ownership, 
control) are made possible by the development of an egalitarian culture in the 
organisation, sustained engagement with this by individuals in day-to-day 
working life, along with a reflexive attention on the part of the membership 
to transforming the structures of the organisation to renew the egalitarian 
culture when needed.  
 
The first point relates to the democratic structure of the organisation and the 
central role that relational egalitarianism - through status equality and a 
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rough equality of working conditions, and supported by equal wages and votes 
- plays in facilitating a view held by most interviewees that each worker in 
Suma is of equal value to the organisation. The second point relates to the 
huge role that work plays in people’s daily lives, and supports Pateman’s 
(1970) claim that workplace democracy could be an important aspect of 
inculcating participatory democratic values in individuals. This could have 
wider application. For example, some Suma members expressed interest in 
rumours that a local football club could become a fan-owned business. The 
third point highlights how, contrary to much New Left thought from the late 
1960s, attention to structure is important in avoiding the tyranny of 
structurelessness, whereby without democratic structures and social norms, 
egalitarian principles can be compromised by the development of hierarchies 
and ‘power over’ relationships (Freeman, 1972). The three major 
transformations of Suma’s organisational structure, from direct democracy to 
‘hub and sector’ and then flat management structure variants of participatory 
democracy with delegated representation show how a concern with avoiding 
hierarchies and elite power, and developing ‘accountable autonomy’ has 
driven the evolution of the co-op as it has expanded in membership. 
 
The Suma case study also highlights how individuals have differing capabilities 
to make use of the empowering structure of the organisation. It is suggested 
that this results from intrinsic factors of habituation to democracy and some 
perceptions of the need for ‘economic efficiency’ in place of democratic 
values, along with extrinsic personal and social factors, which include class 
background, ability, confidence, personality and commitment. This indicates 
a complex relationship between the individual member of Suma and social 
empowerment in the organisation. Returning to Tawney’s (1952) concern with 
an equality of social, political and economic conditions that allows for 
inequalities between individuals in terms of intelligence and natural abilities 
(and the expertise which follows from this), it can be argued that Suma is 
much closer to realising equality in economic conditions than capitalist 
workplaces, but is still limited in this respect by the wider structures and 
culture of a liberal democratic class society that is increasingly neo-liberal 
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and anti-democratic in its political and economic organisation and societal 
values. 
 
The case study of the You Choose participatory budgeting process indicates a 
more limited form of participatory democracy and some potential for social 
empowerment in this social setting. You Choose’s participatory democracy 
promotes relational equality between the participants (but not between the 
Council and citizens, and wider social and economic inequalities limit the 
inclusive aspect of this) and has the potential to increase solidarity in the 
form of social integration in the local community outside of the voting event. 
However, there are fewer opportunities for self-development (freedom) and 
system integration, which links to the absence of citizen control over the 
process and the less developed aspects of social empowerment in You Choose. 
These are described as incipient dimensions that emerge directly from the 
design of the process (voting, critical engagement, strengthening civil society 
groups), while other dimensions are ancillary factors that have emerged to 
some extent unintentionally (some self-development, awareness, networking 
and increased community participation). These would be significantly 
enhanced by citizen control and ownership of the process and a more 
intensive involvement in local government decision-making. There is evidence 
of the desire for this indicated by some interviewees. 
 
While PB processes have potential to facilitate a more participatory culture in 
the politics of the local area and to build community solidarity in the form of 
social and system integration, for Tameside this depends on both the political 
will of the Labour Council, and on effective civil society demands and social 
mobilisation for more democratic participation. While the absence of the 
former can be explained by the strongly centralised nature of power in the 
British political system (especially in local government funding, Burton, 2013), 
the influential values of the liberal democratic typology and dominance of 
neo-liberal managerial politics, and for the latter, the relative absence of 
democratic mobilisation in civil society in the UK generally indicates that it is 
unlikely to be concerned with deepening participatory democracy or issues of 
social justice (Taylor-Gooby, 2012). 
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Social Quality and the Case Studies 
 
The two participatory democratic settings indicate the relevance of social 
quality, viewed here in terms of social empowerment. The multiple 
dimensions of social empowerment suggest that more active participation in 
the democratic structure increases the level of empowerment available to 
Suma members and the opportunities open to them for developing their 
capabilities and capacities. This includes job mobility within the co-op, 
opportunities to learn new skills, self-management, relational egalitarianism, 
democratic ownership and control, and democratic relationships (Table 8.1, 
p.246). With the limits described above, You Choose has potential for social 
empowerment, and this is supported by increased community involvement, 
opportunities for self-development, formal equality and some relational 
egalitarianism, inclusion in democratic decision-making, deepening 
community networks and participation, and strengthening a sense of 
collective identity (Table 8.1, p.246). 
 
Further, this thesis follows Herrmann (2005, 2012) in positing that social 
empowerment is the core value of social quality, especially in terms of its 
understanding of structure and agency (Chapters 2 and 3). A different 
approach could focus on social cohesion, social inclusion/exclusion, socio-
economic security or all of the conditional values together as objects of 
analysis. Some aspects of social cohesion, social inclusion and socio-economic 
security have featured implicitly in this study, for example, in terms of social 
and system integration leading to a more cohesive society, the issue of 
including smaller groups in You Choose and exclusion of manual workers from 
democratic and empowering processes in Suma, and the stability and security 
provided by the democratic workplace. This supports Phillips’ (2006, pp.180-
181) argument that the four conditional values of social quality are bound up 
as ‘four facets of an indivisible whole, with these four facets merging into 
each other and providing overlapping and complementary insights into the 
holistic and indivisible entity that is social quality’. Following this line of 
argument and supported by the empirical evidence presented here, a larger 
scale qualitative project could build on this exploratory research to consider 
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social quality more broadly in relation to democracy at local, regional and 
national levels. 
 
The findings have also developed the empirical application of social 
empowerment. As described above the notion of multiple dimensions of social 
empowerment link the concept to the specific cases. This refers to the form 
and content of social empowerment in practice. These indicate that while the 
emphasis of social empowerment is on participation in social relations for a 
positive end, the nature of this participation has multiple aspects, and these 
depend on the social setting in question and democratic values. The 
development of these dimensions provide a useful departure point for further 
empirical research on social empowerment in different areas of society or in 
further comparative studies of worker co-operatives or participatory 
budgeting in different contexts (for example, the growing use of PB in the 
USA, a strongly liberal democratic society, but one which also has a strong 
culture of Town Hall democratic participation). 
 
Social quality theory is also enhanced by this multidisciplinary study. As social 
quality theory has been refined largely within the discipline of social policy 
since 1997, this political sociological study has built on a further dimension 
that has recently begun development (Therborn, 2001; Walker, 2005): the 
politics of social quality. This argues that the social quality theory requires 
engagement with democratic theory and practice to develop its central 
premise of the positive participation by people in social relations. This in 
particular strengthens social quality’s political claim to be an alternative to 
neo-liberalism in theory, policy-making and ideology (Walker, 2005). 
 
Moreover, the social quality theory and political sociological approach here 
has drawn on a view of democracy that considers not just democratic politics, 
but also the notion of democratic society and the power relations that it 
contains. Democracy is not just a question of an adequate representative 
system and the voting procedures that characterise it. It is not a simple 
method for choosing leaders, as Schumpeter argued. Rather, it relates to the 
societal domains in which democracy should obtain, and the values, 
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institutions and processes associated with it. This is a normative issue for 
politics, sociology and social policy and has required engagement with the 
classical participatory understanding of democracy that was rejected out of 
hand by the likes of Schumpeter and the pluralists. This suggests that political 
sociology (Dowse & Hughes, 1972; Bottomore, 1993; Faulks, 2000; Nash, 2000; 
Nash & Scott, 2004), usually at the intersection of political science, political 
theory, sociology and critical social policy, is an often neglected but 
appropriate locus for a normatively grounded and multidisciplinary critical 
social science concerned with social relations. 
 
From the Case Studies to Democratic Society 
 
The extrinsic social factors of class and education or personal factors of 
character and ability, for example, which limit the capability of some to 
become empowered in Suma and the more limited notion of social 
empowerment present in the managerial and narrow use of participatory 
democracy in You Choose are instructive for broader assertions about the 
democratic complexion of British society. As described in Chapter 4, the UK 
can be conceptualised as laying in-between the ideal types of liberal 
democracy and social democracy (which themselves are not static, and are 
subject to changing values over time). From 1945 to 1973 Britain was closer to 
the ‘traditional’ variant of the social democratic typology (Martell, 2001). 
Despite strong foundations of social democracy established in the formation of 
the welfare state and the NHS, since then it has moved closer to the ideal 
liberal democratic typology, making a significant and concerted break with 
social democracy in the welfare state retrenchment policies of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition since 2010 (Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 
2011). Under the influence of neo-liberal theory and policy since the late 
1970s (Chapter 5), an especially narrow and primitive understanding of 
negative liberty has been prioritised as the central normative value 
underpinning British democratic ideas and institutions. 
 
Given the argument developed in this thesis, the solution to Britain’s 
democratic disillusionment is not just a renewal of trust in the role of elected 
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politicians (with the implication that the problem is simply a question of trust 
and acceptance of the limits of politics, and not social conditions, policy or 
ideology), nor in a renewal of the mid-twentieth century democratic 
compromise between capital and labour (traditional social democracy), but is 
likely to necessitate the creation of new participatory democratic institutions 
and culture in politics, economy and society.  
 
Towards this end, and this is the central contention of this research, this 
involves a critical engagement with the democratic values that underpin the 
notion of participation and the structure of democratic institutions. Put 
simply, participatory democracy should not just be a case of ‘bringing citizens 
back in’ through engagement with existing democratic structures, but also 
bringing in the values of liberty, equality and solidarity in a positive 
equilibrium appropriate for full democracy and the structural transformation 
of institutions that this entails. This thesis has considered the possibilities for 
this in the economic sphere within the workplace and in the intersection of 
social and political spheres at the local government level. It suggests that the 
adoption of workplace democracy along with opportunities for greater citizen 
participation in local government decision-making are likely to be necessary 
aspects of a strategy for deepening democracy and improving social quality.  
 
However, the likelihood of an integrated system of democratic co-operatives 
and citizen involvement in government decision-making through participatory 
budgeting (and other appropriate democratic innovations) at regional, 
national and international levels – a fully democratic society - is a question for 
future research and practical action. This is especially the case in the context 
of the powerful role of capitalist business in the globalising economy and its 
influence over politics, the dominance of neo-liberalism in current policy-
making, and vast inequalities of wealth, organisational resources and 
influence. Though, Restakis (2010) highlights a dual role for co-operation and 
competition in the economy of the Emilia Romagna region of Italy as an 
example of a deeper co-operative economy that meshes with small capitalist 
businesses. Future studies could build on the findings here to explore the 
relationship between Esping-Andersen’s (1990; 1999) conservative welfare 
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regime that emphasises familialism, which characterises Italy (Chapter 4), and 
participatory democracy. This could potentially highlight a further variant of 
democratic typology. Moreover, as this research shows, movement towards 
participatory democracy is a matter of transformations within representative 
democratic structures requiring political will, participatory democratic values 
and social mobilisation with pluralist and open possibilities for positive social 
change rather than a technical blueprint to be imposed on everyday practice. 
 
Implications for Policy and Practitioners 
 
This research has potential for new directions in British social and economic 
policy and local government policy. The workplace democracy case study 
suggests that Suma could provide a model for the development of co-
operative workplaces. Based on this analysis, this would depend on both 
institutional design and the value commitment of workers to those associated 
with the optimised democratic dialectic (especially to an egalitarian culture). 
The UK Government has recently developed policies encouraging the growth 
of co-operative ownership in the public sector and mutuals as part of the ‘big 
society’ agenda (Cabinet Office, 2011). By 2013, the development of 120 
public service mutuals had been recorded by the Cabinet Office (2013). 
Although in practice, the vast majority of public sector contracts have been 
taken up by non-co-operative private sector companies suggesting that more 
support for the development of co-operatives and co-operative values is 
required (Civil Exchange, 2012). Moreover, while encouraging co-operative 
ownership, there is no evidence of policies for democratic control – integral 
for decentralising power, as described in Chapter 6. 
 
The You Choose case study suggests that there is significant potential for 
democratic citizen involvement to increase solidarity (in the form of social 
cohesion especially), but this requires a deepening of democracy in local 
communities. British Governments have for over two decades pursued policies 
aimed at increasing citizen participation in civil society and local government, 
from Major’s Citizen’s Charter in 1991, to Blair’s preference for choice in 
public services, to Cameron’s ‘big society’, however, this has often invoked 
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consumerist and voluntarist concepts of citizenship (Burton, 2013; Corbett & 
Walker, 2013). Indeed, participatory budgeting in every local authority was an 
aspiration for the previous Labour Government (DCLG, 2008b) and the 
Coalition Government have included PB as part of their ‘big society’ 
proposals, although this has sometimes been perniciously proposed to allow 
citizens the ‘empowered’ choice between which public services to keep or cut 
(Nesta, 2010).  
 
The democratic aspect of the co-operative studied here and the involvement 
of citizens in community funding suggest that absent from current concerns 
with increasing citizen participation is a focus on the democratic aspect of 
citizenship. A significant change in government policy, away from neo-liberal 
ideals of the consumer citizen to an active democratic conception of 
citizenship would be a necessary aspect of developing policies for the growth 
of co-operatives, mutuals, and participatory budgeting which retain economic 
and social justice aims. This research suggests that the combination of social 
quality and the democratic dialectic values could contribute to the renewal of 
the social democratic and socialist left that opposes rather than acquiesces to 
neo-liberal theory and policy, as modernising social democracy has done. 
 
This research also has implications for practitioners of participatory 
democracy, for example, those working in the co-operative sector and 
umbrella organisations such as Co-operatives UK, and local government and 
civil society advocates of participatory budgeting such as the PB Network in 
the UK, and the Participatory Budgeting Project in the USA. Although 
practitioners may be drawn from a wide political spectrum, this research 
highlights some of the values and principles that these forms of participatory 
democracy can help to inculcate. Attention to how democratic dialectical 
values and the social quality theory are implicated in democratic institutional 
designs may help to increase the socially empowering aspect of these forms of 
participatory democracy. The focus on describing the historical development 
of the democratic structures of the two case studies also contributes some 
practical aspects of creating and sustaining a democratic workplace and a PB 
process. 
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Directions for Future Research 
 
This thesis has sought to engage with normative and theoretical literature but 
from a position that emphasises the practical politics of democracy in 
everyday life, rather than an abstract and unrealisable utopian ideal. To this 
end, the inclusion of the two case studies of participatory democracy in 
action has added empirical weight to the normative claim that participatory 
democracy can enhance social quality, especially in terms of social 
empowerment. This work has adopted a critical perspective that has sought to 
question the value of participation and the empirical evidence of 
participatory democratic settings. As Pearce (2010a, pp.328-329) states, there 
is a need 
 
to move beyond the polarity between romanticism and pessimism when 
discussing our participatory possibilities, and beyond the abstraction of 
‘participatory’ or ‘representative’ democracy. Participation cannot be 
treated as a hallowed ‘good’. It must be subjected to critical scrutiny. 
 
It is on this basis that this theoretical and empirical research, grounded in the 
theory of social quality, has been conducted. While the conception of 
participatory citizenship proffered by the cases of workplace democracy and 
participatory budgeting may appear to demand a set of human capabilities 
and values that some would consider unrealistic in modern neo-liberal 
capitalist societies, this serves to highlight the importance of social structure 
in understanding human action. It is precisely the empirical evidence of 
alternative ways of structuring social institutions and human action that gives 
weight to the assertions of this thesis.  
 
The implications of this are that a framing ideology and policy-making context 
is required that acts as a counter-hegemonic alternative to that of neo-
liberalism in shaping thought about the appropriate forms of human 
organisation for the twenty-first century. As indicated at various points within 
this thesis, social quality is tentatively proposed as such an alternative that is 
also commensurable with participatory democracy. 
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This thesis has argued that a conception of participatory democracy is 
necessary for social empowerment and social quality. The theoretical 
discussion of the democratic dialectic suggests that social quality theory 
implies a more participative variant than that which characterises the ideal 
types of liberal democracy or social democracy. The extent to which the 
improvement of social quality as a normative value (distinct from its role as 
an analytical tool) at the societal level is compatible with societies that are 
liberal democratic or social democratic is an open question which would 
necessitate further international comparative study. This could also 
comparatively examine the prospects for deepening democratic participation 
in both liberal and social democratic societies, for example, are the Nordic 
societies more conducive to democratic participation and social quality than 
Anglo-American societies? 
 
A second crucial issue for participatory democracy research (along with the 
practical feasibility of scaling up participation beyond the local government 
level or workplace), is the relationship between participatory democracy and 
the processes of globalisation. As the previous social democratic hegemony 
was, in part, broken by the globalisation of capital in the development of neo-
liberalism, then the prospects for meaningful participatory democracy must 
be underpinned by an alternative project at the international and global 
level. This is an issue for research in the field of international political 
economy and global civil society action. On reflection, this could indicate the 
limits of the field of political sociology in the missing political economy 
dimensions, suggesting limits to the critical social science approach employed 
here. 
 
Lastly, this work can be developed sociologically at the level of people’s day-
to-day lives and national, regional and local politics. Neo-communitarian 
perspectives (Davies, 2012) in politics claim to have rediscovered the value of 
the social in contemporary capitalist democracies. This suggests further 
engagement with the everyday politics and policy of neo-liberalism, a critical 
approach to the use of ‘nudge’ economics (libertarian paternalism) and 
analysis of variants of communitarianism in the concrete development of 
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socially just, egalitarian and democratic alternatives (Corbett & Walker, 
2013). 
 
This thesis is the product of a deep and longstanding personal passion for 
understanding the nature of social justice and democratic socialism and is the 
culmination of seven years of learning in the Departments of Sociological 
Studies and Politics at the University of Sheffield. My confidence and belief in 
my work has grown, from my undergraduate studies, where I developed an 
interest in quality of life perspectives, social and political theory and 
empirical sociological research, to the subjects addressed in this PhD thesis. 
This thesis is the result of three of my most intellectually stimulating years 
spent reading, thinking critically and inhabiting the messy, thrilling and 
enlightening world of empirical sociological research.  
 
I am extremely proud to have been taught and supervised by some truly 
inspiring academics and researchers over these seven years. We live in a 
political society in which knowledge is increasingly commodified and 
education is often treated as of purely instrumental value, and the political 
principles of social democrats and socialists alike have for many dissolved or 
been crowded out by political spin, moral relativism, pernicious class 
domination, ignorance, and the vested interests of a cynical and moralising 
right-wing media that defends social and economic injustice (Cohen, 2007). 
This present piece represents my first steps towards building on the work of 
those that have taught me the value of unashamedly passionate, principled, 
value-laden and critical social science that is resolutely committed to creating 
a better society. 
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